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Improbable Probability Statements

Improbable Probability Statements

I have dinner twice a month with an old friend who is a professional 
mathematician. I've talked to him several times about validity in 
probability arguments. He has been doing operations research for 25 
years and knows this stuff. I've given him sample arguments from 
serious NT research by major scholars which he picks to pieces without 
the least effort.  

Apparently much of what passes for probability argumentation in NT 
studies will not stand up to close scrutiny. I raise this issue here 
because I hear this kind of talk on the b-greek list now and then. 

Here is a concrete example: 

Bruce Metzger in his textual commentary on the GNT 3rd ed. (page 
320-21) has a full discussion of the variants for Acts 4:24. His 
concluding remark is all we are concerned with. He says that energeia 
is used nowhere else in Luke, and in the NT it is only used by Paul. 
Metzger considers this evidence against the reading of D for this 
variant. 

I am not the least bit interested in which variant is original in Acts 
4:24. What interests me is that a world class scholar (understatement) 
would consider this an argument. 

Luke has a large vocabulary. Luke has a number of NT hapax. Luke uses 
a number of words only once. So how do we concluded that it is 
*improbable* that Luke would use energeia only once? It does not 
follow.

Here is another kind of Argument:

The relative pronoun normally follows it's antecedent therefore . . . 

The premise is true. But what comes in the second half of the 
statement is often not a valid inference from the premise. This is a 
type of probability statement. It may fall apart because it does not 
take indeterminacy seriously. Improbabilities taken as a class are 
frequent occurrences in any ancient text, the NT included. What I am 
saying is indeterminacy is part of the nature of phenomena in general. 
Language is no exception. Ancient texts are no exception. 

Probability statements don't become useless simply because 
indeterminacy happens. Language is not chaos. But the kind of 
probability argumentation used by 19th century science is going to 
draw some smiles of disbelief at this stage of the game.

Any sharp observer will see that these two examples are not identical 
nor do they make the same point. The second example is fuzzy and open 
ended. The second example does not prove anything. It only raises a 
question. 



Clay Bartholomew
Three Tree Point
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