> >Edgar Foster writes:
> >Without extrapolating the Platonic notion of the "real" Ideas
versus the imperfect, transitory "reflections," let me just say that
IMHO NT "love" is **particularized** in varying ways via love of
principle (AGAPH); love of family (FILOSTORGIA); love of friends
(FILIA); and love of humankind (FILANQRWPIA). We could also include
FILARGURIA (love of money) and EROS (erotic love), but the principle
is the same.<<
> >If I were to draw a diagram, love would be the pinnacle. The other
types of "love" would branch out from the hierarchical concept of
LOVE. This is not to say that I make no distinctions between AGAPH and
FILIA. I do, as shown above. It is clear to me, however, that the
varying Greek words used in the Bible are all describing the same
concept. Unless context dictates otherwise, AGAPH and FILIA could very
well be interchangeable. This is clearly demonstrated by a synchronic
study of AGAPH and FILIA. Overall, I would **not** flatten the
distinctions between the words, however.<<
> Dear Edgar,
>>The Concise Oxford Theasaurus defines "concept" as idea, notion,
abstraction, conceptualization, conception, hypothesis, theory, image
and view". From your words above, it seems that we in our earlier
exchange have used "concept" somewhat differently. My criticism of
Black was solely related to his use of "concept" in relation to
lexical semantics and the single word, and his use of English words
signalling English concepts to describe Greek concepts. I have for a
long time worked with lexical semantics from the point of view of
Bible translation, and when you mention a diagram encompassing several
words with similar sense, I would like to describe my diagram
illustrating communication in a situation of translation.<<
Rolf,
I admit that my use of "concept" might have been somewhat ambiguous,
but it is not totally dissonant with your usage. Concept, from my
PARADEIGMA, has reference to "a mental image" and an "abstraction"
capable of reification and particularization. With that little matter
cleared up, I would like to address certain matters outlined in your
intriguing diagram.
> As a basis for the diagram are two different "presuppositon pools"
(PP), the one belonging to native Greeks in NT times and the other
belonging to English-speaking people today. Taking de Saussure and
Ogden as a point of departure I have to account for four words;
"word", "concept", "reference", and "meaning". I have experimented
with a trapezium to illustrate the relationships, but find two
triangles as a better figure. In the triangle representing the
original PP, "word" is found in the left corner, "reference" in the
right corner and "concept" in the top corner. The "word" in the left
corner is just a signal with no intrinsic meaning, the "reference" is
the thing in the world denoted by the word, and the "concept" is the
mental image being activated when a native Greek heard or read a
particular word.<<
>>As far as I know, no research has yielded data suggesting that words
are stored in the mind as phrases or clauses, but the data suggest
that each word is stored in the mind of people with the same PP as a
"concept" which often has fuzzy edges. Because this concept is
somewhat (but not much) fluid, the same word used in different
contexts illuminates or makes visible different parts of the concept.
So "concept" used in lexical semantics has no meaning outside its PP,
(therefore can we not use English words to describe Greek concepts),
it cannot be defined because it is only apprehended by the minds of
those sharing the same PP, and the only way to express it is to say or
write the word to which it is exclusively connected.<<
I understand what you're saying here, but I cannot totally agree. I
believe that a word (in any language) has a certain FUSIS. In time,
however, the "field" of a word is expanded. Thus, the English "gay" of
years gone by no longer just mentally signals happiness or
conviviality. These newly acquired associations with the word "gay"
are not the word's NOMOS, but its FUSIS.
While Black might not agree about the FUSIS versus the NOMOS of a
word, he does accurately state: "Another basic assumption in semantic
analysis is that words often have more than one meaning" (Black 124).
Yet, within the semantic field of a word, "there is one that is used
the most" (124). Thus, Black distinguishes between "general meanings"
and "secondary or transferred meanings" (The marked and unmarked
meanings). An excellent example of a word having more than one concept
is SPERMA.
SPERMA signalled to the Greek mind "seed." But "seed" is not specific
enough. What type of seed are we talking about? Seed could have
reference to "descendants" (John 8:33); agricultural "seed" (Matt.
