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ARMY AIR FORCES HISTORICAL STUDIES: No. 41

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OPERATIONAL HISTOF
of the
SEVENTH AIR FORCE

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7 December 1941
to
6 November 1943

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ARMY AIR FORCES HISTORICAL STUDIES: NO. 41

OPERATIONAL HISTORY

OF THE

SIXTH AIR FORCE

7 December 1941 to 6 November 1943

The original of this monograph and the documents from which it was written are in the USAF Historical Division, archives branch, Bldg. 914, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

AAF Historical Office
Headquarters, Army Air Forces
December 1945

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In the words of the AAFPOA editor, "It is not intended that this should be considered a definitive operational history of the Seventh Air Force during the period"; it is rather a first narrative based on the files of the Seventh Air Force. "A definitive study would require in addition the use of the files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department." Readers are encouraged to submit additional information or corrections, which may be recorded on the perforated sheets to be found at the end of the study.

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FOREWORD

This study, which was forwarded in October 1944 by the Historical Division of Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (AAFPOA), has been reproduced by the AAF Historical Office with few modifications other than stylistic changes necessary to bring it into conformity with practices adopted in AAF Historical Studies. Several of the less pertinent exhibits have been omitted. Also a section of the original study, constituting pages 26 through 40 in the manuscript, has been deleted in view of the fact that the operations of Seventh Air Force units sent to the South Pacific have been analyzed in AAF Historical Study No. 35: Guadalcanal and the Origins of the Thirteenth Air Force.

Attention is called to the fact that the relatively brief narrative is supplemented by a detailed chronology and by extensive appendixes. The appendixes include highly useful collections of materials on the activities of AAF units during and immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor and in the Battle of Midway. These appendixes have been reproduced verbatim.

The present study deals with the operations of the Seventh Air Force from the beginning of hostilities on 7 December 1941 to the establishment of Advanced Headquarters (ADVON) on the Island of Funafuti in November 1943, preparatory to launching an offensive campaign against Japanese positions in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Activities of the later period are dealt with in AAF Historical Study No. 38: Operational History of the Seventh Air Force, 6 November 1943 to 31 July 1944.

During the twenty-three months covered here the Seventh Air Force was primarily a holding force for the defense of Hawaii, serving also as an agency for the training of combat crews and the modification of aircraft for tactical units in the South Pacific. On occasion, it furnished complete combat units for that theater from its own meager tactical strength. In view of the foregoing, offensive combat operations could not play the important part in Seventh Air Force activities they were destined to play in the months to come. Nevertheless, units of the Seventh Air Force were frequently in active combat during the period under discussion, notably in the Battle of Midway, in strikes against Wake, and in bombardment and reconnaissance missions over the Gilberts and the Marshalls preparatory to the sustained offensive in that area.

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Operational history of the Seventh Air Force
7 December 1941 to 6 November 1943

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SECURITY INFORMATION

~~RESTRICTED~~

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N T E N T S

I PEARL HARBOR TO MIDWAY. 1

II FROM MIDWAY TO THE GILBERTS 25

CHRONOLOGY: OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH AIR FORCE 46

GLOSSARY 67

FOOTNOTES TO NARRATIVE. 68

APPENDIXES

1. Letter, Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fiedler, AC/S, G-2, HHD, to AC/S, G-2, War Dept., 20 December 1941, subject: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941 77

2. Memorandum for Roberts Commission, 20 December 1941 82

3. War Diary kept by A-3, Hawaiian Air Force, 7 December 1941 to 31 December 1941 91

4. Letter, Lt. Col. Walter C. Sweeney, Jr., to Commanding Officer, 11th Bombardment Group (H), Hickam Field, T. H., 3 February 1942, subject: Report of Operations, Bomber Unit Task Group 8.9; with three indorsements 122

5. Letter, Brig. Gen. H. C. Davidson, Commanding General, Seventh Air Force to Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, 19 June 1942. 148

6. Memorandum, Commanding General, VII Bomber Command to Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, 15 September 1942 153

7. Letter, Commanding General, Seventh Air Force to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 13 June 1942, subject: Midway Damage. 156

8. Preliminary Mission Reports, Battle of Midway 160

9. Reports of B-26 Aircraft at Midway. 257

10. Reports on personnel in Action at Midway. 261

11. Daily Reports to War Department from Hawaiian Air Force, 30 May 1942 to 15 June 1942. 285

INDEX 307

~~RESTRICTED~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

AATHS-41

1

Chapter I

PEARL HARBOR TO MIDWAY

The operational history of the organization that is now the Seventh Air Force began very abruptly on the morning of 7 December 1941. At that time, the Hawaiian Air Force, predecessor of the Seventh Air Force, had a strength of 754 officers and 6,706 enlisted men,¹ and was organized tactically into the 18th Bombardment Wing (H) and the 14th Pursuit Wing. Headquarters of the Hawaiian Air Force, under the command of Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin, was located at Hickam Field, Territory of Hawaii, as was also the headquarters of the 18th Bombardment Wing. Headquarters of the 14th Pursuit Group was at Wheeler Field.

The 18th Bombardment Wing was composed of two heavy bombardment groups, the 5th and the 11th. In the 5th Group were the 23d, 31st, and 72d Bomb Squadrons, and the 4th Reconnaissance Squadron (H).² The 11th Bomb Group consisted of the 26th and 42d Bomb Squadrons and the 10th Reconnaissance Squadron (H).³ In addition to the two groups there were the 58th Bomb Squadron (L) and the 86th Observation Squadron (O/D).⁴ Tactical organizations in the 14th Pursuit Wing were the 18th Pursuit Group (I), with the 6th, 19th, 44th, 72d, 73d, and 78th Pursuit Squadrons, and the 15th Pursuit Group (F), with the 45th, 46th, and 47th Pursuit Squadrons.⁵

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AMNH-41

2

The Hawaiian Air Force had a total of 231 aircraft of all types, assigned as follows:⁶

- B-17D - 12
- B-18A - 33
- A-20A - 12
- P-40J - 12
- P-40B - 87
- P-36A - 39
- P-36A - 8
- P-36B - 6
- B-12A - 3
- A-12A - 2
- AT-6 - 4
- OA-9 - 3
- OA-8 - 1
- O-47B - 7
- O-49 - 2

Of the foregoing aircraft, the B-17's, B-18's, and A-20's were located at Hickam Field; the O-49's, O-47's, and 12 of the P-40's at Bellows Field; and the remainder at Wheeler Field.⁷ None of the aircraft was ready for immediate use, although 6 B-17's, 21 B-18's, 5 A-20's, 64 P-40's, 20 P-36's, 10 P-36's, 1 B-12, 2 A-12's, 3 AT-6's, 3 OA-9's, 1 OA-8, 5 O-47B's, and 2 O-49's were in commission but not loaded with bombs or ammunition. The remainder were out for first, second, or third echelon maintenance.⁸

The first indication of an attack came at 0755 on the Sunday morning of 7 December when nine enemy single-engine, low-wing monoplanes, carrying torpedoes, were observed southeast of the Hickam Field hangar line flying at an altitude of 80 feet in the direction of Pearl Harbor.⁹ This flight did not attack Hickam Field, but at almost the same time 12 dive bombers attacked the Hickam Field hangar line and the buildings of the Hawaiian Air Depot, followed shortly by

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SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AATHS-41

3

16 additional dive bombers, which attacked the Hickam Field hangar line. All airplanes participating in the attack dived at approximately 45 to 50 degrees from altitudes of 3,000 to 5,000 feet and released their bombs at about 1,000 feet. Machine-gun fire was employed before and after the bomb release. The attack lasted about ten minutes.

Hickam Field was again attacked at about 0825 when from six to nine airplanes approached from the south and attacked the Number One Agua system, technical buildings immediately behind the hangar line, and consolidated barracks, releasing their bombs from level flight at an altitude of approximately 150 feet. At the same time, aircraft on the parking apron were strafed with gunfire. About one minute later, a formation of five or six planes bombed the baseball diamond from a high altitude. This attack lasted between ten and fifteen minutes.

At about 0800 the third and final attack on Hickam Field took place when a flight of six to nine airplanes strafed dispersed aircraft and technical buildings behind the hangar line with machine-gun fire. Simultaneously, a formation of from seven to nine planes bombed the consolidated barracks, parade ground, and Post Exchange from an altitude of approximately 6,000 feet. This attack lasted about eight minutes, and in the course of it a flight of B-17's which had left from the mainland the previous day on a routine ferrying trip began to arrive.

The first attack on Wheeler Field occurred at about 0800 when approximately 25 enemy airplanes dive-bombed the hangar line, releasing their bombs from altitudes of from 200 to 250 feet. After the first

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

AAFMS-41

4

attack, the formation broke and the individual planes maneuvered reck-
lessly in strafing attacks at an altitude of approximately 200 feet,
concentrating their fire on aircraft on the hangar line and buildings
and personnel in the immediate vicinity. The entire first attack on
Wheeler Field lasted about 15 minutes.

Wheeler Field was again attacked a few minutes after 0900, when
seven airplanes flying roughly in line at an altitude of approximately
500 feet, machine-gunned aircraft being taxied onto the airdrome. The
whole attack lasted less than five minutes.

Bellows Field was attacked twice--once at about 0830, when a
single fighter came in from the sea to machine-gun the tent area, and
again at approximately 0900, when nine airplanes flying in three groups
of three planes each strafed the hangar line. They concentrated on
a B-17 which had been unable to land at Hickam upon arriving from the
mainland and which in attempting to land at Bellows Field had rolled
off the end of the runway.

The attacks on all three Air Corps installations, which were, of
course, but a part of the attack on Army and Navy installations on
the island of Oahu, appeared to have been carefully rehearsed and
exceptionally well executed. It was established that no land-based
planes were used in the attack, and while there were many rumors of
the presence of multi-motored aircraft, it was believed that all of
the enemy airplanes were single-engine types. The bombers at both
Hickam and Wheeler appeared to have been escorted by fighters, and
all planes engaging in strafing attacks descended to extremely low

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

AATYS-41

5

altitudes, using 12.7-mm., 7.7-mm., and 20-mm. ammunition.

The first American fighters to get into the air in opposition to the attack were two P-40's that took off from Wheeler Field at 0855.¹⁰ Twenty minutes later, six P-30's took off from Wheeler Field, and at 0930 five P-40's and six P-36's took to the air. Again at 1200 and 1500, five and eleven P-40's, respectively, took off from Wheeler Field.¹¹ Aircraft got off from Hickam Field on search missions as follows: four A-30A's at 1127, two B-17D's at 1140, three A-30A's at 1300, and two B-18's at 1330.¹² One C-47 took off from Bellows Field at 0950, three at 1040, and three at 1500. Five P-40's were airborne from Bellows at 1245.¹³

The actual damage caused by the attack is difficult to assess. Casualties among personnel of the Hawaiian Air Force, while light in comparison to those suffered by the Navy, were heavy enough. They were distributed as follows:¹⁴

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Missing</u>	<u>Wounded</u>
Hickam Field	121	37	274
Wheeler Field	37	6	53
Bellows Field	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>9</u>
Totals	163	43	336

The Hawaiian Air Depot at Hickam Field suffered serious damage. The engineering, administrative, drafting unit, blueprint and specification files were total losses. The base parachute section was a total loss, as were the overhaul and assembly sections of the Engine Repair Branch. Test equipment was also completely destroyed, and equipment

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of the Aero Repair Branch was 75 per cent wrecked.¹⁵ Of the Depot property stocks, 90 per cent of Classes O2D, O3A, C3D, and 29 were destroyed, 65 per cent of Class O2E, and approximately 50 per cent of the balance of classes were destroyed.¹⁶

The 231 assigned aircraft were reduced by the attack to 157, of which only 79 were reported as usable. These were distributed among the various types as follows:¹⁷

	<u>On Hand After Raid</u>	<u>Usable After Raid</u>
* B-17D	8	4
B-18	21	11
* A-20A	10	5
* P-40C	7	2
* P-40B	50	25
P-36A	35	16
P-36A	3	2
P-26B	5	2
B-12A	3	1
A-12A	2	1
AI-6	3	2
OA-9	1	1
OA-3	1	1
O-47B	7	5
O-49	1	1

* Combat planes

In the feverish days immediately following the debacle of 7 December, the Hawaiian Air Force was faced with the Herculean task of transforming its activities from a peace-time basis to the tactical situation that had been thrust upon it. The immediate mission was the defence of the island of Oahu and the other islands of the Hawaiian chain against a repetition of the attack of 7 December.

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In fulfillment of the Air Corps' share of this responsibility, the aircraft of the 18th Bomb Wing flew daily search missions in a broad sector up to 200 miles seaward.¹⁸ Likewise, the 14th Pursuit Wing, redesignated the Hawaiian Interceptor Command ten days after the attack,¹⁹ had as its immediate mission the defense of the Hawaiian group through the operational control of all land-based fighters, control and coordination of all antiaircraft artillery, the searchlight activities of the Hawaiian Antiaircraft Artillery Command, and aircraft warning activities.²⁰

To fulfill its mission, the Hawaiian Air Force at the end of the year had aircraft at its disposal as follows:²¹

Hawaiian Interceptor Command:

- 43 P-40's and 27 P-36's in commission.
- 3 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for first echelon maintenance.
- 5 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for second echelon maintenance.
- 67 P-40's, 24 P-39's, and 2 P-36's out for third echelon maintenance.

18th Bomb Wing:

- 23 B-17's, 9 B-18's, and 10 A-20's in commission.
- 6 B-17's and 4 B-18's out for first echelon maintenance.
- 1 B-17 and 1 B-18 out for second echelon maintenance.
- 5 B-17's and 7 B-18's out for third echelon maintenance.

26th Observation Squadron:

- 5 O-47's and 1 O-49 in commission.
- 1 O-47 out for first echelon maintenance.

Early in February 1942 a redesignation of Air Corps units in the Hawaiian area was effected. The Hawaiian Air Force became the Seventh

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Air Force,²² the 18th Bombardment Wing became the VII Bomber Command,²³ and the Hawaiian Interceptor Command became first the 7th Interceptor Command²⁴ and on 22 May 1942 the VII Fighter Command.²⁵

Beginning with January 1942, the defensive mission of the Seventh Air Force was broadened from time to time by the assignment of various of its units to task groups operating forward of the Hawaiian area. The first of these occasions occurred during the period 16 to 30 January when three P-17's from the 23d Bomb Squadron and three from the 50th Reconnaissance Squadron were placed under the command of Lt. Col. Walter C. Sweeney and assigned as a bomber unit to Task Group 8.9 for the purpose of conducting antisubmarine search missions.²⁶

The aircraft departed from Hickam Field on 16 January and arrived at Canton on 17 January, having spent the night en route at Palmyra, where one of the P-17's was so badly damaged in landing that it was unable to continue to its destination.²⁷ The 18th of January was spent in submarine searches out of Canton, as was most of the time until the group returned to Hickam Field on 30 January, with the exception of two trips made to Fandi in the Fiji Islands. The first of these was on 21 January with return to Canton on 25 January, and the second was on 25 January with return on 27 January.²⁸

A primary significance of the operation was the experience it afforded in the employment of aircraft in the vast Pacific theater

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SECURITY INFORMATION

AAFHS-41

~~RESTRICTED~~

9

of war. That this mission was a pioneering one in nature is demonstrated by the fact that prior to the landing of the flight on Palmyra, only three E-17D's had used the island's airfield. Servicing facilities at both Canton and Palmyra were very limited, especially in the matter of fueling the airplanes. This was done from 60-gallon drums, and in addition to the time and labor required, the gasoline often proved to be dirty, watered, and to contain corrosive matter. The commander of the Bomb Group strongly urged in his report that before further operations were conducted out of either base Air Corps gasoline trucks be provided.²⁹ Further, he noted while at Mandi that all of the Lockheed Hudson airplanes used by the RCAF were equipped with radar, thus enabling, "a small number of airplanes to cover a large amount of search area most effectively."³⁰

Probably the most significant aspect of Colonel Sweeney's report was the emphasis it placed upon that most important aspect of any aerial operation in the Pacific--navigation. ". . . The necessity of perfect dead reckoning cannot be too greatly emphasized," he wrote. "It is quite possible to pass either Palmyra or Canton islands within a very few miles and due to restricted visibility fail to see them. . . ."³¹

To this, the Commanding General of the VII Bomber Command added:³²

There is one step towards the improvement of navigation which cannot be made by the 7th Bomber Command, but should be

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made by higher headquarters. One particular difficulty which has to be overcome before precision of dead reckoning navigation is made clear to the newly assigned navigator is his reluctance to accept the need for absolute precision in dead reckoning. A large majority of the navigators now assigned to tactical units are graduates of the Pan America School, Coral Gables, Florida. That school does not teach navigation by dead reckoning means, nor does it stress the importance of this type of navigation. If the importance of dead reckoning and the necessity for precision in its use were instilled into the mind of the student early in his studies, his mental reluctance to accept that need would not exist. This mental condition is changed only after he has been assigned to a unit which stresses the importance of dead reckoning, and after he has gained experience through its use. The criticism of the Pan America School for its lack of dead reckoning training has been general throughout the Air Corps. The difficulty which exists because of the lack of such dead reckoning training and of the importance of precision in its use can only be overcome when that school is required to teach precision dead reckoning navigation.

The next such operation was conducted in February, when 13 B-17's were detached from the Hawaiian defense forces and released to OILCFAO³³ for operations in the South Pacific in anticipation of possible Japanese offensives against New Caledonia and Fiji.³⁴ The heavy bombers were designated the Southern Bomber Group and were ordered to proceed from Oahu to Mandi so as to complete the movement by 13 February. After arrival at Mandi they were to operate as directed by the Commander of Task Force 11 in support of the operations of that force against the enemy. After being released by the Commander of Task Force 11 they were to return to Oahu.³⁵

Unfortunately there is a paucity of information at the level at which this account is being written on the operations of the Southern

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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AAEHS-41

11

Bomber Group. Evidently, however, there were some difficulties. The War Department informed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department of a report that in an attempted bombing operation only four out of nine airplanes employed reached their objective; two had been abortive because of mechanical difficulties, two collided on take-off, and one had lost its way and returned. The War Department wanted to know whether adequate arrangements had been made for maintaining the B-17's sent to the South Pacific and whether maintenance and combat crews had been furnished by the Hawaiian Department with the airplanes.³⁶ To this the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department replied that the 13 B-17's had left Oahu with full combat crews, that maintenance crews and service elements had departed by naval surface craft to join the task force at Fandi, and that "present whereabouts of maintenance and service elements [were] unknown as they were to be moved at discretion of Task Force Commander."³⁷

Before, after, and coincident with the above operations the defense of the perimeter was being maintained. On two occasions in the early months of 1942 the routine of events was broken by actions of special note. On 14 February 1942, the first such action occurred when one B-17E of VII Bomber Command conducted a photo reconnaissance of Wake. Adm. G. W. Smitz expressed appreciation for the mission: "The information obtained will be of great value in prospective operations and fully warranted the hazards of this

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 SECURITY INFORMATION

AMHS-41

~~RESTRICTED~~

12

reconnaissance flight which was so bold and expeditiously made."³⁸

The second occurred on 4 March 1942 when a lone Japanese bomber attempted an attack on the island of Oahu. It was first picked up 90 miles northwest of Kauai, from whence it went to Kaena Point on Oahu, then around the north coast until it was opposite Kaneohe where it turned south to Honolulu. Four 500-pound bombs fell short of the city and did no damage. Overcast conditions prevented successful pursuit or the use of antiaircraft. The known presence of a submarine in the French Frigate Shoals area led to the belief that it was a multi-motored flying boat from the Marshalls or Wake, refueling from a submarine.³⁹

During this period there were no operations in which contact was made with enemy aircraft, yet the experience gained was of such a nature as to make observations on the employment of air power possible. It was felt, for example, that in the Pacific area, where long sea searches and continuous alerts by both heavy bombers and fighters were essential, duplicate combat crews were a necessity for all heavy bombers, and a minimum ratio of 1.5 was necessary between combat pilots and fighter aircraft.⁴⁰ Again, it was felt that the P-40 was an unsatisfactory intercenter airplane because of its lack of climbing ability and its inability to operate at high altitudes. The P-39D was also reported as unable to operate at high altitudes.⁴¹

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SECURITY INFORMATION

During this period the VII Bomber Command was under the operational control of Pat Wing Two. Until 1 April all aircraft were assigned either to search or a striking force, which permitted very little training of bombardiers and gunners. On 1 April approximately 25 per cent of the airplanes were made available for limited training.⁴²

Meanwhile, events were transpiring which were to give air power in the Pacific its first real test.

In anticipation of a possible Japanese attack on Midway the Seventh Air Force was placed on a special alert on 18 May 1942. From this date until 28 May, the old B-18's were used on search to supplement the B-17's, and most of the latter were held loaded with 500- and 600-pound demolition bombs.⁴³ At the beginning of this period there were 34 B-17's on hand. Of these, seven were Type C or D, none of which was armed sufficiently for combat. This left 27 airplanes fit for combat.⁴⁴ During the period of alert, however, the VII Bomber Command received a steady influx of B-17 airplanes. To accommodate this large increase in available aircraft, the 72d Bomb Squadron was converted from a B-18 to a B-17 squadron. The squadron was not fully equipped until two days before actually committed to battle.⁴⁵

The period of alert was expanded into one of action on 30 May, when six B-17's of the 26th Bomb Squadron were flown to Midway.⁴⁶ On the next day, six B-17's from the 431st Bomb Squadron, with two

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from the 31st Bomb Squadron and one from the 72d Bomb Squadron were flown to Midway.⁴⁷ Six of these airplanes, with the six from the 26th Bomb Squadron that had arrived at Midway the day before, flew search missions to a distance of 500 miles and return on 31 May and 1 June.⁴⁸

Actual combat began on 3 June 1942, when search planes discovered a Japanese task force steaming toward Midway. The Seventh Air Force's first contact with the enemy came at 1623 when six B-17's from the 431st Bomb Squadron, with two from the 31st Bomb Squadron and one from the 72d attached, attacked five Japanese battleships or heavy cruisers bearing 265°, 570 miles from Midway. They dropped 36 x 500-pound demolition bombs from 8,000 feet, scoring five hits and several near misses.⁴⁹

The first Army air action on 4 June occurred at 0710, when two B-26's from the 18th Reconnaissance Squadron and two B-26B's from the 69th Bomb Squadron (H), in conjunction with Navy torpedo bombers, attacked an aircraft carrier from altitudes of 150 to 300 feet. The results of the attack were not observed, but one B-26 from each squadron was shot down by fire from either the many intercepting fighters or the extremely heavy antiaircraft fire from the carrier. One of the lost B-26's was seen to launch its torpedo before crashing. The other two crash-landed at Midway riddled with holes.⁵⁰

At 0415H a formation of 14 B-17's, composed of six from the 431st Bomb Squadron, five from the 42d, two from the 31st, and one

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AFHS-41

16

from the 73d took off to attack the targets bombed the previous afternoon. En route they reported another task force complete with many carriers approaching Midway from 325° at a distance of 145 miles. They were directed to intercept and climbed to 30,000 feet from which altitude they dropped 103 x 500-pound demolition bombs, registering seven hits and several near misses. Three carriers were reported on fire after the attack. Antiaircraft was heavy and at proper altitude, but generally behind. Enemy fighters did not seem anxious to close with the bombers, but of those that did two Zeros were shot down.⁵¹

Late in the day of 4 June, Seventh Air Force bombers struck three times at the enemy. At 1810, two B-17's of the 42d Bomb Squadron attacked a carrier force at latitude 31°0', longitude 178°40', dropping 16 x 500-pound bombs from 10,000 feet and scoring two hits and three near misses on a carrier that had been damaged by earlier American action. Three Zero interceptors were shot down, and one was possibly shot down.⁵²

At 1830, six B-17's of the 23d Bomb Squadron en route from Oahu to Midway, each loaded with one-half bomb load and one bomb-bay tank, attacked the striking force bearing 332°, 170 miles from Midway. Eight 500-pound demolition bombs were dropped on a carrier and a destroyer. One hit and two near misses were scored on the carrier which was already aflame, and one hit was made on the destroyer which

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sank. Antiaircraft fire was heavy, and the bombers were intercepted by eight Zero fighters of which four were shot down and one was damaged. Two B-17's were damaged so that they were unable to drop their bombs.⁵³

Also at 1330, four B-17's dropped 28 x 500-pound demolition bombs from an altitude of 20,000 to 25,000 feet on a heavy cruiser bearing 334°, 185 miles from Midway. They scored one hit and two near misses, with the results of 16 bombs unobserved.⁵⁴

On the following day, the first contact was made with the enemy at 0830 when five B-17's from the 23d Bomb Squadron and three from the 42d attacked the Japanese force at 270°, 130 miles from Midway. They made their attack in two elements of four airplanes each. The first element dropped 19 x 500-pound demolition bombs from 20,000 feet, getting two probable hits and three near misses. The second element dropped 30 x 500-pound demolition bombs from 20,000 feet, with one direct hit and four near misses. All hits were on two battleships or heavy cruisers. There was no fighter opposition, and although heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered none of the B-17's was damaged.⁵⁵

At 1815, three B-17's from the 43d Bomb Squadron, with one from the 23d attached, attacked a heavy cruiser bearing 300°, 300 miles from Midway. Thirty-two 500-pound demolition bombs were dropped from 16,000 feet, with two hits and three near misses. Immediately

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thereafter, three other B-17's of the 23d Bomb Squadron dropped 24 x 500-pound demolition bombs on the same target from 14,000 feet, getting one hit and one near miss. There was no fighter interception and antiaircraft fire did no damage.⁵⁶

The last strike of the Battle of Midway was made at 1825 when five B-17's from the 72d Bomb Squadron attacked a heavy cruiser bearing 320°, 425 miles from Midway. They dropped 15 x 600-pound bombs and eight 500-pound bombs from altitudes ranging from 9,000 to 12,500 feet, with results unobserved. One B-17 was shot down by the extremely heavy antiaircraft fire coming from the cruiser, and one other was forced down in the water because of a fuel shortage. The crew of the latter was recovered.⁵⁷

On 6 June, 12 B-17's were dispatched to Midway. Of these, six from the 33th Bomb Squadron dropped 30 x 1,100-pound demolition bombs on a target that was believed to be an enemy cruiser or destroyer, but which later was identified as a friendly submarine. The target crash-dived as soon as the attack was launched, and suffered no damage.⁵⁸

Although extensive searches were conducted during the day by the B-17's at Midway, no contact was made with the fleeing enemy. The Navy was yet to suffer serious damage in the loss of the Yorktown, but insofar as Army units were concerned the Battle of Midway was over, and really had been over since the previous day.

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During the three days, 3 to 5 June, the Seventh Air Force had conducted 16 B-17 attacks involving 55 airplanes, and one torpedo attack with four B-26's.⁵⁹ Targets had been battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, transports, and destroyers. Three hundred and fourteen 500- to 600-pound bombs and four torpedoes had been dropped from altitudes of 3,000 to 25,000 feet, with a score of 22 hits, six probable hits, and 46 near misses. Antiaircraft fire had made the observation of results difficult, yet the known results were: one battleship or heavy cruiser hit and two set afire; three aircraft carriers set afire; three hits on carriers already afire; two torpedo hits on one carrier; one torpedo hit on another; one destroyer sunk; and one large transport set afire and another hit.⁶⁰

During the entire attack the Japanese dropped only 14 bombs on Eastern Island and 30 bombs on Sand Island. A few 1,000-pound bombs were reported, but most of the total were apparently 100- and 500-pound demolition bombs. Though the bombs did considerable damage, the enemy carefully avoided hitting the runway. If this had been destroyed during the first attack it would have greatly hampered American operations.⁶¹

The B-17's were intercepted by 14 Zeros, of which eight were shot down and two were damaged. The B-26's were intercepted by many Zeros, of which two were shot down. American losses included: two B-26's shot down, with both crews lost; two B-17's down at sea,

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

AAEHS-41

19

with one crew lost and one recovered; two B-17's damaged, and two B-26's forced to make crash landings at Midway because of damage.⁶³

The aircraft from the following organizations participated in the action:⁶³

43d Bomb Squadron, 11th Bomb Group
 431st Bomb Squadron, 11th Bomb Group
 23d Bomb Squadron, 5th Bomb Group
 61st Bomb Squadron, 5th Bomb Group
 72d Bomb Squadron, 5th Bomb Group
 18th Reconnaissance Squadron, 22d Bomb Group
 69th Bomb Squadron (H), 38th Bomb Group
 1st Provisional Squadron

Army air units functioned under serious handicaps during the Battle of Midway. Probably the most important of these was the lack of either adequate servicing facilities or personnel at Midway. The combat crews not only flew long, grueling search missions daily, but to a large extent were forced to do their own servicing and maintenance. The situation was further complicated by the Japanese attack on Midway which destroyed the power house on Eastern Island, resulting in the complete disruption of the one available system of fueling and making it necessary for tired and over-worked crews to spend long, tedious hours servicing their airplanes from cans and drums. As a result of this condition, and because of the continuous combat missions flown before the attack,⁶⁴ many of the combat crews fought missions in an exhausted physical condition.⁶⁵

Brig. Gen. Willis E. Hale, Commanding General of the VII Bomber Command, had strongly protested the use of his B-17's in the above-

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AFMAG-41

20

mentioned search missions, declaring that such use was in opposition to the Army-Navy agreement that Army bombers would not be employed as a striking force except against known targets.⁶⁶ He had further protested repetition of the mission on 1 June on the grounds that his men had not averaged seven hours rest in two days, and no target was yet known to exist. On both occasions, however, he was overruled by the Navy.⁶⁷

Inasmuch as the Battle of Midway furnished the first combat experience for the bombardment aircraft of the Seventh Air Force, the conclusions of Brig. Gen. L. G. Davidson regarding the action are particularly interesting. On the subject of operations, he wrote:⁶⁸

Attack with torpedo-bearing aircraft must be well coordinated with dive-bombing or high level bombardment attack unless heavy loss of torpedo bombers is anticipated. Fighter support, if the range permits, should always be used.

Coordination with carrier based aviation is an extremely difficult problem for ground based aircraft because carriers normally operate under conditions of radio silence. Every effort should be made to plan attacks well in advance.

No great difficulty was experienced in hitting surface ships at altitudes of 4,000 to 25,000 feet. The Japanese apparently have the reverse of a bombsight mounted on their surface craft and can estimate the time at which the bombardier making his run will have to release his bombs. At this point the ship begins to maneuver, adding to the difficulty of hitting it by precision bombing. In order to aid in this computation, enemy fighter airplanes appeared to be stationed above the fleet for the purpose of giving the exact altitude of our bombers to the ships of the fleet. This aided them in calculating the

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SECURITY INFORMATION

time of the bomb release and also was a great aid in anti-aircraft fire. The anti-aircraft gun fire of the Japanese fleet was heavy but ineffective. The only serious hit obtained by the guns was on the wing of a B-17. On the other hand, the fire of automatic weapons was quite accurate and caused some losses.

Japanese carrier forces proved to be highly maneuverable in their efforts to avoid bomb patterns. In some instances, complete circles, combined with short turning maneuvers, were employed to avoid high-level bombers. Photographs of one large carrier showed a turning radius of about 1700 feet. They made continuous effort to secure cloud cover.

Anti-aircraft fire from carriers and from the immediate escorting vessels proved to be more accurate than anti-aircraft fire from other surface ships.

On the serious problem of maintenance and supply, General Davidson's comments were as follows:

Power equipment is almost a vital necessity for clearing debris from runways and operating areas of any airdromes under attack. Many airplanes were disabled from tire punctures caused by shell fragments and coral thrown up on the runway.

Adequate ground crews and equipment for servicing, maintenance, and care of aircraft must be provided in order not to over-fatigue combat crews. Every consideration should be given to adequate underground facilities for resting and sleeping combat crews. It is believed that the rest and comfort of combat crews is one of the most important factors in their accomplishment of assigned missions.

Adequate air transport service facilitates supply and maintenance to bases distant from supply points. During this operation an already over-burdened transport service was forced into almost continuous operation.

At our air bases scattered throughout the Pacific we must not only have an ample supply of fuel, bombs, and ammunition, but a supply of spare parts, special equipment, and enough maintenance personnel to take care of the equipment likely to be based there until reinforcements can be brought in.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

A1283-41

22

Tital installations where dispersion and concealment are impractical must be protected against air attacks.

Regarding the equipment that was getting its first battle test,

General Davidson said:

For operation against fighter aircraft and in strafing operations it is believed that the current belt loading of ammunition does not contain sufficiently high percentage of tracer ammunition. Combat personnel believe that tracer ammunition should be as high as one in three.

B-30 aircraft is considered suitable for search operations, but it is believed that the use of B-30's for search in the face of the enemy is not desirable, due to their particularly slow speed and vulnerability to fighter aircraft.

The new ball turrets on B-17's proved a very successful installation, and caused only minor electrical difficulty in their operation. In planning the use of electrically operated turrets it should be considered that such installations are a continuous drain on the electrical system of the airplane. Some provision should be made to augment the present source of electrical power since these turrets are in almost continuous operation during combat missions. All fields where bombardment airplanes are stationed should have extra turrets for instruction in maintenance and operation.

Pilots consider the B-17 airplane to be an excellent combat airplane. With the addition of two 50 caliber machine guns in the nose of this airplane, it would be capable of taking care of itself against almost any opposition encountered. The airplane is particularly tough. The major deficiency in the B-17 airplane is its range, and every effort should be made to produce and deliver the B-29 and B-32 types to this area. The B-29 airplane is considered satisfactory as a torpedo bomber but training for crews and ordnance personnel in use of torpedoes must be accomplished and an ample supply of reinforced torpedoes kept on hand.

After the enemy had been repulsed, it was necessary to maintain a defense of Midway and the surrounding area. For about 10 days a

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SECURITY INFORMATION

~~RESTRICTED~~

AFHS-41

23

force of B-17's was maintained on the islands, and these conducted long searches out to sea.⁶⁹ These airplanes were to be returned to Oahu, however, and there was urgent need that the Marine fighter planes that had been almost completely lost during the Battle of Midway be replaced.⁷⁰ The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Adm. G. W. Hinitz, wrote that it was impossible to undertake the replacement of the lost Marine fighters with Marine or Navy fighting planes, because of the need for replenishing the heavy losses suffered by aircraft carriers. He suggested, therefore, that an Army pursuit squadron be temporarily based at Midway.⁷¹

In answer to this suggestion, the 73d Fighter Squadron was transferred from Oahu to Midway. The ground echelon arrived at Eastern Island on 17 June 1942. The officers, arriving a few days later on the aircraft carrier Saratoga flew their 25 P-40E airplanes off the carrier and landed them at Midway. This was the first time such planes had been flown off a carrier in the Pacific theater, and possibly in any theater.⁷²

The 73d Fighter Squadron patrolled Midway Islands and the surrounding ocean every day until 23 January 1943, when the 78th Fighter Squadron arrived to replace them. The pilots of the 78th had flown their 24 P-40E airplanes all the way from Barking Sands to Midway, a distance of 1,100 nautical miles, in the longest over-water massed flight of single-engine airplanes ever attempted.⁷³

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SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AASHG-41

24

Three days later the 78th Fighter Squadron flew 23 P-40L and P-40E1 airplanes from Midway back to Kaneohe Naval Air Station, a distance of 1,400 air miles.⁷⁴ The 78th Fighter Squadron carried on the patrol of Midway until 23 April 1943, when 23 of the P-40L's were flown from Midway back to Barking Sands.⁷⁵

CONFIDENTIAL

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

AASHS-41

25

Chapter II

FROM MIDWAY TO ILE GILBERTS

On 4 July 1942, about a month after the Midway action, the War Department instructed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to designate one heavy bombardment group of the Seventh Air Force as the Hawaiian Mobile Air Force. This was to be a part of the Seventh Air Force, but it was to be available for action outside of the Central Pacific Area.¹ The 11th Bomb Group, under the command of Col. L. G. Saunders, was so designated,² and preparations were made for its movement to the South Pacific area.

The 11th Bomb Group, consisting of the 86th, 42d, 98th, and 431st Bomb Squadrons, left Hickam Field on 17 July with 35 B-17 aircraft.³ Ground personnel of the 11th Group had departed from Cahu on the U. S. S. Argonne on 10 July, expecting to arrive at their destination well before the air echelon. When the Argonne docked on 23 July at Noumea, New Caledonia, however, the air echelon was already there or landing.⁴ The 11th Group became a part of a task force commanded by Rear Adm. John S. McCain. Its mission was to provide scouting and air coverage for the forces under Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley which were designed to rid Australia and New Zealand of the menace of Japanese invasion and protect the American lines of communications to those areas.⁵ Approximately two months

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SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AAEHS-41

26

after the departure of the 11th Bomb Group, the 72d Squadron of the 5th Bombardment Group moved down into the South Pacific where it was subsequently joined by the remaining squadrons of the group.

This transfer of the 5th and 11th Bomb Groups to the South Pacific took from the Seventh Air Force its only heavy bombardment organizations and virtually denuded it of heavy bombardment aircraft. After the movement of the 11th and prior to the movement of the 5th, the latter comprised the only heavy bombardment available for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Yet during the summer of 1942 it was at times incapable of placing in the air more than 12 heavy bombers completely and adequately equipped. The remainder of the 35 B-17's assigned were judged to be unfit for combat, except in a last-ditch stand.

During the movement of the 5th Bomb Group to the South Pacific, the heavy bombardment strength of the Seventh Air Force was provided in part by the 90th Bomb Group, temporarily in the Hawaiian Islands en route to assignment with the Fifth Air Force, and the 307th Bomb Group, assigned for a short time to the Seventh Air Force. Even so, it was at times difficult for the Seventh to provide the 35 heavy bombers considered the minimum necessary for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands.⁶

The VII Bomber Command was directed to furnish a minimum daily striking force of 18 heavy bombers in three squadrons of six

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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AATHS-41

27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

aircraft each, one to be on the alert and two on reserve, with the two on reserve to be available for training purposes except during the dawn and dusk alert periods.⁷ This was done, but under the circumstances there was little else that the Seventh Air Force was capable of doing operationally, and until 22 December when a mass raid was conducted on Wake, the only operations performed by the Seventh Air Force were small-scale missions over Wake and the Gilbert islands.

The missions over Wake were performed on 20 June and 31 July, with Midway serving as a staging base in both instances. The first mission was performed by three B-24's and was a night attack in which 18 x 500-pound bombs were dropped on the airbase area. Although anti-aircraft fire of medium intensity was encountered, there was no interception, and no airplanes were damaged.⁸ The second mission was a photographic reconnaissance conducted by one B-17. After being intercepted by six enemy fighters, four of which it shot down, the bomber returned to its staging base with three bullet holes.⁹ The mission over the Gilberts was a photographic reconnaissance conducted 23 July 1943 by three B-17's of the VII Bomber Command, staging through Canton.¹⁰

The December raid on Wake was planned both as a diversionary measure and as a means of providing training for future operations.¹¹ This was the first of five such missions conducted during the period

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 SECURITY INFORMATION

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covered by this account against the American outpost which had been captured by the Japanese 24 December 1941, and which was serving the enemy as an advanced Central Pacific patrol base, guarding against United Nations' operations toward Japanese-held positions in the Caroline, Marshall, and Gilbert Islands. Its important facilities included a landing field large enough to accommodate all types of airplanes, a seaplane landing and sheltered anchorage area, repair shops, and anchorage facilities for small naval craft.¹² The 307th Bomb Group was designated to execute the attack with 24 B-24D's,¹³ and the Navy was to provide three submarines and one destroyer to furnish navigational aids and perform any necessary rescue missions.¹⁴

Twenty-six airplanes were flown from Oahu to the staging base at Midway, thus providing two spares in addition to the scheduled attacking force. When the staging base was reached, however, it was decided to send all 26 aircraft on the mission. The 26 B-24D's dropped 135 x 500-pound GP bombs and 21 incendiary clusters on Wake. Of the GP bombs, 74 were seen to be hits, 48 were near hits, and 13 were unobserved. Damage assessment was difficult because of clouds and the large number of fires and explosions taking place all over the island.¹⁵ The attack apparently took the enemy completely by surprise, as neither searchlights nor antiaircraft fire were encountered until after the bomb runs had been started. Two small hits comprised the only damage to American aircraft, and all returned

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

to Midway. The operation was a high point in the history of the Seventh Air Force for the year 1943, being the longest offensive massed flight attempted up to that time. The aircraft flew 2,086 nautical miles from Midway to Wake and return, in addition to making the round trip from Oahu to Midway, with bombs aboard on the first leg.¹⁶

The raid on Wake was followed a month later with a daylight photographic reconnaissance mission. On 25 January 1943, six B-24D's of the 371st Bomb Squadron of the 307th Bomb Group staged through Midway from Oahu to perform the mission. They took photos at midday from 14,000 feet and dropped a total of 60 x 100-pound demolition bombs during the photo runs. Fifty-three of the bombs were observed to fall on the island, and vertical photos were taken of the entire island, with obliques being shot from several angles. Upon completion of the photo runs, the formation was intercepted by six to eight Zero fighters, of which one was shot down and four were possibly shot down. The interceptors were aggressive and the lead B-24 was hit ten times, with two other airplanes being hit once each. There was some antiaircraft fire, but it was generally wild and trailing.¹⁷

Wake was not raided again until 15 May 1943 when 18 B-24D's of the 371st and 372d Bomb Squadrons of the 307th Bomb Group were assigned to a daylight bombing mission of the island from Midway.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

AFES-41

30

Four of the airplanes were abortive because of excessive gas consumption, and seven failed to find the target. The seven airplanes that did get over the target dropped 24 x 500-pound GP bombs and six 650-pound death charges from 11,300 feet with results largely unobserved. Although only inaccurate antiaircraft fire was encountered the formation was intercepted by 19 Zekes and three Hamps. Four of the enemy airplanes were shot down, one was probably shot down, and eight were damaged. However, four of the B-24's were damaged, and one was shot down.¹⁸

The last two missions against Wake were conducted on the 24th and 25th of July by the airplanes of the reconstituted 11th Bomb Group, and like their predecessors were diversionary missions. These particular ones were ordered by the Navy to relieve pressure in the South Pacific and to confuse the enemy as to where the next blow would fall.¹⁹ In both instances the airplanes staged through Midway.

