Chapter 3
D-Day on Peleliu¹

FIRST WAVES ASHORE²

Dawn on 15 September 1944 broke calm and clear at 0552. Sharply silhouetted against the first rays of sunlight were the American warships which filled the waters off WHITE and ORANGE Beaches at Peleliu as far as the eye could see. Fortunately for the Marine division scheduled to assault the strongly held enemy island, the weather was ideal for amphibious operations. Only a slight surf was running, and visibility was unlimited in practically every direction.³

With his fire support ships already in position, Admiral Oldendorf in the U.S. heavy cruiser Louisville gave the command and, about 0530, shells began slamming into the target areas. By this time, the green-clad Marines slated to comprise the assault waves already were loaded in their assigned LVTs and were being dispatched toward the line of departure. As the amphibian tractors formed into waves behind the LVT(A)s and began their approach to the beaches, the steady stream of naval shells overhead increased in fury.

On board their amphibious command ships, USS Mount Olympus and Mount McKinley, the ranking Navy and Marine commanders observed the complicated landing operation, while the staff of the 1st Marine Division functioned from the

MARINES boarding landing craft off Peleliu. (USMC A94889)

ASSAULT FORCE under enemy fire at ORANGE Beach 3.
Note burning amtracs in background. (USMC 94937)

U.S. assault transport DuPage. Although this vessel had been equipped as a command ship, the Marines still had to furnish much of their own equipment for communication purposes while afloat.

Beginning at 0750, 50 carrier planes bombed enemy gun positions and installations on the beaches. Not once during this 15-minute aerial strike did the roar of the ships' guns cease, since the plan called for the pilots to remain above the flat trajectory of the naval shells. While the Commander, Support Aircraft, was busy coordinating air operations with naval gunfire, the Advance Commander, Support Aircraft, who had handled this task during the preliminary bombardment, prepared to go ashore, where he would be able to assume control in the event the Mount Olympus became disabled. Destroyers, meanwhile, had placed white phosphorus shells on the ridges of the Umurbrogol to blanket observation by the Japanese artillerymen there, while the heavier warships had shifted to close fire support and begun firing high explosives on the beaches to pulverize their defenses.

The initial assault wave of LVT(A)s crossed the line of departure at 0800 and churned toward WHITE and ORANGE Beaches, closely followed by the LVTs filled with infantry. Preceding were the 18 LCIs (Landing Craft, Infantry), which had been equipped with 4.5-inch rocket launchers. After approaching within 1,000 yards of the shore, these vessels took up positions and began unleashing salvos of 22 rockets each. When the third assault wave passed the LCIs, they moved to the flanks of the landing beaches, ready to deliver "on call" fire. Four other LCIs, mounting 4.2-inch mortars, were stationed on the left (north) flank just off the reef to keep up a continuous fire on the rugged terrain in back of WHITE Beach 1.

No sooner had the sound of the rocket salvos ceased, than 48 fighter-bombers flown by naval fliers appeared in the skies overhead. Peeling off, these planes struck at the landing beaches in a finely coordinated maneuver which kept at least eight of them in attack at any one time. Employing bombs, rockets, and machine guns, they poured down an effective neutralizing fire after the support ships had shifted their targets inland and to the flanks of the beaches and during the amphibian tractors' final run to the shore. As the foremost wave approached the water's edge, the fire of the planes gradually moved inland, at no time coming closer to the LVT(A)s than 200 yards.

At 0832, the armored amphibians clambered out of the water onto land, their 37mm and 75mm cannon placing fire upon the beach defenses. A minute later, the first troop wave touched the shoreline, whereupon the assault Marines hurriedly departed their LVTs and fanned out over the coral sands. Succeeding waves continued to land at one-minute intervals. The sight greeting these early arrivals on the beachhead has been aptly described by one of the participants:

Our amtrac [LVT] was among the first assault waves, yet the beach was already a litter of burning, blackened amphibian tractors, of dead and wounded, a mortal garden of exploding mortar shells. Holes

had been scooped in the white sand or had been blasted out by the shells, the beach was pocked with holes--all filled with green-clad helmeted Marines.⁴

Only the few scattered Japanese that somehow had survived the bombardment opposed the landing, but as the LVT(A)s led the attack inland off the beach, a steadily increasing volume of enemy artillery, mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire hampered the advance. Strewn over the beaches and reaching about 100 yards inland were numerous land mines, many of them naval types whose "horns (lead covered bottles of acid) had not been maintained properly and practically all of these mines failed to detonate. Had these mines been effective the results would have been disastrous."⁵ For reasons unknown, many of the mines had been set on "safe," a possible indication that the Japanese may have expected the landing on the eastern shore, where the mines were fully armed and fused.⁶

The Marines advanced inland beyond the beaches, maintaining their initial momentum despite increasing resistance and heavy losses, As a chaplain with the assault waves marvelled later, "how we got through the murderous mortar fire which the Japs were laying down on the reef we'll never know. The bursts were everywhere and our men were being hit, left and right."⁷ Carefully sited Japanese high velocity weapons also wreaked havoc on the advancing tractors. A 47mm cannon hidden in a coral point jutting into the sea just north of WHITE Beach 1 and antiboat guns located on the southwestern promontory and on a nearby small island kept up a devastating enfilading fire upon the approaches to the beaches, as well as upon the beach flanks themselves.