13:240; sperm (1 John 3:9); individual children (Gal. 3:16). If I said
TW SPERMATI SOU ENEULOGHQHSONTAI to a native Greek, what "signals"
would come to mind? How would the hypothetical Greek speaker know what
I either "meant" or had reference to? What *sense* (concept) would be
conveyed to the Greek speaker's mind. The only escape hatch from the
problem (IMV) would be context and cotext. It would not be enough to
just say SPERMA or SPERMATI. The word SPERMA would have to be viewed
both contextually and cotextually. Even viewing SPERMA as "offspring"
would be inadequate, because we also have to determine whether we're
discussing individuals or a collective group. This is a problem I see
with the one concept model. More emphasis needs to be placed on the
context of the word.
>>The one word AIWN representing one concept (in the minds of the
people) would in Greek signal both the above uses. In English do we as
a minimum need two words to express this "meaning". Thus there is one
concept AIWN in Greek but two concepts which can be signalled by "time
indefinite" and "order of things" in English. The words "eternal" and
"everlasting" represent two concepts in ENGLISH, but they do not
constitute a third and fourth English concept representing the
"meaning" of AIWN (in the left corner of the modern triangle) because
both can be subsumed under "time indefinite". What is eternal is also
indefinite.This shows that "meaning" neither is identical with the
glosses in a lexicon nor with the sum of all the English words used to
translate a Greek word into English.<<
I agree with much of what you say above. The problem I have is with
saying that AIWN is one concept in Greek. To illustrate this matter,
let us consider the word hAMARTIA. hAMARTIA might be simply defined as
"sin" or "an offense against God." From the NT perspective, it appears
to be rebellion against God--disobedience to Him. In harmony with
Black and Silva, however, a word study of hAMARTIA will not lead to an
adequate understanding of what sin meant to the Greek mind. The
concept of sin is not tied up with a single word, but with phrases,
clauses and paragraphs. Substantiating this point, the apostle John
says:
PAS hO POIWN THN hAMARTIAN KAI THN ANOMIAN POIEI KAI hE hAMARTIA ESTIN
hE ANOMIA (1 John 3:4).
PASA ADIKIA hAMATIA ESTI (1 John 5:17).
While the NT places an emphasis on sin being against the person of God
or man, this does not account for the view of unChristianized Greeks.
In the Classical Period, "the word hAMARTIA is ambiguous: in ordinary
usage it is sometimes applied to false moral judgements, sometimes to
purely intellectual error--the average Greek did not make a
distinction" (ER Dodds "On Misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex").
While the average Greek may not have made such a distinction between
the two applications of hAMARTIA, technical philosophers like
Aristotle did. According to Poetics 13, the actions of King Oedipus in
Sophecles' tragedy Oedipus Rex constitute MEGALH hAMARTIA. Dodd and
other Aristotelian scholars feel that by hAMARTIA Aristotle had in
mind--not rebellion against God, nor a false moral judgement--"an
offense committed in ignorance of some material fact and therefore
free from PONHRIA or KAKIA" (Dodd).
Dodd further contends that Oedipus' actions are not to be classified
as ADIKHMA (as John defines hAMARTIA), but as simply hAMARTHMA and
MEGALH hAMARTIA. The point of my reference to Dodd's work is to
illustrate the fact that the idea of "one concept" is a faulty one
which fails to take into consideration "context."
When discussing this issue, I also think we cannot ignore the
linguistic-relativity hypothesis. An important question raised by this
hypothesis is: does language shape our perceptions or do perceptions
shape our language. There seems to be no clear answer sociologically
or psychologically, but there are some interesting observations
sociologists have made in this regard.
(1.) The more involved the members of a culture are with a particular
activity or thing, the more detailed their language becomes.
Does your diagram take this matter into consideration?
For example: Arabs have hundreds of words to describe camels and camel
equipment. Alaskans have numerous words for snow. The word "car" in
America brings many images to mind--not just one. And we also have the
problem of idioms. Does your diagram account for all of these factors?
These are my thoughts,
Edgar
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