Twelve B-24D's were assigned to the first strike, but two did not take off and two returned without finding the target. The eight planes getting over the island dropped seven 500-pound GP bombs, 25 fragmentation clusters and three 650-pound death charges, scoring hits on the oil storage area, barracks, and gun emplacement area at Peacock Point.²⁰ As the airplanes approached Peacock Point they encountered opposition from extremely accurate and intense

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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medium and heavy antiaircraft guns and automatic weapons. After the first flight had made its bombing runs, the airplanes were intercepted by 30 to 35 Zeros and one unidentified biplane. A running fight ensued, with the Zeros following the heavy bombers 50 miles out to sea. The largest number of passes came from above and below between 10 and two o'clock. One pilot observed a total of 85 passes made at his five-airplane formation. Nine enemy fighters were destroyed, four others were probably destroyed, and three were damaged. One B-24 was lost when it crashed into the ocean after a mid-air collision with an enemy fighter which was falling out of control. The crew of the fallen bomber were observed to continue their fire until they crashed. ²¹

Again on 26 July only eight airplanes of the 12 assigned got over the target. These dropped 18 x 500-pound GP bombs, 29 fragmentation clusters, and nine incendiary clusters. Two of the GP bombs hit the central portion of Peale Island, and five hit the oil storage area on the western tip of Wake Island. ²³ Opposition was first encountered about a mile off shore from Peale Island when medium anti-aircraft guns apparently based on the north shore started firing. The bombers were fired upon while crossing the lagoon by heavy guns from Peacock Point and the southeast end of Wilkes Island. There was also some medium fire from the southwest end of Wake Island. In all cases, the antiaircraft was intense and extremely accurate as to

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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altitude and range. After they had completed their bombing runs, the B-24's were intercepted by approximately 26 enemy Zeros and one airplane that was reported as a possible Focke Wulfe 190, although there is no positive evidence that this type of airplane was ever used in this theater. The Japanese pilots were not so aggressive as those encountered on 24 July, and they did not press their attacks home. Coordinated attacks were made by the enemy in elements of two or three airplanes, mostly from below, with the fighters coming up and into the formation from 10 or two o'clock and from the beam. Eleven Zeros were destroyed, eight were probably destroyed, and 11 were damaged. The B-24's suffered no losses.²³

As has been stated, the operations against Wake were, however, merely diversionary actions designed to confuse the enemy. The main emphasis of Seventh Air Force operations during 1943 was against the Japanese outposts in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Hence the remainder of this study will be concerned with the activities of the Seventh Air Force prior to the actual invasion and occupation of islands in those two groups.

Evidently there had been some consideration given to using Johnston Island, a little more than 700 miles from Oahu, as a staging base for the raids on the Gilberts and Marshalls. General Emons wrote CINCOPAC, advising against this, for the reason that to judge from the Wake experience the maximum radius for a heavily-

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 SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL

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AAHS-41

33

loaded B-24 was believed to be about 1,000 nautical miles.²⁴ The closest targets in either chain of islands would be well over that distance from Johnson. General Ammons therefore recommended that Funafuti in the Ellice Islands be considered the primary operating base for sorties into the Gilberts and Marshalls and that the raids begin as soon as the Commander, South Pacific Area reported the base prepared and available.²⁵

The raids began on 25 January 1943, when three B-24D's of the 307th Bomb Group staged through Funafuti to conduct a photographic reconnaissance of Tarawa, Makana, Apamara, Loru, and Tamana. Photographs were taken from 20,000 feet, and one medium-sized cargo-passenger-type merchant vessel, anchored in the lagoon at Tarawa was bombed with 11 x 500-pound demolition bombs, one near miss possibly causing some damage.²⁶ From this date until the latter part of April, when the first relatively large-scale mission was conducted, the Gilberts and Marshalls were raided as follows:

22 January 1943 - One B-24D of 307th Bomb Group photographed Faura and Ocean. Bombs were not carried. Antiaircraft fire was exceedingly heavy and accurate over Ocean.²⁷

22 February 1943 - Three B-24D's of 307th Bomb Group in photo-bombing mission over northern Gilberts from Canton. Photographs were taken from 12,000 to 14,000 feet of Makin, Apikin, and Tarawa. Nine 500-pound demolition bombs were dropped on shipping at Tarawa, but no hits were observed. There were a few inaccurate bursts of antiaircraft fire at Makin, and a heavy concentration of antiaircraft from ships in the lagoon and shore positions at Tarawa, but no damage was sustained by any B-24.²⁸

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The first large-scale attack on the Gilberts was conducted on 20 and 23 April by the 371st and 372d Bomb Squadrons, designated Task Force Twelve, under the personal command of General Hale. Their mission was to bomb Makin and Tarawa in order to destroy the military installations, equipment, and shipping of the enemy located there. Upon completion of the bombing, sufficient reconnaissance sorties were to be made to cover all possible aviation bases in the Gilberts except Makin and Tarawa in order to estimate the possibility and practicability of their use either by the Japanese or American forces. The task force was to operate from Funafuti, and the airplanes were to return to Cahu upon completion of their assigned tasks.²⁹

General Hale proceeded to Funafuti from Cahu on 18 April with the airplanes, having sent a small boat there some two weeks previously to land the necessary supplies and equipment.³³ On 23 April, 23 B-24D's took off from Funafuti for Makin. One airplane was abortive, but 22 dropped 25 x 1000-pound GP bombs, 45 x 500-pound GP bombs, and 45 fragmentation clusters, achieving direct hits on the runway, dispersal, and phosphate plant areas. Oil supplies at the north end of the runway were destroyed. The noonday weather was excellent for bombing, although it permitted the enemy to observe the approach which, because of the location of the targets, had to be in one direction along the shore line. The first elements were engaged by Zero fighters, and all of the airplanes received heavy

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SECURITY INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AMELS-41

35

antiaircraft fire. Five of the B-24's were damaged.³¹ General
 Hale had the highest praise for the combat crews:³²

The men behaved magnificently in that they stayed right
 "down the Groove" in order to insure accuracy in bombing, not-
 withstanding the heavy attacks being made by antiaircraft and
 fighters. I am positive that it will be many months before
 the Japs can restore their destroyed machinery which was in-
 volved in the refining of phosphates. . . . Our bombing was
 all done below 8,500 feet. All planes returned to Funafuti
 notwithstanding the damage they had suffered.

The original plan had been to attack Tarawa the day after the
 raid on Nauru, but repairs required a day's delay. This proved to
 be advantageous, because the Japanese bombed the airfield at Funafuti
 twice before dawn on 22 April, beginning at 0315, the exact hour for
 which the take-off had been planned, and had the mission proceeded as
 scheduled, the Japanese would have caught the heavy bombers taking
 off. As it was, the enemy was able to inflict serious damage on the
 B-24's dispersed along the narrow runway. Direct hits were scored
 on two of the bombers, one of which was already loaded with 3,000
 pounds of bombs. When it exploded, five other airplanes were damaged
 by the falling debris.³³

Notwithstanding the damage inflicted, 12 B-24's took off the
 following day to attack Tarawa, dropping a total of 60 x 100-pound
 GP bombs and six 30-pound fragmentation clusters, getting direct
 hits in the gas storage and barracks areas.³⁴ The formation had flown
 about 500 miles northward to the east of the Gilbert and Ellice
 Islands to avoid detection by Japanese coast watchers, and had then

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 SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

~~RESTRICTED~~

AAFHS-41

36

flown directly west to Tarawa. They evidently took the enemy by complete surprise, as the leading element had dropped its bombs before any anti-aircraft fire occurred. The first firing came from either a cruiser or a destroyer standing offshore, and was followed by "fireworks all over the place," but only one airplane was hit.³⁵

Although, as has been mentioned, the original plan called for following the bombing missions with photographic reconnaissance, General Hale did not feel that he could risk his heavy bombers on the exposed Runafuti airstrip another night, so he made "the longest and fastest retreat in military history back to Hawaii - 3,000 miles away - arriving the following day after attacking Tarawa."³⁶

The next action was over Apurana, where three B-24D's conducted photographic reconnaissance missions from Canton on the 26th and 28th of May. Approximately 250 pictures were taken each time. On the first mission, 9,000 pounds of GP bombs were dropped on the barracks area, and on the second, six 500-pound GP bombs were dropped, with results unobserved. The airplanes encountered neither anti-aircraft nor fighter interception on either mission.³⁷ The pictures taken showed no changes of military significance on the island, and it was recommended that repetition of a photographic reconnaissance over Apurana in the very near future be given a low priority.³⁸

Tarawa was hit for the first time since 23 April on the night of 17-18 June by three B-24D's of the 56th Bomb Squadron and one from

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SECURITY INFORMATION

AAERS-41

~~RESTRICTED~~

37

Headquarters, VII Bomber Command in a diversionary attack in support of a photographic reconnaissance scheduled for the same night over Jaluit and Mille in the Marshalls.³⁹ The attack was planned as an harassing action, with the airplanes taking off at approximately two-hour intervals and proceeding individually to the target. One airplane returned early because of engine trouble, and another was unable to locate the target. The two that did get over the target dropped nine 500-pound GP bombs and 132 x 30-pound fragmentation clusters, rendering 2,500 feet of runway temporarily unserviceable, silencing an anti-aircraft battery, and blowing up an ammunition dump. Anti-aircraft fire was both light and heavy, but ineffective. One airplane was intercepted by seven Zekes, but escaped undamaged.⁴⁰

The photographic reconnaissance mission for which the attack on Tarawa was to furnish support was conducted over Mille by three B-24D's of the 42d Bomb Squadron in what was the first night photographic reconnaissance mission performed by the VII Bomber Command. The airplanes accomplished complete photographic coverage of Mille, Port Rhin, and Tokowa Channel. They encountered medium to heavy anti-aircraft fire, meager to moderate in intensity, but inaccurate, the only damage being one hole in the left vertical stabilizer of one bomber.⁴¹

On the next night, three B-24D's, one of which was abortive, conducted a photographic mission over Jaluit,⁴² with the mission

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

AAFES-41

~~RESTRICTED~~

38

being repeated on the night of 19 June. There was some anti-aircraft fire both times, but no damage was caused the B-24's.⁴³ These missions were followed by photographic reconnaissance on 21, 22, and 24 June, as follows:

21 June 1943--One airplane, piloted by Col. C. F. Hogg, executive officer of VII Bomber Command, conducted an armed photographic reconnaissance over Nonuti, Seru, and Mulumau. Three 500-pound GP bombs were dropped on Nonuti. There was no enemy opposition.⁴⁴

22 June 1943--Three B-24D's of the 426 Bomb Squadron conducted daylight photographic mission over Seru, Mulumau, Tabetuea, Cnotoa, Tarawa, and Arorai from Canton. One airplane, after taking photos of Arorai, dropped to 1,000 feet and expended about 450 rounds of ammunition strafing. There was no enemy opposition.⁴⁵

24 June 1943--Three aircraft of 98th Bomb Squadron conducted visual reconnaissance of Nonuti, Tabetuea, Cnotoa, Tama, Arorai,⁴⁶ and Apanasa. They carried no bombs and met with no opposition.

These reconnaissance missions were followed by a large-scale strike against Mairu on 23 June. The reconstituted 11th Bomb Group was assigned to this second strike of any size against the rich phosphate-producing Japanese stronghold. The mission proved to be little short of disastrous for the inexperienced personnel of the once battle-seasoned 11th Group. Nineteen of the group's airplanes, together with one from Headquarters, VII Bomber Command, were to be flown to Funafuti on 27 June. Of these, however, one crashed at Palmyra en route. The next day, two of the airplanes assigned to the mission were released because of engine difficulties. The first

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SECURITY INFORMATION

AFHS-41

39

airplane to take off for Laura crashed. Six others took off, then another crashed, and General Landon ordered the remaining airplanes to stay on the ground. Four of the airborne aircraft started for Laura but became separated in a heavy front and two of them failed to find the target. The other two airplanes reached the target individually; one dropped 11 x 160-pound fragmentation clusters from 13,000 feet, and the other dropped 10 from 12,000 feet, with results unobserved. There was interception by 10 Zeros, and opposition from light, medium, and heavy anti-aircraft fire, moderately intense but inaccurate. The only damage was the loss of the Plexiglas in the nose of one airplane.⁴⁷

During approximately the next two months the Seventh Air Force engaged in relatively little offensive action against either the Marshalls or the Gilberts. Four B-24D's of the 42d Bomb Squadron conducted a photographic mission over Makin and Little Makin from Funafuti on 11 July,⁴⁸ and six airplanes from the same squadron bombed Poto Island, Tarawa Atoll, on 18 July.⁴⁹ Meanwhile, the 11th Bomb Group was conducting a diversionary strike against Wake to divert attention from the southern part of the Central Pacific and to confuse the enemy as to where the next strike would occur.⁵⁰

Coincident with the unopposed occupation of Baker by American forces, six B-24D's of the 11th Bomb Group began conducting daily search missions out of Canton on 1 September, continuing the missions

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SECURITY INFORMATION

through 14 September.⁵¹ Also, on 11 September, 19 P-40's of the 45th Fighter Squadron, escorted by one B-21 and one LB-30 of the 11th Bomb Group, were flown from Canton to Baker, where they were to provide fighter protection for the forces on the island.⁵²

To prevent the enemy from conducting raids on the installations at Baker, as well as those at Nukufetau and Nanomea in the Ellice Group, a coordinated Army-Navy attack on Tarawa, main Japanese base in the Gilberts, was planned during the month of September. Organized for the purpose was Task Force 15 under the command of Rear Admiral Foymail. Within the task force there were to be two air groups: the Canton Air Group, commanded by Brig. Gen. E. H. Landon, consisting of six PBY's and 12 B-24's; and the Funafuti Air Group, commanded by Brig. Gen. Harold D. Campbell, USMC, consisting of 12 PBY's, 10 PV-1's, and 12 B-24's. The actual attack was to be made by carrier-based aircraft. The Canton and Funafuti air groups were to support the carrier striking group by search and by attack on Tarawa preceding the carrier-based attack.⁵³ The 24 B-24's in the air groups were furnished by the 11th Bomb Group. They assembled at their staging bases on Canton and Funafuti on 14 and 15 September.⁵⁴

The air group plan of attack was to strike land-based aircraft and air installations by bombing Tarawa on the night of 17-18 September. The attack was to be made with fragmentation bombs insofar as possible.⁵⁵ The first three airplanes were to drop 500-

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SECURITY INFORMATION
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pound GP bombs with delay fuse on the runway at Tarawa to immobilize its use during the carrier strike. The air group was to complete its bombing two hours prior to the initial attack of the carrier striking force.⁵⁶

On the night of 18 September, 24 B-24D's--12 from Canton and 12 from Funafuti--took off for Tarawa. Eight airplanes of the Canton Flight attacked Betio Island, the primary target, one bombed Maiana, and three were abortive. Ten airplanes of the Funafuti Flight attacked Betio, one bombed Maiana, one bombed Aramama, and one was abortive. Betio was hit by 229 x 20-pound fragmentation clusters, 25 x 30-pound fragmentation clusters, and 24 x 500-pound GP bombs, with excellent results. Twenty 20-pound and 10 x 30-pound fragmentation clusters fell on alternate targets. There was intense heavy and medium antiaircraft fire, but it was inaccurate. There was no interception.⁵⁷

On 19 September, 13 B-24D's from Canton and 11 from Funafuti conducted a daylight bombardment and photo reconnaissance mission over Tarawa. Four airplanes were abortive. The remaining 20 dropped 120 x 500-pound GP bombs on Tarawa, and five 500-pound GP bombs on Aramama, in addition to obtaining complete photographic coverage of Betio, the primary target for the mission of the preceding night. This attack faced considerably more opposition than had the night attack, for in addition to fire from medium and heavy

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antiaircraft guns, there was intercession from between 15 and 20 Zekes.⁵⁸

A total of 131 passes made at the B-24's were specifically reported, with 85 per cent of them coming from the 10 to two o'clock positions, and the remainder coming chiefly from the beam, with a few scattered ones from the four to eight o'clock positions. There was some difference of opinion as to the degree of experience of the enemy pilots. The general consensus, however, was that with the exception of a few seasoned leaders most of them were inexperienced. Generally they failed to press their attacks home, breaking away in a half-roll and split "S" which presented a difficult target for the B-24 gunners. Attacks were concentrated on the flight leaders unless indications appeared that one of the other airplanes was in trouble. One B-24 was shot down, and 10 others were damaged.⁵⁹

Although there was decided improvement over the Wake mission in July, and all personnel were congratulated on the successful performance of a difficult mission, it was observed that further training in night formation flying was necessary. It was also observed that the importance of frequent blinker contact between the airplanes should be stressed in training.⁶⁰

The bombing of Larawa was the last strike conducted by aircraft of the Seventh Air Force prior to the action connected directly with

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the occupation of the Gilberts. In anticipation of this action, the bombardment strength of the Seventh Air Force was augmented by the addition of one heavy (the 30th), and one medium (the 41st) bombardment group. The 30th Bomb Group was assigned to the Seventh Air Force on 11 October 1943,⁶¹ and the 41st Bomb Group was assigned on 22 October.⁶² On 6 November 1943, Advanced Headquarters (ADVHQ) of the Seventh Air Force was established at Funafuti,⁶³ and the first large-scale offensive in the sweep of the air, land, and sea power of the United States across the Central Pacific was begun.

A recapitulation of the offensive action of the Seventh Air Force during the period under consideration is presented in tables on the following pages.

It will be seen from the foregoing pages that the period from the beginning of the war to the establishment of Advanced Headquarters at Funafuti was one of limited operations for the Seventh Air Force. Handicapped by lack of both personnel and aircraft, its functions were limited largely to defensive and training activities. Yet the air force was able to carry on some offensive operations. These are important not only for the damage they inflicted upon the enemy, but also for the experience they furnished in the employment of land-based Army aircraft in the vast oceanic theater of the Central Pacific--experience which was to be well utilized in the succeeding months.⁶⁴

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 SECURITY INFORMATION

AAFMS-41

44

SIXTH AIR FORCE
 TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED OVER TARGETS BY ALL TYPES OF AIRCRAFT
 DECEMBER 1941-OCTOBER 1943

TARGETS	Short Tons of Bombs Dropped over Targets									
	Dec. 1941	Jan. 1943	Feb. 1943	Apr. 1943	May 1943	Jun. 1943	Jul. 1943	Sen. 1943	Oct. 1943	TOTAL
Enemy Shipping (Midway)	76.35									76.35
Wake Island	4.50	35.40	2.25	7.95	11.75					61.35
G Nauru				28.50	4.50	1.50				34.50
Aogoaona						.75				0.75
I Nonuti								41.40		41.40
Kirawa				15.09						15.09
L Enemy Shipping			2.75							2.75
Madin										
B Kwajalein			1.50							1.50
Karak										
Ikarewa										
Marawa										
Tamana						4.33				4.33
Taketeneva										
Nonuti										
S Total Gilberts	2.75	1.50	43.59	4.50	5.93			41.40		99.72
Jaluit (Marshalls)							1.50			1.50
GRAND TOTAL ALL TARGETS	80.85	35.40	5.00	43.59	12.45	5.98	12.75	41.40		389.92

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SEVENTH AIR FORCE
 SMOKE TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED ON TARGETS BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT
 DECEMBER 1941-OCTOBER 1943 ⁶⁶

Target	Type of Aircraft				Total
	B-17	B-24	B-26	LB-30	
Enemy Shipping (Midway)	74.35		2.00	.	76.35
Waik Island		56.85		4.50	61.35
G Nauru		29.50			29.50
Apamama		4.50			4.50
I Nonuti		.75			.75
Tarawa		56.49			56.49
L Enemy Shipping Makin		2.75			2.75
B Apaiang					
Maraki		1.50			1.50
E Tarawa					
Tarawa					
R Makana					
Facetanea		4.23			4.23
I Nonuti					
S Total Gilberts		99.72			99.72
Jaluit (Marshalls)		1.50			1.50
GRAND TOTAL ALL TARGETS	74.35	188.07	2.00	4.50	238.92

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GEOGOLGY

Operations of the Seventh Air Force
7 December 1941 to 6 November 1943

1941

- 7 Dec. 41 0755 - Five enemy single-engine, low-wing monoplanes, carrying torpedoes, observed southeast of Hickam Field hangar line, flying toward Pearl Harbor at an altitude of about 50 feet. Twelve dive bombers attacked Hickam Field hangar line and Hawaiian Air Depot, and a few minutes later 16 additional dive bombers attacked Hickam Field hangar line. The entire attack lasted about 10 minutes. (Ltr., Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder, AC/S G-2, HHD to AC/S G-2, WDSS, 20 Dec. 41, in AG 7AF 382.9, Enemy Attacks on Oahu. See App. 1.)
- 0800 - Wheeler Field attacked by approximately 25 enemy airplanes, bombing and strafing for approximately 15 minutes. (Ibid.)
- 0825 - Second attack on Hickam Field: six to nine airplanes in low-level bombing and strafing attack on technical buildings, and consolidated barracks. About one minute later, five to six airplanes bombed the baseball diamond from high level. Second attack lasted between 10 and 15 minutes. (Ibid.)
- 0830 - Single Japanese fighter strafed Bellows Field in first attack on that area. Four P-40 and two P-38 aircraft took off from Wheeler Field. (Ibid.; memo for Roberts Commission, 20 Dec. 41. See App. 2.)
- 0855 - Two P-40's took off from Wheeler Field. (Memo for Roberts Com., 20 Dec. 41.)
- 0900 - Third attack on Hickam Field: six to nine airplanes strafed technical buildings behind hangar line and dispersed aircraft with machine-gun fire; seven to nine airplanes bombed consolidated barracks, parade ground, and Post Exchange from about 6,000 feet. Second attack on Wheeler Field: seven enemy airplanes strafed aircraft being taxied onto airfield. Second attack on Bellows Field: nine airplanes strafed aircraft on runways. (Ltr., Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder to AC/S G-2, WDSS, 20 Dec. 41.)

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- 7 Dec. 41 0915 - Six P-30's took off from Wheeler Field. (Memo for Roberts Com., 26 Dec. 41.)
- 0930 - Five P-40's and six P-30's took off from Wheeler Field. (Ibid.)
- 0950 - One O-47 took off from Bellows Field. (Ibid.)
- 1040 - Three O-47's took off from Bellows Field. (Ibid.)
- 1137 - Four A-20A's took off from Hickam Field to search area 25 miles off Barbers Point for carriers reported there. Returned at 1310. (Ibid.)
- 1140 - Two B-17D's took off from Hickam Field to search area 25 miles off Barbers Point for carriers reported there. Returned at 1640. (Ibid.)
- 1200 - Five P-40's took off from Wheeler Field. (Ibid.)
- 1245 - Five P-40's took off from Bellows Field. (Ibid.)
- 1300 - Three A-20A's took off from Hickam Field. (Ibid.)
- 1330 - Two B-18's took off from Hickam Field to search sector 310°-050°. Returned at 1700. (Ibid.)
- 1500 - Three O-47's took off from Bellows Field, and 11 P-40's took off from Wheeler Field. (Ibid.)
- 1520 - Three B-17D's took off from Hickam Field to search sector 165°-195°, returning at 1825. (Ibid.)

Air strength of Hawaiian Air Force, before and after the enemy attack:

Type	On Hand 7 Dec.	On Hand After Raid	Usable After Raid
B-17D	12	8	4
B-18	33	21	11
A-20A	12	10	5
P-40C	12	7	2
P-40B	67	50	25
P-36A	39	35	16
P-26A	8	3	2
P-26E	6	5	2

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AAFHS-41

48

7 Dec. 41 (contd.)	Type	On Hand 7 Dec.	On Hand After Paid	Usable After Paid
	B-12A	3	3	1
	A-12A	2	2	1
	AE-6	4	3	2
	OA-9	3	1	1
	OA-8	1	1	1
	C-47B	7	7	5
	C-49	2	1	1

(Memo for Roberts Com., 26 Dec. 41.)

- 11 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with six B-18's conducted a search and attack mission in sector 230°-170°, 300 miles seaward. (War Diary, A-3, Hawaiian Air Force. See App. 3.)
- 12 Dec. 41 Sampan with police guard and crew of six men en route from Kalahele to Hilo sunk by airplane. Attack evidently was by enemy aircraft as 18th Bomb wing reported that none of its airplanes participated. (Ltr., CG 13th Bomb Wing to CG HED, 14 Dec. 41.)
- 13 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with five B-17's conducted a search and attack mission in sector 250°-340°, 200 miles seaward. (War Diary, A-3, HAF.)
- 14 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing, with 11 B-17's, conducted search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 210°-270°, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)
- 15 Dec. 41 Lahaina, Maui, shelled, probably by submarine. (Ibid.)

18th Bomb Wing with 11 B-17's conducted a search mission against submarines and surface craft in sector 210°-230°, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)
- 16 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 12 B-17's conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 40°-160°, 600 miles seaward. Submarine sighted between Makoalawe and Moloikihi Rocks, but contact was lost when it dived. (Ibid.)

19th Bomb Wing with eight B-18's conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 350°-40°, 150 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

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17 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 12 B-17's conducted a search mission in sectors 10^o-70^o and 250^o-310^o, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

18th Bomb Wing with three B-18's conducted a search mission in sector 70^o-100^o, 300 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

18th Bomb Wing, with six A-20's conducted a search mission in sector 80^o-140^o, 150 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

18 Dec. 41 Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin relinquished command of the Hawaiian Air Force (GO 24, HAF, 18 Dec. 41), and Maj. Gen. Clarence L. Tinker assumed command. (GO #25, HAF, 18 Dec. 41.)

Aircraft of the 18th Bomb Wing in following search missions: 10 B-17's in sectors 90^o-120^o and 150^o-180^o, 600 miles seaward; six B-18's in sectors 90^o-120^o and 150^o-180^o, 300 miles seaward. On the latter mission, one 600-pound bomb was dropped in an oil slick, which enlarged to three or four times its former size. (War Diary, A-3, HAF).

19 Dec. 41 Aircraft of 18th Bomb Wing in following search missions: 11 B-17's in sector 210^o-230^o, 600 miles seaward; one B-18 in sector 20^o-200^o, 300 miles seaward; six A-20's in sector 30^o-90^o, 150 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

20 Dec. 41 Aircraft of 18th Bomb Wing in following search missions: 17 B-17's in sector 60^o-180^o, 600 miles seaward; three A-20's in vicinity of long. 155^o, 30', lat. 22^o, 00'. (Ibid.)

21 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with eight B-17's conducted search mission in sector 140^o-250^o, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

22 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 11 B-17's conducted search mission in sector 130^o-240^o, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

23 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 12 B-17's conducted a search mission in sector 120^o-240^o, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

24 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 16 B-17's conducted a search mission in sector 30^o-180^o, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

18th Bomb Wing with three A-20's and one B-17 conducted a search and attack mission against enemy submarines reported between Hihau and Kaula. Bombs were dropped on what appeared to be two submarines diving. Results were unobserved. (Ibid.)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

A-585-41

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

50

- 25 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 16 B-17's conducted a search mission in sector 60°-180°, 800 miles seaward. (Ibid.)
- 26 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 16 B-17's conducted a search mission in sector 60°-180°, 800 miles seaward. (Ibid.)
- 27 Dec. 41 Aircraft of 18th Bomb Wing in following search missions: 16 B-17's in sector 60°-180°, 800 miles seaward; 10 B-18's in sector 250°-300°, 150 miles seaward; and six A-20's off Kalahele. (Ibid.)
- 28 Dec. 41 Aircraft of 18th Bomb Wing in following search missions: 15 B-17's in sector 60°-180°, 800 miles seaward; six B-18's on a course 260°, 300 miles seaward; one B-16, 150 miles out on west leg of search beam and return; and three A-20's on a course 325° from Kaena Point, 150 miles seaward. Three submarines were sighted by the B-18's. One was bombed and probably destroyed. (War Diary, A-3, LAF.)
- 29 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 12 B-17's conducted search mission in sector 60°-90° and 120°-180°, 800 miles seaward. (Ibid.)
- 30 Dec. 41 Aircraft of 18th Bomb Wing in following search missions: 12 B-17's in sector 10°-110°, 800 miles seaward; four B-18's in sector 140°-170°, 300 miles seaward; and three A-20's in sector 260°-285°, 150 miles seaward. (Ibid.)
- 31 Dec. 41 One of 12 B-17's of 18th Bomb Wing on search missions in sectors 60°-150°, 25°-55°, 95°-110°, and 130°-180°, 800 miles seaward, dropped three 300-lb. bombs on or near submarine. Other 18th Wing aircraft in search missions as follows: four B-18's in sector 55°-95°, 300 miles seaward; and three A-20's in sector 260°-285°, 150 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

Aircraft status report of Hawaiian Interceptor Command:

- 43 P-40's and 27 P-36's in commission.
 - 3 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for first echelon maintenance.
 - 5 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for second echelon maintenance.
 - 67 P-40's, 24 P-39's, and 2 P-36's out for third echelon maintenance.
- (Ibid.)

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31 Dec. 41 Aircraft Status Report of 18th Bomb Wing:
 (contd.) 28 B-17's, 9 B-18's, and 10 A-20's in commission.
 6 B-17's and 4 B-18's out for first echelon
 maintenance.
 1 B-17 and 1 B-18 out for second echelon maintenance.
 5 B-17's and 7 B-18's out for third echelon
 maintenance.
 (Ibid.)

Aircraft Status Report of 86th Observation Squadron:
 5 O-47's and 1 O-49 in commission.
 1 O-47 out for first echelon maintenance.
 (Ibid.)

1942

- 16 Jan. 42 During this period, three B-17E's of 23d Bomb Squadron
 to and three of the 50th Reconnaissance Squadron served as
 30 Jan. 42 a bomber unit assigned to Task Group 8.9. They departed
 Hickam Field on 16 January and arrived at Canton on
 17 January. The 18th and 19th of January were devoted
 to anti-submarine search missions. On 21 January, the
 flight proceeded to Mandi, returning to Canton on 23
 January. A second flight was made to Mandi on 25
 January, with return to Canton on 27 January. A sub-
 marine search to 500 miles west of Canton was made on 28
 January, with no contacts reported. The return to Hickam
 Field via Palmyra was effected without incident on 29-30
 January. (Report of Operations, Bomber Unit Task Group
 8.9 to CG 11th Bomb Gr., 3 Feb. 42. Sec App. 4.)
- 1 Feb. 42 Women's Air Raid Defense (W.A.R.D.) organized and trained.
 Ninety women took over in place of enlisted men at
 Information Center and moved to Fort Shafter. (VII Fighter
 Command History, Dec. 1941-July 1944.)
- 5 Feb. 42 Hawaiian Air Force redesignated as Seventh Air Force,
 composed of three commands: Bomber, Interceptor, and Base.
 (CG 30, HAD, 5 Mar. 42.)
- 9-10 Feb. 42 Twelve B-17's, detached from defense forces and released
 to CILCPAC for operations in South Pacific, scheduled to
 depart from Oahu so as to arrive Mandi Airport, Fiji,
 on 13 February. To be assigned to Task Force 11 under
 Vice Admiral Brown, and to operate in support of operations
 of that force until released by the Commander of the Task
 Force, at which time they were to return to Oahu. (CILCPAC
 Operations Plan 14-42, 8 Feb. 42; CILCPAC Operations

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~~RESTRICTED~~

- 9-10 Feb. Order 43-42, 9 Feb. 42, in AG 7AF 370.26, Operations-42 (contd.) Joint Army-Navy.)
- 14 Feb. 42 One B-17 of VII Bomber Command in photographic reconnaissance of Wake. (Ltr., Adm. G. W. Nimitz to CG HHD, 21 Feb. 42; VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Reports.)
- 4 Mar. 42 At 0012 an unidentified aircraft witted up 90 miles north-west of Kauai, from where it went to Keena Point on Oahu, then around north coast until opposite Kaneohe where it turned south to Honolulu. Four 500-lb. bombs fell short of the city, and did no damage. Overcast conditions prevented successful pursuit or the use of anti-aircraft. The known presence of a submarine in the French Frigate Shoals area indicated that it was a multi-motored flying boat from the Marshalls or Wake, refueling from a submarine. (CG-CVE-3685/9th, Emmons to Chief AAF, 13 June 42, in AG 7AF 382.9, Enemy attacks on Oahu.)
- 18-28 May 42 Seventh Air Force on a special alert to meet threatened enemy attack. A majority of the B-17's were held loaded with 500- and 600-lb. demolition bombs. (Ltr., Brig. Gen. H. G. Davidson, CG 7AF to CG AAF, 13 June 42; G-3 Reports, 7AF, 18-28 May 42.)
- 30 May 42 Six B-17's from 36th Bomb Squadron flown to Midway. (Memo, CG VII Bomber Command to G-3, 7AF, 6 June 42, in AG 7AF 370.24, Battles and Engagements.)
- 31 May 42 Six B-17's from 431st Bomb Squadron, two from the 31st Bomb Squadron, and one from 72d Bomb Squadron flown to Midway. (Ibid.)
- Six B-17's from 36th Bomb Squadron and six from 431st Bomb Squadron (probably) flew search missions to the distance of 800 miles and return. (Ltr., Brig. Gen. H. G. Davidson to CG AAF, 13 June 42.)
- 1 June 42 One B-17 flown to Midway. (Memo, CG VII Bomber Command to G-3 7AF, 6 June 42.)
- Two squadrons, with six B-17's each, flew search missions from Midway to a distance of 800 miles and return. (Ltr., Brig. Gen. H. G. Davidson to CG AAF, 13 June 42.)
- 2 June 42 Six B-17's from 36th Bomb Squadron returned from Midway to Wheeler Field. (Memo, CG VII Bomber Command to G-3 7AF, 6 June 42; Ltr., Lt. Col. L. C. Coddington, CG 36th Bomb Sq. to CG 11th Bomb Gp., 8 June 42, in AG 7AF 370. 4, Battles and Engagements.)

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- 3 June 42 0505 - One B-17, with maximum gas load and no bomb load, departed for Midway. (Memo, CG VII Bomber Command to CG-3 ZAF, 3 June 42.)
- 1405 - Six B-17's from 42d Bomb Squadron departed from Earling Sands for Midway, with full load. (Ibid.)
- 1623 - Six B-17's from 431st Bomb Squadron, with two from 31st Bomb Squadron and one from 72d Bomb Squadron attached, attacked five Japanese battleships or heavy cruisers, bearing 265°, 570 miles from Midway. Dropped 36 x 600-lb. demolition bombs from 5,000 feet, scoring five hits and several near misses. (Seventh Air Force and the Battle of Midway, 3-6 June 1942, a consolidation of Seventh Air Force activity; memo, CG VII Bomber Command to CG ZAF, 15 Sep. 42, in AG ZAF 370.24, Battles and Engagements. See App. 6.)
- 4 June 42 0710 - Two B-23's from 18th Reconnaissance Squadron, and two B-23B's from 69th Bomb Squadron (M), in torpedo attack on aircraft carrier from altitude of 150 to 200 feet, results not observed. One B-23 from each squadron shot down by fire from many intercepting fighters and/or extremely heavy anti-aircraft fire. The other two airplanes crash-landed at Midway because of damage suffered. (Ibid. See also App. 9.)
- 0815 - Fourteen B-17's (six from 431st Bomb Squadron, five from 42d Bomb Squadron, two from 31st Bomb Squadron, and one from 72d Bomb Squadron) attacked striking force bearing 325°, 145 miles from Midway. Dropped 108 x 500-lb. demolition bombs from 20,000 feet, with seven hits and several near misses. (Ibid.)
- 1235 - Six B-17's from 33d Bomb Squadron departed for Midway, each with one-half bomb load and one bomb-bay tank. Attacked carrier force bearing 333°, 170 miles distant, at about 1830, before landing at Midway. Eight 500-lb. demolition bombs were dropped on one aircraft carrier and one destroyer. One hit and two near misses were scored on the carrier which was already aflame, and one hit was made on the destroyer which sank. Anti-aircraft was heavy. There was interception by eight Zero fighters, of which four were shot down and one was damaged. Two B-17's were unable to drop their bombs because of damage. (Ibid.; Ltr., Brig. Gen. M. C. Davidson, CG ZAF to CG ZAF, 13 June 42.)

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- 4 June 42 (contd.)
- 1810 - Two B-17's of 42d Bomb Squadron attacked carrier force at Lat. 31°, Long. 178° 40', dropping 16 x 500-lb. bombs from 10,000 feet, scoring one hit and two near misses on a battleship, and two hits and three near misses on damaged carrier. Three Zero interceptors were shot down, and one possibly shot down. (Ibid.)
- 1830 - Four B-17's, at least two of which were from the 431st Bomb Squadron, dropped 23 x 500-lb. demolition bombs from 20,000 to 25,000 feet on heavy cruiser bearing 334°, 165 miles from Midway, scoring one hit and two near misses, with results of 16 bombs unobserved. (Ibid.)
- 5 June 42
- 0820 - Six B-17's from 72d Bomb Squadron departed for Midway. (Memo, CG VII Bomber Command to G-3 7AF, 6 June 42.)
- 0830 - Five B-17's from 23d Bomb Squadron and three from 42d Bomb Squadron attacked enemy force at 270°, 130 miles from Midway, in two elements of four airplanes each. The first element dropped 19 x 500-lb. demolition bombs from 30,000 feet, getting two probable hits and three near misses. The second element dropped 20 x 500-lb. demolition bombs from 20,000 feet, getting one direct hit and four near misses. Heavy AA fire, but no fighter opposition. No damage to any B-17. (Ibid.; Seventh Air Force and the Battle of Midway, 3-6 June 1942; ltr., Brig. Gen. H. G. Davidson, CG 7AF to CG AAF, 13 June 42; memo, CG VII Bomber Command to CG 7AF, 15 Sep. 42.)
- 1205 - Six B-17's from 31st Bomb Squadron, with one bomb-ay tank and four 600-lb. bombs, departed for Midway. (Memo, CG VII Bomber Command to G-3 7AF, 6 June 42.)
- 1815 - Three B-17's from 42d Bomb Squadron, with one from the 23d Squadron attached, attacked heavy cruiser bearing 300°, 300 miles from Midway. Thirty-two 500-lb. demolition bombs were dropped from 16,000 feet, scoring two hits and three near misses. Immediately thereafter, three B-17's of the 23d Bomb Squadron dropped 24 x 500-lb. demolition bombs on the same target from 14,000 feet, getting one hit and one near miss. There was no fighter interception, and AA fire did no damage. (Seventh Air Force and the Battle of Midway, 3-6 June 1942; memo, CG VII Bomber Command to CG 7AF, 15 Sep. 42; ltr., Brig. Gen. H. G. Davidson to CG AAF, 13 June 42.)

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- 5 June 42 (contd.) 1825 - Five B-17's from 73d Bomb Squadron, attacked cruiser bearing 320°, 425 miles from Midway, dropping 15 x 600-lb. bombs and eight 300-lb. bombs from 9,000 to 12,500 feet, with results unobserved. One B-17 was shot down by extremely heavy AA fire, and one other was forced down in water due to fuel shortage--crew recovered. (Ibid.)
- 6 June 42 0900 - Six B-17's from 11th Bomb Group, loaded with two 1,100-lb. demolition bombs, departed for Midway. (Memo, CG VII Bomber Command to G-3 7AF, 6 June 42.)
- 0300 - Six B-17's from 8th Bomb Group, loaded with two 1,100-lb. demolition bombs, departed for Midway. (Ibid.)
- 1140 - Six B-17's from 26th Bomb Squadron dropped 20 x 1,100-lb. demolition bombs on target that proved to be a friendly submarine, which later reported no damage. Another flight of five B-17's returned to Midway after an extensive search with negative results. (Seventh Air Force and the Battle of Midway, 3-6 June 1942; ltr., Lt. Col. L. C. Coddington, CO 26th Bomb Sq. to CO 11th Bomb Gr., 8 June 42.)
- 7 June 42 Brig. Gen. H. G. Davidson assumed command of the Seventh Air Force, succeeding Maj. Gen. Clarence L. Kirkner who was lost near Midway. (GO 51, 7AF, 9 June 42.)
- 8 June 42 Seventh Air Force reported a striking force of 27 B-17's, 21 B-20's, 5 B-18's, and 1 B-26 at Caku, with 16 B-17's still at Midway. (CG 7AF to C/S USA, Daily Report for War Department, 8 June 42, in 7AF A-3 file. See App. 11.)
- 17 June 42 73d Fighter Squadron began daily dawn and dusk patrols from Eastern Island, Midway. P-40 aircraft flown from aircraft carrier U. S. S. Saratoga. (History of VII Fighter Command, Dec. 41-July 44.)
- 20 June 42 Maj. Gen. Willis H. Hale assumed command of the Seventh Air Force, succeeding Brig. Gen. H. G. Davidson. (GO 57, 7AF, 20 June 42.)
- 23 June 42 Seventh Air Force aircraft bombed enemy installations on Wake. (CM-CUE-1163/39th, Memo to C/S USA, 23 June 42, in A 7AF 370.24, Battles and Engagements.)
- 10 July 42 Ground echelon of 11th Bomb Group departed from Caku on U. S. S. Argonne. (Basic History, 11th Bomb Gr.)

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 SECURITY INFORMATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

145783-41

56

- 16 July 42 11th Bomb Group designated as the Mobile Air Force in the Central Pacific. (C.I.-OUT-1562/16th, Emmons to C/S USA, 16 July 42, in AF 7AF 370.032, Hawaiian Mobile Air Force.)
- 17 July 42 The first squadron of eight B-17's of the 11th Bomb Group departed from Hickam Field for Suva, Fiji Islands, with the remainder of the Group leaving in the next three days. (C.I.-OUT-1598/16th, Emmons to C/S USA, 17 July 42, ibid.)
- 22-23 July 42 Headquarters, air echelon, 11th Bomb Group, and nine B-17's of the 98th Bomb Squadron and nine B-17's of the 43d Bomb Squadron arrived Plaines des Gaiacs, New Caledonia. (Basic histories, 43d and 98th Bomb Sq., 11th Bomb Gr.)
- 23 July 42 Ground echelon on 11th Bomb Group arrived at Noumea. (Basic History, 11th Bomb Gr.)
- Three B-17's of VII Bomber Command in photographic reconnaissance mission over Makin from Canton. (Ltr., CG 7AF to C.I.C.PAC, 27 July 42, in AG 7AF 373.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.)
- 24 July 42 431st Bomb Squadron arrived at Landi, Fiji Group. (Basic History, 11th Bomb Gr.)
- 25 July 42 Nine B-17's of the 98th Bomb Squadron arrived at Wate. (Basic History, 98th Bomb Sq.)
- 31 July 42 Ground echelon of 431st Bomb Squadron arrived at Veti Lvu in Fiji Group. (Basic History, 11th Bomb Gr.)
- One B-17 of the Seventh Air Force in photographic mission over Wake from Midway. Intercepted by six enemy fighters, four of which were shot down. The B-17 returned with three bullet holes. (Ltr., CG 7AF to C.I.C.PAC, 3 Aug. 42, in AG 7AF 004.511.)
- VII Bomber Command directed to furnish a minimum daily striking force of 18 heavy bombers, in three squadrons of six aircraft each, one to be on alert and two on reserve. The two squadrons on reserve at any one time were to be available for training purposes except during the

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL

~~RESTRICTED~~

- 31 July 42 (cont'd.) dawn and dusk alert periods. (Ltr., Maj. Gen. Willis H. Hale, CG 7AF to CG VII Bomber Command, 31 Jul. 42, in AG 7AF 373.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.)
- 1 Aug. 42 The 431st Bomb Squadron arrived at Votua Lava in Fiji Group. (Basic History, 431st Bomb Sq.)
- 11 Sep. 42 383d Fighter Squadron arrived at Canton to engage in submarine patrol, interception, and training. (History of VII Fighter Command, Dec. 41-July 44.)
- 23 Sep. 42 Aircraft of the 431st Bomb Squadron began flying search missions over the Ellice Islands. (Basic History, 431st Bomb Sq.)
- 25 Sep. 42 72d Bomb Squadron of 5th Bomb Group was attached to the 11th Bomb Group. (Basic History, 11th Bomb Gr.)
- 1 Nov. 42 The ground echelon of the 431st Bomb Squadron arrived at Espiritu Santo. The air echelon had arrived earlier. (Basic History, 431st Bomb Sq.)
- 23 Nov. 42 The 42d Bomb Squadron was transferred to Espiritu Santo. (Basic History, 42d Bomb Sq.)
- 1 Dec. 42 South Pacific Area assumed administrative control of the 5th and 11th Bomb Groups and 12th and 44th Fighter Squadrons.
- 5 Dec. 42 Following units of Seventh Air Force formally transferred to South Pacific Area.

- 11th Bomb Group (H), Headquarters & Headquarters Squadron
 - 36th Bomb Squadron (L)
 - 42d Bomb Squadron (A)
 - 93th Bomb Squadron (E)
 - 431st Bomb Squadron (H)
- 5th Bomb Group (H), Headquarters & Headquarters Squadron
 - 23d Bomb Squadron (A)
 - 31st Bomb Squadron (A)
 - 72d Bomb Squadron (A)
 - 394th Bomb Squadron (H)
- 12th Fighter Squadron
- 44th Fighter Squadron
- 482d Ordnance Company (Aviation)

~~RESTRICTED~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

CONFIDENTIAL

887th Chemical Company (Aviation Operations)
(GO #188, H&D, 5 Dec. 42; ltr., AG 330.2, 12-23-42,
OS-I-17-11, 4 Jan. 43.)

22-23 Dec. 42 Twenty-six B-24D's of 307th Bomb Group staged through Midway to bomb Wake. They dropped 136 x 500-lb. GP bombs and 21 incendiary clusters. Damage assessment was difficult because of clouds and the large number of fires and explosions taking place over the island. The attack apparently took the enemy by surprise, as neither searchlights nor AA fire were encountered until after the attack started. No aircraft damaged except two small hits. The Navy furnished three submarines and one destroyer to render navigational assistance and to rescue any crews forced down at sea. (Ltr., Brig. Gen. H. K. Ramey to CG 7AF, 30 Dec. 42; ltr., Maj. Gen. Willis H. Hale, CG 7AF to Lt. Gen. W. H. Arnold, CG AAF, 28 Dec. 42, in AG 7AF 373.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.)

1945

23 Jan. 43 Twenty-four P-40L aircraft of the 78th Fighter Squadron flown from Barking Sands to Midway, in the longest over-water mass flight of single-engine airplanes ever attempted. The flight made as the 78th Fighter Squadron relieved the 73d Fighter Squadron in the defense of Midway. (History of the VII Fighter Command, Dec. 41-July 44, Doc. 5.)

25 Jan. 43 Six B-24D's of 371st Bomb Squadron in daylight aerial photo recon mission over Wake from Sand Island, Midway, dropped 60 x 100-lb. demolition bombs. AA, which was first fired after bomb runs started, was accurate as to height but trailing. The B-24's were attacked by possibly eight Zeros as they completed their runs and refueled. One Zero was definitely shot down, with four possibly shot down. The leading B-24 was hit 10 times, and two other aircraft received one hit each. Vertical photographs were taken of the entire island, and oblique were taken from several angles. (No. 307th Bomb Co., Mission Report, 25 Jan. 43, in VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Reports.)

26 Jan. 43 Twenty-two P-40 and P-40L aircraft of 73d Fighters Squadron flown from Midway to Kaneohe Naval Air Station. (History of VII Fighter Command, Dec. 41-July 44, Doc. 5.)

~~RESTRICTED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

AATES-41

59

- 25 Jan. 43 (cont.) Three B-24D's of 507th Bomb Group conducted a photographic mission over Tarawa, Makana, Ananara, -eru, and Tamana from Funafuti. Photographs were taken from 20,000 feet. One medium-sized cargo-passenger type merchant vessel anchored in the lagoon at Tarawa was bombed with 11 x 500-lb. demolition bombs. One near miss may have caused damage. (Ltr., Col. T. H. London, CG VII Bomber Command to CG 7AF, 3 Feb. 43, in AG 7AF 373.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.)
- 28 Jan. 43 One B-24D of 507th Bomb Group photographed Tauru and Ocean Islands. Bombs were not carried. AA exceedingly heavy and accurate over Ocean. (Ibid.; Summary of VII Bomber Command Missions.)
- 30 Jan. 43 Aircraft of 333d Fighter Squadron search for submarine which shelled Canton. (Basic history, 333d Fighter Squadron.)
- 6 Feb. 43 424th Bomb Squadron (H) left Cebu for the South Pacific.
- 17 Feb. 43 Three B-24D's of 507th Bomb Group in a photographic reconnaissance mission over the northern Gilberts, which was unsuccessful because of heavy clouds. Bombs were jettisoned. No AA or interception. (Ltr., Brig. Gen. London to CG 7AF, 24 Feb. 43, in 7AF A-2 files)
- 20 Feb. 43 Three B-24D's of 507th Bomb Group in photo-bombing mission over northern Gilberts from Canton. Photographs were taken from 13,000 to 14,000 feet of Makin, Ananara, and Tarawa. Nine 500-lb. demolition bombs were dropped on shipping at Tarawa, but no hits were observed. There were a few inaccurate bursts of AA at Makin, and a heavy concentration of AA from ships in the lagoon and shore positions at Tarawa. No damage sustained by any B-24. (Ibid.; ltr., Maj. Gen. Willis H. Hale, CG 7AF to Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, CG AAF, 24 Feb. 43, in AG 7AF 373.11, Aerial Operations, Striking & Bombing Missions.)
- 22 Feb. 43 Four aircraft of 333d Fighter Squadron up to intercept enemy bombers at Canton. No contact with enemy. (Basic history, 333d Fighter Sq.)
- 27 Feb. 43 Five aircraft of 333d Fighter Squadron at Canton up to intercept enemy bombers. No contact. (Ibid.)

~~RESTRICTED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

~~RESTRICTED~~

- 10 Mar. 43 Det Fiteron 6 moved from Oahu to Brisbane, Australia, in two flights, each consisting of three P-70 and one LB-30 aircraft. (History of VII Fighter Command, Dec. 41-July 44.)
- 27 Mar. 43 Two 46th Fighter Squadron arrived at Canton to take over duties of 333d Fighter Squadron. Aircraft of 333d Fighter Squadron left at Canton for use of 46th. (Basic History, 40th Fighter Sq.)
- 6 Apr. 43 333d Fighter Squadron arrived at Hilo from Canton. (Basic History, 333d Fighter Sq.)
- 8 Apr. 43 11th Bomb Group (Heavy) reassigned to the Seventh Air Force. (GO #43, HLD, 17 Apr. 43.)
- 20 Apr. 43 Twenty-three B-24D's from 371st and 372d Bomb Squadrons, in bombardment and photographic mission of Kauru from Funafuti. Twenty-two airplanes dropped 28 x 1,000-lb. GP bombs, 45 x 500-lb. GP bombs, and 45 fragmentation clusters, scoring direct hits on runway and dispersal areas. Interception by seven to nine enemy fighters, damaging five B-24's. One B-24 was abortive. (Ltr., Brig. Gen. T. M. London to CG 7AF, 26 Apr. 43; memo, Capt. L. W. Patterson and Capt. J. W. McIlvaine to Lt. Col. P. L. Maldron, A-2 7AF, 24 Apr. 43, in A-2 7AF files.)
- 22 Apr. 43 Japanese bombers attacked Funafuti twice before dawn. One B-24's of the 371st and 372d Bomb Squadrons were dispersed along the narrow runway following the attack on Kauru. Two were destroyed and five were damaged. (7AF Intelligence Bulletin No. 93, 26 July 43.)
- 23 Apr. 43 Six B-24's from 371st Bomb Squadron, five B-24's from 372d Bomb Squadron, and one from Headquarters VII Bomber Command, attacked Isarawa from Funafuti. Aircraft from 371st Bomb Squadron dropped 36 x 100-lb. bombs and six 20-lb. fragmentation bombs, causing direct hits in gas storage and barracks areas. Those from 372d Bomb Squadron and Headquarters VII Bomber Command dropped 24 x 500-lb. GP bombs on Titutu Island with damage unobserved. AA ineffective. Interception by a float biplane and four Zekes. 10 U. S. airplanes damaged. (Hq. VII Bomber Command, "U. S. Aircraft, Action with Enemy, 26 Apr. 43 and 30 Apr. 43," in 7AF A-3 files.)
- 78th Fighter Squadron returned from Midway to Landing Sands. (Basic History, 78th Fighter Sq.)

~~RESTRICTED~~
 SECURITY INFORMATION
 CONFIDENTIAL

AFPS-4

~~RESTRICTED~~

61

- 15 May 43 Nineteen B-24D's from 371st and 372d Bomb Squadrons in daylight bombing mission of Wake from Midway. Four aircraft abortive because of excessive gas consumption, and seven failed to find the target. Seven airplanes dropped 24 x 500-lb. GP bombs and six 650-lb. death charges on target from 11,300 feet. Nineteen Zekes and three Hamps intercepted, four of which were shot down, one probably shot down, and eight damaged. There was considerable inaccurate AA fire. Four B-24's were damaged and one was forced down in the water. (Ltr., Brig. Gen. E. M. Landon to CG 7AF, 18 May 43; Misc. 7AF Reports, in 7AF A-2 files.)
- 23 May 43 A flight of P-40's from the 78th Fighter Squadron dropped 500-lb. bombs on a submarine from 1,500 feet, after which an oil slick and debris were observed. (Basic history, 78th Fighter Co.)
- 26 May 43 Three B-24D's of VII Bomber Command in a visual and photo reconnaissance mission over Ananama. Took 250 pictures and dropped 9,000 pounds of GP bombs on barracks area. No interception or AA. (Summary of VII Bomber Command Missions since Dec. 22, 1942, in 7AF A-2 files.)
- 28 May 43 Three B-24D's of 431st Bomb Squadron in photographic mission of Ananama from Canton. After taking approximately 210 photographs, the aircraft each dropped six 500-lb. GP bombs, with results largely unobserved. No AA or interception. (VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 31 May 43, in AG 7AF 373.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.)
- 14 June 43 One B-24 of 98th Bomb Squadron bombed runways at Tarawa from Funafuti. (Basic history, 98th Bomb Sq.)
- 17-18 June 43 Three B-24's of 98th Bomb Squadron with one from Headquarters, VII Bomber Command, conducted diversionary bombing mission of Tarawa from Funafuti. Dropped nine 500-lb. GP bombs and 152 x 30-lb. fragmentation clusters, rendering 2,000 feet of runway temporarily unserviceable, silencing an AA battery and blowing up an ammunition dump. Five airplanes were over the target one at a time, two hours apart. One airplane was attacked by seven Zekes. AA was both light and heavy. One of the B-24's was damaged. (VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 28 June 43.)

~~RESTRICTED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

AAEHS-41

63

- 17-18 June 43 (contd.) Three B-24D's of 42d Bomb Squadron conducted night photographic reconnaissance mission of Lillo. Encountered medium and heavy AA, heavier to moderate, but inaccurate. Only damage was one hole in left vertical stabilizer of one airplane. Accomplished complete photographic coverage of Vili, Fori Pkin, and Tokawa Channel. This was the first night photographic reconnaissance mission performed by the VII Bomber Command. (Ltr., 25 June 43; ltr., Lt. Col. J. D. Tutledge, Jr. to CG 7AF, 27 June 43, in A-2 7AF files.)
- 18 June 43 Three B-24D's of VII Bomber Command, one of which was abortive, in night photographic mission over Jaluit from Funafuti. Each airplane carried ten photo flash bombs. Inaccurate AA fire caused no damage. (Ltr., Brig. Gen. F. H. Dandon, CG VII Bomber Command to CG 7AF, 3 July 43, in AG 7AF 373.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.)
- 19 June 43 Three B-24D's of 26th Bomb Squadron carried out night photo reconnaissance mission over Jaluit from Funafuti. Light and medium AA fire caused no damage. (VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 2 July 43.)
- 21 June 43 One airplane of VII Bomber Command, piloted by Col. G. E. Berg, Executive Officer of VII Bomber Command, in armed photo reconnaissance mission over Nonuti, Beru, and Turunau. Three 500-lb. G. bombs were dropped on Nonuti. There was no enemy opposition. (VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 26 June 43.)
- 23 June 43 Three B-24D's of 42d Bomb Squadron in daylight photographic mission over Beru, Turunau, Taveteuea, Onotoa, Tarawa, and Arorai from Canton. One airplane, after taking photos of Arorai, dropped to 1,000 feet and expended about 450 rounds of ammunition strafing. There was no enemy opposition. (Ltr.)
- 24 June 43 Three aircraft of 96th Bomb Squadron in daylight visual reconnaissance of Nonuti, Taveteuea, Onotoa, Tarawa, Arorai, and Makuluu. They carried no bombs and met with no opposition. (VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 2 July 43.)
- Two aircraft of 42d Bomb Squadron conducted search mission over Canton. (Basic history, 42d Bomb Sq.)

~~RESTRICTED~~
 SECURITY INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL

AFMAB-41

63

- 24 June 43 The 531st Fighter Squadron arrived at Canton. The pilots arrived via Navy Laker with 13 new A-24 aircraft. (Basic History, 531st Fighter Sq.)
- 27 June 43 One B-24D of Headquarters VII Bomber Command and 19 from 11th Bomb Group (six from 431st Bomb Squadron, six from 26th Bomb Squadron, three from 42d Bomb Squadron, and four from 98th Bomb Squadron) arrived at Funafuti. One B-24D of 98th Bomb Squadron crashed at Salaya en route. (Ltr., Capt. John L. Nellvaine, Acting A-3 VII Bomber Command to CG VII Bomber Command, 2 July 43, in A-3 7AF files.)
- 23 June 43 Bombing mission against Nauru. Of the airplanes at Funafuti assigned to the mission (see 27 June 43), two were released because of engine difficulties. The first airplane crashed on take-off. Six others took off, then another crashed. General Landon ordered the remaining airplanes to stay on the ground. Four of the airborne aircraft, all from the 26th Bomb Squadron, started for Nauru. They became separated in a heavy front and two of them failed to find the target. The other two reached the target individually--one dropped 110 x 30-lb. fragmentation clusters from 13,000 feet and the other, 100 x 30-lb. fragmentation clusters from 12,000 feet, with results unobserved. Ten Zeros intercepted. Light, heavy, and medium AA, of moderate intensity but inaccurate, commenced firing after first airplane had made its bomb run. The Plexiglas in the nose of one B-24 was shot out. (Ibid.)
- 4 July 43 Twenty-five new P-38A1 aircraft delivered by carrier to the 49th Fighter Squadron at Canton to replace the P-38D3 aircraft left behind by the 533d Fighter Squadron. (Basic History, 49th Fighter Sq.)
- 11 July 43 Four B-24D's of 42d Bomb Squadron in photographic mission over Makin and Little Makin from Funafuti. One airplane was abortive due to navigational difficulties and adverse weather. Two airplanes dropped three 500-lb. G. bombs on the target. Kodachrome and black and white pictures taken. AA over Makin moderate. (Ltr., Col. C. F. Long to CG 7AF, 15 July 43.)
- 13 July 43 Six airplanes from 42d Bomb Squadron in bombing mission over Betio from Funafuti. (Basic History, 42d Bomb Sq.)

~~RESTRICTED~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

~~RESTRICTED~~

AFMS-41

04

- 18 July 43 Aircraft of 46th Fighter Squadron was to intercept Japanese bombers conducting air raid at Canton. Enemy airplanes released bomb load over water due to intensity of AA fire. (Basic History, 46th Fighter Sq.)
- 23 July 43 Two aircraft of 46th Fighter Squadron took off to intercept Japanese bombers at Canton, but did not make contact. No bombs dropped. (Ibid.)
- 24 July 43 Twelve B-24D's of 11th Bomb Group assigned to strike on Wake from Midway. Two did not take off and two returned without sighting target. The eight aircraft reaching the target dropped seven 500-lb. GP bombs, 22 fragmentation clusters, and three 650-lb. depth charges on oil storage area, barracks, and gun emplacement area at Peacock Point. Fire from medium and heavy guns and automatic weapons extremely accurate and intense. Interception by 20 to 30 Zeros and one unidentified biplane, nine of which were destroyed, four probably destroyed and three damaged. One bomber was lost. (Ltr., Brig. Gen. F. H. Landon to CG 7AF, 29 July 43; VII Bomber Command, "Bombing of Wake Island," in Accrdlon Folder.)
- 26 July 43 Twelve B-24D's of 11th Bomb Group in strike on Wake from Midway. Eight hit over the target, and dropped 18 x 500-lb. GP bombs, 23 fragmentation clusters, and nine incendiary clusters. Two GP bombs hit central portion of Peale Island and five hit oil storage area on western tip of Wake Island. Medium and heavy AA intense and extremely accurate. After the bombing runs were over, approximately 85 enemy Zeros with one possible Focke Wulf 190 intercepted, of which 11 were destroyed, eight possibly destroyed and 11 damaged. No damage suffered by B-24's. (Ibid.)
- 24 Aug. 43 46th Fighter Squadron arrived at Canton with 19 B-10F aircraft. (Basic History, 46th Fighter Sq.)
- 1-14 Sep. 43 Six B-24D's of 11th Bomb Group conducted daily search missions out of Canton. Only enemy contact occurred on 8 September when one airplane encountered a four-on-line flying boat, Emily, on which approximately 500 rounds of .50-cal. ammunition were fired, with about 50 hits, but no visible damage. (Ltrs., Capt. John W. Melvaine to CG VII Bomber Command, 6, 9, 11, and 16 Sep. 43, in A-2 7AF files.)

~~RESTRICTED~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

- ~~RESTRICTED~~
- 11 Sep. 43 Nineteen P-40N's of 45th Fighter Squadron escorted by one B-24D and one B-30 of 11th Bomb Group, flown from Canton to Laker. (Ibid., 16 Sep. 43; Basic History, 45th Fighter Sq.)
- 14-15 Sep. 43 Twenty-two B-24D's of 11th Bomb Group assembled from Oahu and Canton on bases at Funafuti and Canton to form a Task Group of which Brig. Gen. F. H. Landon assumed command at Funafuti. (VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 24 Sep. 43.)
- 18 Sep. 43 Twenty-four B-24D's of 11th Bomb Group, plus General Landon in one from Headquarters VII Bomber Command, conducted a night attack on Tarawa. Of the 11th Bomb Group aircraft, 12 were from Funafuti and 12 from Canton, and consisted of six airplanes each from the 26th, 43d, 98th and 431st Bomb Squadrons. Light airplanes of the Canton Flight attacked Letio Island, the primary target, one bombed Malana, and three were abortive. Ten airplanes of the Funafuti flight attacked Letio, one bombed Malana, one bombed Anakama, and one was abortive. Letio was hit by 229 x 20-lb. fragmentation clusters, 25 x 50-lb. fragmentation clusters, and 24 x 500-lb. GP bombs, with excellent results. Twenty 20-lb. and 10 x 50-lb. fragmentation clusters fell on alternate targets. Heavy and medium AA fire was intense but inaccurate. There was no interception. (Ibid.; VII Bomber Command, Analysis of Tarawa Mission, 18-19 Sep. 1943, p. 17.)
- 19 Sep. 43 Thirteen B-24D's from Canton and eleven from Funafuti conducted a day bombardment and photo reconnaissance mission over Tarawa. Seven of the aircraft were from the 26th Bomb Squadron, six each from the 98th and 431st, four from the 43d, and one from Headquarters VII Bomber Command. Four airplanes were abortive. The remaining 20 dropped 120 x 500-lb. GP bombs on Tarawa, five 500-lb. GP bombs on Anakama. Complete photographic coverage of Letio Island was obtained. Medium and heavy AA fire ranged from inaccurate to accurate. The formation was intercepted by about 15 to 18 Zeikas. One B-24 was shot down and 10 were damaged. (Ibid.)
- 11 Oct. 43 30th Bomb Group (H) assigned to the Seventh Air Force. (GO 160, HQPA, 11 Oct. 43.)
- 17 Oct. 43 One P-70 of the 6th Night Fighter Squadron sent up to identify an unknown pilot, who, being caught in searchlights, took successful evasive action. (Ltr., Col. E. P. Mussett to CG 7AF, 2 Nov. 43, in A-2 7AF files.)

~~RESTRICTED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

AFMS-41

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66

- 23 Oct. 43 41st Bomb Group (L) assigned to Seventh Air Force. (CG 4161, HQ 41, 23 Oct. 43.)
- 23 Oct. 43 New-type Japanese four-engine flying boat, Emily, destroyed 70 miles south of Baker by one airplane of 45th Fighter Squadron. (Basic History, 45th Fighter Sq.)
- 6 Nov. 43 Advanced Headquarters (ADVOL) of the Seventh Air Force established at Funafuti in Ellice Islands. (Ltr., CG 712 to CG VII AFHQ, 21 Oct. 43, in AG 7AF 372.3, Zone of Advance.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

~~RESTRICTED~~

GLOSSARY

- AC/S Assistant Chief of Staff
- AG 7AF Adjutant General's Files, Seventh Air Force
- CG AAF Commanding General, Army Air Forces
- CG 7AF Commanding General, Seventh Air Force
- CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas
- CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
- CM Classified Message
- C/S Chief of Staff
- C/S USA Chief of Staff, United States Army
- F Fighter
- GP General purpose bomb
- GO General Order
- H Heavy
- LAF Hawaiian Air Force
- HCPA Headquarters, Central Pacific Area
- HHD Headquarters, Hawaiian Department
- I Interceptor
- L Light
- ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
- RNZAF Royal New Zealand Air Force
- SCU Statistical Control Unit
- WD War Department

~~RESTRICTED~~

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REF ID: A66000

INDEX

Chapter 1

1. Incl. 2 to 26 incl., Air Officer to DDE (Gen. Belos G. Wilson, CG HQ), 7 Apr. 42.
2. Redesignated 25th Bomb Sq. (M), CG 22, M.D., 22 Apr. 42.
3. Redesignated 431st Bomb Sq. (M), CG 22, M.D., 22 Apr. 42.
4. General's Status Report, 1941-42, in AG 7AF 008, Policies and Precedents.
5. Seventh Air Force Historical Data, in AG 7AF 008, Policies and Precedents.
6. Memo for Roberts Commission, 26 Dec. 41, in AG 7AF, special folder for Gen. Martin. See also 2.
7. Seventh Air Force Historical Data, in AG 7AF 008, Policies and Precedents.
8. For complete statement on the status of aircraft on 7 December 41 see memo for Roberts Com., 26 Dec. 41, in memo 2.
9. Except where otherwise indicated, this account of the attack of 7 December 41 is taken from ltr., Lt. Col. Clyde H. Fielder, AG/S 2-2, M.D. to AG/S G-2, M.D., 20 Dec. 41, in AG 7AF 389.9, General Attaches on Cebu. See also 1.
10. Memo for Roberts Com., 26 Dec. 41.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ltr., CG HQ to CG HQ, 18 Dec. 41, in AG 7AF 704, Casualties.
15. AG 7AF 214.21, for Diaries and Journals of Events.
16. CI-CUI-2405/3th, Report to Chief A J, Wright Field, 4 Dec. 41, in AG 7AF 389.9, General Attaches on Cebu.
17. Memo for Roberts Com., 26 Dec. 41.
18. Mr. Dixon, AG-2, M.D. See memo 2.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL

- 19. GO 30, HQ, 17 Dec. 41.
- 20. History of VII Bomber Command, Dec. 41 to July 44, p. 3.
- 21. War Diary, A-2, HQ.
- 22. GO 30, HQ, 8 Mar. 42. Arabic numerals were applied to all of the organizations until April 42, when they were designated as indicated in the text.
- 23. GO 11, HQ, 2 Feb. 42.
- 24. Ibid.
- 25. GO 12, HQ, 12 May 42.
- 26. Ltr., Lt. Col. Walter C. Sweeney to CG 11th Bomb Gr., 3 Feb. 42, in AG 7AF 370, Employment, Operation, and Movement of Groups. See App. 1.
- 27. Ibid.
- 28. Ibid.
- 29. Ibid.
- 30. Ibid.
- 31. Ibid.
- 32. 1st ind. (ltr., Lt. Col. Walter C. Sweeney to CG 11th Bomb Gr., 3 Feb. 42) CG VII Bomber Command to CG HQ, 22 Feb. 42.
- 33. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
- 34. CINCPAC Serial 0234, Operations Plan 14-42, 3 Feb. 42; C-11-1508/8th, 12-23-42 to CG HQ, 3 Feb. 42, in AG 7AF 370, Operations-Joint-Army-Navy.
- 35. CINCPAC Serial 0234, Operations Order 13-42, 3 Feb. 42, in AG 7AF 370, Operations-Joint-Army-Navy.
- 36. C-11-1591/8th, HQ to CG HQ, 23 Feb. 42, in AG 7AF 370, Operations-Joint-Army-Navy.
- 37. 2d ind. (C-11-1591/8th, HQ to CG HQ, 23 Feb. 42) CG HQ to C/S, 1 Mar. 42, in AG 7AF 370, Operations-Joint-Army-Navy.
- 38. Ltr., -dtd. O. A. Fitch to CG HQ, 21 Feb. 42; VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Reports.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

~~RESTRICTED~~

- 39. OLCI-0895/9th, Memo to Chief AEF, 9 Mar. 42, in AG 7AF 287.9, Enemy Attacks on Okin.
- 40. Ltr., Col. James A. Hollison, O/S 7AF to CG AEF, 1 Mar. 42, in AG 7AF 272.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.
- 41. Ltr., Brig. Gen. H. C. Davidson, CG VII Interceptor Command, to CG 7AF, 11 Mar. 42, in AG 7AF 272.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.
- 42. Ltr., Brig. Gen. H. C. Davidson, CG 7AF to CG AEF, 13 June 42, in AG 7AF 270.24, Battles and Engagements.
- 43. Ibid. This states that no B-17's were used on search during the period. Daily G-3 Reports, 7AF, however, show from one to seven B-17's on search each day.
- 44. Ibid.
- 45. Ibid.
- 46. Memo, CG VII Bomber Command to G-3 7AF, 3 June 42, in AG 7AF 270.24, Battles and Engagements.
- 47. Ibid.
- 48. Ltr., Brig. Gen. H. C. Davidson, CG 7AF to CG AEF, 13 June 42.
- 49. Seventh Air Force and the Battle of Midway, 3-6 June 42-- consolidation of Seventh Air Force operations, in AG 270.24, Battle of Midway (Special File); memo, CG VII Bomber Command to CG 7AF, 13 Jun. 42, in AG 7AF 270.24, Battles and Engagements. See also 6.
- 50. Ibid. The 13th Reconnaissance Squadron and the 62nd Bomb Squadron were not permanently assigned to the Seventh Air Force, but were only attached en route to the South Pacific. See AG 7AF Consolidated Station List.
- 51. See sources in no. 43 and 49 above.
- 52. Ibid.
- 53. Ibid.
- 54. Ibid.
- 55. Ibid.
- 56. Ibid.
- 57. Ibid.

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58. Seventh Air Force and the Battle of Midway, 2-5 June 42; ltr., Lt. Col. L. C. Gorington, CG 20th Bomb Gr. to CG 11th Bomb Gr., 2 June 42.
59. CI-CUL-11 one to C/S USA, 12 June 42, in AG 7AF 270.71, Battles and Engagements.
60. Ibid.
61. Ltr., Brig. Gen. H. C. Davidson, CG 7AF to Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, CG AAF, 19 June 42. See also ltr., CG 7AF to CG AAF, 13 June 42, sup. 7. It seems probable that the bombs were for the last part of the 20th and 250th.
62. CI-CUL-11 one to C/S USA, 12 June 42. The two B-17's lost were circling from the 1st Provisional Squadron en route from the United States to Fiji. (E/s, CG VII AS Base Comd and to CG AAF, 23 June 42, in AG 7AF 270.5, Assignment, Change of Status - Troops), as were the 17th Reconnaissance Squadron and the 20th Bomb Squadron. However, crews of the 1st Provisional Squadron probably were in action. See no. 10.
63. Memo, CG VII Bomber Command to CG 7AF, 12 Sep. 42. In connection with the last three units named, see note 61 above.
64. See no. 14-15.
65. Ltr., Brig. Gen. H. C. Davidson, CG 7AF to CG AAF, 13 June 42.
66. Ltr., Brig. Gen. Willis W. Hale, CG VII Bomber Command to CG AAF, thru CG 7AF, 3 June 42, in AG 7AF 270.33, Operations-Joint-Air-Nav.
67. Ibid.
68. All of the extracts which follow are from ltr. Brig. Gen. H. C. Davidson, CG 7AF to CG AAF, 12 June 42.
69. See App. 7. It was while conducting an air search for the enemy that Maj. Gen. Clarence L. Sinker, Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, was lost. CI-CUL-129/9th, 11 one to C/S USA, 9 June 42, in AG 7AF 270.54, Battles and Engagements.
70. Ltr., CG 22AG to CG AAF, 3 June 42, in AG 7AF 270.027, Reinforcements.
71. Ibid.
72. VII Fighter Command in the Defense of Midway Islands, and Overwater Flights of P-40 Airplanes, January 1942-April 1942, Doc. 35, History of VII Fighter Command, Dec. 31 to July 31.

MEMO-1, Notes, Chro. 1

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70

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

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1. C-11-1695/4th, Hqs. 11 to HQ, 4 July 49, in AG 7AF 310.023, Hawaiian Mobile Air Force.
2. C-11-1153/18th, Hqs. to C/S USA, 16 July 49, ibid.
3. Memo, Lt. Col. J. Luce, Navy Air Combat Intel., based on information from available record of the 11th Bomb Gr. of the Hawaiian Mobile Air Force and discussion with various officers of the group, subject: Performance, Results and Attribution of B-17 Heavy Bombers in Solomon Islands Operations - August and September, 1942. Int'l Center, Pacific Ocean Area, 30 Oct. 49, in 7AF 1-2 files.
4. Basic History, 11th Bomb Gr.
5. For an account of South Pacific operations during this period see AAF Historical Studies: No. 26, Guadalcanal and the origin of the Thirteenth Air Force.
6. In connection with the arrival of the 90th Bomb Group, there arose the problem of effecting a transition from B-17 to B-24 type aircraft. General Arnold wrote General Hale of his fear that because the B-17 had been so lavishly built up in the press there was a tendency, even among AAF personnel, to rate it far superior to any other heavy bomber. He said that, in particular, some of the 90th Bomb Group's personnel had been heard to speak disparagingly of the B-24. He wanted General Hale to take "positive action" to make sure that they did not go into battle with "preconceived erroneous belief that theirs is not a truly superior heavy bomber." General Hale replied that he had relieved the group commander and one squadron commander that he had taken action to modify the airframe so as to relieve the congestion in the nose, and that the bulk of the 90th's personnel were "enthusiastic about entering the fight."
7. Ltr., Maj. Gen. Willis A. Hale, CG 7AF to CG VII Bomber Command, 31 July 49, in AG 7AF 373.11, Serial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.
8. Ltr., Lt. Col. W. J. Erickson to CG AFD, 18 July 49, in AG 7AF 770.21, Battles and Engagements. In this connection it is interesting to note that General Parsons wired the War Department that it was not intended to repeat this type of incident until some continuity of similar action would warrant a special follow-up with an attack declared for the occupation of the. C-11-1153/22th, Hqs. to C/S USA, 29 June 49, ibid.
9. Ltr., Lt. Col. W. J. Erickson to CIGRAS, 2 June 49, in AG 7AF 604.311.
10. Ltr., CG 7AF to CIGRAS, thru CG AFD, 27 July 49, in AG 7AF 373.11, Serial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 11. CLICAPAC Cooperation Order 42-42, 17 Dec. 42.
- 12. VII Bomber Command, 'Bombing of Wake Island,' 4 Aug. 42, in Accordion Folder, 742 A-2 files.
- 13. VII Bomber Command TO 347, 9 Dec. 42.
- 14. CLICAPAC Cooperation Order 42-42, 17 Dec. 42.
- 15. Ltr., Brig. Gen. E. M. London to CG 7AF, 20 Dec. 42, in 742 A-2 files.
- 16. Ltr., Maj. Gen. Willis W. Hale, CG 7AF, to Lt. Gen. E. M. Arnold, CG 7AF, 23 Dec. 42, in CG 7AF 572.11, Serial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.
- 17. Ltr., Col. E. M. London, CG VII Bomber Command, to CG 7AF, 13 Jan. 43, *ibid.* See also 507th Bomb Co. Mission Report, 13 Jan. 43, in VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Reports, 742 A-2 files.
- 18. Ltr., Brig. Gen. E. M. London to CG 7AF, 18 July 43; 371st and 372d Co. Mission Reports, in 742 A-2 files.
- 19. Ltr., Brig. Gen. Robert J. Douglas, CG 7AF to Gen. E. M. Arnold, CG 7AF, 21 July 43, in CG 7AF 572.11, Serial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions (Special File).
- 20. Ltr., Brig. Gen. E. M. London to CG 7AF, 19 July 43, in 742 A-2 files.
- 21. VII Bomber Command, 'Bombing of Wake Island,' 4 Aug. 42.
- 22. Ltr., Brig. Gen. E. M. London to CG 7AF, 19 July 43.
- 23. VII Bomber Command, 'Bombing of Wake Island,' 4 Aug. 42.
- 24. Ltr., Lt. Gen. Felix G. Brone, CG 7AF to CLICAPAC, 9 Jan. 43, in CG 7AF 572.11, Serial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.
- 25. ibid.
- 26. Ltr., Col. E. M. London to CG 7AF, 7 Dec. 42, in CG 7AF 572.11, Serial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.
- 27. Summary of VII Bomber Command Missions.
- 28. The mission had originally been scheduled for 12 February 1943 but was unsuccessful on that date because of heavy clouds. Ltr., Brig. Gen. E. M. London to CG 7AF, 24 Feb. 43; Ltr., Maj. Gen. Willis W. Hale, CG 7AF to Lt. Gen. E. M. Arnold, 24 Feb. 43, in CG 7AF 572.11, Serial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.

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- 28. OICOPAC Operation Order 1-43, 21 Mar. 43, ibid.
- 29. Ltr., Lt. Col. to Gen. W. H. Arnold, 27 Mar. 43, ibid.
- 31. Ltr., Dir. Gen. L. H. London to CG 747, 23 Apr. 43, in 747 1-2 files.
- 32. Ltr., Lt. Col. to Gen. W. H. Arnold, 27 Mar. 43.
- 33. Ibid.
- 34. Ltr., Dir. Gen. L. H. London to CG 747, 23 Apr. 43; memo, Capt. W. H. [unclear] and Capt. J. J. McIlwaine to Lt. Col. L. H. London, 23 Apr. 43, in 747 1-2 files.
- 35. Ltr., [unclear] to Gen. W. H. Arnold, 7 Apr. 43.
- 36. Ibid.
- 37. Summary of VII Bomber Command Missions since 27 Dec. 42, in 747 1-2 files; VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 21 June 43, in 43 747 278.11 Aerial Operations, Strategic and Tactical Missions.
- 38. Ltr., Lt. Col. Willis F. Felt, CG 747, to OICOPAC, thru CG 747, 2 June 43, ibid.
- 39. Ltr., Lt. Col. Willis F. Felt to C/O USAF, thru CG 747 and OICOPAC, 1 July 43, in 43 747 278.11, Aerial Operations, Strategic and Tactical Missions.
- 40. Ibid.; VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 27 June 43.
- 41. Ibid., 23 June 43; ltr., Lt. Col. F. D. Tutledge, Jr. to CG 747, 27 June 43, in 747 1-2 files.
- 42. Ltr., Lt. Col. L. H. London, VII Bomber Command to CG 747, 3 July 43, in 43 747 278.11, Aerial Operations, Strategic and Tactical Missions.
- 43. VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 27 July 43.
- 44. Ibid., 23 June 43.
- 45. Ibid.
- 46. Ibid., 3 July 43.
- 47. Ltr., Capt. John J. McIlwaine, Liaison VII Bomber Command to CG 747, 2 July 43, in 747 1-2 files.
- 48. Ltr., Col. J. J. [unclear] to CG 747, 13 July 43.

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- 49. Basic History, 408 Barb Ct.
- 50. See p. 30.
- 51. Ltr., Capt. John J. McElly Inc to CG VII Harbor Command, 3, 9, 11, and 13 Sep. 47, in 201-1-7 Files.
- 52. Basic History, 408 Barb Ct.; Ltr. 1st Lt. J. J. McElly Inc to CG VII Harbor Command, 18 Sep. 47, 7AFA-2 Files.
- 53. CG OASD Operations Plan 19-48, 10 Sep. 48, in 49 727 370.13, Operations-Joint-Army-Navy.
- 54. VII Harbor Command, Consolidated Air Log Report, 10 Sep. 47.
- 55. There were only 45 airplanes in a cluster at Canton, sufficient for two simulators only.
- 56. Ltr., Capt. E. J. London to CG VII, 12 Sep. 48, in 49 727 370.13, Operations-Joint-Army-Navy.
- 57. VII Harbor Command Consolidated Mission Report, 24 Sep. 47; VII Harbor Command, Analysis of Current Mission, 19-19 Sep. 47, 10 Sep. 47.
- 58. Ibid.
- 59. Ibid.
- 60. Ibid.
- 61. CG 150, 102A, 18 Oct. 47.
- 62. CG 151, 102A, 22 Oct. 47.
- 63. Ltr., CG 727 to CG VII 12-13, 21 Oct. 47, in 49 727 370.13, Zone of Advance.
- 64. For a discussion of Soviet Air Force operations in the Gilbert, Marshall, and Mariana Islands see AAF Historical Studies No. 66, Operational History of the Seventh Air Force, 1 May 1942 to 31 July 1944.
- 65. Prepared by 6th CG, Overseas, 20 cpl.
- 66. Ibid.

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77

APPENDIX 1

Letter, Lt. Col. Donald F. Fielder, AG/3, G-2, I.D., to AG/3, G-2, I.D., 20 December 1941, subject: Report of the attaché's London, 7 December 1941.

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HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
FORT SHAFTER, T.H.

In reply refer to:

20 December 1941

SUBJECT: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941.

TO: A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

- 1. The following facts have been gleaned from numerous reports of eye-witnesses and supplement or correct reports sent you by radio.
- 2. The enemy effort will be covered under three general headings: Hickam Field area; Wheeler Field Area; Bellows Field area.

a. HICKAM FIELD AREA: At 7:5 A.M., December 7, 1941, the first indication of an attack was 9 enemy single engine, low wing monoplanes, carrying torpedoes, which were observed southeast of Hickam Field Hanger line, flying at an altitude of about 50 feet, and toward Pearl Harbor. They were in two echelons, 5 planes in the first and 4 in the second. This flight did not attack Hickam Field. At almost the same time, however, 9 dive bombers attacked the Aviation Air Depot buildings and Hickam Field hanger line from the south, and 7 additional planes attacked the same objectives from the Northwest. Several minutes later 9 additional dive bombers bombed Hickam Field hanger line from the Southwest. Immediately thereafter 7 additional dive bombers attacked the Hickam Field hanger line from the East.

All planes dived at approximately 45 to 50 degrees from altitudes of 500 to 5000 feet. Bombs were released at about 1000 feet with the planes pulling out of dives from 300 feet to approximately 300 feet.

Machine-gun fire was employed before and after bomb release. This attack lasted about 10 minutes. This attack and subsequent ones were supported by fighter planes.

The second attack occurred at about 8:25 A.M., when between 6 and 8 planes approached from the south and attacked No. 1 Quarters, technical buildings immediately behind hanger lines and consolidated barracks. These planes when first observed were flying level and released bombs from level flight at altitude of about 150 feet. During and immediately after this bombing attack our planes on working patrol were attacked with gun fire. About one minute later (8:26) a formation of probably 5 or 6 planes bombed the baseball diamond from a high altitude, evidently believing gasoline storage system to be in that area. The second attack lasted between 10 and 15 minutes.

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Subject: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941 - Cont'd
To: A. G. of I., C-2, Air Dept., Washington

The third attack occurred about 9:00 A.M., when 8 to 9 planes (presumably those that had previously loitered from level flight at 100 feet at 8:35) attacked the technical building behind hangar line and our dispersed planes with machine gun fire. These attacks came from four directions almost simultaneously. At the same time a formation of from 7 to 9 planes, flying in "V" formation at an altitude of about 2,000 feet approached from the south, releasing bombs which struck consolidated barracks, parade ground and Post Exchange. The third attack lasted about 2 minutes. Our F-17's were arriving from the island during this attack. All enemy planes observed at low altitudes were single engine, low wing, monoplane. Type of high altitude bombers not definitely established. Largest bomb used believed not to exceed 500 pounds. Gun ammunition used identified as 7.7 and 30 mm.

b. WHEELER FIELD AREA: At 9:00 A.M., Sunday, 7 December 1941, approximately 35 planes approached Wheeler Field, generally from the south, at about 5,000 feet altitude. They circled north to east of the field, circled counter-clockwise, loitered at altitude and approached for attack from north at about 3,000 feet, generally perpendicular to the hangar line. The formation of the entire group was roughly a closed "V" with 5 sections of 2 planes each forming the "V" formation, with a 4th plane extending the right leg of the "V". A single odd plane flew directly to the rear of the formation. The attack dived at an angle of about 45 degrees from horizontal. The attack struck hangar line and vicinity over a length of about 300 yards, starting near the engineering hangar, which is at the extreme south east of the hangar line. Bombs and machine gun fire were employed during dive bombing attack. Practically all bombs struck the hangar line and points in rear of the line and were released at altitudes of 300 and 200 feet. After releasing bombs the planes continued to dive for a short distance and pulled out at about same angle as start of dive. No evidence of load of bombs larger than 500 pounds.

After the first dive bombing the formation broke, scattered in all directions, with individual planes continuing to fire, and without regard to possibility of collision. This phase of the attack was carried on from altitudes of approximately 200 feet and the only semblance of order appeared to be that planes circled counter-clockwise. Principal targets for this gun fire were our planes on hangar line and buildings and personnel in immediate vicinity. All planes in first attack's formation appeared similar externally and were single engine, low wing, monoplane. While not positively established, it is inferred from evidence of 30 mm fire that this attack included fighters in support of dive bombers. The entire attack lasted approximately 15 minutes.

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Subject: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941 - Cont'd
 To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Dept., Washington

Another attack struck Wheeler Field a few minutes after 9:00 A.M., same day. This attack consisted of 7 enemy planes which approached from the south, flying roughly in line at an altitude of about 500 feet. They fired machine guns at planes being taxied onto the air-grounds but it is believed that no plane fired more than 25 to 50 rounds. All seven planes were single engine, low wing, monoplanes, two-seaters. They withdrew to the north. The whole second attack less than 5 minutes. This could very reasonably have been a group of planes expending the remainder of their ammunition.

c. BELLOWS FIELD AREA: The attack on Bellows Field was initiated by a single Japanese fighter plane at approximately 8:30 A.M., December 7th. He came directly from the sea (East) and employed machine-gun fire on the tent area apparently expending all his ammunition in this one attack.

At about 9:00 A.M., nine fighters attacked from the north in 3 groups of 3 planes each in "V" formation. This attack lasted about 15 minutes and consisted of gun fire only. It was initiated with a diving attack of all 9 planes, after which the 3 formations of 3 each peeled off and attacked from various directions.

After the single plane, tent-area attack, a B-17 which had arrived from the mainland and which had been unable to land at Hickam Field attempted to land at Bellows Field but rolled off the runway. This plane was repeatedly machine-gunned by the 9 plane attack.

The attack at Bellows Field appeared well planned, rehearsed and well executed. One plane was reported shot down by Infantry troops defending the area but no part of it was recovered from the sea for identification purposes.

d. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS & REMARKS: Strafing planes came down to a very low altitude in practically all cases. Some 50 to 50 feet from the ground. Strafing used 50 caliber, 7.7 cal. and 30 mm. The torpedo planes which were employed only against Pearl Harbor came in to sight flying very low and did not change altitude until torpedoes were dropped.

Tight flight discipline was demonstrated by the enemy and accurate bombing was evidenced. Such an attack could not have been performed without numerous and detailed rehearsals. Every movement seemed to have been rehearsed and was exceptionally well executed.

Liaison with battle force intelligence has been maintained but the general tactics of the enemy attack has not definitely been reconstructed.

A few bombs were dropped in Honolulu proper, but in all probability this resulted from individual planes clearing bomb racks before departing. A few bursts of machine gun fire were likewise delivered at targets other than military objectives.

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21

Subject: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941 - Cont'd
Re: A. C. of S., C-2, or Best., Washington.

4. CONCLUSION: It is impossible at this time to state how many planes or how many carriers were employed, but it is still believed that at least three carriers were involved. Likewise, it is impossible to definitely establish whether or not any planes returned to a carrier, re-loaded and participated in subsequent attacks. It is the opinion of this office that no plane did so. It is more probable that planes were launched from different carriers at different times or that different groups of planes were launched at staggered intervals. It has not been established from what direction or distance the carriers were when the planes were launched, although the Navy believes that at least one carrier operated from 150 miles north of Oahu. It is established that no land based planes were employed in the attacks, and while many reports come in relative to enemy planes with more than one motor no positive identification of such planes has been established. It is believed that multi-motor planes reported were our own L-12's, a flight of which arrived from the Mainland during the attacks.

(+ FRANK J. HILLMAN,
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.C.,
A. C. of S., C-2.

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APPENDIX 2

Memorandum for Roberts Commission,
26 December 1941

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HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE
Office of the Air Force Commander
Hickam Field, T.H.

In reply refer to:

(C-2)

26 December 1941.

MEMORANDUM TO: Roberts Commission.

In compliance with informal Memorandum, this date, the following information is submitted:

a. The Defense Plan specifying numbers and types of aircraft for Hawaii was submitted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, but was not returned approved by the War Department. This plan requested the aircraft tabulated below:

- 180 - Heavy bombers.
- 18 - Dive bombers.
- 36 - Torpedo bombers (long range)
- 326 - Pursuits.
- 25 - Observation planes.
- 13 - Transports.

b. The following airplanes were on hand 7 December 1941:

- (1) B-17D's - 12
- (2) B-18's - 33
- (3) A-20A's - 12
- (4) P-40C's - 12
- (5) P-40B's - 87
- (6) P-36A's - 39
- (7) P-35A's - 8
- (9) P-25B's - 6
- (9) B-12A's - 3
- (10) A-12A's - 2
- (11) AT-6's - 4
- (12) OA-9's - 3
- (13) OA-8's - 1
- (14) O-47B's - 7
- (15) O-49's - 2

c. Airplanes ready for immediate use:

None.

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d. The following airplanes were not ready for immediate use and reasons therefor:

(1) In commission but not loaded with bombs or ammunition:

- (a) F-17D's - 6
- (b) F-18's - 21
- (c) A-20A's - 5
- (d) F-400's - 9
- (e) F-40B's - 55
- (f) F-36A's - 20
- (g) F-26A's - 7
- (h) F-26B's - 3
- (i) B-12A's - 1
- (j) A-12A's - 2
- (k) AT-6's - 3
- (l) OA-9's - 3
- (m) OA-8's - 1
- (n) O-47E's - 5
- (o) O-49's - 2

(2) Out of commission for 1st echelon maintenance:

- (a) F-17D's - 4 (1 out for engines since 11-3-41 not available at EAD)
- (b) F-19's - 9 (1 out for cracked landing gear, & 1 out for elevator - Not in stock, 7 miscellaneous)
- (c) A-20A's - 5
- (d) F-400's - 2
- (e) F-40B's - 22
- (f) F-36A's - 12
- (g) F-26A's - 1
- (h) F-26B's - 3
- (i) B-12A's - 2
- (j) A-12A's - 0
- (k) AT-6's - 1
- (l) OA-9's - 0
- (m) OA-8's - 0
- (n) O-47's - 3
- (o) O-49's - 0

(3) Out of commission for 2d echelon maintenance:

- (a) F-17D's - 0
- (b) F-18's - 0
- (c) A-20A's - 0
- (d) F-400's - 0
- (e) F-40B's - 2
- (f) F-36A's - 0
- (g) F-26A's - 0
- (h) F-26B's - 0
- (i) B-12A's - 0
- (j) A-12A's - 0
- (k) AT-6's - 0
- (l) OA-9's - 0
- (m) OA-8's - 0

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(n)	C-47B's	-	0
(o)	C-49's	-	0

(A) Out of commission for 2d echelon maintenance:

(a)	F-17D's	-	2
(b)	F-18's	-	3
(c)	A-20A's	-	2
(d)	F-40C's	-	1
(e)	F-40B's	-	9
(f)	F-38A's	-	0
(g)	F-38A's	-	0
(h)	F-38B's	-	0
(i)	B-12A's	-	0
(j)	A-12A's	-	0
(k)	AT-6's	-	0
(l)	CA-9's	-	0
(m)	CA-3's	-	0
(n)	C-47B's	-	0
(o)	C-49's	-	0

g. The following airplanes were on hand after the raid:

(1)	B-17D's	-	8
(2)	B-18's	-	31
(3)	A-20A's	-	10
(4)	F-40C's	-	7
(5)	F-40B's	-	30
(6)	F-38A's	-	28
(7)	F-38A's	-	3
(8)	F-38B's	-	5
(9)	B-12A's	-	3
(10)	A-12A's	-	2
(11)	AT-6's	-	2
(12)	CA-9's	-	1
(13)	CA-3's	-	1
(14)	C-47B's	-	7
(15)	C-49's	-	1

f. The following airplanes were usable after the raid:

(1)	B-17D's	-	4
(2)	B-18's	-	11
(3)	A-20A's	-	5
(4)	F-40C's	-	2
(5)	F-40B's	-	25
(6)	F-38A's	-	16
(7)	F-38A's	-	2
(8)	F-38B's	-	2
(9)	B-12A's	-	1
(10)	A-12A's	-	1
(11)	AT-6's	-	2
(12)	CA-9's	-	1
(13)	CA-3's	-	1
(14)	C-47B's	-	5
(15)	C-49's	-	1

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The following airplanes took to the air at the times indicated.

0850	-	4 F-40's.
0920	-	3 F-76A's.
0955	-	2 F-40's.
0915	-	6 F-30A's.
0970	-	5 F-40's.
0950	-	6 F-30A's.
0950	-	1 C-47B.
1040	-	3 C-47B's.
1127	-	4 A-20's
1140	-	2 B-17D's.
1200	-	5 F-40's.
1300	-	3 A-20A's.
1330	-	2 B-17's.
1500	-	11 F-40's.
1500	-	2 C-47B's.
1520	-	3 B-17D's.

(t) A. W. LEEHAY,
Major, Air Corps,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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REF: 1

37

WREGLER FIELD

1.

2. HOW MANY PLANE OF EACH TYPE WERE ON HAND DEC 7, 1941?

13 P-400's	87 P-40B's	89 P-36A's	8 P-36A's	6 P-36B's	1 O-47B
2 A-12A's	3 B-12A's	3 O-49's	1 OA-9's	4 AT-6's	1 B-18

3. OF THESE HOW MANY WERE READY FOR IMMEDIATE USE?

None.

4. HOW MANY WERE NOT READY FOR IMMEDIATE USE AND WHY?

a. In commission and unarmed:

9 P-400	85 P-40B	30 P-36A	7 P-36A	3 P-36B	1 O-47B	2 A-12A
1 B-12A	1 B-18	3 OA-9	1 OA-9	3 AT-6		

b. Out of commission for 1st. echelon maintenance:

2 P-400	22 P-40B	19 P-36A	1 P-36A	3 P-36B	2 B-12A	1 AT-6
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c. Out of commission for 2nd echelon maintenance:

2 P-400

d. Out of commission for 3rd echelon maintenance:

1 P-400 3 P-40B

5. AFTER THE RAID, HOW MANY OF EACH TYPE WERE ON HAND?

7 P-400	50 P-40B	85 P-36A	3 P-36A	5 P-36B	1 O-47B	2 A-12A
2 B-12A	1 B-18	1 OA-9	1 OA-9	3 AT-6		

6. OF THESE HOW MANY WERE USABLE?

2 P-400	25 P-40B	16 P-36A	2 P-36A	2 P-36B	1 O-47B
1 A-12A	1 B-12A	1 B-18	1 OA-9	1 OA-9	2 AT-6

7. HOW MANY PLANE OF EACH TYPE TOOK TO THE AIR DEC 7, 1941?

4 P-40 took off 0930	5 P-40 took off 0930
2 P-36 took off 0930	6 P-36 took off 0930
2 P-40 took off 0955	5 P-40 took off 1000
3 P-36 took off 0915	11 P-40 took off 1500

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33

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE
Office of the Air Force Commander
Hickam Field, T. H.

In reply refer to:

BELLOWS FIELD

1.

2. How many planes of each type were present Dec. 77

12 F-40's 3 C-47's 6 C-47's

3. Of these, how many were ready for immediate use?

None.

4. How many were not ready for immediate use, and why?

18 were not loaded. 2 C-47's were out for engine change.

5. After the raid, how many of each type were on hand?

10 F-40's 6 C-47's 1 C-49

6. Of these, how many were usable?

6 F-40's 4 C-47's 1 C-49

7. How many planes of each type took to the air Dec. 77

5 F-40's took off 1215 6 F-40's took off 1549
1 C-47 took off 0950 3 C-47's took off 1010
3 C-47's took off 1800.

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HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE
Office of the Air Force Commander
Hickam Field, T. H.

In reply refer to:

HICKAM FIELD

1.

2. How many planes of each type were present Dec. 7, 1941?

12 B-17D's 22 B-18's 12 A-20's

3. Of these how many were ready for immediate use?

None.

4. How many were not ready for immediate use and why?

a B-17D's: 1 out for engine since 11-3-41.
2 out for repair of fuel tanks by EAD.
1 out for 50 Hr. inspection, #2 Feeder tank removed.
1 out for 200 Hr. inspection.
1 out for carburetor repair.

Total 6 out of commission

The other six not loaded with bombs or ammunition.

b B-18's: 1 Awaiting overhaul call by EAD, T.O. submitted 11-17-41.
2 At EAD for overhaul.
1 Cracked landing gear. NIS.
1 Elevator, NIS.

Total 7 Undergoing miscellaneous 1st echelon maintenance.

The other twenty were not loaded with bombs or ammunition.

c A-20's: 2 At EAD for repair
1 Awaiting right wing flap
2 Awaiting parts. NIS
2 Miscellaneous 1st echelon maintenance.

Total 7 Out of commission

The other five were not loaded with bombs or ammunition.

5. After the raid, how many of each type were on hand?

2 B-17D's 20 B-18's 10 A-20's

6. Of these how many were usable?

4 B-17D's 10 B-18's 5 A-20's

6. How many planes of each type took to the air Dec. 7, 1941?

4 A-20's took off 1137 3 A-20's took off 1230
2 B-17D's took off 1140 7 B-17D's took off 1230
2 B-18's took off 1250

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MISSION REPORT ON 7 MARCH 1941

1. 1137 to 1510, 3 hr. 33 min., four (4) A-20's to search area 35 miles off Barber's Point for carriers reported there.
2. 1140 to 1340, 2 hr., two (2) F-17's to search area 35 miles off Barber's Point for carriers reported there.
3. 1700 to 1700, 2 hr. 30 min., two (2) E-18's to search sector 210° - 060°.
4. 1530 to 1540, 2 hr. 40 min., three (3) A-20's to search sector 310° - 020°.
5. 1500 to 1805, 3 hr. 05 min., three (3) E-17's to search sector 185° - 195°.

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APPENDIX B

War Diary kept by B-2, Hawaiian Air Force,
7 December 1941 to 27 December 1941

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90

WAR DIARY

7 December 1941

- 0755 - Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field, Pearl Harbor, Kaneohe, Ewa Field and Fort Renshaw attacked by Japanese aircraft in a surprise air raid.
- 0830 - 4 P-40's and 2 P-35's took off to engage the enemy.
- 0855 - 2 P-40's took off to engage the enemy.
- 0915 - 8 P-35's took off to engage the enemy.
- 0930 - 5 P-40's and 6 P-35's took off to engage the enemy.
- 0945 - Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field, Pearl Harbor, Kaneohe, Ewa Field and Fort Renshaw attacked by Japanese aircraft in second raid. Attack consisted mostly of ground strafing with some dive bombing.
- 0950 - 1 O-47 took off to make a reconnaissance for possible enemy activity.
- 1040 - 3 O-47's took off to make a reconnaissance for possible enemy activity.
- 1135 - Pearl Harbor bombed by high altitude horizontal bombers.
- 1137 - 4 A-20's took off to make a search for enemy surface craft.
- 1140 - 3 B-17's took off to make a search for enemy surface craft.
- 1200 - 3 P-40's took off to patrol.
- 1700 - 3 A-20's took off to make search for enemy surface craft.
- 1230 - 3 P-18's took off to make search for enemy surface craft.
- 1500 - 11 P-40's and 3 O-47's took off to patrol.
- 1500 - Command Post of Hawaiian Air Force moved from Hickam Field to Aliianna Crater.
- 1530 - 3 B-17's took off to search for enemy surface craft.
- 1550 - Messengers from Bellows Field - No airplanes ready to go with crews on alert.

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2 Dec: Nov 1941 (cont)

1712 - Fro : Hallow Field - Search for any flight circles or other activity surface or air or aircraft between Hallow Point and Eureka for radius of fifteen miles out to sea.

Numerous reports of nocturnal tracks were received from time of first attack throughout the day. These were not confirmed.

1800 - Message from Hallow Field - Nine airplanes in commission and ready to go.

3 December 1941

Radio sent to the Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. re: "Arrival of -17's on the morning of 7 December 1941 unaccounted for as yet. Request they be accounted for action in the future".

Orders issued to provide 500 gallons of 100 octane gasoline at Hilo Airport for planes arriving at Hilo. This supply to be taken from Horsa Field.

1105 - Fro: Forestard Field - East West Runway at Forestard Field partially blocked. Landing possible.

1700 - 01 P-40's and 1 P-39's available and in commission.

1828 - 03 P-40's and 10 P-39's available at Hallow Field.

2004 - 07 P-40's, 0 P-39's and 10 Grumans available at Hallow Field.

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24

9 December 1941

0500 - 23 P-40's, 12 P-26's and 12 Grumms available at Wheeler Field.

0900 - Teletype message to Commanding General, 18th and 14th Wings, and Commanding Officers, Wheeler and Bellows Fields: SUITER AND LARGE FIELD BLOCKED STOP REQUIRES FIFTEEN MINUTES NOTICE TO OFFER AND LANDING PERIODS FROM LANDING AREAS STOP ALL SERVICING UNITS TRANSFERRING GASOLINE KONAPO TO HILO.

1000 - 12 E-17's, 10 B-18's and 9 A-20's in commission.

1200 - 26 P-40's and 14 P-26's in commission.

1300 - Telephone call received from General Arnold. He requested Identification Procedure and information on alternate airdromes on outlying islands to be used in case of an air attack at time of arrival. 9 E-17's were to leave Wednesday night, 9 on Friday night and 9 on Sunday night.

Radio sent to the Chief of the Army Air Forces re: Instructions reference arrival of E-17's from the Mainland.

1300 - Teletype message to Commanding General, 18th Wing: INDICATIONS ARE THAT 18TH WING FREQUENCIES ARE BEING JAMMED BY THE ENEMY STOP IN COOPERATION WITH FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS PEOPLE A LIST OF FOLLOWING FREQUENCIES WILL BE CONSIDERED USING A PLAN OF ONE SIGNIFIER WING COLON H HOUR TO H HOUR PLUS TEN MINUTES SIGNIFIER STOP APPROXIMATELY TWENTY FIVE MILES FROM OAHU STOP IN A SIGNIFICANT POSITION REPORT OF FIVE THREE FIVE FIVE FIVE MILICYCLING WING PERIOD STOP SEVERAL TIMES H HOUR PLUS TWENTY MINUTES TO H HOUR PLUS FORTY MINUTES FROM A POSITION CLOSE TO OAHU CALL OF FOUR EIGHT SEVEN FIVE MILICYCLING FOR LANDING INSTRUCTIONS PERIOD APPEAR NOT TO BE ABLE TO CONTACT LOWER BY REPEATED CALLS AND SIGNAL TO FOUR FOUR FIVE FIVE MILICYCLING PERIOD H HOUR PLUS FORTY MINUTES TO H HOUR PLUS FIFTY MINUTES PERIOD CALL FOR LANDING INSTRUCTIONS ON FOUR FOUR FIVE FIVE AND APPEAR TO NOT BE ABLE TO CONTACT LOWER PERIOD BEFORE RESULTS TO SIGNAL OF ICAI EARLIER AIR FORCES AS SOON AFTER LANDING AS POSSIBLE PERIOD H HOUR WILL BE FURNISHED YOU UPON NOTIFICATION FROM YOU VIA PHONE LINE PLANE IS READY TO CONTACT STOP

1600 - Air Raid Alarm.

1750 - All clear sounded.

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95

9 December 1941 (contd)

1807 - Information received from Patrol Wing Two that enemy carrier is 90 miles East of Johnson Island on an irregular course.

2300 - 22 P-40's and 13 P-35's available at Redler Field.

Two-man submarine discovered off Admiral's Beach. One Japanese naval officer captured. Discovered two 18' torpedoes still intact.

10 Dec 1941

Radio received from the Chief of the Army Air Forces re: Airplane arriving from the mainland will use approach Procedure Proposed.

Radio received from the Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. re: Number of additional personnel required to man and operate 150 additional pursuit planes and the number of heavy bombers required to bring operating strength to 75.

Radio sent from Commanding General, Hawaiian Department to CAG re: Pursuit airplanes have been dispersed to outlying fields on the Island of Oahu and the building of bunkers for protection.

Radio sent to the Adjutant General re: Number of pursuit pilots required to operate 150 additional pursuit airplanes and number of heavy bombers needed to make total of 75.

Radio sent to CAG re: Conclusion drawn from Japanese Air Attack of 7 December 1941. Believe aircraft were launched from carriers with no plans for recovery.

Radio received from the Adjutant General re: Information concerning any Sherry Turret specialists available.

0800 - 22 P-40's and 13 P-35's available at Redler Field.

1500 - 12 P-17's, 2 P-18's and 2 A-20's in commission.

2300 - 30 P-40's and 17 P-35's in commission.

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11 December 1941

Radio sent to the Adjutant General re: Cn. Corporal Martin instruction on Jerry Currots.

Radio from Commanding General, Hamilton Field re: Departure of 9 P-17's.

Approach Procedure to Island of Oahu published and distributed to all units Army and Navy.

0900 - 27 P-40's and 16 P-39's in commission.

18th Wing with 3 P-18's conducted search and attack mission in Sector 270° - 170°, 500 miles seaward.

Radio sent Commanding General, Hamilton Field re: Arrival of 9 P-17's.

1300 - 9 P-17's, 11 P-18's and 9 P-39's in commission.

2400 - 24 P-40's and 13 P-39's in commission.

12 December 1941

Radio sent to CAG re: Request for 6 Transport Airplanes.

Radio sent to CAG re: Changes in Approach procedure.

Radio received from the Adjutant General re: General Arnold requests Daily Status Report of Airplanes in commission.

From Hawaiian Department: Hawaiian Airlines Ltd., will be in operation on regular schedule 13 December 1941. Army given priority on personnel and cargo.

Instructions sent to units requesting numbers of combat crew members by station and qualification necessary to permit units to have duplicate crews for all combat airplanes.

18th Wing notified to have 11 pilots report on effectiveness of blackouts during night missions. (For Department).

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13 December 1941

Radio to CAAE re: Daily Status of Aircraft of Hawaiian Air Force.

Radio to CCAC re: Malfunctioning of many .50 cal. machine guns on newly arrived airplanes.

Radio from Wilson at Wake re: Army radio equipment moved underground. Will transmit very minimum amount to avoid giving bearing to enemy aircraft.

18th Bomb Wing with 5 P-17's conducted search and attack mission in Sector 230° - 340°, 200 miles seaward.

1519 - Word received from Commanding Officer, Maui District, that Japanese Plane landed sometime ago on Niihau. Pilot is threatening residents with machine gun.

1800 - 33 P-40's and 17 P-50's in commission.

14 December 1941

Radio from the Adjutant General re:urret Experts will be sent to Hawaiian Department as soon as possible.

Radio to CAAE re: Status Report of Aircraft.

Location and strength of Air Base detachments on outlying islands furnished Department Commander.

1829 - 33 P-40's and 13 P-26's in commission.

Instructions sent Kings and Bellows Field that S-3 Periodic Reports cover the periods 1900 to 1930 the following day.

18th Bomb Wing, with 11 P-17's, conducted search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 210° - 270°, 600 miles seaward. Friendly carrier with escort ships and two friendly freighters located.

1843 - 21 P-17's, 10 P-18's and 10 A-20's in commission.

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15 December 1941

Reproduced OGP 1024 for all units.

1 C-47C conducted a photographic mission between Barber's Point and Ahu Point covering coastline.

Radio to CAAF re: Daily Aircraft Status Report.

Radio from CAAF re: 10 C-53 airplanes will be shipped to Hawaiian Department as soon as possible.

Memorandum to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department re: Emergency Landing Fields on Island of Oahu.

1730 - Lehoine, Kauai, was shelled, probably by submarine.

1821 - 37 P-40's and 15 P-26's in commission.

1903 - Johnson Island being attacked by surface vessels.

2256 - Commanding Officer, Hawaii District, reports submarine observed at 1830 off Kaula Bay, Hawaii.

18th Bomb Wing with 11 P-17's, conducted a search mission against submarines and surface craft in Sector 210° - 330°, 600 miles seaward. No enemy activities sighted. One carrier with 13 escort vessels sighted.

16 December 1941

Radio to CAAF re: Daily Aircraft Status Report.

Radio from the Adjutant General re: Daily Aircraft Status Reports no longer required.

Radio from Commanding General, Hamilton Field, re: Departure of 1 B-24.

0930 - Major Flake given authorization to contact Hawaiian Airline re: Use of their Operations Building at Burns Field.

1040 - 18th Wing opposed to exchange of Co-pilots, as suggested by Admiral Bellinger, due to difference of equipment.

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16 December 1941 (contd)

- 1390 - No submarines two miles off Tunalua Bay about eight miles North of Honolulu at 1150 traveling south. From Commanding Officer, Hawaii District.
- 1740 - Major Fleming called. Summary into prevailing wind 4500' by 500' will be completed at Maui Airport by dark 17 December 1941. Another runway 5000' long will be completed in two weeks.
- 1800 - 23 B-17's and 17 B-23's in commission.
- 1800 - 20 B-17's, 10 B-18's and 10 A-20's in commission.
- * 1850 - All units informed Commanding Officer, Hawaii District, authorized to use an Ansona Chief Trainer for emergency communication between Hilo, Honaunau and Kilauea.
- 2200 - C-3 Periodic Report, Hawaiian Air Force, for period 1800 18 December to 1800 18 December submitted to Department.
- 2255 - General Short concerned about dispersal of B-17's. Plans in-coming nine dispersed immediately at Honaunau or Maui. He stated that A-4 defense at Maui is responsibility of Navy. He will contact Admiral Bloch re this. 12th Wing informed.

*18th Bomb Wing, with 12 B-17's, conducted search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 140° to 160°, 500 miles seaward. Submarine sighted between Kahoelawe and Moloai Rock but lost contact when it dived. No friendly freighters and three friendly destroyers sighted.

18th Bomb Wing, with 9 B-17's, conducted search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 300° - 040°, 150 miles seaward. No enemy contacts made.

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100

17 December 1941

Radio to OAG and Commanding General, Hamilton Field re: JCSB will broadcast at all times upon notification of departure of flights to Hawaii.

1515 - Corrections reported off Kalahele, Hawaii, at 1100 by Commanding Officer, Hawaii District.

1800 - 20 B-17's, 11 B-18's and 10 A-20's in commission. Five B-17's and 7 B-18's out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1800 - 23 P-40's and 25 P-26's in commission. Five P-40's and 4 P-26's out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1800 - 5 C-47B's and 1 C-49 in commission. 1 C-47B out for maintenance.

1842 - Communications Officer, Kauri District, reported: 103-L RADIO MESSAGE PICKED UP ON SIXTY TO SEVENTY CYCLES PER SECOND THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE: LARGE JAPANESE FLEET ENTERING TO AND FROM FROM 000 DEGREE.

18th Bomb Wing, with 17 B-17's, conducted a search mission against submarines and surface craft in sectors 010° - 070° and 250° - 210°, 300 miles seaward. One friendly carrier with 3 destroyers sighted. No enemy contacts.

18th Bomb Wing, with 5 B-18's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 070° - 100°, 300 miles seaward. No enemy contacts.

18th Bomb Wing, with 6 A-20's, conducted a search mission against submarines and surface craft in Sector 020° - 140°, 150 miles seaward. No enemy contacts.

18 December 1941

Radio to Commanding General, Hamilton Field, re: Arrival 5 B-17's.

Radio to OAG re: Corrections to description of Japanese Dive-Bombers previously submitted.

Ordered by Department to assign all pilots to have qualified Naval Officer with each flight or squadron sent out on search missions.

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101

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18 December 1941 (contd)

- 1800 - 25 B-17's, 10 B-18's and 10 B-20's in commission. 4 B-17's and 4 B-18's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 1800 - 41 P-40's and 22 P-26's in commission. 7 P-40's and 3 P-26's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 1920 - Instructions issued 11th and 13th Wings and Bellows Field that all fields out for maintenance for as long as two hours could be drained of all propane.

15th Bomb Wing, with 10 B-17's, conducted search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sectors 270° - 280° and 50° - 90°, 600 miles seaward. One friendly submarine with destroyer escort and one friendly minesweeper sighted. No enemy contact made.

13th Bomb Wing, with 6 B-18's, conducted search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sectors 00° - 120° and 150° - 180°, 500 miles seaward. Sighted one submarine with 2 destroyers, one friendly freighter with 1 friendly destroyer, 3 friendly freighters and 2 friendly destroyers. At 0820 oil streaks were sighted at Lat. 17° 21' N., Long. 156° 10' W. Produced one 600 lb. bomb at large end of oil. Oil patch enlarged to 3 or 4 times its former size. Suspect enemy submarine was destroyed.

19 December 1941

Radio from Commanding General, 4th Air Force, re: 9 B-17's departed for Hawaii.

Radio to Commanding General, March Field re: 1 B-24 departed Hickam for March Field.

0800 - 13th Bomb Wing ordered to return 4th Reconnaissance Squadron from Maui, 20 December 1941.

0935 - Following instructions issued all units:

1. From 30 minutes before sunrise to 0800, and one hour before sunset to 20 minutes after sunset, 1/3 of army pursuit and Army fighter in air.

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103

12 September 1971 (cont)

All other Army and Navy planes, including pursuit, excepting search planes, stand by, as usual and ready to take off.

2. Between 0500 and one (1) hour before sunset:

- 1/3 Army and Navy pursuit in air.
- 1/3 Army and Navy pursuit search on, armed and ready to go.

All other Army and Navy planes, including fighters, excepting search planes, on one hour's notice.

3. One hour after sunset to 30 minutes before sunrise, search planes on one hour's notice, 3/4 on four hours' notice.

1000 - Radio to CAG and Com Air Force 1, 4th Air Force, re: Arrival of 6 F-17's.

16th Bomb Wing, with 12 F-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 010° - 050°, 300 miles seaward. 7 destroyers, 1 cruiser and 2 heavy cruisers sighted. 1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers and 2 transports or freighters sighted east of Kent Point. No enemy contacts.

18th Bomb Wing, with 12 F-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 020° - 060°, 300 miles seaward. 1 friendly freighter sighted.

18th Bomb Wing, with 12 F-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 020° - 060°, 300 miles seaward. 1 friendly freighter sighted.

18th Bomb Wing, with 6 F-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 050° - 090°, 180 miles seaward. No enemy contacts made.

13 September 1971

Radio from the Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Command, re: Recognition of Navy Sea Force ships and aircraft.

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30 December 1941 (cont.)

- Radio from Commanding General, Hamilton Field, re: Departure F-17's.
- 0700 - Instructions issued Commanding General, 18th Wing, re: Navigation and Bombardier School.
- Requested W. D. orders to detain Lt. Phillip Nuhl in Hawaiian Department.
- 0930 - Mr. Merridge (PAA) requested authority to route his Clippers straight from Pearl Harbor out to sea so that accuracy will be improved. Interceptor Commander approved.
- 1400 - Instructions issued all units to make use of maximum dispersion of airplanes.
- 1515 - Arrangements made to send ammunition to Hawaii via air on 31 December 1941.
- 1645 - 18th Wing requested to run boat with signal lamp furnished by Signal Officer, Hawaiian Air Force.
- 1610 - All units ordered to stay clear of Pearl Harbor unless necessary in combat.
- 1625 - Commanding General, 18th Wing, directed to have one Bombardment Squadron ready to take off under Pursuit protection at 0515. Balance of bombardment ordered to take off in 20 minutes, if ordered.
- 1640 - Instructions issued Commanding General, 18th Wing, cutting Down Approach Procedure (Distant Islands) into effect.
- 1700 - Commanding General, Hawaiian Interceptor Command, ordered to have one Pursuit Squadron of 12 planes in air at all flight, balance in A-1 status until notified by this headquarters.
- 1800 - Aircraft Status of Hawaiian Interceptor Command:
 - 40 F-10's and 21 F-26's in commission.
 - 2 F-10's and 3 F-26's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 - 3 F-10's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 - 8 F-10's and 6 F-26's out for 3d echelon maintenance.
- 1800 - Aircraft status of 18th Bomb Wing:
 - 21 F-17's, 9 F-18's and 10 F-20's in commission.
 - 6 F-17's and 5 F-18's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 - 2 F-17's out for 2d echelon maintenance.

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30 December 1941 (contd)

- 1800 - Aircraft Status of 86th Observation Squadron:
4 C-47's and 1 C-49 in commission.
2 C-47's out for 1st echelon maintenance.

- 1923 - Report of Missions accomplished - 86th Observation Squadron:
Two 3-plane patrols Wihou and Maui.
Three 3-plane patrols Volokai and Maui.
Three 3-plane patrols of Keiki Channel.
Total tactical hours flown this date: 40:20.

- 1935 - Memorandum furnished Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
re: Lt. G. F. Harris on training; flight crashed into sea 3
miles off Lanikaula. Wreckage sunk. No trace of pilot.
Pilot did not bail out. Crash occurred at approximately 1312.

- 2030 - Commanding General, 18th Bomb Wing, ordered to report anything
unusual and reports made to Navy upon completion of missions.

- 2030 - Commanding General, Hawaiian Interceptor Command, ordered to
report results of dawn and dusk patrols upon completion of
missions.

- 19th Bomb Wing, with 17 B-17's conducted a search mission,
against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 000°
120°, 600 miles seaward. No enemy vessels sighted. Friendly
destroyer and 3 friendly freighters sighted.

- 18th Bomb Wing, with 3 B-20's, conducted a search mission in
vicinity of Long, 156° 30', Lat. 22° 00' against enemy sub-
marines and surface craft 100 miles seaward. No enemy activi-
ties reported.

- Hawaiian Interceptor Command conducted 7 tactical missions (33:40)
and 5 non-tactical missions (3:00).

31 December 1941

- 0015 - Radio received from Commanding General, 17th Air Force re:
Departure of B-17's, for Hawaii.

- 0730 - Radio to CAC and Commanding General, Hamilton Field re:
Arrival of B-17's.

- Radio to CAC re: Communications Instructions for Airplanes
arriving from Mainland.

- Radio to the Adjutant General re: Request Col. Willis
Hale or Lt. Col. Harold L. George to report to CAC as
to their Command.

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105

PL Recs for 1941 (contd)

Radio from Commanding General 1, Hawaiian Department to Commanding Officer, Hawaii District, re: Evacuation of all Army personnel, supplies and equipment from Harse Field to Hilo.

Radio from the Adjutant General re: Summarizing Japanese Aerial Att'ck.

Letter from General Brown to Admiral Fye re: Pursuit patrols.

Letter from Cinc Pacific Fleet to Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier re: Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier Defense.

- 0900 - Hawaiian Air Force Alert terminated until further notice. Alerts, until further notice from this headquarters, will be as ordered by Commanding Generals, 18th Bomb Wing and Hawaiian Interceptor Command.
- 0935 - Dawn Mission of Interceptor Command completed with number of ships ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.
- 1150 - Interceptor Command ordered to maintain an air alert over convoy approaching from the coast from 1500 to 1700, this date. They will remain above the anti-submarine patrol being performed by Patrol Wing Ivo.
- 1203 - Report to test of signal lights by 18th Bomb Wing. Lights tested at 1100. Read with binoculars 5000' to 6000'. Read without binoculars 3000'. Landing lights not feasible.
- 1240 - Report from 86th Observation Squadron on Maui - Miihau Patrol. Small speck one-half mile off shore east and one-half miles West of Makahala Point, Maui, at 1000 heading West. No sea in it. Not giving any identification.
- 1300 - Aircraft Status of 86th Observation Squadron:
4 B-47's and 1 B-49 in commission.
2 B-47's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 1300 - Aircraft status of Hawaiian Interceptor Command:
40 B-40's and 19 B-33's in commission.
1 B-40 and 3 B-33's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
6 B-40's and 4 B-33's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
12 B-40's and 4 B-33's out for 3d echelon maintenance.
- 1300 - Aircraft Status of 18th Bomb Wing:
33 B-17's, 11 B-18's and 10 B-20's in commission.
6 B-17's and 1 B-18 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
2 B-18's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
4 B-17's and 7 B-18's out for 3d echelon maintenance.

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106

21 December 1941 (contd)

1899 - 18th Bomb Wing, ordered to retain 18 B-17's as striking force.

1904 - Report of patrols - 88th Observation Squadron:
Two 2-plane patrols Maui - Hihau.
Three 2-plane patrols Molokai - Maui.
Two 2-plane patrols Keiki Channel.
One 1-plane patrol Keiki Channel.
Total tactical hours flown this date: 41:20.

1956 - Bomb mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.

2310 - Radio from Arcadio at San Francisco. USAF Blisc left San Francisco 17 December 1941 with 17 planes.

2316 - USAF Garfield departed San Francisco 17 December 1941 with 73 planes.

18th Bomb Wing, with 8 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 140° - 220°, 600 miles seaward. Sighted one Army freighter; 2 transports; SS Cornwell, Ocho; and life raft containing several men who appeared to be U. S. Marines. Dropped position report and emergency ration, which were recovered.

Hawaiian Interceptor Command conducted 23 tactical missions (32:00) and 3 non-tactical missions (9:15).

22 December 1941

0210 - Engineer's Report re: Electing of Airports on Catalina Islands.

0331 - Bomb mission of Hawaiian completed with number of planes ordered. Patrols had nothing to report. Escorted Glimmer.

1230 - Ordnance Officer instructed to remove munitions, materials and men from Hone Field.

1913 - Ordered 18th Wing to dispatch plane to Maui to report progress of Electing fields and provisions for their destruction. Also one plane to land at Hilo, Maui, and Hanalei. Observe Suiter and Janni. Reports to be rendered Gen. Strons. To be particularly concerned as to the obstructions that are to be removed for landings to provide safe area viz., not too close to runway during landing.

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29 December 1941 (contd)

- Major Allen called for information for Robert Commission:
 - a. Weather forecast of condition 7 December 1941. Also time of sunrise.
 - b. Diagram of airfield with exact disposition of planes at time of the attack.
 - c. Positions of bunkers prepared but not occupied and time of attack.

1st Lt. Hollinger called re: Blocking of airbase at Maui. Due to their over-tightness, he requests that blocking materials and arrangements be made but that field be left open during day for their operations. Area would be immediately available for blocking. Engineers have other instructions and have field blocked at all times except when plane is known to be preparing to land.

1710 - Capt. ordered following records of units of Hawaiian Air Force be submitted by OPO, 27 Dec 41; Log, Records of Operations and alert instructions from 15 Nov 41 to 7 Dec 41.

1800 - Aircraft status of 18th OAS:

- 32 B-17's, 12 B-13's, 10 A-20's in commission.
- 3 B-17's and 1 B-13 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 2 B-13's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
- 2 B-17's out for 3d echelon maintenance.

1800 - Aircraft status of 18th OAS:

- 3 O-47's in commission.
- 1 O-47, 1 O-49 out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1900 - Information received from Navy that one plane departed Hamilton Field OPO 601.

2000 - Report on control of 18th OAS:

- Two 2 plane patrols Maui - Hawaii.
- Three 2 plane patrols Molokai - Maui.
- One 2 plane patrol Maui Channel.
- Total effective hours flown this date: 40:50.

18th OAS, with 11 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 150° - 200°, 200 miles covered. Missed by "Transport, U.S. Mail; Coast Guard Cutter "Malines".

1st Lt. conducted 11 tactical missions (17:15) and 7 tactical missions (6:00).

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23 December 1941

Radio sent O-47 & O-49, Hamilton Field re: Arrival 11 B-17.

- 1030 - G-7 Dept. requested to allow one 1st Lt. Wm. Oltz Inf. of our Battalion, 101st Inf., to remain at Hamilton Field. G-7 disapproved and stated our Battalion was more than adequate. 1-3 - Col. Donagan.
- 1350 - Pictures of Mandates Islands received.
- 1750 - Gen. Strong left instructions re: 1st. Bellinger's striking force of 11 B-17's.
- 1840 - Call from 1st. Bellinger requesting that we release 10 in addition 11 B-17's for the search even though it is necessary to reduce the striking force below 18 B-17's.
- 1900 - Aircraft Status Report of 28th Cbr Co:
 - 3 O-47's in condition.
 - 1 O-47 & 1 O-49 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 1920 - Aircraft Status Report of 1st Tr Sq:
 - 28 B-17's, 1 B-18 in condition.
 - 2 B-19's & 7 B-20's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 - 3 B-19's & 3 B-20's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 - 3 B-19's & 2 B-20's out for 3d echelon maintenance.
- 1930 - Aircraft Status Report of 19th Bomb Grp:
 - 22 B-17's, 12 B-18's & 9 B-20's in condition.
 - 5 B-17's, 2 B-18's & 1 B-20 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 - 7 B-17's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 - 5 B-17's & 4 B-18's out for 3d echelon maintenance.
- 1950 - Reports of patrols - 28th Cbr Co:
 - Two patrol controls fixed - Mikru.
 - Four patrol controls Kolo'wai - Lani.
 - Two patrol controls Kiki'okalani.
 - Total tactical hours this date: 40:40.
- 1955 - Orders issued all units that not more than twenty five percent of combat personnel be concentrated in any one place at any time. Especially, no more than 1000's.
- 2040 - Forwarded to Chief of Staff, Army Dept., a report of 1st Air Depot re: Security measures, orders, instructions issued since attack.

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NAFAS-41

109

22 December 1941 (cont'd)

215 - Instructions in use COs, 18th in HavInCo; COs, Hick, Wepler and Bellows field and from Air Dept, re: availability to go on before the Roberts Commission.

220 - HavInCo reported no host actions this date.

18th Bomb Gr, with 12 B-17's, conducted search mission to detect enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 130° - 240°, 800 miles seaward. One friendly aircraft and one friendly surface sighted.

HavInCo conducted 7 tactical missions (8:20) and 2 non-tactical missions (2:05).

24 December 1941

0720 - Bomber escort provided incoming vessel.

0857 - Recon mission of HavInCo completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol to return to report.

1400 - From Burns field. "Sighted first reported to be six or seven small subs between Niikau and Oahu". Sighted Lt. P. L. Willis.

1300 - Aircraft Status Report of HavInCo:
16 B-24's, 13 B-26's in commission.
5 B-24's, 7 B-26's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
8 B-24's, 2 B-26's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
2 B-24's, 2 B-26's out for 3d echelon maintenance.

1400 - Aircraft Status Report of 18th Bomb Gr:
23 B-17's, 10 B-18's, 7 A-20's in commission.
5 B-17's, 3 B-18's, 2 A-20's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
2 B-17's, 2 B-18's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
5 B-17's, 6 B-18's, 1 A-20 out for 3d echelon maintenance.

1300 - Aircraft Status Report of 28th Obs Sq:
5 C-47's in commission.
1 C-47, 1 C-49 out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1415 - Report of Patrols of 838th Obs Sq:
Two patrol aircraft Niikau - Niikau.
Four patrol aircraft Niikau - Niikau.
Two patrol aircraft Niikau - Niikau.
One photographic mission.
Total tactical hours flown this date: 21:00

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AFES-41

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110

24 December 1941 (contd)

2220 - Col. Powell requested to contact Transport Squadron re: Transportation to Maui to get radio sets.

2225 - HawInCom reported no Dusk missions t is date.

18th Bomb Gp, with 16 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface vessels in sector 060° - 180°, 600 (800)? miles seaward. One Destroyer and one submarine; and three Freighters, SS Mapele, SS Lake Francis, and SS Hamakua; observed.

18th Bomb Wg, with 3 A-20's and 1 B-17, conducted a search and attack mission against enemy submarines reported between Niheu and Keuei. Two planes saw what appeared to be two submarines diving. One plane dropped bombs where submarine was believed to be and returned to base due to motor trouble. Other plane dropped two live bombs and one dud where other submarine left oil slick when it dived. Results unknown. Sighted one Destroyer and one Freighter 40 miles off Haleiwa. One sampan with American Flag observed off Burns Field.

HawInCom conducted 12 tactical missions (38:40) and 4 non-tactical missions. (3:10).

25 December 1941

Ltr. from CinCPacFlt to Com14ND & ComPat'ie IWO re: "Return of Aircraft to Oahu during Darkness, Use of Lights for."

Radio from TAG to CG, Navy Dept, re: Giving Procedure of Ferry Flights to Oahu.

Memorandum to CG, Navy Dept, re: Joint Army and Navy Air Doctrine.

General Tinker Directed that pursuit airplanes being assembled at Egan Air Depot be dispersed.

Ltr. to CG, Navy Dept, re: Ground Defense of Airdromes.

0758 - Dawn mission of HawInCom completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

25 December 1941 (contd)

- 1030 - Directed Interceptor Command to hold movement of unit to Kaneohe indefinitely.
- 1200 - CG, HawInCom called re: Moving anti-aircraft gun emplacements being prepared at certain locations.
- 1220 - Gen. Einker directed 1-4 to take necessary action to see that blocking of Maui Airport be executed as desired by the Navy.
- 1225 - Gen. Einker gave approval of Navy spotting 90, 500 lb bombs at Hickam Wheeler and Bellows Fields.
- 1300 - Directed 18th Wing to contact Patton LAC re: Carrying bombs on all search missions. 18th Wing to report results.
- 1305 - Directed 18th Wing investigate possible operation of 3 B-17's from Kaneohe and report to this office.
- 1310 - Directed HawInCom to move 12 Pursuit planes to Kaneohe when communications are established to insure control of unit. Personnel and equipment not needed to remain at Wheeler Field.
- 1520 - Arranged with Adm. Bellinger for planes of 44th Pursuit Squadron to move to Kaneohe with following: 8 planes (to be increased to 12), 16 officers and 37 men. Navy will furnish gas truck, food and housing. HawInCom directed to move above 26 Dec 41.
- 1600 - Aircraft Status of HawInCom:
 43 P-40's & 21 P-35's in commission.
 4 P-40's & 3 P-36's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 4 P-40's & 6 P-36's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 4 P-40's & 2 P-36's out for 3d echelon maintenance.
- 1800 - Aircraft Status of 18th Bomb Gp:
 36 B-17's, 10 B-18's & 9 A-20's in commission.
 4 B-17's & 2 B-18's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 2 B-18's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 5 B-17's and 1 A-20 out for 3d echelon maintenance.
- 1800 - Aircraft Status of 36th Cbe Sq:
 5 O-47's & 1 O-49 in commission.
 1 O-47 out for 1st echelon maintenance.

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 SECURITY INFORMATION

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 SECURITY INFORMATION

25 December 1941 (contd)

- 1804 - Report of Patrols of 26th Obs Sq:
 Two 2 plane patrols Maui - Hihiku.
 Four 2 plane patrols Kolokai - Maui.
 One 2 plane patrol Kivi Channel.
 Total tactical hours flown this date: 40:40.
- 13th Bomb Gp, with 16 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 060° - 180°, 600 miles seaward. Four friendly surface vessels observed.

26 December 1941

- Received copy of ltr. from CG, Navy Dept, to Adm. Pye re: Proposed Air Policy.
- Memorandum to CG, Navy Dept, re: Clearing out of B-17's.
- 1897 - Dawn mission of EvnInCom completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.
- 1800 - Aircraft Status of 26th Obs Sq:
 5 O-47's & 1 O-49 in commission.
 1 O-47 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 1800 - Aircraft Status of 13th Bomb Gp:
 27 B-17's, 1 P B-18's & 3 A-20's in commission.
 2 B-17's, 3 B-18's, & 1 A-20 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 6 B-17's, 6 B-18's & 1 A-20 out for 3d echelon maintenance.
- 1800 - Aircraft Status of EvnInCom:
 40 P-40's & 24 P-35's in commission.
 6 P-40's & 3 P-35's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 5 P-40's, 2 P-39's & 2 P-35's out for 3d echelon maintenance.
 3 P-40's & 2 P-35's out for 3d echelon maintenance.
- 1830 - EvnInCom reported no dusk missions this date.
- 1850 - EvnInCom reported no dusk missions this date.
- 2120 - Radio to Chief Air Service Command re: Ammunition Boxes for 37mm guns on P-39's. Requested delivery by most expeditious means.
- 2146 - Report of Patrols of 26th Obs Sq:
 Two 2 plane patrols Maui - Hihiku.
 Two 2 plane patrols Kivi Channel.
 Four 2 plane patrols Maui - Kolokai.

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 SECURITY INFORMATION

~~RESTRICTED~~

26 December 1941 (contd)

Total tactical hours flown this date: 39:35.
 Total non-tactical hours flown this date: 1:15.

- 2315 - Radio to IAG re: Correct Approach procedure for Planes Approaching Oahu.
- 2400 - EvInCom reported that E-17E, Pilot Lt. Cooper, landed on water 40 miles South of Pearl out of gas. Ship had been reported lost and was working with EvInCom in an effort to get orientated to return to Hickam Field.

18th Bomb Wg. with 16 E-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 080° - 120°, 300 miles seaward. Sighted 2 Destroyers; Friendly Freighter - SS Atlantic City; and FBY down on water.

EvInCom conducted 11 tactical missions (16:10) and 3 non-tactical missions (1:10).

27 December 1941

- 0300 - 18th Wing called re: E-17 down in water. E-18 sent out to position and reported seeing light on water. Destroyer and Coast Guard Cutter enroute.

0739 - EvInCom reported no dawn missions this date.

- 1625 - Signal Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, called and stated radio interference is not from out stations, but believed to be from a submarine located 3 miles South and West of Maene Point.

1800 - Aircraft Status of 18th Bomb Wg:
 23 E-17's, 12 E-18's & 9 A-20's in commission.
 4 E-17's & 3 E-18's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 3 E-17's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 4 E-17's, 6 E-18's & 1 A-20 out for 3d echelon maintenance.

1800 - Aircraft Status of EvInCom:
 42 P-40's & 25 P-36's in commission.
 2 P-40's & 1 P-36 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 6 P-40's & 4 P-36's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 25 P-40's, 7 P-36's & 1 P-36 out for 3d echelon maintenance.

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 SECURITY INFORMATION

AFES-41

~~RESTRICTED~~

114

27 December 1941 (contd)

- 1825 - Captain Lowe, U.S. Navy, and Col. Conroy called re: Pursuit protection for Navy Task Force.
- 2031 - Dash mission of EvInCom completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.
- 18th Bomb Gp, with 16 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 050° - 130°, 800 miles seaward. A large oil slick, including debris, was sighted off the East Coast of Nihoa. Plane descended to 500' and periscope was retracted with 20 seconds. The oil slick and debris is believed to be the wreckage of a small surface vessel. No bombs were carried on this plane as it was swinging compass with normal long range gas load.
- 18th Bomb Gp, with 10 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 050° - 300°, 150 miles seaward. One friendly Destroyer observed. Oil slick, small boxes and loose planks were sighted off Nihoa. One plane sighted life boat and stood by until boat was picked up by Coast Guard.
- 19th Bomb Gp, with 6 B-20's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines off Kalahele. Pilots reported no enemy activity.
- EvInCom conducted 3 tactical missions (11:10) and 4 non-tactical missions (2:45).

28 December 1941

- 0830 - Information received from Air Service Command that spare P-40 and B-17 engines would be shipped by most expeditious means.
- 0930 - Radio from Air Service Command that P-39's enroute are complete with 37mm cannons and magazines. 30 P-40's scheduled for delivery will be complete with 20mm cannons and related equipment.
- 0940 - Hawaiian Interceptor Command directed that where dummy airplanes are placed on dummy airbases, plowed furrows will be made to give the appearance of bunkers and planes will drop fields occasionally to simulate landings and/or take-offs.
- 1025 - 35,000 rounds 37 mm enroute. Ship manifest shows 13,000 now here.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

23 December 1941 (contd)

- 1220 - Informed that Headquarters Bellows Field would move from Plantation Office on 29 December 1941.
- 1340 - General Emmons directs that until further orders, there will be no pursuit planes on the dawn and dusk patrols. This will probably last until Navy Task Forces now in Pearl Harbor have departed.
- 1410 - Colonel Ryan reported Southern Air Route ready now as follows:
 5000' of runway at Canton.
 4200' of runway at Hanalei (5000' by 1st January 1942).
 5000' of runway at Honouliuli.
 5000' of runway at Townsville.
 100,000 gal. 100 octane gasoline at all except Townsville where 70,000 gals. are located. No lubrication, oxygen, hydraulic brake fluid. Defense at all U. S. armed places provided by Army.
- 1500 - Called 18th Bombing re: Operation of Bomberier Training Squadron, 42d Squadron, from Bellows as directed by General Hinker. Planes to fly to Kauai each morning and return each evening before dark. Landings for reloading to be made at Parking Sands.
- 1800 - Aircraft Status Report of 86th Observation Squadron:
 6 O-47's and 1 O-49 in commission.
- 1800 - Aircraft Status Report of Hawaiian Interceptor Command:
 40 P-40's and 25 P-36's in commission.
 5 P-40's and 2 P-36's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 4 P-40's and 2 P-36's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 22 P-40's, 10 P-39's and 3 P-36's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
- 1800 - Aircraft Status Report of 18th Bombing:
 33 B-17's, 9 B-18's and 8 B-20's in commission.
 7 B-17's, 2 B-18's and 2 B-20's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 1821 - Report of Patrols of 86th Observation Squadron:
 Two 2-plane patrols Maui - Hihou.
 Four 2-plane patrols Kolohele - Maui.
 Two 2-plane patrols Kaiwi Channel.
 Total tactical hours flown this date: 29:25.
 Total non-tactical hours flown this date: 1:25.

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 SECURITY INFORMATION

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28 December 1941 (contd)

1843 - Dash Mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrols had nothing to report.

1845 - One P-40 damaged in landing.

18th Bomb Wing, with 15 B-17's, conducted a search mission against submarines and surface craft in Sector 080° - 180°, 80 miles seaward. One PBY filled in Sector 090° - 197.5°. Sighted 1 destroyer; USS Hulbert with whale in tow; and 3 distinct wakes, believed to be submarines, 3 miles off south shores of Hawaii. Navy took action.

18th Bomb Wing, with 6 B-18's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft on a course of 280°, 20 miles interval between airplanes, 200 miles seaward. One other B-18 conducted a search mission on the following course: Keena Point, Kauni, Fiihou, Kula Rock, out 150 miles on west leg of Kauai Bern and return. USS Kevajo sighted near what was believed to be wreckage; one lifeboat was seen but was left for destroyer which was approaching; 3 destroyers; and nine other surface vessels. Three submarines were located. One plane located two but lost one when it submerged. The other submerged but produced large oil bubbles after being bombed - believed to be destroyed. One other submarine was located and bombed. According to all visible evidence the submarine was destroyed. Large bubbling oil patches were observed after the bombing.

18th Bomb Wing, with 3 B-20's, conducted an attack mission against enemy submarines on a course 225° from Keena Point, 150 miles seaward.

One plane sighted heavy oil slick area of 3 to 5 square miles and much debris 85 miles from Keena Point.

Hawaiian Interceptor Command conducted 4 tactical missions (7:20) and 9 non-tactical missions (6:10).

29 December 1941

0829 - Dash mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrols had nothing to report.

0950 - 18th Bomb Wing directed to disperse 3 B-17's at Bellows Field during hours of darkness daily.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

AFHS-41

~~RESTRICTED~~

117

29 December 1941 (contd.)

- 1000 - 18th Bomb Wing directed to make a careful search of the Laysi, Niikau and Zevla Rocks area for possible enemy submarine bases or fuel caches. Report will be made to this headquarters of results of this mission.
- 1355 - Report received that pilot of A-20 found six drums stacked at Cape Kawaihau, Niikau. Fired their load.
- 1800 - Aircraft status of Hawaiian Interceptor Command:
 42 P-40's and 23 P-36's in commission.
 4 P-40's and 3 P-36's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 4 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 40 P-40's, 19 P-39's and 3 P-36's out for 3d echelon maintenance.
- 1800 - Aircraft status of 86th Observation Squadron:
 5 O-47's and 1 O-42 in commission.
 1 O-47 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 1800 - Aircraft status of 18th Bomb Wing:
 35 B-17's, 11 B-18's and 9 A-20's in commission.
 3 B-17's and 2 B-18's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 2 B-17's and 1 B-18 out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 1 B-17's, 7 B-18's and 1 A-20 out for 3d echelon maintenance.
- 1850 - Reply sent to the Adjutant General re: Flight of 2 B-17's south.
- 1855 - Radio received from the War Department stating that our request for additional B-17's was now under consideration.
- 2024 - Dusk mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrols had nothing to report.
- 2105 - Report of Patrols of 86th Observation Squadron:
 Two 2-plane patrols Maui - Niikau.
 Four 2-plane patrols Molokai - Laysi.
 Two 2-plane patrols Keiwi Channel.
 Total tactical hours flown this date: 26:40.
 Total non-tactical hours flown this date: 1:40.
- 18th Bomb Wing, with 12 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sectors 060° - 090° and 120° - 180°, 300 miles seaward. Sighted convoy of 1 destroyer, 2 tankers and 1 aircraft tender. Another plane sighted 2 destroyers and 2 small boats, friendly.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

29 December 1941 (contd)

13th Bomb Wing, with B-20's, conducted a search mission for possible submarine refueling bases. Found six fuel drums stacked on shore at Ohe Kawaihau, Pihiku. Wired their land.

Hawaiian Interceptor Command conducted 13 tactical missions (37:40) and 7 non-tactical missions (9:50).

30 December 1941

- 0810 - Colonel Howbough called saying that Federal Communications Commission definitely located a submarine at Long. 158° 10' Lat. 21° 15' 43". Information Center notified. They notified Navy. One tender being sent out.
- 0927 - Submarine reported 8 miles off Keana Point.
- 0959 - Dawn mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.
- 1030 - Arrangements completed between Hawaiian Interceptor Command and 18th Bomb Wing for planes to test night fighter tactics.
- 1335 - P-40E, Lt. J. S. Evans, pilot, damaged in forced landing. Landing gear failed.
- 1530 - Notified 18th Bomb Wing that special flight of P-17's would not depart this P. M. Crews released for rest and awaiting further instructions tomorrow.
- 1535 - 96th Observation Squadron reported as follows: "On patrol today, 30 December 1941, on North shore of Molokai, East of Keouhi, we noted a series of markings plowed in the ground resembling Japanese characters. The area in this vicinity had apparently been plowed to prevent landing of enemy planes but this part of the area was too rough for landings regardless of preventive measures". A-20 sent out to inspect.
- 1750 - 18th Bomb Wing reported results of A-20 inspection were negative.
- 1807 - Aircraft Status Report of 18th Bomb Wing:
 32 P-17's, 9 B-18's and 10 A-20's in commission.
 7 P-17's, and 3 B-18's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 2 B-18's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 4 P-17's and 7 B-18's out for 3d echelon maintenance.

~~RESTRICTED~~30 December 1941 (contd)

- 1800 - Aircraft Status of 86th Observation Squadron:
 4 O-47's and 1 O-49 in commission.
 2 O-47's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 1800 - Aircraft Status Report of Hawaiian Interceptor Command:
 41 P-40's and 27 P-36's in commission.
 4 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 5 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 23 P-40's and 22 P-29's and 2 P-35's out for 3d echelon maintenance.

Flash received that Hilo, Hawaii, was being shelled, presumably by enemy submarine.

18th Bomb Wing, with 13 P-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 010° - 110°, 80° miles seaward. Task Force of 1 destroyer, 2 tankers and 1 heavy cruiser observed. 1 friendly freighter sighted. One carrier and planes observed. Also sighted wake with oil bubbles rising at end of wake. Another plane sighted an enemy submarine and one friendly destroyer within 15 miles headed for it. Instructed to proceed on mission.

18th Bomb Wing, with 4 B-18's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 140° - 170°, 300 miles seaward. No enemy contacts made.

18th Bomb Wing, with 3 A-20's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines in Sector 260° - 285°, 150 miles seaward. No enemy activities observed.

Hawaiian Interceptor Command conducted 20 tactical missions (40:45) and 4 non-tactical missions (30:00).

31 December 1941

- 0735 - Dawn Mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.
- 0745 - Dawn Mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.
- 1030 - Informed by Colonel Lyman that one field at Schofield Barracks is finished.

SECURITY INFORMATION

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AMHS-41

130

31 December 1941 (contd)

- 1110 - Arrangements completed for Joint Pursuit - Searchlight Irrigating Problem.
- 1403 - Information received from Commanding Officer, Kauai District, that Lihue, Kauai, is under enemy fire. Shell fire short of Nawiliwili Pier. Gasfield back of Nawiliwili on fire.
- 1650 - General Erons directed Hawaiian Air Force to make an aerial reconnaissance of Kaneohe, Dow Field and Ford Island where it was reported that carrier-based aircraft are parked in a very small area making an ideal target. This was especially true of Kaneohe. Department Commander desires that General Winker take this up with proper Naval Commander, if true.
- 1800 - Aircraft Status Report of Hawaiian Interceptor Command:
 43 P-40's and 27 P-36's in commission.
 3 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 5 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 57 P-40's, 24 P-39's and 2 P-36's out for 3d echelon maintenance.
- 1800 - Aircraft Status Report of 18th Bomb Wing:
 23 B-17's, 2 B-13's and 10 A-20's in commission.
 6 B-17's and 1 B-13's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
 1 B-17 and 1 B-13 out for 2d echelon maintenance.
 5 B-17's and 7 B-13's out for 3d echelon maintenance.
- 1900 - Aircraft Status Report of 26th Observation Squadron:
 5 O-47's and 1 O-49 in commission.
 1 O-47 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 1849 - Dark mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrols had nothing to report.
- 1855 - Report of Patrols of 26th Observation Squadron:
 Two 2-plane patrols Kauai - Niikeu.
 Three 2-plane patrols Molokai - Maui.
 One 2-plane patrol Kaimi Channel.
 One photo track mission.
- 1940 - Hawaiian Interceptor Command reported on Naval Dispersion of aircraft. Planes bunched up at Ford Island. Kaneohe and Dow Field are C. I.

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A-243-1

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131

31 December 1941 (contd)

18th Bomb Wing, with 12 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sectors 000° - 015°; 025° - 055°; 095° - 110°; and 120° - 160°, 700 miles seaward. One plane saw wake with periscope at end. Periscope submerged. Plane observed submarine surfacing as it made run. Dropped 2 300-lb bombs, one hitting 30 feet right of conning tower and two hit about 120 or 130 feet over the conning tower near the tail. The submarine was visibly shaken, it rolled about 30° and went under. In continuing search, 2 more periscopes were sighted but could not make a run on them. These might have been the same submarine trying to surface. The submarine was sand colored and about 150 to 200 feet long. Friendly convoy sighted by another plane.

10th Bomb Wing, with 4 B-18's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 055° - 095°, 300 miles seaward. Two small skiffs sighted near Molokai.

18th Bomb Wing, with 3 A-20's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines in Sector 260° - 285°, 150 miles seaward. No enemy activities observed.

Evansian Interceptor Command conducted 14 tactical missions (2:5) and 7 non-tactical missions (4:35).

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SECURITY INFORMATION

AMSLB-41

CONFIDENTIAL
132

APPENDIX 4

Letter, Lt. Col. Walter G. Jecney, Jr., to Commanding Officer,
11th Bombardment Group (A), Hickam Field, H. I., 2 February 1949,
subject: Report of Operations, Bomber Unit Test Group 3.9, with
three indorsements.

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133

50th RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON (H)*
Office of the Squadron Commander

Hickam Field, T. H.
3 February 1949

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, Bomber Unit Task Group 8.9
TO : Commanding Officer, 11th Bombardment Group (E),
Hickam Field, T. H.

1. In compliance with the verbal directive of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, the undersigned assumed command of a flight of six (6) airplanes designated, by Operations Plan No. 8-42, United States Pacific Fleet, dated 13 January 1949, as Bomber Unit and assigned to Task Group 8.9. The following detailed report is submitted covering the operations of this unit.

a. ~~PARAGRAPH~~: (1) The unit was organized as directed, by taking three airplanes and crews from the 23rd Bombardment Squadron (H). Ground crew personnel in the number of twelve (12) were taken from each of the foregoing squadrons and transported to CALEDA by destroyers designated as Task Group 8.8. The air echelon departed HICKAM FIELD at 0630 LZT 16 January and the last airplane landed at PALMYRA at 1630 on that date. Airplane number 41-2420, pilot Lieutenant Sullivan, was severely damaged in landing at PALMYRA when the tail wheel hit short of the runway tearing off the tail section below the vertical fin. Causes for this accident were three fold, first very poor visibility due to rain at the time of landing, second, absence of marking at the end of the runway to permit the pilot to judge his elevation and distance out, third, pilot error in making too slow an approach. Investigation revealed that two of the only other three P-17E airplanes to land previously at this field narrowly escaped having exactly the same type of accident for the same reasons. Black oil stripes have since been painted at fifty foot intervals on the runway and have simplified landings at this field.

Due to intermittent rain squalls visibility in the immediate vicinity of the island was very restricted, consequently it was necessary for the ground station at PALMYRA to utilize the navy lost plane procedure and refer to bring in one airplane piloted by the undersigned. Although this airplane passed within approximately one mile of the island at five hundred feet it was impossible to discern the island. Foning by radio compass on 11 signals transmitted by Palmyra was impossible due to strong static interference. Cooperation

* This 50th Reconnaissance Squadron redesignated as 50th Reconnaissance Squadron (H) on 12 April 1949.

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on the part of the permanent personnel at this station was excellent, everything required by the bomber unit was furnished immediately and efficiently, however gassing facilities are inadequate and the gas as serviced is of doubtful quality due to water and foreign matter content.

(2) Departure from HALLIERA was made at 0630 LZ1, on 17 January and the last airplane landed at CANNON at 1815. Again poor visibility in the vicinity of the terminal made navigation exceedingly difficult and the location of the destination at time of arrival very doubtful. Two of the airplanes came in to the island satisfactorily on dead reckoning alone. Two of the airplanes missed by the island on their dead reckoning and were forced to then make a positive error and locate the island by use of a landfall utilizing a precomputed curve for the sun, fortunately this system was well understood by the navigators and brought them in safely to the island. No I/O signals were received by any of the foregoing four airplanes although two of them requested same. The fifth airplane was definitely lost having passed within ten miles of the island in a rain squall. The undersigned immediately upon landing proceeded to the Fan Air hoisting station located across the lagoon from the landing strip in an effort to ascertain the reason that no homing signals were being dispatched. The radio operator on duty was shortly and properly instructed and the fifth airplane soon picked up the I/O signals and effected a safe arrival. This airplane reported a contact with two enemy submarines sighted off HULL ISLAND, one was bombed, results doubtful.

(3) The following day, 18 January was spent in maintenance and patrols to include celestial air swinging of the compasses. Sectors in the vicinity of HULL ISLAND for search and attack were assigned to two airplanes. Contact report of a submarine sighted and bombed off SIDNEY reported, results doubtful.

Facilities at CANNON were limited. Gassing was done and is still being done from fifty gallon drums. This is a very unsatisfactory manner of servicing, it is obvious that for one hour of flight service from four drums will be required per airplane; for normal missions of heavy bombardment the time for flight will average nine hours which will mean between thirty-two and thirty-six drums must be serviced to each airplane, a very tedious and primitive system. In addition to the time required for servicing, the gasoline obtained proved dirty, watered and full of metal corrosive. Tugs must be provided for handling of heavy bombers on the ground, none were available at any of these bases. The messing facilities at CANNON are few, however in consideration of the difficulties experienced by the mess personnel it must be stressed that they are doing a most commendable job in serving food, properly cooked, of a reasonable variety and are in fact operating a superior mess. Sleeping facilities in tents are adequate. Protective measures other than passive defenses are absolutely lacking, this subject will be covered in paragraph one (1) of RECOMMENDATIONS. The bomb shelters

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now being constructed are satisfactory, the emplacements for airplanes are not of sufficient height to protect the B-30 or the B-17E type airplane. Captain Ecker, the Engineer Corps officer on duty at CAMICH, has been made cognizant of this fact.

(4) The 19 January was devoted to a search mission in accordance with the aforementioned operations plan. Airplane number 41-2439, pilot Captain Blakey damaged two propellers, and one wheel in landing. Accident was attributed to two causes, first a strong cross wind from the north making landing hazardous, second pilot error in using excessive application of brakes rather than maintaining control of the run on the ground with the outboard engines. The Seeburger dispatched from CAMICH to PALMYRA to remove two propellers and landing wheels from the B-17E 41-2439 grounded at PALMYRA. The removal of the parts required proceeded according to schedule, however on taking off from PALMYRA the airplane piloted by Lt. Seeburger blew a cylinder head. With no additional instructions and in a remarkable short time a cylinder head was taken from the airplane with the damaged tail section. Lt. Seeburger returned to CAMICH and within six hours of his return to CAMICH, Captain Blakey's airplane was in flying condition. The technical difficulties overcome by the enlisted mechanics in this instance deserve special commendation.

(5) According to plan, on the 21 January the flight proceeded to MAELI. One airplane, number 41-2433 piloted by Lieut. Wenderer developed engine trouble in the number three engine. This airplane is still grounded at MAELI awaiting an engine. The faulty engine has been thoroughly checked by competent enlisted mechanics and by the local Wright Company representative, none of whom are able to state exactly what is wrong with the engine, however all are agreed that it is unsafe to fly. The housing and messin facilities with the RZAF unit stationed at the field are adequate. There is an American camp being built within two miles of the field where transients may be housed and messed which will further improve the facilities. The only runway now available runs from the water toward the hills. This is an excellent runway approximately three hundred (300) feet wide and five thousand (5000) feet long. Pilots must be cautioned that when a cross-wind prevails or when a no wind condition exists landing must be made toward the hills as there is a definite slope from the hills towards the water. Likewise for take-off, heavily loaded the run should be made towards the water, unless a strong opposite wind is blowing, taking advantage of the down grade to pick up momentum. Full cooperation was received from the unit commander, Squadron Leader White. An approach procedure for friendly aircraft was lacking. This resulted in unannounced American airplanes arriving and causing unnecessary alerts. This condition is believed to be remedied as a recommended approach procedure has been forwarded from Squadron Leader White to the Commanding General Hawaiian Department. The only discomfort existing at this station are the mosquitos, which appear after dusk, all personnel visiting this field must bring mosquito bars if their sleep and their health are to be preserved.

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SECRET INFORMATION
 CONFIDENTIAL

A-110-41

126

(6) On the 22 January a flight in a RZAN, DeFevilen 36 was made by the undersigned to KAUSORIS a field approximately fifteen miles from SJVA. This field is so usable by heavy bombardment in an emergency. Plans are evidently underway to station all or a portion of an American pursuit unit at this field. Unless there is sufficient pursuit being sent to VILI LEVU to permit protection on both sides of the island, MADEI and SJVA sides, this action deemed most unwise. Defense of MADEI by pursuit based on the SJVA side of the island would be most unreliable for two reasons, first the weather on the SJVA side of the island is generally rainy with low clouds obscuring the mountain passes making passage by air from one side of the island to the other hazardous, second the distance of KAUSORIS to MADEI of ninety miles is believed excessive for close support. Ground defenses on both sides of the island consist of infantry and artillery, the exact number of each were not divulged. However it is safe to say that there are three thousand ground troops in the vicinity of MADEI and approximately the same amount on the SJVA side.

(7) Return to CANNON was effected on 23 January. This flight was noteworthy only in that although over two hours were flown on instruments at five hundred feet, all airplanes came in to CANNON with no radio hovering assistance. The importance of hairline accuracy in dead reckoning navigation had been fortunately brought home to the navigators and pilots concerned with most satisfying results.

(8) In accordance with the operations plan, a flight to MADEI was made on 25 January. A contact report was submitted by one airplane, 6 V 33 who sighted and attacked a submarine south of CAROLINE ISLE, results doubtful. A diving attack out of the sun by a friendly navy fighter was successfully repulsed by airplane 6 V 33, fortunately no casualties were inflicted on either party. One airplane encountered difficulty in landing at MADEI due to a strong cross wind and ended up off the runway at the water's edge. The only cause to the airplane was a burned out right brake. A recollection was obtained from the airplane grounded for engine check. This nearly disastrous landing serves to emphasize the point previously made that cross-wind or no-wind landing must be made towards the hills and not down the slope towards the water. In company with Squadron Leader White a survey of a small field adjacent to the main airrome at MADEI was made on the 25 January. This field has definite possibilities as a pursuit field. It affords excellent natural coverage and a large amount of room for dispersion. The actual suitability of the field for pursuit operation is a matter the pursuit commander scheduled to arrive on or about the 29 January, is much more ably qualified to answer than the undersigned.

(9) Return to CANNON on 27 January was effected without incident. A survey enroute of two islands FUKAFOU and KIU LILILI was made and as far as could be determined there was no evidence of Japanese occupation of either of these islands. The British flag was drawn to the top of

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SECURITY INFORMATION

REF ID: A1

~~RESTRICTED~~

127

the radio tower on FIDELITY immediately after the visiting airplane had been identified as American.

(10) Search to five hundred miles west of GARDNER was made on 28 January, no contacts reported.

(11) Return to HIGGINS FIELD via PALMYRA was made without incident on 29-30 January.

B. REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) GARDNER is essential as a base for ferry crossings by both medium and heavy bombardment. In its present unprotected state it may well be destroyed by a very small force of the enemy. Pending the arrival of complete ground defense units it is suggested that a continued off-shore patrol by at least two destroyers be maintained.

(2) Weather makes it imperative that all legs of the flight along the south Pacific route be flown during the hours of daylight and in view of the accuracy required in navigation that there be as short as possible. It is recommended that personnel ferrying airplanes through this section westward, be organized into flights of three or more airplanes under the command of the senior pilot. Flying in a loose formation at visibility distance will assist in interception of the island base even during very limited visibility conditions.

It is advisable that an experienced pilot be in charge of each flight to evaluate the weather, matters of maintenance and the many details in flight movements which are bound to arise.

(3) In connection with the foregoing the necessity of perfect dead reckoning cannot be too greatly emphasized. It is quite possible to miss either PALMYRA or GARDNER islands within a very few miles and due to restricted visibility fail to see them. Radio as distance by A0 signals are of immense value, however the heading by radio must not be relied upon as static conditions may well exist which will make reception of doubtful value. To obtain accurate dead reckoning results it is essential that prior to any flights of this nature the installed navigation equipment be thoroughly calibrated with the load to be carried installed. Air swinging of the compass by means of sights at a celestial body are exceedingly difficult in the B-17E airplane with no pelorus available. It is suggested that known terrestrial courses be worked out in the vicinity of HIGGINS FIELD at approximately 200 intervals for the convenience of pilots in air swinging the compasses frequently.

(4) The arrival and departure messages pertaining to airplanes along this route are not being satisfactorily processed. A system similar to the normal per capita P.M. messages is a requirement. Secrecy of movements of aircraft cannot be over stressed, however, it must be intelligently applied and the details of the communications throughout the route simplified.

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SECURITY

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(5) It is interesting to note that all of the Lockheed Hudson airplanes belonging to the KIZIA were equipped with a JCR. This enabled a small number of airplanes to cover a large amount of search area most effectively. It is recommended that airplanes of this type would be given priority on installation of equipment of this nature.

(6) Refueling at HAWAII was quite expeditious due to the presence of Army Air Corps servicing trucks. It is believed essential for rapid service of Army aircraft at OAHU and KAUAI that similar gasoline trucks be delivered to both of these islands. The gasoline service through these tanks would be of a much better quality as the tanks acts as a huge separator.

(7) It is believed that much less information of movement of airplanes will be given away to the enemy if a prearranged daily schedule of 10 heading signals is put into effect at each base, such as signals for five minutes on every hour. It would eliminate a large amount of radio traffic now required by airplanes requesting heading signals.

(8) At each base on the southern route there should be stationed an Air Corps officer representative and some maintenance personnel. The officer and enlisted personnel referred to above have arrived at OAHU, however there were no Air Corps personnel stationed at KAUAI.

(9) The camouflage of these airplanes when parked on airbases is not particularly effective as reference to the photo recon taken at HAWAII and OAHU will disclose. In the air the rust color shows up most predominantly. It is suggested that a broken pattern camouflage be adopted consisting of various shades of blue from dark blue to light powder blue. It is believed that this will be much less visible when flying over water and little more noticeable than the present colors when the airplane is parked on the ground. Above all it is recommended that the painting of the rudder with bright red and white stripes be discontinued immediately as this destroys any camouflage effect which may have been obtained by the multi-colored painting of the airplane.

(10) The undersigned desires to recommend all of the officers and enlisted men participating in this flight. No one could ask for more cooperation and splendid spirit than was displayed by this group throughout the entire period. It is a matter of pride to be permitted to command such a fighting unit.

WALTER C. SELLERY, JR.
Lt. Col. Air Corps
Commanding

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SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

78 Ind.

(C-1)

HEADQUARTERS MARITIME AIR FORCE, Hickam Field, H. I., 12 February 1942.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Forwarded for your information. The recommendations contained in paragraph 1 b have been or will be acted upon as tabulated below:

- Par 1 b (1): Defense forces for Canton are en route.
- Par 1 b (2): This recommendation will be followed as far as possible in all future ferry flights.
- Par 1 b (3): The method of compass swingings outlined is now being used by the Bomber Command.
- Par 1 b (4): Secrecy of these messages must be preserved. It is believed that additional signal personnel now assigned to or enroute to these islands will eliminate most communication difficulties.
- Par 1 b (5): A radio message was sent to the Chief of the Air Corps, dated 11 February 1942, requesting radar equipment for aircraft of the Bomber Command. Commander Naval Base Air Defense states that most of this equipment has been made available to the Navy in Hawaii.
- Par 1 b (6): Servicing trucks are now in operation at Christmas and Canton. It is understood that the Navy intends to send a servicing truck to Palmyra.
- Par 1 b (7): A daily schedule of MO's is in operation now at Christmas and Canton.
- Par 1 b (8): Since Christmas Island is ready for operation, extensive use of Palmyra is not contemplated.
- Par 1 b (9): A study is being made of the desirability of changing the color of the camouflage particularly on heavy bombers that search far out to sea. The nonspecular blue and gray paint used on Navy patrol planes seems the most effective. Any differences of opinion exist on the desirability of red and white tail stripes. Carrier based and Interceptor Command pilots favor the stripes while the Bomber Command and Patrol Command want them discontinued. This is a subject for further investigation.

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HEADQUARTERS 7TH BOMBER COMMAND, Hickam Field, H. I., 22 February 1949.
 TO: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Hickam Field, H. I.

1. In furtherance of the recommendations contained in paragraph 1 b (3), Report of Operation Bomber Unit Task Group 8.9 submitted by Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney, the following steps have been taken:

a. A method of calibrating compasses has been devised and proven, which method is to be made standard throughout the 7th Bomber Command. This method involves the use of the upper gun turret. It will allow the calibration of the compass under all load conditions with comparative ease.

b. In the training of the navigators within the Bomber Command School, precision of navigation by dead reckoning means is stressed repeatedly throughout the course.

c. The importance of the precision of dead reckoning navigation is impressed upon the minds of the newly assigned qualified navigators.

d. The close coordination and cooperation of the pilot-navigator team, in order to navigate precisely, is stressed as a basic requirement by all units of this command.

e. Pilots are requiring navigators to return to this base by means of dead reckoning navigation alone, and without the aids of radio navigation.

f. Navigation logs are closely checked by Squadron Navigation Officers, and from time to time by the Group Commanders.

g. Daily experiences on search missions have improved the degree of accuracy of all navigators. The navigator's precision is directly proportional to the amount of his dead reckoning, overwater flight experience. This is proven by the following two facts:

(1) There has been a marked decrease in the number of airplanes lost on return from search missions within the 7th Bomber Command.

(2) Lieutenant Colonel Sweeney reported that the manner in which the navigators of the Bomber Unit Task Force 8.9 performed their missions after their first return flight from Wandi to Canton was much more precise than that of their first trip.

2. There is one step towards the improvement of navigation which cannot be made by the 7th Bomber Command, but should be made by higher headquarters. One particular difficulty which has to be overcome before precision of dead reckoning navigation is made clear to the newly assigned navigator is his reluctance to accept the need for absolute precision in dead reckoning navigation.

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1st Ind. (Cont'd)

A large majority of the navigators now assigned to tactical units are graduates of the Pan American School, Coral Gables, Florida. That school does not teach navigation by dead reckoning means, nor does it stress the importance of this type of navigation. If the importance of dead reckoning and the necessity for precision in its use were instilled in the mind of the student early in his studies, his mental reluctance to accept that need would not exist. This mental condition is changed only after he has been assigned to a unit which stresses the importance of dead reckoning, and after he has gained experience through its use. The criticism of the Pan American School for its lack of dead reckoning training has been general throughout the Air Corps. The difficulty which exists because of the lack of such dead reckoning training and of the importance of precision in its use can only be overcome when that school is required to teach precision dead reckoning navigation.

3. Before sound recommendations can be made regarding camouflage of aircraft under this command, the following decisions are requested.

a. Are airbases to be camouflaged only for the terrain from which they are now operating?

b. Is it desired that a universal camouflage be used for all airbases in this territory?

c. Is it desired that a universal camouflage be used for all airbases from which this command may be required to operate?

d. Is it desirable to camouflage for over-water flight or for ground marking?

e. Would half the present size of markings on the tail surfaces be of sufficient size for ground identification?

For the Commanding General:

/s/ A. E. Hegenberger,
/t/ A. E. HEGENBERGER,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Executive.

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133

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COMBATTANT BATTLE FORCE
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

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February 7, 1942

From: Lieutenant Commander Charles E. Greber, U. S. Navy, Naval Observer.

To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of recent operations with Army Bombing Unit.

1. The attached report of recent operations of the Army bombing unit composed of six B-24's (B-24's) (B-24's) to which I was assigned as Naval Observer consists of the following enclosure:

- (A) History of the operations.
- (B) Chronological record.
- (C) List of submarine contacts.
- (D) Comments on each base visited.
- (E) General comments and recommendations.

C. E. GREBER,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.,
Naval Observer.

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(A) HISTORY OF OPERATIONS.

1. At 0630 on Friday, January 16th, 1942 six Army B17's took off from Midway Field at two minute intervals, took departure from Diamond Head, and set course for Palmyra. At 1030 one of our WP planes, probably on its usual patrol, was sighted on a southerly course about ten miles distant. At the expiration of our estimated line of arrival (D.L.A.) Palmyra was not in sight. Visibility was reduced to 2 - 4 miles and in rain squalls to less than a mile or less. A rectangle was flown but there was still no sight of Palmyra. The Radio Direction Indicator was out of commission so a bearing from Palmyra's Under was asked for. The landing was made at 1330. One of the B17's, 41-2420, on landing hit the ramp of the landing strip with its tail wheel, tearing off the after gun section and twisting the after end of the fuselage. There were no injuries to personnel other than to the wife of the pilot.

2. Saturday Morning, January 17th, the takeoff was made at 0630 by 6 B17's, the sixth not being able to continue as it required major repairs. The weather between Palmyra and Canton was doubtful. An attempt was made to go above it but the top was above the ceiling of the flying portresses with their heavy loading. Hence, the flight proceeded to go "under" the front end, except for several periods of instrument flying which was accomplished. Upon the expiration of our D.L.A. Canton was not in sight, so the course was continued for about ten minutes and then reversed. There were numerous small rain squalls, interspersing areas of good visibility, and unlimited ceilings so that a rain squall could completely blot out Canton Island even though the visibility might be up to twenty-five miles in other directions. Since the radio direction equipment was still out of commission it was decided to "run down" a sun line parallel to our computed position, that intersected Canton. This was done and a landing was made at 1445, zone plus 10¹ time. Plane 41-2429, Captain Elbert, pilot, made a landing at Hull Island and noticed two submarines at periscope depth apparently circumnavigating the island. He dropped two 500 pound bombs in the wake of one which submerged immediately on his approach. In conversation with the pilot I believe these bombs were too far astern to cause anything but slight damage at the best. The report of this contact was not made at the time because the pilot was not sure of its position. After landing at 1810 (zone 10¹ time) with the aid of radio signals the information was forwarded.

3. At sunrise the next morning, Sunday, January 18th, 1942, two planes were sent to Hull and Sydney to further investigate the two submarines sighted the previous day. A WP on search observed one heading west, bearing 270°, distant 85 miles from Canton—probably one of those sighted the day before. A bomber was also maintained on patrol around Canton Island from dawnbreak until return of the WP planes from their search. Plane 41-2426, 1st Lt. W. N. Hall, Air Corps, U.S. Army, pilot, sighted a submarine in the act of submerging bearing 272° I, distant 200 yards from Sydney Island. The plane was turned for the attack but by the time the attack was completed (about two minutes) the

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SECURITY INFORMATION

submarine was deeply submerged. The 60 round to be, with one tenth second delay of settings were done in the estimated position of the submarine with negative result. Other planes checked compasses in flight around the island.

4. On Monday, January 18th, 5 B17's made their scheduled search to the south to a distance of 400 miles. The sections of each area searched were 130° E, 135° E, 130° W, 135° W, and 110° E. The results were negative. Plane 44-3409, Captain Blakey, pilot, returned after only a 100 mile search as his track indicated that his deviation card was considerably in error. In landing on the only completed strip (17 - 3) in a twenty knot crosswind, he ground looped at the end of the run and dented the right wheel and one propeller.

5. Tuesday, January 20th, was spent in maintenance and upkeep while B17 proceeded on mission. 1 B17 was sent back to Palmyra to obtain parts from the damaged bomber there in order to repair the damaged bomber at Canton.

6. Wednesday, January 21st, 7 bombers took off at 0545 and made a search enroute to Fofi (pronounced Fendi) on the northwestern coast of Viti Levu, Fiji Islands. They arrived at 1450.

7. On Thursday, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, the other officers and myself, were flown by Squadron Leader White, NZAF, to a landing field at Natvori, 14 miles to the eastward of Suva, from where we were driven to headquarters in Suva. A conference was held with Wing Commander Roberts, NZAF, Lieutenant Commander A. J. Gray, U.S. Navy, (ret), Naval Observer, Capt in Inde, U.S. Army, Military Observer, and several officers in the intelligence and communication sections. It was found that despite the close liaison between Lieutenant Commander Gray and the local New Zealand military forces (all New Zealand officers spoke very highly of Lieutenant Commander Gray) that sufficient information was not being received for proper action. As an example, upon receipt of a despatch notifying them of our intended arrival, they had leased two houses and erected one barrack of their own troops to provide quarters for our group believing we were to be permanently stationed there. I believe this mistake was due to their own misinterpretation of the despatch. Another cause of concern was the arrival of bombers on ferry without previous notification. Sometimes the message, probably because of garbling, indicated to the local bombers that the B-24's were the ones meant. This led to the command at Fofi awaiting the arrival of a two engine plane in addition to the B-24 which had already arrived. It is believed this situation has been or is being cleared up. After the conference which extended into the afternoon, and after an inspection of the proposed seaplane base at Lautoka, the return flight to Fofi was made where it was found that 2 B-24's had arrived before receipt of a message. All of these crises not only had the messing and quartering facilities.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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8. The next day, Friday, January 23rd, (plus 12 time) only two B17's departed at 0800 for Canton arriving at 1400. One 172, #41-2422, had engine trouble, which was unable to repair although working during night since their arrival. Later it was found that the engine had a bent connecting rod in one of the lower cylinder. There were no replacements available in that area. The flight north was pretty rugged as it was necessary to pass through a turbul at tropic front. We flew on instruments between two and three hours. This emphasizes the necessity of as accurate weather forecasts as possible, also the desirability of all flights being made during daylight unless military necessity dictates otherwise. Due to low visibility in the Canton Island area the radio station was asked to send 10's in order to check bearing. Through a mistake of inexperienced radio operators these 10's were sent on a frequency not on the receiver coil of the plane equipment. Fortunately the rain squalls cleared for a short period as we were approaching the approach of the island and a landing was made. This indicates the necessity of only carrying, experienced personnel in such important ferry stops otherwise valuable personnel and planes may be lost at sea needlessly.

9. Saturday, January 25th, was spent in maintenance and upkeep and with the arrival of Lieutenant Sectorer from Melbourne with structural repair work was immediately started in placing 171 #41-2409 back on commission. This was completed close to midnight.

10. At 0813, Sunday, January 26th, 4 B17's, and 2 B-24's, which had arrived at Canton the day before, departed on a search from Canton to 1701. When about 90 miles southeast of Coronadolet leaf two carrier based planes came down out of the sun on B17 #41-2409, Captain Blakey, pilot. Fortunately both planes were recognized and no shots fired. However, pilots should be warned to investigate out of range and then make friendly approach from somewhere other than out of the sun. The latter approach should be reserved for attack only. First Force 17 was sighted by the plane on the left flank of the scouting line. At about 0800 (zone plus 12 time) a submarine periscope and wake was sighted by plane #41-2409, Capt. in Blakey, pilot, in latitude 06° 15' south, longitude 174° 10' west. Two 500 pound bombs with one tenth second delay fuse settings were dropped about 75' to the left. Observers in the plane claim the submarine conted to starboard, righted itself, and then went straight down. However, no oil became visible. Plane remained in area only about ten or twelve minutes. Submarine possibly damaged, but positive sinking doubtful.

11. As the Royal New Zealand Air Force personnel were at repair by for an inspection on Monday, January 26th, (plus 12 time) by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, no transportation was available to Suva, so no further contacts were made at that end. The day was spent in maintenance and upkeep of planes and in inspecting the location and progress of the "American Camp"; also an auxiliary field (no name) under construction with two landing strips, unsurfaced but levelled, 2500' x 100' capable of handling a squadron of B17 or B24.

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12. On January 27th, (plus 12 time) 4 B17's and 1 W2 made the return search to Canton starting at 0515. One W2 took the direct line with one bomber to his east and three to the west. As the New Zealanders had received intelligence reports that Hanafuti in the Millice Island group had been machine gunned by Japanese flying boat and no reports received since, one bomber on its return leg swung wide flying over Hanafuti and took pictures of the area. Apparently everything was all right as the British flag was still flying and people gradually assembled and waved as they identified us as an American plane. Another bomber performed a similar tour over Kuru Leilei. The flight arrived Canton at 1515. One B17, 41-2454, was forced to remain at Koro until receipt of a new engine.

13. On Wednesday, January 28th, the special reconnaissance was carried out by 6 W2 and 4 B17's. The bombers covered the sectors whose medians were 233° E, 235° E, 245° E, and 255° E, to 500 miles. The results were negative. The takeoff was at 0530 and the return at 1245. During the morning a supply ship and two destroyers arrived with supplies, engineers, and civilian contractors, and personnel.

14. At 0530, Thursday, January 29th, four B17's took off from Canton Island for Palmyra and arrived at 1210 (plus 12 time).

15. On Friday, January 30th, at 0620 (plus 10 time) the bomber group of 4 B17's took off from Palmyra enroute to Hickam Field, Honolulu. About 0800 in latitude 08-57 N, longitude 161-24 west, two freighters with one destroyer as escort were sighted headed north on course 018° speed 9 knots. Landed at Hickam Field at 1310.

B. CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD.

Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Sweaney, Air Corps, Commanding.

50th Reconnaissance Squadron

27th Reconnaissance Squadron

41-2403

41-2429

Pilot Lt-Col A. G. Sweaney
 Co-pilot 2/Lt Frank L. Kostovitz
 Navigator 2/Lt William E. Adams
 Bombardier 2/Lt James I. Moore

Pilot Capt Blinney
 Co-pilot 2/Lt Burns
 Navigator 2/Lt Lehoney
 Bombardier 2/Lt C. J. Her

41-2426

41-2432

Pilot 1st Lt W. M. Pharr
 Co-pilot 2/Lt Everett G. ...
 Navigator 2/Lt ...
 Bombardier 2/Lt Richard ...

Pilot 1st Lt Seaburner
 Co-pilot 2/Lt Nelson
 Navigator 2/Lt ...
 Bombardier 2/Lt ...

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B. OPERATIONAL RECORD (Continued)

41-2469

41-2478

Pilot 1st Lt W. M. Sullivan
Co-pilot 2/Lt J. L. Edie
Navigator 2/Lt C. Peterson
Bombardier 2/Lt W. L. Anderson

Pilot 1st Lt Anderson
Co-pilot 2/Lt Greig
Navigator 2/Lt Jacobs
Bombardier C. J. Olson

Note: Other enlisted personnel of planes not listed.

Friday, January 16th, 1942 (Zone plus 10¹ time).

0630 Took off from Hickam Field in B-17E Number 41-2469. Five more followed in two minute intervals. Course 95.50 true, speed indicated 115 miles per hour.

1000 Sighted one United States patrol plane on southerly course, distant ten miles, altitude 1200 feet, crossed well astern. Did not exchange recognition signals.

1530 Landed at Palmyra. One plane, 41-2469, First Lieutenant Sullivan, pilot, departed beyond immediate repair in landing.

Flight time 9 hours.

Saturday, January 17th, 1942. (Zone plus 10¹ time).

0625 Five B-17's took off in succession.

1415 Landed at Canton.

1810 Lost plane 41-2469, Captain Blaker, 1st Lt. and reported sighting two submarines at Hull Islands about 1800 (Zone plus 10¹). Bombed wreckage of one.

Flight time 8 hours, 50 minutes.

Sunday, January 18th, 1942. (Zone plus 12¹ time).

0645 Five B-17's took off for patrol to Sydney and Hull Islands in search of submarines.

0740 Submarine in net of submarine was sighted 279⁰, 200 yards from Sydney Island. Pilot 41-2468, First Lieutenant Kerr, pilot. Last reported position bombed; negative results.

One B-17 maintained on patrol around Sydney Island out to about twenty-five miles from sunrise until 1800. No results of search.

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Monday, January 19th, 1942. (Zone plus 1 1/2 time).

0545 Five B-17's took off to southern to 45 miles in area of ... the following bearings 130°, 135°, 140°, 145°, 150°. The plane (1-2429) ... covering the area of the 110° bearing returned after going only 100 miles due to engine trouble; ground looped on landing down in one wheel and ditched. All search results negative.

Tuesday, January 20th, 1942. (Zone plus 1 1/2 time).

0600 One B-17, 41-2429, First Lieutenant Seaburger, departed for Palmyra for some structural work for B-17 41-2429 damaged in landing the previous day.

Wednesday, January 21st, 1942. (Zone plus 1 1/2 time).

0545 2 B-17's took off for some and flight to Viti Levu, Fiji Islands.

1100 Arrived Nadi, Viti Levu. Flight time 3 hours, 45 minutes.

Thursday, January 22nd, 1942. (Zone plus 1 1/2 time).

0235 Took off from Nadi in ... New Zealand Air Force plane DeWittland 89, Squadron Leader White, pilot, for Natsori (Luvu).

0935 Landed Natsori.

1355 Took off from Natsori.

1657 Landed Nadi.

Friday, January 23rd, 1942. (Zone plus 1 1/2 time).

0500 Two B-17's took off from Nadi.

1400 Landed Canton Island. Flight time 2 hours.

Saturday, January 24th, 1942. (Zone plus 1 1/2 time).

Day spent in maintenance and upkeep. B-17 41-2429, First Lieutenant Seaburger, returned to Canton from Palmyra with structural repairs for B-17 41-2429.

Sunday, January 25th, 1942. (Zone plus 1 1/2 time).

0515 4 B-17's and 2 B-24's took off for Nadi.

1415 Arrived Nadi. Flight time 2 hours.

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Monday, January 26, 1942. (Zone plus 12 time).

Maintenance and upkeep.

Tuesday, January 27th, 1942. (Zone plus 12 time).

0515 4 B-17's plus 1 W-1 took off for Canton. 1 B-17L went by way of Sunfuti. One B-17D went by way of Numa Lailai.

1515 Arrived Canton. Flight time 10 hours.

Wednesday, January 28th, 1942. (Zone plus 12 time).

0530 4 B-17's searched to a distance of 300 miles, covering the arcs whose bearings were 275° W, 245° W, 255° E.

1515 Arrived Canton.

Thursday, January 29th, 1942. (Zone plus 12 time).

0530 4 B-17's took off from Canton.

1510 Arrived Palmyra. Flight time 6 hours, 40 minutes.

Friday, January 30th, 1942. (Zone plus 10 time).

0530 4 B-17's took off from Palmyra.

1510 Arrived Hickam Field. Flight time 6 hours, 20 minutes.

(3) LOSS OF SUBMARINE CONTACTS.

1. At 1900, (plus 12 time), January 17th, 1942, two submarines sighted apparently circling Hull Island. These submarines were at perpendicular to the island, and distant about 1 mile. Plane 41-2429, Capt in Blakey, pilot, proceeded to the attack and dropped two 800 pound bombs in the wake of one submarine. This submarine, had however, immediately submerged as the plane approached. No bombs were dropped and no aft and results were undoubtedly negative.

2. On January 18th, at about 0740 (plus 12 time) a submarine in the act of submerging was sighted bearing 275° E, distant 200 yards from Sydney Island from plane 41-2403, First Lieutenant L. T. Flynn, Air Corps, U.S. Army, pilot. The plane was turned for the attack but by the time the attack was completed (about two minutes) the submarine was deeply submerged. Two 800 pound bombs with one tenth second delay fuse set in it were dropped in the estimated position of the submarine. Results were negative.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

3. On the same date a W search to the westward saw a submarine on the surface first at about 13 miles. This submarine bore about 270° E, distant 55 miles from Canton, no headed westward. It is said to be submerged and no sign on it. The W plane was too far away. This submarine may have been one of the two sighted at Hull Island the day before.

4. At about 0830 (plus 12 time) January 20th, 1949, a submarine periscope and wake was sighted by plane 41-2423, Capt in Elsie, pilot, in latitude 08° 15' south, longitude 174° 10' east. Two 500 pound bombs with one ton second delay fuse settings were dropped about 75' to the left. Observers in the plane claim the submarine dived to starboard, righted itself and then went straight down. However, no oil became visible. Plane remained in the area only about ten or twelve minutes. Submarine was possibly damaged but positive claim is doubtful.

1. PALMYRA.

There is one landing strip 5000' x 200' made of coral and well rolled. Another 50' is being added and when completed should give ample room for landing and taking off of the heaviest of planes. This runway is into the wind that prevails 70% of the time. A second runway at a distance of about 800' to the present is being contemplated and should take care of nearly all the remaining 30% of wind direction. This runway will probably be only about 2500' long by 150' wide but it is believed all time land planes will be able to land on it due to the force of the winds usually prevailing in that direction. Heavily loaded planes can always take off on the long runway.

There are at present seven irregularly spaced revetments capable of taking B17 or two of the smaller planes. Each revetment has a ramp on either side large enough for two men to sleep in. At present these revetments are little too low to completely hide a B17 from surface observation. It is believed this is being corrected. This situation can easily occur to a W or B17 or both. The aviation gas situation at the present time is a cause of much concern due to the presence of large quantities of water and dirt in the gasoline. One suggested method of increasing the gas capacity as well as reducing the difficulty of refueling personnel is to pour large tanks in deep water in the lagoon and have planes land on a buoy which contains a pump and gas outlets from the tank.

With the completion of BQ (now a delayed project) there will be sufficient quarters for officers and men of planes assigned there within the capacity of the field and anchorage.

Communications covered a few days ago will administered, especially the radio equipment. The efficient use of this equipment has already saved many planes with their personnel from landing in the water out of view. The "thin in the air" on occasions be rain during periods of rain and low visibility.

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(D) CANTON ISLAND AND EAST ISLAND.

3. Canton.

From messages received it was apparent that a clear concept of the development of Canton Island was not at hand. Canton Island is really two semi-circular islands with channels at the north and south points. The north channel is the broad channel and can be used only by boats or barges of light draft. It has a 1-10 knot current at the full force of the tide. The western island contains the anchor for seaplanes, all of the main facilities, and the home in equipment of the British representative. The eastern island contains the barracks, the landing strip, bomb shelter, and very inadequate defense equipment supplies.

The 1-10 knot strip is 2000 x 1800 of reefed coral and is being lengthened to 3000'. The 1-3 strip is under construction, both runs were expected to be completed by about February 15th.

Inter-island communication from one island to the other required a boat trip of about twenty minutes, taking an inverted U-shaped (∩) course, out to the center of the lagoon. The trips were made after sundown due to black-out and inability to line up markers of course. Except for the narrow entrance of canal and the goal of the lagoon is crowded with coral reefs.

Communication between the two islands was by radio or messenger. With the arrival of the last supply ship it is believed sufficient wire was received to install a telephone system. While it is likely needed for the main equipment is used, such as the radio, to send messages to itinerant and ferry planes scheduled to stop at Canton, while the local radio equipment and the Commanding Officer of the main contingent, Captain Baker, with the code book must necessarily remain on the eastern island. There is a decided lack of trained and experienced radio operators. These are essential as planes can pass within six or seven miles of the island (during periods of rain squalls and low visibility) and be unable to see it. It is then that the use of radio beacon devices are necessary. The installation of radar equipment on Canton is highly desirable, from the viewpoint of both the defense of the base and the safety of planes and personnel.

There are no underground passages. The main supply of water is obtained in the main tank which are entirely above the ground and are in excellent form. When these tanks there are outlets leading down to a fueling dock area. Here all seaplanes are refueled. The supply of gas for landplanes is maintained in drums filled from the main tanks and ferried over to the other island on a small barge.

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(D) COMMENTS ON LOG AND VISUALS

3. VITI LEVU

Fidi, or Fidi as it is called, is a field about the size of ... at present it has one surfaced landing strip, laid into the prevailing wind, 2000' x 200' and this is being lengthened to 2000'. Another landing strip, also of 2000' x 200' is under construction. It is almost perpendicular to the present one. There are no revetments, splinter-proofs or bombshelters. One long run of concrete flooring and apron is almost completed. The field off the landing strip is rather hard ground with grass severely matted. The B-17's in their overloaded condition (about 25,000 pounds) made slight cuts as they taxied across the field. The administration building is a comparatively small one-story wooden building. In this are housed the operations, communications, and command offices of the base. The office for securing confidential matter was called the 'SECRET' office. Day third rate quarters could probably be made from this building. Power and other facilities are very limited.

Until the American Camp, which will house 200-1000 men is completed quarters and messing facilities are very limited, especially the messing facilities. Messes were erected to provide for a lot of the officers and men of the B-17's while a few officers were invited to share the mess beds in the rooms of the senior B-24 officers of the base. Defense against mosquitoes must be provided if personnel are to be able to rest. One pilot kept awake most of the night when he returned to the mess because the mosquitoes wore out their stingers by midnight and then began throwing his sleep.

Only six Lockheed Hudsons are operated at this field and daily search in the northwest quadrant is made to 100 miles. Search planes are equipped with effective radio detection equipment which makes the search very effective. Search planes used in U.S. war trucks are lined from a crane close to the field. A main supply is retained in the base at about 140 miles - fourteen miles from Fidi.

It is understood that Fidi is being developed and will have 2000' runways. About six Lockheed Hudsons are to be based there. Plans were also under consideration by Air Commodore Goddard, RAF, to institute a reconnaissance patrol which could cover the area from New Zealand to Fidi, to Fidi, to Noumea, to New Zealand. A satellite field with two runways about 2500' x 1000' is under construction about five or six miles to the southeast of Fidi. This field can easily take a group run of B-24 or B-29.

(D) COMMENTS ON LOG AND VISUALS

3. VITI LEVU (continued)

On the South or West side of the island a grass two-way field about 2000' x 200' is located at Fidi, fourteen miles by road to the north of Fidi. This field has absolutely no facilities except a small supply

COMMENTS

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SECURITY INFORMATION

of gas in drums. There are covered large tanks, one of 14,000 gallons capacity, sitting to be installed underground. It is believed this field could soon become heavily matted under extensive operations unless purified. Possibly the use of the test tanks developed by the Air Corps, U.S. Army, could alleviate this difficulty.

A proposed seaplane base, at Lantau, started by Fensir and located about five miles to the eastward of Luv is capable of receiving 1000 tons. It is and instead that a heavy cable of 1000 lbs, or more, to be used for construction of seaplanes, and tanks with a capacity of 100,000 gallons will be constructed in case of potential need. At present there are only the footings for the tanks installed and a 10' amount of concrete laid. The water area immediately in front permits direct takeoffs into the prevailing wind without long taxiing runs to a takeoff area.

Conversation with several oficers of the IZM has indicated that Lantau is a much more desirable seaplane base than Luv. Fensir at Luv is heavily protected and would be a detriment to the seaplane base. Lantau is on the "dry" side of the island, is protected by a jutting arm of land, has a good "wind" area, and has large tanks already built there which deposit their fuel. Fuel is transported to Lantau by trucks and trailers. In the above reference is a reference to "wet" and "dry" sides of the island of Niti Levu. This is meant that a range of mountain ranges all east north and south divides the island and courses most of the rain to fall on the Luv side. The "dry" side is not barren, so there is sufficient rain for all crops, but there is a definite decrease in low clouds, rain, poor visibility on the Luv side as compared with the Luv side. Captain Lander White has stated that in the fifteen months he has been at Luv only three days were non-alignable. One disadvantage at Lantau is that the construction of a seaplane base would be started from scratch. Only a few small sheds were observed on the end of land extending out although several seaplanes were seen moored there.

(2) GENERAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. A nucleus of aviation maintenance and repair specialists plus a small supply of stores should be stationed at Lantau or Canton.
2. Portable engine shelters should be sent to Palmyra, Canton, and Luvu.
3. Palmyra and Canton need one or two planes of the J3 type for reconnaissance.
4. Palmyra needs a portable field kitchen set such as is now at Canton.
5. Canton needs better equipment such as is installed at Palmyra for defense and as a deterrent to landings.

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SECRET

6. Control is definitely in need of some better defense equipment if it is to be considered as vital in future wars. The equipment now on hand is woefully inadequate.

7. Control should be supplied with a large number of facilities in refueling, landing and in all in the water on dirt.

8. Flares on ferry routes should be thrown as lights, not as candles, as it will prevent inexperienced pilot from attempting to become Columbus of the air. Their range may be determined and determined to be safe. This valuable information should not be neglected or to be safe. Flights should be so routed as to at least arrive at their destination during daylight. Islands such as Palmyra and Canton are not visible for long distances and the weather in the tropics, particularly during the months of November to March, is very exacting conditions for any but expert navigation and piloting. Landmarks can be used not for for all the time course can be used to prevent in a certain drift. Included with the use of overwater navigation it is absolutely necessary that a compass of high accuracy be used before departure on a voyage of 1000 miles. A compass should be used as precise as possible. It is suggested that a check list be maintained between arrival and departure of aircraft and the latter through their greater experience will be able to see an expert pilot and strict of the track that could be necessary to be made by the other navigators.

9. It is strongly recommended that the conditions of departure and arrival reports should be made to be instituted. This should be possible code changed periodically. This is necessary because (1) it prevents unannounced planes from being fired on, (2) a plane may be downed and neither departure nor arrival points are cognizant of the situation, (3) a plane may be delayed through servicing facilities being secured, (4) housing and service facilities cannot be available, as well as if a plane arrives just before a storm and the black out prevents any operations.

10. It is suggested that it is to be given a priority and be able (over a five minute interval) from a large number of stations. It will permit pilots to check their progress and identify the necessary of the air for 1000. In itself this would give security to the number of planes arriving and it will be unknown. As it is not the only need only listen on the request of 1000 frequency and very closely connected to the number of planes arriving by the number of the flights are started and stopped.

11. There are five items which both Army and Navy pilots should be thoroughly conversant.

(1) Last's recognition of our own type of aircraft. (2) CV plane down on the ground on 172. (3) Disaster - experts - related recognition of the CV pilot. (4) 1000 - under recognized & immediately called for to inform the CV planes to be seen in the area and be held fire. (5) The code not to be held for any other line on any of no extent out of the area.

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(9) This was done recognition in n ls.

(10) Keeping flight on schedule as far as possible. The 11-3 could have been used by radio to correct course to a further west limit of intercept.

(11) If a lost time procedure is used in a flight it is readily available to safety when only a direction radio is available (Canton).

(12) Communication procedure of each part of the service. At present radio over bars are confused with the procedure of the other service. Could joint and I V procedure be established? In this case connection it is recommended that only experienced or trained personnel be sent to outlying bases since such a group would depend on their ability, initiative, and resourcefulness.

13. In an operation such as this one it is suggested that the mission might be more easily accomplished if only one type of plane were used. Although the closest cooperation was obtained, communications between the units command was most difficult. In Fiji, 17 Mi, and saw are 173 miles apart by road and about 10 by air. Telephone conversation was definitely available to command bases only lists could be made. At Canton radio had to be used for twenty minutes for a ride in and the boats were available and then only in the daytime. No boats ran at night.

14. In laying out landing strips on outlying islands care should be taken that these strips run into the prevailing winds as most aircraft operations will probably be in the daytime. Wind charts give the prevailing wind throughout the twenty-four hour of the day.

15. From conversations with the ANZAC officers it is apparent that the look to the United States for leadership and guidance. They are most anxious to cooperate with our way of operations, discipline, with our manner of flying, and with our type of attack or defense. Since they consider it of mutual benefit if some of their pilots could be sent to the United States for instruction in our methods and operation of equipment in order that they in turn could instruct their compatriots. I believe it would lead to a closer understanding.

REMARKS: I/US SAC Flt A18-3/72 (23, 24, 25, 26): "Special Cooperation of Army Aircraft in Canton- 1st Line 10-30 Jan 62."

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SECURITY INFORMATION

1-1-1

1-5

4th Ind.
3/3
28 Feb 60.

09

A very interesting and informative report.
Suggest it be referred to the JCS and JCS/JC for
recommendation or comment on action taken on
pertinent paragraphs of section II. Recommend also
that copies of Air Force report be referred
to all offices concerned in command from
Bras A.C.

J.M.O.

38 Ind.
C/3

21 Mar 60. to CG USAF, 23/60

For comment and recommendation on
pertinent paragraphs of section I.

J. B. GIBLIN,
Chief of Staff,
Air Force, 1960,
Chief of Staff.

5th Ind.
CG, USAF

21 Mar 60. to JCS/CS

Reference section (1), comments and recommendations
follow:

1. ... in ... strategic ... assistance is
needed for this.
2. No plans of this type are available in the Division
Air Force.
3. No comment.
4. ... equipment is being installed at Station.
5. ... of ... has been ... since
this report.
6. ... trucks have been provided for Station.
7. ... are scheduled in ... as far as possible
for ... long. ... are being ...
... possible, and ... in
... on ... navigation. ...
... will be
beneficial although the ... of ... remain
... on the ... to ...

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9. The establishment of the communication equipment and arrival of additional personnel at Christmas, Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve. The operations department will submit reports in the future.
10. Aircrews being sent on a prearranged schedule for Christmas, and Christmas Eve.
11. (1), (2), (3) Combat crews are attending schools on the subjects of silhouette of our aircraft and enemy air and surface vessels, side and rear recognition signals, radio blinker. (4) The lost lane procedure is identical with that used by the Eastern Command. (5) Joint communication radio procedure has been established and Communication Officers from Hawaiian Air Force and Civil Air Defense are publishing a joint communication policy for the outlying islands.
12. No comment.
13. Same.
14. No comment.

For the Commanding General:

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AFM 3-11

140

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APPENDIX 5

Letter, Lt. Gen. E. C. Davidson, Jr., Chief of Staff, Seventh Air Force to Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Chief of Staff, Army Air Forces, 19 June 1947.

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1173-1

1-9

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HEADQUARTERS 7AF AFHQ
Office of the Air Force Commander
10-11-44, D.C.

10 June 1949

Lt. General H. H. Arnold,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Arnold:

I am giving below my personal reaction to the lessons learned in the Battle of Midway. This information is sent in this form in order not to in any way compromise the Department Commander, especially with reference to the utility of battleships.

1. Japanese battleships so greatly did not obtain information of the loss of their carrier force on the morning of June 6th and two of them continued to steam toward Midway. When about 110 miles out on June 6th, they were attacked by P-17's that dropped 32 500 demolition bombs from 30,000 feet, obtaining one "norm" hit, two prob. hits and seven near misses. As far as can be learned the workings in this battle and also in the Coral Sea Battle did not fire a shot. The battleships were particularly useless. The main effect they had was to attract 29 bombs on the 6th and 25 bombs on the other days, that could have been more profitably employed on other targets. Battleships should be placed on a low priority for leading targets.

2. There is a need for a long range fighter to accompany bombers. Since this fighter will have to have at least equal range and speed with the bomber, realize the bomb load and bombing equipment with protective armor and armament. The P-17's with ball turret is not a good match for Japanese fighter. However, due to the targets bombed, not many fighters were encountered and we should not draw too many conclusions on bomber versus fighter from the action around Midway.

3. Luck and good planning were on our side at Midway. We had the good fortune to cut out all four of their carriers during the early afternoon of the 6th. Under these conditions, we were enabled to destroy a large part of their fleet, including the carriers. If luck had gone the other way, we could have lost many of our warships engaged and probably the battle of Midway. The lesson learned is neither warships nor carriers are able to compete against long-range land-based bombers.

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4. There is need for bombers with at least 2000 mile tactical radius and lower if possible. The reluctance of the Zero fighters to close with the B-17's shows the value of good armament. Armament and load carrying capacities should be the prime requisites of a heavy bomber. Speed, though desirable, should be subordinate to these two.

5. During the Japanese bombing attacks on Midway they dropped only 14 bombs on Eastern Island and 20 bombs on Sand Island. A few of these were 1000 pound, but most were 100 and 500 pound demolition bombs. The enemy carefully avoided hitting the runway. If this had been destroyed during the first attack it would have greatly hindered our operations. The destruction caused by 41 bombs on Midway on June 4th should be remembered if and when we begin to obtain Japanese held islands. These bombs caused the following damage:

- a. Small local damage to runways.
- b. Landing alley near hill and PX with all equipment completely demolished.
- c. One wood elevated tank for brush-clearer demolished; one repairable.
- d. Powerhouse building completely demolished; installations thereon destroyed as follows: three 40 HP boilers completely demolished, one 2500 GPM condenser completely demolished, one Davis water coil 6000 GPM evaporator completely demolished, three 280 Kw Fairbanks Morse generators exciters and electrical parts unfit for use being returned to Pearl Harbor for possible repair or replacement, one electrical control panel demolished, three 500 HP Fairbanks Morse diesel engines about 75 damaged but repairable, three 25 HP transmission completely demolished.
- e. Direct hit severed telephone cable and issue lines and salt water supply to some gas spaces, now restored.
- f. Ice-plant number 75 damaged.
- g. Sewer lines locally damaged, now restored.
- h. Water lines locally damaged, now restored.
- i. One head 75 damaged, now restored.
- j. Various repairable damage to trucks, cars and small equipment.
- k. One switch three pole double 100 amperes; three switches three pole fuse 60 amperes; five Westinghouse manual starters 150 not recoverable service class 11-200 line starter for equipment class

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indirect on return; three phase 60 cycle 208 volts 3 phase; overhead wire and electric line loads in old contractors' work burned and rounded, other lines damaged but repairable.

- 1. One welding machine and Chicago pneumatic air compressor 50' damaged.
- 2. Two sixties and one station wagon demolished.

WATER LINE:

- a. High pressure water lines, br. cast iron and salt, to Marine area torn out 200-300 feet by direct hit.
- b. Low pressure water lines broken in several places over the camp, now repaired.
- c. 50' of fire clow destroyed.
- d. 200,000 gallon water tank - storage and down pipe damaged.
- e. Three fuel oil storage tanks, two 10,000 barrels and one 5,000 barrel destroyed completely by fire.
- f. Old pump tanks destroyed.
- g. Navy laundry building seriously damaged, one corner demolished. Remainder of steel frame in good condition. Equipment repairable.
- h. Navy machine shop, paint storage building and gym building destroyed except steel frame and foundations. Equipment not damaged - building usable.
- i. Navy carpenter shop and metal shop buildings seriously damaged except steel frame and foundations. Building usable. Equipment slightly damaged but repairable.
- j. Morocó and bomb sight building destroyed beyond economical repair. Feet and wire has warped and twisted the steel frame.
- k. Electric shop and oil fire shop now obsolete left building seriously damaged except steel frame and foundations. Building usable. Equipment not damaged.
- l. Bus garage and vehicle consider destroyed and one corner demolished. 50' of steel frame undamaged.
- m. Goldstone building, main storage area walls cracked. Remainder of building slightly damaged but repairable and equipment repairable. Some repairs already accomplished.

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- h. Contractor's control de oliskad b: wire.
- i. Contractor's barracks No. 10A and 10B de oliskad.
- j. New mess hall pillars ad bri: demolisier. Remainder of building de oliskad but repairable. Less and: 100% in operation.
- k. The new barracks numbers 1 and 2 walls and windows heavily damaged but structural frames and foundations unharmed.
- l. New dispensary could not be demolished by the direct fire from wire.
- m. Three 15 KW transformers in exterior and unit water heating equipment destroyed.
- n. Three contractor superintendent's quarters building damaged but repairable and one completely demolished.
- o. Messer completely burned. 100% destroyed from fire condition.
- p. New mess and administration building slightly damaged by concussion.
- q. Naval officers' recreation building slightly damaged.
- r. The new Air fuel storage tanks damaged by fragments, tanks being damaged.
- s. Four new diesel and fuel oil storage tanks damaged by bomb fragments and shrapnel, tanks now unusable.
- t. Numerous electrical control panels in building destroyed: Holloway Dispensary, all electrical equipment and track with exception of two cable boxes; Bruning, No. 1 three cable boxes and switch assembly; DeWright building, all electrical control panels and track; Messer, all lighting and power panels total 100% destroyed; Cold Storage, one lighting panel 100% and one 100/200 volt three phase four wire sixteen circuits; Mess Hall and: 100%, two lighting panels 100% and one 100/200 volt three phase four wire eight circuit, two power panels three phase four wire; Cold Storage plant, three of four electrical buses 100% interconnector electric 215/21 200 ampere 200 100 0 0 20 volt three phase.

Sincerely,

M. G. MARTIN,
 Brigadier General, USAF.
 USAF - Commanding.

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451-1

185

APPENDIX 6

Memorandum, Commanding General, VII Bomber Command to
Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, 15 September 1944

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154

HEADQUARTERS VIIth AFWP COMBATT
AFSC 033

03-1

13 Controller USAF

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Commanding General, Seventh Air Force.

The following is a compilation of the extent of participation of units of this command (including attached units) during the battle of Midway:

a. 431st Bombardment Squadron (B), 11th Bombardment Group: Afternoon 3 June 1942: 3 airplanes, with 1 airplane from 21st Bombardment Squadron and 1 airplane from 20th Bombardment Squadron attached. Attacks on enemy force from 9,000, 10,000 and 11,000 feet. One hit, possibly 2 on stern of battleship or heavy cruiser. One hit on large transport. Morning 4 June 1942: 5 airplanes, with 2 airplanes of the 11th Bombardment Squadron and one from the 20th Bombardment Squadron attached from 20,000 feet. One hit on carrier, 1 carrier lighter aircraft shot down. Afternoon 4 June 1942: 5 airplanes attached from 28,000 feet. One hit on heavy cruiser, 2 near misses. All airplanes returned from all missions.

b. 42nd Bombardment Squadron (B), 11th Bombardment Group: Morning 4 June 1942: 5 airplanes attached from 20,000 feet. One hit and 2 near misses on carrier. Afternoon 4 June 1942: 2 airplanes attached from 20,000 feet. No hit observed. Two airplanes attached from 10,000 feet. One hit and 2 near misses on battleship. Two hits and 3 near misses on escorted carrier. Three carrier lighters shot down. Morning 5 June 1942: 3 airplanes operating with 1 airplane from 20th Bombardment Squadron attached from 20,000 feet. Two possible hits and 5 near misses on battleship or heavy cruiser. Afternoon 5 June 1942: 3 airplanes, with 1 plane operating from 20th Bombardment Squadron, attached from 11,000 feet. Two hits and 5 near misses on heavy cruiser. All airplanes returned from all missions.

c. 23rd Bombardment Squadron, 11th Bombardment Group: Afternoon 4 June 1942: 2 airplanes attached while enroute from Oahu to Midway. Attached from 7,700 feet. One hit on carrier and 2 near misses. One carrier lighter shot down, 1 airplane damaged, 1 hit on destroyer. Morning 5 June 1942: 1 airplane attached from 20,000 feet. One hit on battleship, several near misses. Afternoon 5 June 1942: 3 airplanes attached from 11,000 feet. One hit on cruiser. One airplane of this squadron was attached to the 42nd Bombardment Squadron during morning and afternoon attacks by that Squadron on 5 June (see b. above). All airplanes returned from all missions.

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Memorandum to Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, dated 20 June 1949.

g. 70th Bombardment Squadron, 6th Bombardment Group: Afternoon of June 1949: 5 airplanes attacked. One possible hit on heavy cruiser. Two airplanes failed to return from mission. One crew (less 1 enlisted man) rescued by Navy patrol helicopter on 3 June 1949 (see also g. above).

h. 21st Bombardment Squadron, 5th Bombardment Group: (See g. above).

i. 13th Reconnaissance Squadron (1), 3rd Bombardment Group: 2 B-26 airplanes operating with 2 B-24 airplanes of the 69th Bombardment Squadron (1) carried out torpedo attack against an enemy force on the morning of 2 June 1949. One probable hit on one carrier, and one possible hit on another. Two airplanes failed to return from mission; 1 from each squadron participating. Two enemy fighters shot down, and possible a third.

j. 69th Bombardment Squadron (1), 7th Bombardment Group: (See i. above).

For the Commanding General:

J. M. [Name],
1st Lieut., Army Air Forces,
Asst. Adjutant.

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APPENDIX 7

Letter, Commanding General, Seventh Air Force to Commanding General,
Mexican Expedition, 15 June 1950, subject: Military Service.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

1170-1

107

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE
Forward Echelon

13 June 1949.

TO: Midway Base.

FROM: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Following is a list of damage done by one air attack on Eastern and Midway Islands. This information is submitted for whatever value it might have in showing the effect and serious disruption to operations resulting from an air attack on all islands:

DAMAGE LIST:

Small local damage to runway.

Navine call room hole and 17 with all equipment completely demolished.

One road elevated tank for broadcast water demolished; one repairable.

Powerhouse building completely demolished; installations thereon destroyed as follows: three 4000 boiler completely demolished, one Reilly 2000 GPD evaporator completely demolished, one Davis 2000 GPD evaporator completely demolished, three 2000 amp three phase generator exciter and electrical parts unfit for use but returned to Pearl Harbor for possible repair or replacement, one electrical control panel demolished, three 2000 transformers completely demolished.

Aircraft hit severed gasoline fill and island lines and salt water supply to pump and system, not restored.

Learn to talk or to be damaged.

Power lines locally damaged, not restored.

Water lines locally damaged, not restored.

One road 20, damaged, not restored.

Various repairable damage to tracks, cars and small equipment.

One switch three pole 100 amperes; three switches three pole three pole fusible 20 amperes; five Westinghouse magnetic starters 40 non-reversible service class 11-00 line starter for squirrel cage induction motors; three large 20 cycle 203 volts 200; overhead wire and electric line leads in old control case burned and rounded, other lines damaged but repairable.

One welding machine and 50 cubic pneumatic air compressor 20 damaged.

Two pickups and one station wagon demolished.

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100-101

133

Ltr., by Seventh Air Force, 18 June 1954, subject: "Damage Report, 1954"

NAVY INSTALLATIONS:

High pressure water lines, low side and salt, to landing area torn out for 40 feet by direct hit.

Erection tower lines broken in several places over the area, now restored.

50 of fire lungs destroyed.

200,000 gallon rubber tank stays and down pipe damaged.

Three fuel oil storage tanks, two 10,000 barrels and one 5,000 barrel destroyed completely by fire.

Old army toilet destroyed.

Naval laundry building seriously damaged, one corner demolished. Remainder of steel frame in good condition. Equipment recoverable.

Naval clinic shop, print storage building and printer building destroyed except steel frame and foundations. Equipment not damaged. Building usable.

Naval carpenter shop and metal shop building seriously damaged except steel frame and foundations. Building usable. Equipment slightly damaged but recoverable.

Corrode and to bright building damaged beyond economical repair. Part and fire has burned and twisted the steel frame.

Electric oil and blanking area merchandise left building seriously damaged except steel frame and foundations. Building usable. Equipment not damaged.

Cruciforms' warehouse considerably damaged and one corner demolished. 80% of steel frame undamaged.

Cold storage buildings, supply storage room and refrigerator. Remainder of building slightly damaged but refrigeration equipment recoverable. One repair already accomplished.

Contractors' canteen demolished by fire.

Contractors' barracks Nos. 104 and 105 demolished by fire.

Naval mess hall galley and grill demolished. Remainder of building damaged but recoverable. Mess and galley not in operation.

Two new barracks Nos. 1 and 1 built and windows heavily damaged but steel frame and foundations unharmed.

Naval dispensary completely demolished by two direct hits and fire.

Three 1500 transformers in anteroom and unit meter testing equipment destroyed.

Three contractor superintendent's quarters building damaged but recoverable and one completely demolished.

Engine completely burned. 80% of steel frame in fair condition.

Naval HQ and administration building slightly damaged by concussion.

Naval officers' recreation building slightly damaged.

Two Franklin fuel storage tanks damaged by fragments, leaks being plugged.

Four navy diesel and fuel oil storage tanks damaged by both fragments and stranding, leaks now plugged.

SECURITY INFORMATION

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Ltr., To Seventh Air Force, 10 June 1950, Subject: ~~Library~~ cont'd:

SAND ISLAND (cont'd):

Numerous electrical control panels in buildings were destroyed as follows: Messengers, all electric equipment total wreck; 1st exception of 3rd mess store; 1 laundry, No. 1 three pole 30 ampere switch frame; 20 mess kit building, all lighting and power panels total wreck; 1 apr. all lighting and power panels total wreck; 6a Storehouse, one lighting panel 100 ampere 125/250 volt three phase four wire sixteen circuits; Mess hall and galley, two lighting panels 10 ampere 125/250 volt three phase four wire sixteen circuits, two power panels three phase four wire; Cold storage plant, three 30 breaker contingency circuit interrupter style 543091 50 ampere 250/500 60 40 volts three phase.

For the Commanding General:

E. L. RILEY,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

APPENDIX 9

Preliminary Mission Reports, Battle of Midway

- A - Search Missions, 2-3 June 42
- B - Afternoon Mission, 3 June 42
- C - Morning Mission, 4 June 42
- D - Afternoon Mission, 4 June 42 (303 Lt b Squadron)
- E - Afternoon Mission, 4 June 42 (4 S-17's)
- F - Afternoon Mission, 4 June 42 (7 S-17's)
- G - Morning Mission, 5 June 42
- H - Afternoon Mission, 5 June 42 (1115)
- I - Night Search Mission, 5 June 42 (1320)
- J - Morning Mission, 6 June 42
- K - Search Mission, 7 June 42
- L - Special Report, 303 Lt b Squadron

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IN 75-11

181

Appendix BA

(Secret Report 1 let side on 8 June 1962)

June 12, 1962.

UNCLASSIFIED: Midway Mission Report.

Flight 1. Midway to Midway - 0730 EDT to 1130 EDT. Info unclassified - not in sighted.

Flight 2. Midway to Midway - 1400 EDT to 2030 EDT. Sent out to track enemy forces some 150 - 200 miles S. W. of Midway, then to send info to direct striking forces out. Looked on radar in Midway area there out to help.

At 250 miles out, bearing 251° from Midway etc, we found 2 transports, 2 destroyers and a submarine. While conducting this and contact reports to director from 201° to 202° while one maneuvered (in circles) and shot at us. We stopped there about 2 hours, returning to Midway that night.

Flight 3. Midway to Midway 0700 EDT to 1030 EDT. Looked off with striking force to do nothing more than observe. The pictures of the carrier and its escorts. Found 173 miles from Midway 200° (100). To see one train of torpedoes fired from the stern of a carrier and torpedoes along (10 miles) towards the same carrier. Stayed for an hour or so then back to Midway where we took some pictures and started back to Midway. We had no time for taking pictures and no circles for any, there were to be to Midway.

On return from and the following was sighted:
*** (Director of ships)

On return from and the following was sighted: (Director of ships) to be trailed across east end of Carrier ...

*** (Director of ships)

/s/ Lt. J. L. Smith
South Sals
Victor Field, A.F.

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APPENDIX

100-1000 Report

Appendix A (cont'd)

U. S. AIR FORCE - 100-1000

1. Date: June 2 1950. Mail 27 Mail 197 - Mail: 1950-11
2. NAME: Caselus broken 50' to 50'01
3. OTHER INFORMATION: 39 to - attached list. Approximate: 1-17
4. NAME OF PERSON: Main force - 1st Lt. - Lt. Col. etc. known to be in area.
5. SPECIFIC COMMENTS: 3 to reports - 1 to 60 to 60 - not in area.
6. PERSON IDENTIFIED: *** (in rear of ship)
7. TIME OF ATTACK: 1st Lt. fired at us on ve circled peninsula
8. OTHER INFORMATION: Maneuvering - 1st Lt. in incident 1 circles.
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT: 1st Lt. no to be - attached to 800' - attached to 800' sending 1st Lt. AA.
10. PERSONS EMPLOYED:
 Can
 West out of area east of the - circled course.
11. RELATIVE POSITIONS: Frequent.
12. OBSERVATION COMMENTS: 100.
13. ***
14. ***
15. ***
16. ***

/s/ Lt. Col. & Lt.

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100-11

102

Memorandum (cont'd) Agency Liaison Report

U. S. AIR FORCE IN ARMY

1. Date: 2 June 1952. Lt. Capt. Louis, 173d A. H. L.: 0800 - 1150
2. TIME: Calulus broken 800' - 6000'
3. UNIT REPORT: 201th - Attached (not attached); 15-17
Search for main base - Carriers attached (not attached).
4. NUMBER OF OBSERVERS: One.
5. NUMBER OF SUBJECTS: 3 - 3 Carriers - none; Carriers, 22, 21,
impossible to count.
6. SEARCH METHOD:
Cum
All other data on us.
7. TYPE OF SEARCH: Maneuvering widely in circles (individual)
8. " "
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACTION: Fwd no birds - observed some of
battle - 1st Lt. other 15-17's at 08,000'.
10. WEATHER REPORT:
Clear.
Direction course and altitude.
11. " "
12. AIRCRAFT TYPE: ***
13. " "
14. " "
15. " "
16. Remarks: At time to be hit carrier, saw only this action
before we left crest for a towards 1st on carrier - by
marine airplane.

(Diagram of carrier) other birds as credit dispersed all
over - impossible to place correctly.

Do not track carrier till end.

in position (Diagram) (08,000')

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AF 5-41

124

Inventory 98

U. S. AIR FORCE - ACTION 1 - 1111

Attack after noon of June 3rd.

1. Date: 7 June 1952 Lat. 23° 24' N Long. 173° 17' W Time 1804
2. WEATHER: 3/10 scattered
3. UNIT EMPLOYED: V82 FIVE PLACES: B-17E
4. NATURE OF OPERATIONS: Bombing attack
5. OBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE: Battle ship or Navy Cruiser
6. TARGET AREA:
City
Time (P) B-17E
7. TYPE OF WEAPON: section (element of three)
8. BOMBING TECHNIQUE: Circling into target
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACTION: Came in at 40° at 3000', left target on a course of north, varying altitude.
10. WEAPONS EMPLOYED: 500, Devotion (own) (Heavy) Anti-Aircraft
11. EVASIVE ACTION EMPLOYED: Came in from N, varying altitude and direction leaving target.
12. ALTIMETER READING: 4-500 1/10 sec. delay.
13. RESULTS: (Certain) Near miss on port side.
(Estimated) Possible damage to side plates.
14. NATURE OF WEAPON: None
15. ***
16. REMARKS: Clusters of bombs in very close to cruiser.

/s/ William C. SULLIVAN Jr.
Lt. Colonel,
1st Bomb Sq (H)
Commander.

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Appendix B (cont)

U. S. AIR FORCE - 101st TFW

1st of June 1952, afternoon 1400z time.

1. Date: 1 June 1952. Lat. 38° 35' N. Long. 178° 19' W. Alt. 1600.
2. Time: 7/10 seconds.
3. Unit: 24-92. Type: F-17.
4. Nature of Operation: No aim attack.
5. Objective of Mission: Destroy or destroy.
6. Details of Mission:

Type of Mission: Can 2 F-17's	Enemy Low speed force of either B-29 or heavy cruiser and electric other aircraft in number (not 10, not 20)
-------------------------------------	--
7. Type of Mission (cont):
 Element of 2 F-17's - 1 in each, 2 in each, 2 in each.
8. Primary Mission: Destroy - turned into our attack.
9. Details of Mission: Attacked from 70° on the right rear
 of the axis from southwest of their plane - distance 1-2 mi.
 by the 100 seconds interval from 1,000 feet altitude. After
 the attack, the aircraft on both sides of their axis.
10. Details of Mission:
 Can
 - 2000. In addition to the anti-aircraft.
11. Details of Mission: After the release our element split up
 and fired, climbed and we were individually never 1000 feet
 until clear of the target area.
12. Details of Mission: 100 caliber machine gun position etc. etc.
 4-600 lb. 1/10 second delay - 1000.
13. Details (Cont'd) of our mission:
 (2 F-17's) 1 in each, 1 in each, 1 in each
 the plane's to be close on the right - 100
 the plane's to be close on left side.

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100-1

100

Appendix B (cont'd)

Appendix of June 5, 1953, afternoon 10:00 a.m. (cont'd)

- 14. Appendix of June 5, 1953, afternoon 10:00 a.m. (cont'd): None
- 15. ***
- 16. Appendix of June 5, 1953, afternoon 10:00 a.m. (cont'd):
 - 1. 10:00 a.m. to 10:15 a.m.
 - 1. 10:15 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.
 - 1. 10:30 a.m. to 10:45 a.m.
 - 1. 10:45 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.

/s/ Charles E. ...
 Capt., USA, 1st Lt. ...
 Deputy ...
 in position of
 1st Lt.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix 2 (cont)

U. S. AIR FORCE - NO. 1 - 1954

1st Observer on June 5th

1. Date: 7 June 1954. Time: 08⁰⁰ - 10⁰⁰ 17⁰⁰ 17⁰⁰ - 18⁰⁰
2. Location: 2/10 sec. delay
3. Unit: 1st AF (SVC) - 1st AF (SVC) - 1-171
4. Name of Observer: Robert L. ...
5. Name of Observer: 1st Lt. ...
6. Name of Observer: 1st Lt. ...
7. Type of Mission: Recon (Element of 3rd ...)
8. Type of Mission: Circling into ...
9. Brief Description of Action: Came in at 10⁰⁰ at 3000', left target on a course of north, varying latitude.
10. Weapons Employed:

Own	Enemy
60 Revolution	Anti-aircraft
11. Relative Motion Employed: Came in from sun, varying latitude no direction to view target.
12. Altitude of Observer: 2-500 1/10 sec. delay.
13. Remarks: (Capt in) To remain on port side.
(Anti-air) Possible ...
14. Name of Observer: None
15. ...
16. Remarks: 1st. Storey (to barrier) ...

/s/ WILLIAM G. ...
1st Lieut., U.S.
1st Bomb Sq (H)

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Appendix II (contd)

U. S. AIR FORCE - NORTH ATLANTIC

Attachment: Statement of June 19.

1. LAT. GR^o 53' N LONG. 175^o 17' W - 1821
2. ALTITUDE: Good - low broken. 3/10 ALTITUDE: 3-172
3. WIND REPORTS: 41-99
4. ALTITUDE OBSERVATION: Attack Heavy Targets.
5. SP. 3110 OBSERVATION: Intentional or Heavy Clouds.
6. HEIGHT OF CLOUDS:

Over	The "
3-1710	Intentional or Heavy
	Cruisers, Destroyers,
	or reports
7. WIND OBSERVATION: Level to high - 7' ship element
8. ALTITUDE OBSERVATION: Short turn to right.
9. WIND OBSERVATION: On course 00^o, 10,000 feet
10. WIND OBSERVATION:

Over	Heavy
3-1710 to 3-1715	Anti-aircraft fire.
11. WIND OBSERVATION: Short turn.
12. WIND OBSERVATION: 3-1715 to 3-1720 clear.
13. ALTITUDE (Certain) heavy smoke emission from forward section. Reported to be definitely on fire.
14. WIND OBSERVATION: Lower condition of clouds observed in (believed caused by concussion.)
15. * * *

/s/ G. S. [Name]
Capt., U.S.
[Signature]

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Page 1

189

Appendix A (cont)

U. S. AIR FORCE - NORTH PACIFIC

Attachment 1000000 of June 7, 1954.

1. Date: 3 June 1954. Lat. 43° 03' N Long. 179° 17' W. Alt. 183.
2. Remarks: 7/10 Lower scattered
3. Unit: 37-80. 2-17
4. Nature of Observation: Bombing on Cruiser. no reports
5. Description of Object: Battleship (or) Navy Cruiser.
6. Remarks: (cont)
 Can
 2-17's
 Heavy
 Tr reports, Cruiser,
 Destroyer, etc (?)
7. Height of Object: Element of 3 to 4 in air - 80 to 100 in train
 of 100 feet.
8. Direction of Motion: Turns and speed into attack - anti-aircraft.
9. Chief Characteristics of Object: 10,000 feet altitude, from stern
 division - it turns to port.
10. Remarks: (cont)
 Can
 2-17's
 Heavy
 Anti-aircraft
11. Direction of Motion: Turns, speed and turns into attack.
12. Direction of Motion: 1 - 8 - 1/10 speed below.
13. Remarks: (Certain) Target hit at least once.
 (Cont. cont) 2-17's, etc.
14. Direction of Motion: None
15. Remarks: Heavy fire at least two of leader's heads in the air. Blue
 smoke in the volume containing the target.

1/3/ JOHN W. SULLIVAN
 Captain, USN
 First Lt USN (A)

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Appendix C (cont)

U. S. AIR FORCE - NO. 101 T. 1. 1. Y

attached on afternoon of June 3rd.

1. Date: 7 June 1947 ILL. 03⁰ 01 N 1000. 172⁰ 171⁰ - ILL 1024
2. WEATHER: 7/10 scattered.
3. TIME OF DAY: 12:00 (?) TEMPERATURE: 5/17⁰
4. NAME OF CREW/PILOT: To being attached or convert.
5. AIRCRAFT TYPE: Large transport.
6. POSITION:

On	Enemy
9 E-17's	In report, Ordian, 70 troopers, machine.
7. TYPE OF WEAPON (Cmn)

2 1/2" element.	
-----------------	--
8. TYPE OF ACTION: Skirmish and circling of the fire.
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACTION: It's crew convert from stern out of run at 12,000 feet, released to be, withdrew into run.
10. WEAPON TYPE:

On	Enemy
Canon	---
11. TYPE OF ACTION: Attached from ground - it then into run and started continuing.
12. WEAPON TYPE: 4-000 lb., Instantaneous. 7 Eps.
13. RESULTS: One hit on right side of a 10 by right wing man (Capt'n). (Capt'n) None.
14. DAMAGE TO CREW/PILOT: None
15. *
16. RESULTS: One bomb from the right wing man on the side of and against a 10 by transport at the water line on the inside of the run. Smoke and 1 for some engine from the side. One bomb from the side hit just to the rear of the transport but failed to explode.

~~SECRET~~
 Lt. COL. L. W. WICK
 Capt., U. S.
 SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix 22 (contd)

U. S. AIR FORCE - 11 NOVEMBER 1944

Attack on afternoon of June 3, 1942.

1. Date: 3 June 1942. Lat. 26° 28' N Long. 172° 17' W. Alt. 1675
2. WEATHER: 7/10 scattered
3. TIME REPORTING: 7-00 (7-00) ID-7 PLANTS: 2-172
4. NATURE OF OPERATION: Bombing Attack on Convoy.
5. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: Large Iron Transport.
6. FORCE EMPLOYED:

Own	Enemy
B-17s	Ironports, Cruisers, Destroyers
7. TYPE OF ATTACK: 3 ship elements
8. BOMBING MODE: Diving
9. BOMBING ALTITUDE OF ATTACK: Attacked convoy from the sun; 17,000 feet; turned to left after dropping; then dove out of Alt.
10. WEAPONS EMPLOYED:

Own	Enemy
500 lb. bombs	Alt
11. EVALUATION OF RESULTS EMPLOYED: Attacked out of sun; then turned and dove to left.
12. ALTERNATE WEAPONS: 1 - 500 lb. bomb, 1/10 fuses.
13. RESULTS: (Certain) None
(Estimated) Possible hit on transport.
14. REASON FOR NON-SUCCESS: None
15. ***
16. REMARKS: Refer to Capt. Toulmer's remarks.

/s/ EDWARD L. GILLESPIE
1st Lieut., U.S.
Capt. Bomb Sq (C)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix 3B (contd)

U. S. AIRCRAFT -- ACTION WITH ENEMY

Attack afternoon of June 5rd

1. Date: 3 June 1942 LAT. 26° 29' N LONG. 172° 17' E TIME 1624
2. WEATHER: 2/10 scattered
3. UIC REPORTING: 3792 TYPE PLANE: B-17D
4. NATURE OF OFFENSE: Bombing of enemy sea craft
5. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: Large troop transport
6. FORCES ENGAGED

Own Nine (9) B-17E's	Enemy Innocents, Cruisers, Destroyers, Cargo and Tankers
-------------------------	---
7. TYPE OF ATTACK
(Own)
3 elements
8. BATTLE TACTICS: Weaving turn into bombs
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACTION: 10,000' attack from the sun, withdrawal into the sun from return.
10. WEAPONS EMPLOYED:

Own ECC, Bombs	Enemy Anti-aircraft fire
-------------------	-----------------------------
11. EVASIVE ACTION EMPLOYED: Sharp diving turn
12. AMMUNITION EXPENDED: 4-500 bombs
13. RESULTS: (Certain) One water line hit midship
14. DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT: None

REMARKS: One bomb hit near transport at water line midship and was seen smoking after run. Bombs were dropped at 100' interval.

/s/ KEVIN B. ADAMS
1st Lieut., A.C.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Appendix B (contd)

U. S. AIRCRAFT - ACTION REPORT

Attachment of afternoon of June 7, 1942

1. Date: 7 June 1942 LAT. 36° 0' N LONG. 173° 17' W TIME 1034
2. NUMBER: 3/10
3. UNIT REPORTING: 67-82 EXPD PLACES: 3-17L
4. NATURE OF OFFENSE: Bombing on transport, large
5. SPECIFIC OFFENSE: Enemy transport, large
6. BURST DIRECTION:

Own	Enemy
3-17	Large transport
7. TYPE OF AMMO: (Line 7) Single along 10,000 feet
8. TYPE MANOEUVRE: Turning into to us
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACTION: Altitude - 10,000 feet, speed 300 MPH indicated. Results - Transport hit and burning heavily. Bombs - 2-600 in train 170 feet interval. Direction - across transport and hit angle from sun. Withdrawal - diving, turn to left
10. REPORT'S DETAILS:

Own	Enemy
2-600, Demolition bombs 1/10 second fuse	Anti-aircraft fire
11. MANOEUVRE REPORTED: Turning sharply and diving
12. AMMO TYPE REPORTED: 2-600 Demolition. 1/10 second fuse
13. RESULTS: (Certain) Transport hit directly amidships, burning heavily
14. DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT: None

REMARKS: Use additional sheet if necessary (circled) ***

/s/ PAUL E. PAYLE
1st Lt., AG
1st Lt. Force 30 (7)

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11-10-11

172

Appendix D


U. S. AIR FORCE - ACTION REPORT

Attack Summary of June 4th.

1. Date: 4 June 1942 Lat. 20° 13' N Long. 173° 15' W Alt: 0315
2. Altitude: 8/10 broken tons 3,000'
3. Unit: 3rd Bomb Group V-35 4th Bomb Group B-17D
4. Nature of Operations: Working Attack
5. Principal Objective: Airplane Carrier
6. Force Details:

Own Sixteen (16) B-17D	Enemy Large enemy task force including: Battle Ships, Carriers, Cruisers and Destroyers
---------------------------	---
7. Type of Attack: (Own)
Section (Element of Force).
8. Enemy Actions: Burning Carriers toward to hit - attack
9. Brief Description of Action: Horizontal bombing at 30,000 feet
10. Weapons Employed:

Own Eight (8) 500 lb. bombs	Enemy Anti-aircraft three (3) "40" fighters
--------------------------------	---
11. Results of Action: Various altitude bombs were fired, target
12. Casualties: 2-500 bombs 30 rounds of 20 cal.
13. Damage (Carrier) One (1) hit on stern of carrier
14. Loss of Personnel: None
15. Remarks: None
16. Summary: One (1) bomb hit on stern of carrier causing heavy smoke. Other bombs (five elements) dropped did no apparent damage as far as could be determined.


 Lt. Col.,
 3rd Bomb Group (B)
 Commanding

Appendix 93 (cont'd)

U. S. AIRCRAFT -- ACTION IN BATTLE

1. Date: June 1943 Lat. 19° 15' Long. 179° TIME: 0815 Zulu Day
2. MATTER: Breach of 68 8000' - 8000'
3. UNIT/ACTOR: 10 V B Leader and Co. V B AFB/AS: B-17E
4. NATURE OF OPER. I/O: Attack of enemy Carrier Task Force
5. SPECIFIC OBSERVATION: Carrier
6. WEAPONS EMPLOYED:

Own	Enemy
2 Sq. Bv Bombs B-17's 1' planes	CV Task Force
7. LINE OF ACTION: High level bombing
8. TACTICAL ACTION: Maneuvering to avoid bombs
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACTION: Attack was made at 09,00; see attached sketch
10. WEAPONS EMPLOYED:

Own	Enemy
800 1/2 bombs; 500 - bombs	Flares - anti-aircraft
80 1/2 cal. 10 guns	
11. MASSIVE ACTION EMPLOYED: All enemy vessels maneuvered violently to avoid bombs
12. AUXILIARY WEAPONS: 500 lbs. 10 cal. 40 800 800 lb. bombs
13. RESULTS: (Own) 1st 10 cal - 1 hit, 2 near misses - CV
 2nd 10 cal - 1 hit, 1 near miss - CV
 (Estimated) All other bombs missed
14. DAMAGE TO OPERATOR: None
15. >
16. REFERENCE: 4000 Bombs Report to Com V-12
 10-11-12-V-90

/s/ E. E. Allen
Lt. Col., U.S.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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1. (cont'd)

U. S. AIR FORCE - BOMBING - B-29

Attack on Carrier June 4, 1942 (Continued)

1. Date: 4 June 1942. Lat. 20° 13' N Long. 175° 45' W. Alt: 6510
2. Weather: Heavy cloud patch at 14,000 feet, broken
3. UNIT REPORT NO: 47-80. TYPE PLANE: B-29
4. NATURE OF OPERATIONS: attacking enemy vessels
5. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: Aircraft Carrier
6. RESULTS OF MISSION:

Com	Enemy
B-29-17's	Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers, Escort
7. AREA OF SEARCH: (Com) Level bombing
8. WEATHER MODIFICATION: Turning to cloud coverage
9. DIRECTION OF APPROACH: On course, 19,000 feet. Withdrew and proceeded 10° to right
10. WEAPONS EMPLOYED:

Com	Enemy
300 lb. bombs	Zero fighters and anti-aircraft force
11. OBSERVED RESULTS: Missing turn to right
12. COMMUNICATIONS EMPLOYED: 3 - 500 lb. bombs. 1/10' delay
13. RESULTS: (Certain) did not see results
14. DAMAGE TO C. AIRCRAFT: None
15. REMARKS:
16. COMMENTS: Did not see results. Enemy radar one attack - no damage (Enemy fighters).

/s/ G. E. ROBERTS
Capt. U.S.
471st Bomb Grp (C)

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Appendix 10 (cont)

U. S. AIRCRAFT -- 1942. I. 175

Letter on carrier of June 4, 1942.

1. Date: June 1942 L.A. 20° 10' N 107° 45' W ILL: 0215
2. ILL: 8/10 Lower Broken, tow at 600 feet
3. UNIT REPORT: 5V-00 ILL: 1-175
4. ILL: 0215: Bombardier
5. ILL: 0215: Carrier
6. ILL: 0215:

Cm	Crew
15 B-17's	Pursuit, Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers
7. ILL: 0215: (Cm) Down to bottom of 7 miles. 3 - 1000 bombs
in train
8. ILL: 0215: Anti-aircraft, anti-air, no high water clouds
9. ILL: 0215: 10,000 feet, the right side of
carrier, diving right turn to withdraw
10. ILL: 0215:

Cm	Crew
3 - 1000 Bombs	Anti-aircraft, pursuit
11. ILL: 0215: Quick turns and cloud cover
12. ILL: 0215: 3 - 1000 bombs, 1/10 second delay
13. ILL: 0215: None
14. ILL: 0215: None
15. ILL: 0215: None
16. ILL: 0215: None
17. ILL: 0215: None
18. ILL: 0215: No hits seen. One Zero fighter took on ... ship,
no results.

/s/ JOHN B. ...
Scobin, A.O.
1942 ... (5)

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44-11-1

179

Appendix 53 (contd)

U. S. AIRCRAFT -- ACTION IN BIRMA

Attack on Airbase at June 4, 1945.

1. Date: 4 June 1945. Lat. 59° 10' N. Lon. 17° 43' W. Alt: 6315
2. WEATHER: 8/10 clouds
3. U.S. FORCE: 57-99 14FL 14500; 5-171
4. NAME OF OPERATION: Testing on Carrier
5. OPERATIONAL ELEMENT: Aircraft Carrier
6. FORCES EMPLOYED:

C-119	Easy
B-17E	Carrier
7. TYPE OF ATTACK: (Cm) Bombing 100 foot interval. single ship
8. WEAPON USED: Bomb turning into bombs
9. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ACTION: Altitude 63,000 feet
 Bombing interval 100 feet interval
 Results - 1 killed
 Withdraw - level at full throttle
10. WEAPONS EMPLOYED:

Cm	Easy
2 - 500 lbs	Anti-aircraft 25 ft iter
11. WEAPONS EMPLOYED BY ENEMY: None
12. AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED: 4 - 500 lbs. 1/10 3-cool fuse
 10 cal. Iron side gun
13. RESULTS: (Certain) None on carrier. One fighter destroyed
14. WEAPONS EMPLOYED BY ENEMY: None
15. **
16. REMARKS: I was enroute to the carrier. I remained directly below estimated 10000 feet. On our altitude for about 10 seconds, then a bomb fell directly in front of me for about 10 seconds, then a second bomb exploded and attached to front quarter, apparent target on tail gunner. Life gunner fired and I went flying over, now parallel to it. After pursuit returned to carrier. Col. Terrell has suggestion for more attack on this ship.

W. H. RAY

1st Lt. US

1st Lt. US

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AMEMB-44

1.0

Appendix B (cont)

U. S. AIR FORCE - LONDON - 11 JULY

1. Date: 11 June 1944 LAL. 21° 10' 1019. 178 25 2
2. WEATHER: Scattered clouds: 2000' - 6000'
3. U. S. AIRCRAFT: 11 - Y2C BOMBERS: B-17G
4. TARGETS OF OPERATIONS: Bombing and Cannery
5. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS: Carrier
6. FORCE EMPLOYED:

Own	Enemy
20 Co. Ev. Bombs	37 tank force
7. TYPE OF WEAPON: Attack by elements, pattern to target, 3 - 800 bombs
8. ENEMY ACTIONS: Enemy fighters attempted to intercept
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACTION: Alt. 20,000'. 20 min. run bearing 05°. Withdraw: 118°
10. WEAPONS EMPLOYED:

Own	Enemy
3 - 800 bombs	anti-aircraft fire
11. OBSERVED RESULTS: Circles night vision to left at bomb release.
12. AMMUNITION EXPENSE: 3 - 800 bombs instantaneous loss 3
13. RESULTS: Not observed
14. ENEMY LOSS AT GROUND: None
15. ***
16. * *

/s/ PAUL I. WILLIAMS
Pilot

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SECURITY INFORMATION
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Appendix 93 (cont)

U. S. AIRCRAFT -- 10-10-61

1. Date: June , 1961 Lat. 30° 12'N, 179° 0' W Alt: 8:00 (LAL) 23 730°
2. WEATHER: Broken clouds 2000' - 8000'
3. WEATHER AT 8: 11 V 20' 112 1210, 2-172
4. NUMBER OF CARRIERS: Attached on enemy CV to its force
5. SPECIFIC CARRIERS: French Carriers
6. FORCES EMPLOYED:

Cm	Enemy
2 B-57, 1 B-57, 1 B-57	CV to its force
7. TYPE OF ATTACK: High altitude bombing
8. BOMBING ACTION: Maneuvering to avoid to hit
9. TARGET DESCRIPTION & LOCATION: Latitude 02, 00' (Iran) Longitude 121
Bombing
10. WEAPONS EMPLOYED:

Cm	Enemy
3 M-119 500 lb. bombs	Anti-aircraft
20 G-1, 1 30 G-1, 1 G	11 500s
11. EVASIVE MANEUVER EMPLOYED: Frequent change of altitude; constant turning, except on bombing runs
12. COMMUNICATIONS EMPLOYED: 1 - 300 lb. bomb 1 - 2 to 3s (1 code) 1/10 second delay
13. RESULTS: (Certain) Near in on first four to 5 (within drawing distance). In front of front of carrier on second four to 5s
14. DAMAGE TO CV AIRCRAFT: None
15. ***
16. ***

/s/ WILLIAM J. BENTZ
1st Lieut., ...

Appendix 13 (cont'd)

U. S. AIRCRAFT - ACTION IN BATTLE

Month: June 4, 1942.

1. Date: 4 June 1942. Lat. 50° 1' N Long. 178° 40' W. Alt: 0615
2. ***
3. UNIT REPORT NO: 27-90 IN. FILE NO: 2-172 NO. 1200
4. NATURE OF OPERATIONS: Bombing Attack
5. AIRCRAFT OPERATIVE: Carrier
6. WEAPONS EMPLOYED:

Gun	Enemy
10 1-17's	1 Battleship
	Many Carriers
	Sundry Destroyers and Destroyers
7. NATURE OF ATTACK (Gun)

Elements of 3 B-17's - 2 - 500 lb. in each	
--	--
8. BATTLE TACTICS: Invasive
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACTION: 20,000 foot level bombing - 3 500 lb. bombs, directions unknown, 100 foot interval between bombs
10. AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED:

Gun	Enemy
3 - 500 lb. Torpedo Bombs	AA Pursuit
.50 Caliber guns	
11. EXTENSIVE MANEUVERING: Minor climb, diving and weaving in formation and turning change of altitude in formation after bomb release
12. AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED: 3 - 500 lb. Navy Bombs, fuses unknown. No hits
13. RESULTS (Certain) Hit on stern of carrier - 1 hit on stern (Estimated) Many near misses at stern
14. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT: None
15. ***
16. REMARKS: Enemy pursuit appeared to have no desire to close on B-17's modified. I see another elements to be all around one carrier with possible hits.

AS/ CHARLES L. HEDGECOCK
/s/ CHARLES L. HEDGECOCK

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SECURITY INFORMATION - Capt. (MC, 421st obs Co (1)
First line position of lead element

Appendix D (contd)

U. S. AIR FORCE - ACTION REPORT

Attack on morning of June 5, 1967

1. Date: 5 June 1967 LHA, 50° 13' N LONG, 178° 45' W TIME: 0815

2. TARGET: 6/10 Broken tons 0300'

3. UNIT REPORTING: 7 V 92 TYPE AIRCRAFT: E-173

4. NATURE OF OBSERVATION: Bombing Attack

5. SPECIFIC OBSERVATION: Airline Carrier

6. WEAPONS USED:

GM
Sixteen (16) E-173

Enemy
Large enemy task force in-
cluding Battle Ships,
Carriers, Cruisers and
Destroyers

7. WEAPON USED: (GM)
Section (Element of three)

8. WEAPON EFFECT: Enemy carriers toward to being struck

9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF OBSERVATION: Horizontal bombing at 20,000 feet

10. WEAPONS EMPLOYED: Flight (2) GM Bombs (GM) Enemy -- anti-
aircraft, three (3) GM fighters

11. EVASIVE ACTION EMPLOYED: Varying altitude goals over area target

12. AIRCRAFT OBSERVED: 2 E-173 Bombs 50 rounds of 50 cal.

13. RESULTS: (Certain) One (1) hit on stern of carrier

14. WEAPONS OBSERVED: None

15. **

16. RESULTS: One (1) bomb hit on stern of carrier causing heavy damage.
Other bombs (this element) dropped did no apparent damage as air-
craft could be determined.

/s/ W. G. ...
/t/ W. G. ...
1st Lieut., ...
421st ...

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Am carrier (cont'd)

U. S. AIR FORCE - ACTION 1 - 1714

Attack on Carrier June 4, 1942. (Moraine)

1. Date: 4 June 1942. Lat. 29° 18' N. Long. 123° 45' W. Time: 0-15
2. WEATHER: 8/10 Broken - top of clouds 2000 feet
3. WEATHER REPORTING: 7-92 (7) TAIL PLATES: B-17E
4. AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS: No. 10 - Attack on Carrier
5. OPERATING OBJECTIVE: Large Carrier
6. FORCE'S COMPOSITION:

Com	Enemy
15 B-17s	Carrier, Cruisers, Destroyers
7. TYPE OF ATTACK: (Com) 7 ship elements
8. ENEMY ACTIONS: Moving and circling
9. RESULT OF OPERATION OF ACTION: Attack carrier from starboard at 10,000 feet. Had 17 minutes for banking run. Carrier was not trying to evade banking due to lower cloud layer impairing visibility.
10. ENEMY'S REACTION:

Com	Enemy
10-30s	11 - pursuit
11. ENEMY'S REACTION: Turned and came back around continuously
12. WEATHER REPORTING: 7-5 1000, 1/10 base. 90 rounds. 50 cal. - 100 rounds., 75 cal.
13. COMMENTS: (Certain) 10-30s - 10-30s - 10-30s - 10-30s - 10-30s.
(Anti-air) 10-30s - 10-30s - 10-30s - 10-30s - 10-30s.
200 ft. on fighter
14. ENEMY'S REACTION: 10-30s - 10-30s - 10-30s - 10-30s - 10-30s.
Lower 1 other 7.7 holes in ship. All planes injured or destroyed.
15. **
16. COMMENTS: No carrier was under thin layer of clouds then we went into clouds. It is believed the carrier did not see us because there was no air search engines. There was no pursuit or air fire so the carrier was able to bank about 120 degrees without opposition. Results of attack were as follows:

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Appendix D (cont'd)

U. S. AIR FORCE - ACTION REPORT

Attack on Carrier, June 4, 1942

1. Date: 4 June 1942. Lat. 30° 14' N. Long. 173° 40' W. Alt: 6515
2. Altitude: 6/10 3,000 feet top of cloud
3. UNIT DESIGNATION: 7-22 (197-22) REFERENCE: 2-172
4. NATURE OF OPERATION: Bombing Task Force
5. SPECIAL OBJECTIVE: Large Carrier
6. CROSSING DATA:

Com	Enemy
18 7-17c	Carrier, Cruisers, Destroyers
7. TYPE OF ATTACK: (Com) 3 ship elements from stern
8. WEAPON DESIGNATION: Devia, burning and all fire
9. BOMBING DESIGNATION OF TARGET: Attacked carrier from starboard stern at 30,000 feet
10. WEAPON DESIGNATION:

Com	Enemy
2 - 500 lb. bombs	AA and fighters
11. EVASIVE ACTION EMPLOYED: Sharp diving turn
12. AMMUNITION USED: 3 - 500 lb. bombs. 500 rounds .50 c.l.
13. RESULTS: (Certain) Elements - one hit port bow of carrier. 2 near misses. (Detected) Possible hit on starboard bow of carrier
14. DAMAGE TO COMBATANT: All in fire
15. ***
16. REMARKS: Refer to Capt. Wallmer's reports.

/s/ EDWARD W. SHELDON
1st Lt. AG
20th Bomb Gr ()

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Page 1

183

Appendix B3 (cont)

U. S. NAVAL LOGBOOK

Location of Event, Date

1. Date: June 1960, Lat. 50° 11' N, Lon. 173° 48' W, Alt: 0810
2. TIME: 8/10 Broken cloud top at 8,000'
3. UNIT NUMBER: 2700 REFERENCE: E-177
4. NAVAL ORIGINATOR: Bomber Force
5. SPECIAL DESIGNATION: Carriers
6. NUMBER OF:

Carriers	Enemy
Fifteen (15) E-12's	Carriers, Destroyers,
	and Cruisers
7. NAME OF SUBJECT: (Car) Individual, High altitude
8. TYPE OF SUBJECT: Same circle to the right
9. TYPE OF SUBJECT OR SUBJECT: Altitude 50,000'. Same means of used same diving burner
10. NUMBER OF SUBJECTS:

Carriers	Enemy
2 bombs 1/10 hour	11 other and anti-aircraft
11. NUMBER OF SUBJECTS: Same diving burner
12. NUMBER OF SUBJECTS: Same to be 1/10 hour, 10 min.
13. RESULTS: (Control) 2 items
14. NUMBER OF SUBJECTS: None
15. ***
16. COMMENTS: Drones were at 10,000 interval. Bomber group were receiving from on line. 115 1/2 mi. in 10 min. very skill on pt.

/s/ JOHN R. ANDERSON
1st Lieut., --C.

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Attachment 33 (cont'd)

U. S. AIR FORCE -- ADJUTANT GENERAL

Capt. Whetzel - 388 Element - 15792 of 14 bombs attached to main attack of June 4, 1942

1. Date: 001 June 4, 1942 LA, 20 1000, 178 HLL 0340 ZC 250°
2. ALTITUDE: scattered circles at 10,000
3. WING SPREAD: 137-00 (46th sqd) WING SPREAD: B-17C
4. TRACK OF OBSERVATION: Carrier and accompanying ships
5. GEOMETRIC OBSERVATION: Carrier battleship (large red circle on carrier deck)
6. RANGE OF BOMBING (Cm) Horizontal bombing from 11,000'
7. LINE OF SIGHT: (Cm) Rapid maneuvering - carriers in circles - to flash on and cruise in -
8. WING SPREAD: 11,000' - Run 1 approx. 100' east, 2 west (dry run) 2 south
9. BOMB DISPOSITION OF BOMB: 1 1000 lbs 0 500 lbs. - anti-aircraft
10. WING SPREAD: Cm Rapid circling and maneuvering by one - - own none
11. ...
12. WING SPREAD: 2 1000 lbs 0 500 lbs - Instantaneous losses - 10 000'
13. ...
14. ...
15. ...
16. ...
17. ... (Cont'd) ... about 500-500' short and left. ... one definite hit ... Others within 100' short and over.
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/s/ G. L. ...
Capt. ...

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APP-1

183

Appendix 20 (contd)

U. S. AIRCRAFT -- BOMBING I -- ONLY

1. Date: 4 June 1949
2. WEATHER: 10m clouds
3. WEATHER CODE: 10-V50 OBSERVATIONS: 2-2171
4. NUMBER OF CARRIERS: 20 being
5. TYPE OF CARRIERS: Carriers
6. AIRCRAFT TYPE:

C-47	Energy
A-1	A-1
A-1	A-1
7. TYPE OF BOMBING: 20 being by elements, 10 being on side le
slings
8. TYPE OF BOMBING: 20 being anti-aircraft, 10 being fighters attached att ch
9. HEIGHT AND DIRECTION OF BOMBING: Altitude and directions of release
and with several. Released 2-200 bombs at 70,000 ft. In train
by side run
10. TYPE OF BOMBING:

C-47	Energy
A-1	A-1
A-1	A-1
11. TYPE OF BOMBING: 20 being anti-aircraft, 10 being fighters attached att ch
12. TYPE OF BOMBING: 20 being anti-aircraft, 10 being fighters attached att ch
13. RESULTS: (Central) One "C" Fighter downed. No hits observed
14. TYPE OF BOMBING: None
15. **
16. **

/s/ U. S. C. UFFNER

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Appendix 30 (cont'd)

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COMBAT REPORT

Morning Mission:

I was to lead the strike formation in flight direction. First four elements passed over the target and continued in a northern direction. After trying unsuccessfully to attract attention of landing planes, I pulled away from formation with remaining 12. I worked in 1 for 10 - 15 min to bomb individually. I made two attacks, circles to cover results and headed for base. On I first saw landing elements on formation to the left in different directions. I left the formation because I was not sure rest of formation had seen enemy, there were no enemy fighters, and cloud conditions gave ideal conditions for low level runs on carriers.

/s/ CHARLES W. MOSELEY
Capt. U.S.

Morning Mission June 4, 1943 U.S.A.

I dropped three bombs on the first run. All target was a Jap carrier. The bombs fell 200' to 300' short and left.

On the second run I dropped five bombs across the stern of a Jap carrier, one definite hit as possible two. Other bombs within 100' of vessel short and over.

/s/ JAMES R. COPPIN
Capt. Bertole's crew

Morning Mission June 5, 1943 U.S.A.

From my position in flight under I could see over 100 five bombs burst stern of the carrier, one definite hit, making runs on 1 or 2 definite hits, and 2 near misses.

/s/ JAMES D. F. POOL
P.F.O. Air Corps
Gunner

Capt. Bertole's crew

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Appendix 80

U. S. AIRCRAFT - ACTION SUMMARY

1. Date: June 1949. Location: 333 West 170 Street, Co. - Date 1950
2. WEATHER: Scattered clouds - 1000 feet
3. UNIT REPORTS: 333 West 170 Street Co. () 00 Capt. Lanierre - 1-17-49
4. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT: 1st Lt. West at Midway
5. ***
6. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT:

Own	Enemy
One E-17-2	1st Lt. Lanierre, 01's, 02's, 03's, 04's, 05's. Zero fighters.
7. TYPE OF ACTION: 2700 feet level formation to bring 300 lb bombs 1/10 sec fuse delay
8. TACTICAL MANEUVER: Evasive maneuvers - Zero fighters - heavy A.A. fire
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACTION: 2800' collision course 90° out of the sun with direction a course of 100° at 11:30 AM
10. WEAPONS EMPLOYED:

Own	Enemy
50 cal machine piercing 500 lb bombs	A.A. gun shells, machine gun fire, Zero fighters.
11. EVASIVE ACTION EMPLOYED: Used flight to bring plans - turned about 100° after releasing bombs
12. DAMAGE TO WEAPONS: 200 rounds of 50 cal expended on return one - 150 rounds of 50 cal to lighten load - malfunctioning of equipment. 4 500 lb bombs 1/10 sec fuse
13. RESULTS: (Gertsin) Shot down one Zero fighter (Notified) Conditions to ease person of by strafing backs with lower turrets and tail guns
14. DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT: structural hold right wing
15. **
16. REMARKS: See flight log for details (Capt Lanierre) 1 flight log 2 position. 1st Lieutenant 1st Lt. Lanierre.

/s/ C. G. ... Captain, Air Corps

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171

A. ENEMY SE (cont'd) U. S. AIRBORNE -- NO. 107 THE MILITARY

1. Date: 21 June 1949 Bearing 330 Distance 170 from light wave: 1950
21 Heavy
2. WEATHER: 3 cumulus clouds at sea, 2,000 feet visibility 8 - 10 miles
3. U.S. AIRBORNE MILITARY: 1 Heavy Element 23rd Bomb Gr (W) TYPE AIRCRAFT: B-17's
4. TACTICAL OPERATIONS: Formation heading
5. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS: To attack and destroy enemy carrier
6. WEAPONS EMPLOYED:

Com	Enemy
8 B-17's	2 Zero fighters, 2 B-17's
7. TYPE OF ACTION: Level to high from 3500 feet attached in formation
8. WEAPON EMPLOYED: Heavy anti-aircraft fire, or diversion of surface vessels, and attack by 4 Zero fighters
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ACTION: Approach objective at 3500 feet altitude on a course of approx. 20° over line of searchlights 330° and turning right to 30° and over edge of cloud out of the sun -- released on that course (30°). Withdraw on a course of approx. 100° at an altitude of 3000 feet
10. WEAPONS EMPLOYED:

Com	Enemy
200 lb. demolition bombs	Heavy anti-aircraft fire
20 - 30 cal machine gun fire	(shrapnel). 200 lb shells, machine gun fire
11. MANEUVER EMPLOYED: As much as possible on 10° turn of 10° to right and left of collision course. No change in altitude and airspeed -- heading too fast. Divided formation after release
12. AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED: No reports by 200 rounds of 30 cal demolition 3 200 lb dem with 1/10 sec fuse
13. RESULTS: (Cont'd) One hit on enemy carrier -- the next miss one Zero fighter hit down. Damage to personnel on enemy ships from our machine gun fire
14. OBSERVATIONS: One 200 lb bullet hole in aircraft tail
15. ...
16. (Dir ...)

/s/ [Signature] Lt Col, Air Force

Appendix 8D (cont)

U. S. AIR FORCE - ADJUTANT GENERAL

1. Date: 4 June 1947 170 miles SSE from ...
2. Weather: ... clouds 1500 feet. ...
3. Unit: ...
4. Nature of Operation: ...
5. Description of Event: ...
6. Persons Involved:

Cm	...
...	...
7. ...
8. ...
9. ...
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12. ...
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21. ...
22. ...

1c/ E. D. ... IV
Captain, Air Corps

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Appendix 3D (cont'd)

U. S. AIR CRAFT - AGENTS IN BATTLE

1. Date: 4 June 1942 Lat Bearing: 2329 Long Distance 170 Mile 1800
Z 116-00
2. WEATHER: Broken clouds 1500 feet
3. UNIT: 1st Lt. J. G. ... (1) ... E-17 ...
Leader Capt. ... Lt. ... Lt. ...
4. NAME OF CARRIER: Aircraft carrier
5. AIRCRAFT TYPE: Aircraft Carrier
6. AIRCRAFT LOSS: ...
... Zero fighters
... Aircraft carrier
... Cruisers
... Destroyers
7. ...: ... of aircraft. Horizontal ... run at
... feet ... out of ...
8. ...: ... aircraft ... out of ...
... fire ...
9. ...: ... by Zero fighters ...
... course
... of 150° ... of 150° at 2000 feet
10. ...:
...
... Zero fighter
... fire
11. ...: ... by
... 600 feet ...
12. ...: ...
... rounds of 57 cal; 70 rounds of 47 cal
13. ...: (Jettison) ... Zero fighters shot down. One hit on stern of
destroyer, two Zero fighters ... (Left) ... Zero
fighters shot down (believed)
14. ...: One ... hit in ...
broken over to ...
- 15.
16. ...: * (...)

Approved (cont) U. S. Navy - 100-1

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
 Com
 1-17-42
 The ...
 Four Zero fighters
 Three aircraft carriers
 Two heavy cruisers
 Five destroyers
7.
8.
9.
10.
 Com

 Zero fighters

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Appendix B

U. S. AIR FORCE - AIRCRAFT IN ACTION

and attached to June 1942

1. Date: 1 June 1942. LAC 21° 10' N, 179° 11' W. LAC: 1700 Zulu Time
2. Location: Elmendorf AFB, Alaska
3. Unit: 48th Bombardment Group, B-24 Liberator; 1-17-42
4. Aircraft: 4 B-24s; Level to high on 17th Force
5. Operating Agency: 17th Force
6. Aircraft Type: B-24 Liberator; 17th Force
7. Type of Attack: High level bombing
8. Evading Maneuver: Manoeuvring
9. Initial Direction of Attack: Attacked from 10,000'. Attacked from NE - Alt 6000 to 10,000'
10. Aircraft Type: B-24 Liberator; 17th Force; 48th Bombardment Group; 1-17-42; 17th Force - anti-aircraft
11. Evading Maneuver: 17th Force maneuvered to avoid bombs
12. Aircraft Type: B-24 Liberator
13. Results: Not observed
14. Damage to Aircraft: None
15. Remarks: None
16. Remarks: As described under 1st Force Position. As a result of confusion and target, 1st Force failed to drop bombs on 17th Force. 17th Force from direction and 17th Force did not observe on what was reported to be a B-24. Due to intense anti-aircraft fire and low formation of 17th Force, 1st Force failed to observe. 17th Force did not observe. 17th Force reports a good run.

/s/ J. L. ... Lt. Col. ...

100-1 (cont)

U. S. NAVAL AIR FORCE REPORT

1. Date: 1 June 1950
2. Location: 01 clouds
3. Time of Day: 1800 Altitude: 1500
4. Name of Aircraft: Boeing Navy Cruiser
5. Name of Pilot: Navy Cruiser
6. Aircraft Type:

C-1	Boeing
Four (4) 1/10	Convoy, Navy Cruisers and
	in vicinity
7. Name of Observer: Boeing; 4 ship element
8. Flight Status: leaving
9. Altitude and Direction: Altitude 15,000 ft. North - Four (4)
at 1/10 second completion. Alt of - Navy Cruiser. Altitude -
15,000 ft.
10. Weapons Employed:

C-1	Boeing
Four (4) at 1/10 sec.	15,000 ft
completion	
11. Description of Action: Diving and burning
12. Name of Observer: C-10 15,000
13. Remarks: One (1) hit on stern of Navy Cruiser
14. Name of Command: None
15. Remarks: Navy Cruiser seen as result of direct hit on stern
of Navy Cruiser.

/s/ WILLIAM J. KELLEY,
1st Lieut., U.S.N.
481st Bomb Sq (B)

10 leading (cont'd)

U. S. AIR FORCE - 1950 - 1951

1. Date: June 17, 1950. Alt. 10,000 ft. 1700. Alt. 1:10.01.
2. Location: Bm. Clouds
3. Unit: 4-480. Alt. 1700.
4. Name of Pilot: Captain J. J. ...
5. Description of ...
6. ...
7. ...
8. ...
9. ...
10. ...
11. ...
12. ...
13. ...
14. ...
15. ...
16. ...
17. ...

/s/ PAUL I. ...
1st Lt. ... pilot

Appendix B (contd)

U. S. AIR FORCE - 1950 - 1951

Attack afternoons of June 1951

1. Date: 1 June 1951
2. NUMBER: 3/10 Broken down at 2000'
3. UNIT NUMBER: 2 VCS IZM NUMBER: B-17
4. NUMBER OF OPER. Rts: Bombing attack
5. AIRCRAFT TYPE: Heavy Bombers
6. AIRCRAFT TYPE:

Com	Heavy
Four (4) B-17E	Long t'ail force including
	Detachments and Bombers
7. TYPE OF MISSION: Station (Location of four (4) in closed 7)
8. MISSION TYPE: Turned into bombing run
9. MAIN ENGAGEMENT ALTITUDE: Horizontal flight at 20,000'
10. AIRCRAFT TYPE:

Light () B-17E	Heavy
	Anti-aircraft
11. AIRCRAFT TYPE: Operating altitude in direction going away from target

Appendix 87

FOURTH AIR FORCE (1)

8 June 1942

Plane 1942
ATTACHED TO THE 4TH AIR FORCE

Plane-027 in B-17 1942 at 09:00 8 June 1942 accompanied by Lt. Grandson in another B-17. Located early 18 miles from Midway on course 22° degrees. Saw two (2) damaged carriers, two (2) battleships or heavy cruisers and six (6) or eight (8) light cruisers or destroyers. Made four (4) bombing runs. Run one (1): -Dropped two (2) bombs on battleship from 9,600 feet indicated altitude and 100 feet indicated altitude. Formation of six (6) B-17's at lower altitude reported that battleship was hit and was smoking, about three (3) minutes later. Very heavy anti-aircraft at this altitude. Run two (2): -Dropped one (1) bomb on destroyer which turned and was hit about 100 feet short. Run three (3): -Climbed to 10,000 feet indicated. Dropped one (1) bomb on battleship port side to left of maneuvering battleship or cruiser. Run four (4): -Dropped four (4) bombs, two (2) on deck of damaged carrier and two (2) over. B-17 was seen to slow down and lumber--discontinued anti-aircraft after being hit. Saw four (4) B-17's. Saw attack by one (1) plane which shot down by anti-aircraft on second wave.

Due to engine and fire trouble two (2) planes of 1942 were unable to take off on the second attack on June 4, 1942. No fire was inflicted and a task of one (1) hour later.

/s/ JOHN F. HULL
 Captain, Air Corps
 Pilot

Appendix A (cont)

U. S. AIR FORCE -- ACTION I. SUMMARY

1. Date: June 6, 1967, 10:00 AM, ZL 1010, 175-00, 4:30 PM, 21 0230
2. Altitude: 6,000 ft clouds at 6,000
3. UNIT: 448-11; 7-20 (1967) BY: 448-11; 4-12-2
4. AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS: Horizontal flight at 6,000 ft, constant thrust force
5. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE: 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs - 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs
6. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE:

Crew	Pilot
1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs	1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs
7. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE: 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs - 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs
8. ***
9. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE: 2,000' to 10,000'
10. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE:

Crew	Pilot
1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs	1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs
11. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE: 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs - 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs
12. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE: 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs - 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs
13. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE: 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs - 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs
14. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE: 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs - 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs
15. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE: 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs - 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs
16. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE: 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs - 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs
17. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE: 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs - 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs
18. AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE: 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs - 1 - 1-12 200 lb bombs

/s/ G.

4- 117-11 (cont)

(cont)

17 June 1950

From my lower turret position on the deck I saw two hits on the ship's hull on the starboard side. In our fourth run the ship's burning carrier and the anti-aircraft fire stopped in the air. It is the ship's.

On the second mission during the attack on the ship, I saw one plane flying over the ship. Later on another followed but it was identified as a mistake. It is the ship's.

/s/ ROBERT W. Mc MILL
Cpl.
Lower Turret Gunner
Crew, Battleship

Afternoon Mission June 17th, 1950. 601

From my position on the turret gunner, I saw the ship's turret
space of fire all around. The turret attacked the ship's hull, coming
in with a side search just over the ship. When within range, I
started firing. The pursuit started into a steep climb, and I knew
I was hitting the ship's engine because I could follow the air crew.
He came all out at 11 and at 12:00. When he started to
come down, and I followed him with my gun firing until he was
out of range.

/s/ SGT. ROBERT W. Mc MILL
Engineer and Lower Turret
Gunner

100-1

Memorandum (cont.)

V. S. LINDSAY - ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

1. Date: 1/4 1946
2. TO: SAC
3. FROM: SAC; 1/4 1946 (SAC) (SAC) (SAC)
4. SUBJECT: [Illegible]
5. [Illegible]
6. [Illegible]
7. [Illegible]
8. [Illegible]
9. [Illegible]
10. [Illegible]
11. [Illegible]
12. [Illegible]
13. [Illegible]
14. [Illegible]
15. [Illegible]

[Illegible signature]

ACPS-1

75

Incident #1 (cont.)

From my position at battle-station over the I saw distinctly a hit of our battleship carrier aircraft carrier on the afternoon of June 4, 1942. On this occasion I saw a enemy Zero aircraft.

/s/ W. L. ...

Afternoon June 4.

From my position I saw one direct hit on one of our ships on an enemy aircraft carrier. At the point of release the collision course was the same as the carrier. At the instant of impact the collision course was directly over the carrier. The bombs were traveling with high velocity and hitting the carrier, causing a fire and some falling over.

/s/ ...

AS-11 (cont.)

U. S. AIR FORCE - 1954

1. Date: 13 June 1954, 11:30 AM, 11:30 AM, 11:30 AM, 11:30 AM, 11:30 AM
2. Location: Clear and unobscured
3. Unit: 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Division (A), 1st Cavalry Division, 11:30 AM
4. Name of Aircraft: Unit Function 11:30 AM
5. Description of Aircraft: Part of the unit to be checked. First time of observation, 11:30 AM
6. Type of Aircraft:

11:30 AM	11:30 AM
11:30 AM	11:30 AM
7. Type of Aircraft (Cin) Bombing from 11,000 ft. Function level
8. Type of Aircraft: Ineffective anti-air at 11:30, excessive action of vessel
9. Description of Aircraft: Approach objective at 11,000 ft true on a course of 11:30. Our line of approach was 11:30 at turning to collision course of 11:30 with our approach from east of the sun. 11:30 released on that course (11:30) and withdrawn on a course of 11:30 losing altitude 11:30.
10. Description of Aircraft:

11:30	11:30
11:30	11:30
11. Description of Aircraft: 11:30 also turn after release
12. Description of Aircraft: 11:30 also turn after release with 1/10 second delay from 11:30
13. Location: (Latitude, 11:30 - 11:30 from 11:30)
14. Name of Aircraft: None
15. * * *
16. * * *

1-1 / 11:30 AM, 11:30 AM, 11:30 AM, 11:30 AM, 11:30 AM

1-1-1

24

1-1-1 (cont)

U. S. AIR FORCE - AIR FORCE

1. Date: 10 Jan 1970. Air Force 1970 List 1.0 10 2, 11: 0370
24 0370
2. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
10/1/70 (10/1/70)
3. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
10/1/70
4. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
10/1/70
5. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
10/1/70
6. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
10/1/70
7. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
10/1/70
8. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
10/1/70
9. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
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10. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
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11. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
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12. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
10/1/70
13. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
10/1/70
14. Title: Air Force (referred) clear on 10/1/70
10/1/70
15. *
16. *

1-1/ 01 0370, 11: 0370
Major, Air Corps

1-17-57

10

1. ... (cont'd)

U. S. AIR FORCE - NO 1-17-57

1. ... 300° ... 0.50
2. ... clear over the ...
3. ... () ...
4. ...
5. ...
6. ...

On	Start
1-17-57	07:45:00
7. ...
8. ...
9. ... on course 090°; ... ft.
10. ...

On	Start
1-17-57	07:45:00
11. ...
12. ... 1/10 second ...
13. ...
14. ...
15. ...
16. ...
17. ...

/s/ ...
Captain, Air Force

SECRET

013

Appendix 20 (contd)

U. S. AIR FORCE - AIRCRAFT FLIGHT

June 1950
Administration

1. Date: 1 June 1950. Lat. 37° 34' N. Long. 175° 39' W. Alt: 4:00
2. Location: Oahu
3. Unit: 48th FS. Altitude: 1-1/2
4. Direction of flight: Horizontal
5. Direction of spin: No spin
6. Spin rate: 0 rpm
Spin direction: No spin
7. Altitude: 10,000 ft. Altitude: 10,000 ft.
8. Direction of spin: No spin
9. Direction of spin: No spin
10. Direction of spin: No spin
11. Direction of spin: No spin
12. Direction of spin: No spin
13. Direction of spin: No spin
14. Direction of spin: No spin
15. Direction of spin: No spin
16. Direction of spin: No spin
17. Direction of spin: No spin
18. Direction of spin: No spin
19. Direction of spin: No spin
20. Direction of spin: No spin

/s/ J. I. ...
1. ...
2. ...

1. [Illegible]

U. S. AIR FORCE - [Illegible]

1. [Illegible]
2. [Illegible]
3. [Illegible]
4. [Illegible]
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14. [Illegible]
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17. [Illegible]
18. [Illegible]
19. [Illegible]
20. [Illegible]

/s/ [Illegible]
[Illegible]

MEMORANDUM

1-

TO : Chief of Staff

FROM : Major General [Name] ()

9 June 1950

SUBJECT: Special Operation

1. G. O. [Name] ()

OPERATIONAL PLAN, 9 June 1950

1. [Detailed description of the operation, including units involved and objectives.]

2. [Detailed description of the operation, including units involved and objectives.]

3. [Detailed description of the operation, including units involved and objectives.]

4. [Detailed description of the operation, including units involved and objectives.]

(Signature)
Major General [Name], IV
Corps, [Location]

100-1

11a

100-1 (cont)

100-1 (cont)

1. 100-1 (cont) 100-1 (cont)

- (1) To be filled out by unit commander in accordance with 100-1 after any action or operation to contact with the unit.
- (2) To not be used for this report - in order to maintain with responsible accuracy enter data in 100-1 as data is available.

1. Date: 10 June 1960. Loc: 801 3 11 2, 178 Alt: 18:00 2 11:00

2. NAME: Glenn

3. UNIT: 801 3 11 2 7 80

100-1 (cont)

4. NAME OF OBSERVER:

Horizontal Position:

5. OBSERVATION CHARACTERS:

CU in force

6. AIRCRAFT TYPE (include models and number):

CU

100-1

7-170's

100-1

7. NAME OF AIRCRAFT (Com: Name) (Sketch on:

Horizontal Position:

8. NAME OF AIRCRAFT:

CU in force

9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF OBSERVATION (include altitudes and range of contact, altitudes and directions of release and direction of fall.)

Altitude of 1100 ft. out of view

10. AIRCRAFT IDENTIFIED:

CU

100-1

Altitude of 1100 ft

Horizontal Position:

11. NAME OF AIRCRAFT:

CU

12 3-71

210

As on 12 31 (cont'd)

12. AMOUNTS EXPENDED (include type and date settlement. Indicate number of days.)

2 - 300, -10

13. RECEIPTS (Cont'd)

Over 1 year amount

(Date - see)

14. AMOUNT OF LIABILITIES

THE DIVISION OF INVESTIGATION
AND INSURANCE

1000

/s/ L. G. ...

Re produced by G-2, FBI - under Control
7 June 1971.

100-101

770

1. Appendix (cont.)

12. LACRIMATOR (facile traces of pure settings. Table to number of cuts.)

13. C 16-35-35

14. RECORD (Gertin)

Not observed.

(Distorted)

Number of near miss - possible damage to understructure.

15. SOURCE OF INFORMATION AUTHORITY OF INFORMATION AND DATE

None

Unknown

**

/s/ JOHN I. STELLAS
1st Lt 10

Reproduced for S-2, VII Letter District
7 June 1967.

100-1

101

100-1 (cont)

U. S. AIR FORCE - 100-1
100-10000

1. TIME 3 June 1948 1800Z
2. Location Clear over target.
3. U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000 (100-10000)
100-10000 (100-10000)
4. U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
Attended to by Jones.
5. U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
6. U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000 (100-10000)
U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
7. U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000 (100-10000)
U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
8. U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
9. U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000 (100-10000)
U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
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U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
11. U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000
U.S. AIR FORCE - 100-10000

100-11

11

10. (cont)

10. 10. (cont) (include the ... solution. Indicate number of ...)

Right ...

11. 11. (cont)

One ... of ...

(...)

One ...

12. 12. (cont) ...

...

...

...

...

13/ ...
1st Lt., Air Corps
14/ ...
1st Lt., Air Corps

Approved ...
2 June 1945.

SECRET

100

As earlier (cont)

U. S. AIR FORCE - AIRCRAFT - 1945

- 1. Date 3 June 1945. Lt. Col. ...
- 2. ...
- 3. ...
- 4. ...
- 5. ...
- 6. ...
- 7. ...
- 8. ...
- 9. ...
- 10. ...
- 11. ...

SECRET

SECRET (cont.)

19. UNITED STATES (includes the first section. Title to number of year.)

is under review of the Commission.

20. UNITED STATES (Continued)

(Continued)

One hit on return of evidence to the Director.

21. UNITED STATES (Continued) (Continued) (Continued) (Continued)

One hit on return of evidence to the Director.

One hit

One hit

One hit

/s/

WALTER J. WOOD, IV,
Captain, Air Corps.

100-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

100-100000 (cont)

10. 100-100000

100-100000, to be...

1. 100-100000

(100-100000)

possible left on store of officer.

1. 100-100000

100-100000

1000

Unknown

1000

(100-100000)

100-100000, 100-100000,
100-100000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 7 of 7 (cont)

U. S. AIR FORCE - 1950

- 1. ...
- 2. ...
- 3. UNIT REPORTING Capt Seeburger, Ldr 23rd Bomb Sq (H) Type Planes B-17 E

... on course 075°, ...

... CONFIDENTIAL

... (3 ...)

- 4. ...

Com	...
B-17	1 ...

- 5. ...
- ... at 1,000 ft.

...

...

- 6. ...

... on course 070° ...

- 7. ...

Com	...
B-17	...

- 8. ...
- ...

- 9. ...
- ...

[Signature]
 SECURITY INFORMATION
 Capt. ...

CONFIDENTIAL

100-1

228

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

12-1

12

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SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

100-1

71

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10/ [Illegible]
11/ [Illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX I

Appendix I (cont)

U. S. AIR FORCE - 1950 - 1954

1. Date: 1 June 1954 Alt: 15'5
2. HAZARD: No stored G., None
3. U.S. AIR FORCE: 708 1st Bomb Sq (M) USAF Station: 1-127
Interception of Japanese Forces
4. HAZARD OF CONTAMINATION: Aircraft carriers in Japanese Forces
5. USE OF ISOTOPE: None
6. RADIOACTIVE: None
7. HAZARD OF EXPLOSION: None
8. HAZARD OF FLAMMABILITY: None
9. HAZARD OF CORROSION: (Altitude and direction of release not indicated.) None
10. HAZARD OF IRRADIATION: None
11. HAZARD OF TOXICITY: None
12. HAZARD OF OTHER: None
13. HAZARD OF OTHER: None
14. HAZARD OF OTHER: None
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74. HAZARD OF OTHER: None
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97. HAZARD OF OTHER: None
98. HAZARD OF OTHER: None
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/s/ J. I. ...
Chief, Air Corps

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1. Date: 5/10/68

U. S. AIR FORCE - 3000 1000 1000

2. From: SAC, [illegible] (100-100000)

3. To: SAC, [illegible] (100-100000)

4. Subject: [illegible]

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Appendix B (as to)

U. S. AIR FORCE - 1957

1. DATE: 10 June 1957. Lat. 27° 00' N Lon. 143° 00' W Alt: 10,000 ft. 10,000
2. WEATHER: Overcast clouds, visibility unlimited
3. WEATHER REPORT: 2-1000 in 10000 ft. 10,000
TEMPERATURE: 17-17-17
4. TYPE OF OBSERVATION: Interceptor aircraft crew report of a missile
5. TYPE OF OBSERVATION: Target could be tracked - 2 missiles and 1 destroyer
6. RANGE OBSERVED: 1 missile was not actually seen
7. HEIGHT OBSERVED: 10,000 to 15,000 ft. in the air
8. TYPE OF OBSERVATION: Altitude of missile 10,000 ft.
10. TYPE OF OBSERVATION:
1,100 bombs
12. TYPE OF OBSERVATION: None
14. TYPE OF OBSERVATION: 1,100 ft. 1/10 second of second
16. TYPE OF OBSERVATION: Unknown
18. TYPE OF OBSERVATION: None
20. TYPE OF OBSERVATION: None

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1. Date: June 2, 1968 (1968) ...

2. Location: ...

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Web entered ... at 11:00 June 2, 1968 ...

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at 08:00 (cc 1)

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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1-1 I. I. I. I. I. I.,
I. I. I. I. I.

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U. S. AIR FORCE

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/s/ [Illegible]
[Illegible]

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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

- 1. Date: June 1, 1962. LA. Serial 935⁰ et. seq. filed June 1, 1962.
- 2. Name: Val J. Miller, 2105 W. and underneath
- 3. Will Review: 220 W. and underneath; 2-172 Interest cases; evidence.
- 4. Will Review: 220 W. and underneath
- 5. Will Review: 220 W. and underneath
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1/7 - 2 - 220 W. and underneath

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U. S. AIR FORCE

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/s/ [Illegible]

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10-22-74 10-1-74

Appendix B (cont)

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SI ()
Web Field, . . .

3 June 1953

MEMO: Security Information

TO : SAC, New York, NY (100-100000), New York, NY

1. On 10/10/52 (NY 100-100000), New York, NY, advised that on 10/10/52, a field report was received from New York, NY.

2. NY 100-100000 advised that on 10/10/52, a field report was received from New York, NY.

3. It was noted that the report contained information regarding the activities of the New York, NY, field office.

4. It was noted that the report contained information regarding the activities of the New York, NY, field office.

5. The field office at New York, NY, advised that on 10/10/52, a field report was received from New York, NY.

6. It was noted that the report contained information regarding the activities of the New York, NY, field office.

7. It was noted that the report contained information regarding the activities of the New York, NY, field office.

8. It was noted that the report contained information regarding the activities of the New York, NY, field office.

9. It was noted that the report contained information regarding the activities of the New York, NY, field office.

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APPENDIX C

Report of the Special Agent in Charge

Letter, Lt. Col. [Name], 1st [Unit], [Location]
[Date] to [Recipient], [Address], [City], [State]
[Date], [Time], [Subject]: [Details]

1. [Section Header]

Letter, [Name], [Rank], [Unit], [Location]
[Date] to [Recipient], [Address], [City], [State]
[Date], [Time], [Subject]: [Details]

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11-10-58 ()
11-10-58

1. The first part of the report is a summary of the work done during the period from 10/1/58 to 10/31/58. It is a summary of the work done by the group and is not intended to be a detailed report of the work done.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed report of the work done during the period from 10/1/58 to 10/31/58. It is a detailed report of the work done by the group and is intended to be a detailed report of the work done.

3. The third part of the report is a summary of the work done during the period from 10/1/58 to 10/31/58. It is a summary of the work done by the group and is not intended to be a detailed report of the work done.

4. The fourth part of the report is a summary of the work done during the period from 10/1/58 to 10/31/58. It is a summary of the work done by the group and is not intended to be a detailed report of the work done.

5. The fifth part of the report is a summary of the work done during the period from 10/1/58 to 10/31/58. It is a summary of the work done by the group and is not intended to be a detailed report of the work done.

6. The sixth part of the report is a summary of the work done during the period from 10/1/58 to 10/31/58. It is a summary of the work done by the group and is not intended to be a detailed report of the work done.

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100-100000

100

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR (100-100000)

(100-100000)

Subject: [Illegible]

Reference is made to [Illegible]

[Illegible body text]

[Illegible body text]

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Page 1

11

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Letter, General [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Zip].
Subject: [Topic]

Letter, General [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Zip].
Subject: [Topic]

Letter, General [Name], [Address], [City], [State], [Zip].
Subject: [Topic]

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10-1-7

Appendix 10

(AG 500.01 - 211.1.100 - in respect of Index 1)

1. The following are the names of the persons who were involved in the operation of the aircraft on 10 July 1942.

(...)

10 July 1942

2. The following are the names of the persons who were involved in the operation of the aircraft on 11 July 1942.

3. The following are the names of the persons who were involved in the operation of the aircraft on 12 July 1942.

4. The following are the names of the persons who were involved in the operation of the aircraft on 13 July 1942.

5. The following is a compilation of the names of the crew members, as identified by the cockpit crew commander:

10 JULY 1942

1st Pilot	(Governor)	2nd Pilot	(Collins)	3rd Pilot	(...)
	(...)		(...)		(...)
	(...)		(...)		(...)

11 JULY 1942

1st Pilot

1st Pilot	(Governor)	2nd Pilot	(Collins)	3rd Pilot	(...)
	(...)		(...)		(...)
	(...)		(...)		(...)

2nd Pilot

1st Pilot	(Governor)	2nd Pilot	(Collins)
	(...)		(...)
	(...)		(...)

The following are the names of the persons who were involved in the operation of the aircraft on 14 July 1942.

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137

1. 10 (cont)

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

1st Lt	(Lieutenant)	1st Lt	(Lieutenant)
2nd Lt	(Lieutenant)	2nd Lt	(Lieutenant)
3rd Lt	(Lieutenant)	3rd Lt	(Lieutenant)

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1st Lt	(Lieutenant)	2nd Lt	(Lieutenant)
3rd Lt	(Lieutenant)	4th Lt	(Lieutenant)

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CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

1st Lt	(Lieutenant)	2nd Lt	(Lieutenant)
3rd Lt	(Lieutenant)	4th Lt	(Lieutenant)

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1st Lt	(Lieutenant)	2nd Lt	(Lieutenant)
3rd Lt	(Lieutenant)	4th Lt	(Lieutenant)

2. You may see this document.

3. In consideration of the above, the following points are noted and for your consideration:

4. On the afternoon of 1 June 1954, the 1st Lt of the 1st Lt (cont)

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Page 10 (cont)

The following cases pertain to the four to which the
reference is made in the report:

All
Cases
1941-42

a. The persistent failure of the...
Department of the Army...

b. In order to...
during the...
concern the...
subject in...
the...
to...

All
Cases

c. Following...
on...
the...
of...
from...
of...
coincided with...
to...

For the...
Cases:

/s/ H. G. ...
/t/ ...
...

Incl :

- 1 - Report of...
2 - Report of...

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115

March 1950 (cont.)

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HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE (7)

Field, U.S.A.
1950-11-10

SUBJECT: Report on Section 8.1.1.1.

TO: Chief of Staff, USAF, Washington, D.C.

In accordance with verbal instructions, your representative has
been assigned to investigate the activities of the [redacted] in
the [redacted] region.

For the [redacted] [redacted]

/s/ [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

cc: [redacted] [redacted] in
[redacted] region.

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770-2-2-3-1-1

<u>Ref. No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Rel.</u>	<u>or I.D. No.</u>
1-15-52	4	Wendell P. ...	Rel. ID.	0-11115
	5	Wendell P. ...	Rel. ID.	0-11116
	6	Burch, Kenneth ...	Rel. ID.	0-11117
	7	Callison, Richard ...	Rel. ID.	12-1077
	8	Johnson, Willie ...	Rel. ID.	3028303
	9	Trucci, Frank Jr.	Rel. ID.	1001000
	10	Lockwood, Fred ...	Rel. ID.	1010009
	11	Johnson, Albert ...	Rel. ID.	1101100
	12	Johnson, ...	Rel. ID.	302 107

<u>Date</u>	<u>Ref.</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Rel. ID.</u>
10/10	3/5/52	1	Confidential -
10/11	7/7/52	2	Confidential -

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... (cont)

PERSONNEL

<u>NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Anderson, T. J.	P		1st Lt.	
Allen, R. L.	SP		SGT	
Burkholder, D. J.	C		1st Lt.	
Conrad, A. J.	P		1st Lt.	
Callahan, R. J.	C		1st Lt.	
Frank, J. J.	C		1st Lt.	
Grubbs, J.	P		1st Lt.	
Harris, J. B.	C		1st Lt.	
McClure, J.	C		1st Lt.	

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1970	8/1/70	1
1970	8/1/70	2

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Area 1-10 (cont.)

Area 1-10 (cont.)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Rate</u>	<u>SS IAW No.</u>
1-1010	2	Leone, Ernest	Capt	0-10107
	2	Lee, William	Capt	0-10108
	2	Johnson, John C.	Capt	0-10109
	2	Leone, Ernest	Capt	0-10110
	2	Hill, Joseph	Capt	0-10111
	2	Lee, Roy W.	Capt	0-10112
	2	Johnson, Albert W.	C/Sgt	0-10113
	2	Leone, Robert D.	Pfc	0-10114
	2	Lee, William D.	Cora	0-10115

<u>Area</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1-101	2/1/50	2	Area 1-101 was established as a separate unit. All of the personnel assigned to this area were transferred from Area 1-100. Results: list on enclosure 1-101-1.
1-102	2/1/50	2	Area 1-102 was established by the addition of four (Carnierre, Hill, Leone, and Johnson). Results: list on enclosure 1-102-1.

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REF ID: A66000

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>REF ID</u>
11-1970	1	Fort, Ohio	1st Lt.	04-01100
	2	Washington, D.C.	1st Lt.	04-01107
	3	Fort, Ohio	1st Lt.	04-01100
	4	Fort, Ohio	1st Lt.	04-01100
	5	Fort, Ohio	1st Lt.	04-01100
	6	Fort, Ohio	1st Lt.	04-01100
	7	Fort, Ohio	1st Lt.	04-01100
	8	Fort, Ohio	1st Lt.	04-01100

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
-------------	-------------	-----------------	-------------

1961	1/1/61		First Army, 1st Army to provide support and to be in control of the 1st Army.
1970	1/1/70		1st Army, 1st Army to provide support and to be in control of the 1st Army.
1970	1/1/70		1st Army, 1st Army to provide support and to be in control of the 1st Army.

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<u>FILE NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>FILE NO.</u>
41-5377	2	Tolson, Llewellyn	Conf	0-11557
	2	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557

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1-10 0/1-1 Class of 1-10-10.

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<u>FILE NO.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>FILE NO.</u>
41-5377	2	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	2	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557
	3	Board, William	Conf	0-11557

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1-10 0/1-1 Class of 1-10-10.

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100-10 (cont.)

7-1-1953

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
100-10	7-1-53	Wagner, John H.	100	100-10
		Wool, ...	100	100-10
		Wright, John H.	100	100-10
		Wright, ...	100	100-10
		Wright, ...	100	100-10
		Wright, ...	100	100-10
		Wright, ...	100	100-10
		Wright, ...	100	100-10
		Wright, ...	100	100-10
		Wright, ...	100	100-10

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7-1-1953

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CLASS</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
100-10	7-1-53	Wright, John H.	100	100-10
		Wright, ...	100	100-10
		Wright, ...	100	100-10
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		Wright, ...	100	100-10
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<u>NAME</u>	<u>AGE</u>	<u>RELATIONSHIP</u>	<u>SEX</u>	<u>HT</u>	<u>HAIR</u>	<u>COMPLEXION</u>
1-1-1	4	in,	1	5		
	2	brother,				
	3	follow,				
	4	brother,				
	5	brother,				
	6	brother,				
	7	brother,				
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<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1st Lt	1/10/50
2nd Lt	1/10/50
3rd Lt	1/10/50
4th Lt	1/10/50
5th Lt	1/10/50
6th Lt	1/10/50
7th Lt	1/10/50
8th Lt	1/10/50
9th Lt	1/10/50
10th Lt	1/10/50

1st Lt ... 1/10/50 ...

2nd Lt ... 1/10/50 ...

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4th Lt ... 1/10/50 ...

5th Lt ... 1/10/50 ...

6th Lt ... 1/10/50 ...

7th Lt ... 1/10/50 ...

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9th Lt ... 1/10/50 ...

10th Lt ... 1/10/50 ...

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10-1-77

FLORIDA () Cont'd

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
10-1-77	10/1/77	St. Petersburg, Florida	08:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	1:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	2:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	3:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	4:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	5:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	6:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	7:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	8:00	0-1110

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
10-1-77	8/1/77	St. Petersburg	At 08:00 hours, 100 ft net side of 1110 on St. Petersburg, Florida on stern of 1110. 100 ft net side of 1110 - 100 ft net side of 1110.
10-1-77	8/1/77	St. Petersburg	At 08:00 hours, 100 ft net side of 1110 on St. Petersburg, Florida on stern of 1110. 100 ft net side of 1110 - 100 ft net side of 1110.
10-1-77	8/1/77	St. Petersburg	At 08:00 hours, 100 ft net side of 1110 on St. Petersburg, Florida on stern of 1110. 100 ft net side of 1110 - 100 ft net side of 1110.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
10-1-77	10/1/77	St. Petersburg, Florida	10:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	11:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	12:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	13:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	14:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	15:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	16:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	17:00	0-1110
		St. Petersburg, Florida	18:00	0-1110

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
10-1-77	8/1/77	St. Petersburg	At 08:00 hours, 100 ft net side of 1110 on St. Petersburg, Florida on stern of 1110. 100 ft net side of 1110 - 100 ft net side of 1110.
10-1-77	8/1/77	St. Petersburg	At 08:00 hours, 100 ft net side of 1110 on St. Petersburg, Florida on stern of 1110. 100 ft net side of 1110 - 100 ft net side of 1110.
10-1-77	8/1/77	St. Petersburg	At 08:00 hours, 100 ft net side of 1110 on St. Petersburg, Florida on stern of 1110. 100 ft net side of 1110 - 100 ft net side of 1110.

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1. For the purpose of this report, the following definitions apply:

- 1.1 - [unclear]
- 1.2 - [unclear]
- 1.3 - [unclear]
- 1.4 - [unclear]

- 1.1 - [unclear]
- 1.2 - [unclear]

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APPENDIX 11

Daily Reports to War Department from Hawaiian Air Force

30 May 1942 to 15 June 1942

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1. The following information is being furnished to you:

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2. The following information is being furnished to you:

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3. The following information is being furnished to you:

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4. The following information is being furnished to you:

5. The following information is being furnished to you:

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9. The following information is being furnished to you:

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with a copy of the report (L-10000)

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Following is the full report of the investigation:

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1. Background: The investigation was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2002, specifically the requirements regarding the review of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency's Special Source Operations (SSO) units.

2. Findings: None.

3. Recommendations: It is recommended that the CIA continue to maintain the highest standards of integrity and ethical conduct in all of its activities. The CIA should continue to monitor and report on the activities of its SSO units, and should ensure that all personnel involved in these activities are properly trained and supervised. The CIA should also continue to work closely with the Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies to ensure that all activities are conducted in accordance with the law.

4. Conclusion: The investigation has determined that the CIA's SSO units are operating in accordance with the law and the CIA's policies and procedures.

On 10/10/02, the CIA's SSO units were found to be operating in accordance with the law and the CIA's policies and procedures. The CIA's SSO units are operating in accordance with the law and the CIA's policies and procedures. The CIA's SSO units are operating in accordance with the law and the CIA's policies and procedures.

The CIA's SSO units are operating in accordance with the law and the CIA's policies and procedures. The CIA's SSO units are operating in accordance with the law and the CIA's policies and procedures. The CIA's SSO units are operating in accordance with the law and the CIA's policies and procedures.

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1. The purpose of this document is to provide information regarding the activities of the [redacted] in the [redacted] area. This information is being provided to you for your information only and is not to be disseminated outside of your organization.

2. The [redacted] has been identified as a [redacted] and is being monitored for [redacted] activities. It is believed that this [redacted] is involved in [redacted] operations and is a potential threat to the [redacted] program.

3. The [redacted] is currently operating in the [redacted] area and is being monitored for [redacted] activities. It is believed that this [redacted] is involved in [redacted] operations and is a potential threat to the [redacted] program.

4. The [redacted] is currently operating in the [redacted] area and is being monitored for [redacted] activities. It is believed that this [redacted] is involved in [redacted] operations and is a potential threat to the [redacted] program.

5. The [redacted] is currently operating in the [redacted] area and is being monitored for [redacted] activities. It is believed that this [redacted] is involved in [redacted] operations and is a potential threat to the [redacted] program.

6. The [redacted] is currently operating in the [redacted] area and is being monitored for [redacted] activities. It is believed that this [redacted] is involved in [redacted] operations and is a potential threat to the [redacted] program.

7. The [redacted] is currently operating in the [redacted] area and is being monitored for [redacted] activities. It is believed that this [redacted] is involved in [redacted] operations and is a potential threat to the [redacted] program.

8. The [redacted] is currently operating in the [redacted] area and is being monitored for [redacted] activities. It is believed that this [redacted] is involved in [redacted] operations and is a potential threat to the [redacted] program.

9. The [redacted] is currently operating in the [redacted] area and is being monitored for [redacted] activities. It is believed that this [redacted] is involved in [redacted] operations and is a potential threat to the [redacted] program.

10. The [redacted] is currently operating in the [redacted] area and is being monitored for [redacted] activities. It is believed that this [redacted] is involved in [redacted] operations and is a potential threat to the [redacted] program.

Other activities of [redacted] in the [redacted] area are being monitored for [redacted] activities. It is believed that this [redacted] is involved in [redacted] operations and is a potential threat to the [redacted] program.

The [redacted] is currently operating in the [redacted] area and is being monitored for [redacted] activities. It is believed that this [redacted] is involved in [redacted] operations and is a potential threat to the [redacted] program.

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REF ID: A66000

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Subject: [Illegible]

- 1. [Illegible]
- 2. [Illegible]
- 3. [Illegible]
- 4. [Illegible]

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Department of Defense (Continued).

To: Inf.

Following is a summary of the information received from the Department of Defense:

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- 1. **Weapons:**
 - M109 155 mm self-propelled howitzer.
 - M270 270 mm mobile launcher vehicle.
- 2. **Artillery:**
 - M109 155 mm self-propelled howitzer.
- 3. **Missiles:**
 - M262 262 mm mobile launcher vehicle.
- 4. **Other weapons:**
 - M270 270 mm mobile launcher vehicle.
 - M262 262 mm mobile launcher vehicle.
 - M270 270 mm mobile launcher vehicle.
 - M262 262 mm mobile launcher vehicle.

Top Secret Information
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1. All information contained herein is (Confidential).

2. It is

intended to be disseminated only to those personnel who have a valid need to know.

3. It is

not to be distributed outside the Department of Defense, and its use is limited to official duties.

4. It is

not to be distributed to the public.

5. It is not to be used for any purpose other than that for which it was prepared.

6. All information contained herein is (Confidential) and its use is limited to official duties.

7. This information is intended for the use of the Department of Defense and its use is limited to official duties. It is not to be distributed outside the Department of Defense, and its use is limited to official duties.

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I N D E X

A

A-12, 2
 A-12A, 2, 6
 A-20, 2, 7
 A-20A, 2, 5-6
 Advanced Hq. 7th AF, 43
 Aqua system, Number One, 3
 Apaiang, 33, 44-45
 Apakama, 33, 36, 38, 41, 44-45
 Arbonne, U.S.S., 25
 Arnold, General, 73 (n 6)
 Arorai, 38
 AF-6, 2, 6
 Australia, 25

B

B-12, 2
 B-12A, 2, 6
 B-17, 2-4, 7-8, 10-11, 13-19,
 21-23, 26-27, 45, 70 (n 4),
 71 (n 62), 73 (n 6)
 B-17C, 13
 B-17D, 2, 5-6, 13
 B-17E, 8-9, 11, 22, 25, 27
 B-18, 2, 5-7, 13
 B-18A, 2
 B-24, 30, 32-33, 35, 38, 40, 42,
 45, 73 (n 6)
 B-24D, 28-30, 33-41
 B-26, 14, 18-19, 22, 45
 B-26E, 14
 B-29, 22
 B-32, 22
 Baker I., 30-40
 Barking Sands, 26-24
 Bellows Field, 2, 4-5
 Beru, 33, 38
 Betio I., 30, 41

C

Campbell, Brig. Gen. H. D., 40
 Canton, 8-9, 27, 33, 36, 38-41,
 76 (n 55)
 Canton Air Group, 40
 Caroline Is., 28
 Central Pacific Area, 25, 28, 39,
 43
 Coral Gables, Fla. 10

D, E

Davidson, Brig. Gen. H. C., 20-
 22
 11th Bomb Gp., 1, 9, 19, 25-26,
 30, 38-40, 73 (n 3)
 13th Bomb Gp., 1, 7-8
 18th Pursuit Gp., 1
 18th Reconnaissance Sq., 14, 19,
 70 (n 50), 71 (n 62)
 86th Observation Sq., 1
 Eastern I., 18-19, 23
 Elice Is., 33, 35, 40
 Emmons, General, 32-33, 73 (n 8)

F

1st Provisional Sq., 19, 71 (n 62)
 4th Reconnaissance Sq., 1
 5th AF, 26
 5th Bomb Gp., 1, 19, 26
 14th Pursuit Gp., 1, 7
 15th Pursuit Gp., 1
 41st Bomb Gp., 43
 42nd Bomb Sq., 14-16, 19, 25, 37-
 39
 44th Pursuit Sq., 1
 45th Fighter Sq., 40
 45th Pursuit Sq., 1

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AAPHS-41

308

40th Pursuit Sq., 1
 47th Pursuit Sq., 1
 50th Reconnaissance Sq., 1, 8
 50th Bomb Sq., 1
 431st Bomb Sq., 13-14, 19, 25,
 68 (n 3)
 Fiji I., 8, 10, 71 (n 62)
 French Frigate Shoals, 12
 Funafuti Air Group, 40
 Funafuti I., 33-36, 38-41, 43

G

Ghormley, Vice Adm., R. L., 25
 Gilbert Is., 25, 27-28, 32-35,
 39-40, 43-45

H

Hale, Brig. Gen., W. H., 19, 34-
 36, 73 (n 6)
 Hamp (s/c), 30
 Hawaiian Air Depot, 2, 5
 Aero Repair Br., 6
 Engine Repair Br., 5
 Hawaiian AF, 1-2, 5-7
 Hawaiian Antiaircraft Artillery
 Command, 7
 Hawaiian Department
 Commanding General of, 11, 25
 Hawaiian Interceptor Command, 7-8.
 See also 14th Pursuit Sq.
 Hawaiian Is., 1, 6-8, 26
 Hawaiian Mobile AF, 25, 73 (n 3)
 Hopy, Col., C.F., 38
 Hickam Field, 1-5, 8, 25
 Honolulu, 12

J

Jaluit I., 37, 44-45
 Johnston I., 32-35

K
 Kaena Point (Oahu), 12
 Kaneohe, 12
 Kaneohe Naval Air Station, 24
 Kauai, 12

L

Landon, General, T. H., 39-40
 LB-30, 22, 27, 40, 45
 Little Makin I., 39
 Lockheed Hudson, 9

M

McCain, Rear Adm., J. S., 25
 Maiana, 33, 41
 Makin I., 33-34, 39, 44-45
 Maraki, 44-45
 Marines, 23
 Marshall Is., 12, 28, 32-33,
 37, 39, 44-45
 Martin, Maj. Gen., F. L., 1
 Midway, Battle of, 17, 19-20,
 23
 Midway Is., 1, 13-17, 19, 22-25,
 27-30, 44-45
 Mille (Mill) I., 37

N

19th Pursuit Sq., 1
 90th Bomb Gp., 26, 70 (n 6)
 98th Bomb Sq., 25, 38, 38
 Nandi I., 8-11
 Nanomea, 40
 Nauru I., 33-35, 33-39, 44-45
 Navy, 4-5, 14, 17, 20, 23, 28,
 30, 40
 New Caledonia, 10, 25
 New Zealand, 25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Nimitz, Adm., C. V., 11, 23.

See also Pacific Fleet.

Nonu'i, 33, 44-45

Noumea, 25

Nukunetau, 40

Nukunau, 38

O

O-47, 5, 7

O-47B, 1, 6

O-49, 1, 6-7

OA-8, 1, 6

OA-9, 1, 6

Oahu I., 4, 6, 10-12, 15, 23,
25, 28-29, 32, 34

Ocean I., 33

Onotoa, 38

P

P-26, 2

P-26A, 2, 6

P-26B, 2, 6

P-36, 2, 5, 7

P-36A, 2, 6

P-39, 7

P-39D, 12

P-40, 2, 5, 7, 12

P-40B, 2, 6

P-40C, 2, 6

P-40E, 23-24

P-40K, 23-24

P-40N, 40

PBY, 22, 40

PV-1, 40

Pacific Fleet, Commander in

Chief (CINCPAC), 10, 23, 32

Palmyra, 8, 9, 38

Pan America School, 10

Pat King Two, 13

Peacock Point, 30-31

Peale I., 31

Pearl Herbor, 1-2

Port Rhin, 37

Post Exchange, 1

Pownall, Rear Admiral, 40

R, S

Royal New Zealand AF, 9

6th Pursuit Sq., 1

VII Bomber Command, 8-9, 11, 13

26-27, 37-38

Commanding General, 9, 19

Hq, 37-38

VII Fighter Command, 8

7th Interceptor Command, 8

69th Bomb Sq., 14, 19, 70 (n 50),

71 (n 62)

72nd Bomb Sq., 1, 13-15, 17, 19,

26

72nd Pursuit Sq., 1

73rd Fighter Sq., 23-24

73rd Pursuit Sq., 1

78th Fighter Sq., 23-24

78th Pursuit Sq., 1

Sand I., 18

Saratoga, 23

Saunders, Col., L. G., 25

Southern Bomber Gp., 10-11

South Pacific Area, 10-11, 25-26,

30, 70, (n 50), 73 (n 5)

Commander, 33

Sweeney, Lt. Col., W.C., 8-9

T

22nd Bomb Gp., 19

23rd Bomb Sq., 1, 8, 15-17, 19

26th Bomb Sq., 13-14, 17, 25

30th Bomb Gp., 43

31st Bomb Sq., 1, 14, 19

38th Bomb Gp., 19

307th Bomb Gp., 26, 28-29, 33

371st Bomb Sq., 29, 34

372nd Bomb Sq., 29, 34

304th Bomb Sq., 68 (n 2)

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AAPES-41

310

Tamana, 33, 38, 44-45
 Tapeteuea, 30, 44-45
 Tarawa Atoll, 33-42, 44-45
 Task Force 11
 Commander of, 10-11
 Task Force 12, 34
 Task Force 15, 40
 Task Group 8.9, 8
 Tinker, Maj. Gen., C. L., 71
 (n 69)
 Tokowa Channel, 37

W

Wake I., 11-12, 27-32, 39, 42,
 44-45
 War Department, 11, 25
 Wheeler Field, 1-5
 Wilkes I., 31

Y, Z

Yorktown, 17
 Zeke (a/c), 30, 42
 Zero (a/c), 15-16, 16, 29, 31-32,
 34, 39

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