As more and more LVTs were destroyed, and their burning hulls cluttered up the beaches, a shortage of these all-important vehicles was soon felt. The division's action report gave the official number of LVTs destroyed that day as 26, but "unofficial estimates by assault unit commanders bring the total knocked out at least temporarily in excess of 60."⁸ This discrepancy in figures probably arose because of the observers' inability to differentiate between the blazing LVTs and DUKWs, as well as the Marines' great skill and ingenuity in repairing crippled LVTs and thus restoring them to usefulness.

Despite the heavy losses in amphibian tractors, subsequent waves continued to

move shoreward. Landing simultaneously with the fourth wave were the division's tanks (M-4 Shermans). Because of their excellent waterproofing for the operation, they successfully negotiated the reef, where the worst of the underwater obstacles had been removed by UDTs, and continued toward land in six parallel columns led by their respective LVT guides. The enemy fire, however, proved so intense that over half of 30 tanks organic to the division suffered from one to four hits during the 10 minutes necessary to cross the reef. In the 1st Marines' zone, for example, only one of the assigned tanks escaped being hit during the trip ashore. only three, however, were completely knocked out of action. "Thus within a half hour after the initial landing the infantry had full tank support--a record unsurpassed in any previous Marine landing in the Central Pacific, except for the Marshalls."⁹

TROUBLE ON THE LEFT¹⁰

Colonel Lewis B. Puller's 1st Marines came in over the WHITE Beaches on schedule. Its 3d Battalion (3/1)¹¹ landed on WHITE Beach 1, the 2d on WHITE Beach 2, with the 1st landing over WHITE Beach 1 at 0945 as regimental reserve. Colonel Puller rode in with the first troop wave and, as his LVT grounded:

. . . went up and over that side as fast as I could scramble and ran like hell at least twenty-five yards before I hit the beach, flat down. . . . Every platoon leader was trying to form a line of his own, just as I was. . . . That big promontory on my left hadn't been touched by the ship's guns and planes, and we got a whirlwind of machine gun and anti-tank fire.¹²

Landing with Companies K and I in assault, 3/1 (Lieutenant Colonel Stephen V. Sabol) ran into the most determined resistance, which, coupled with the severe enemy shelling and unexpected obstacles, hindered its progress toward phase line O-1 (See Map 4). As the left assault unit, Company K was to act as the pivot when the regiment turned north. Its immediate objective was the Point--a jagged coral outcropping jutting into the sea and rising some 30 feet above the water's edge--from which Japanese gunners were placing a dangerous enfilading fire upon the division's flank. Company K, led by Captain George P. Hunt, was destined to execute a classic example of a small-unit attack on a fortified position.

The assault rifle platoons climbed out of their LVTs onto the white coral sand only to find themselves about 100 yards to the right of their assigned area. Company K immediately attacked inland, nevertheless, and initiated its turning movement northward with two platoons in assault. The 3d Platoon on the left

Map: D-Day       (E.L. Wilson)

close to the shore fought its way to within 50 yards of The Point before its attack stalled. The 2d Platoon pushed straight ahead some 75 yards before stumbling into a tank trap and becoming pinned down by heavy fire coming from the northern end of a long coral ridge that loomed up some 30-40 feet to the right front of the startled Marines. The precipitous face of this obstacle, shown on none of the photographs or maps supplied to the 1st Marines, was honeycombed with caves and dug-in positions swarming with Japanese soldiers. By this time, the heavy fighting against stiff enemy resistance had reduced the effective strength of each of the assault platoons to approximately a squad, and contact between the two units had been severed.

Ignoring the gap between his assault units, Captain Hunt sent his reserve platoon forward to press the attack against the assigned objective, The Point.¹³ Before this formidable stronghold could be seized, Company K would have to overcome five reinforced-concrete pillboxes, one of which housed a 47mm cannon, and the others, heavy machine guns. Each pillbox had from 6 to 12 occupants, while other Japanese infantrymen, some with light machine guns, had been placed in nearby dug-in positions and coral depressions to provide protective fire. All of these carefully prepared defenses were still intact at the time of the Marine assault, despite Colonel Puller's having insisted upon, and received, assurances from naval officers that this strategic area enfilading his flank would be properly blanketed with fire during the preliminary bombardment.¹⁴

Since The Point's fires were oriented primarily towards the landing beach area, the Marines decided to assault the bastion from the rear (east). Gathering up the remnants of the 3d Platoon, Second Lieutenant William A. Willis and his 1st Platoon began slugging their way toward the top of the objective in the face of concentrated enemy fire. After killing off its protecting infantrymen, the Marines approached each pillbox from its blind spot to blast the occupants with grenades. Finally, the attackers broke through the maze of infantry positions and pillboxes to storm the crest of The Point, but beneath them at the water's edge could be heard the roar of the 47mm cannon that had wreaked havoc among the Marines all morning.

Stealthily easing down toward the reinforced-concrete casemate from above, Lieutenant Willis managed to lob a smoke grenade right in front of the embrasure, temporarily blinding the gunners inside. Mere seconds later, another Marine fired a rifle grenade through the

gun port. This bursting grenade probably ignited some stacked ammunition, for the whole interior almost immediately became seared with white-hot flames. When the fleeing Japanese, their clothes aflame and their cartridge belts exploding from the intense heat, dashed out, pre-positioned Marine riflemen cut them down.

By 1015, Company K had fulfilled its mission, killing a counted 110 enemy soldiers in the process. As a result, the enfilading fire from the left flank had been silenced, but the cost to the Marines had been high. Out of the two-platoon assault force, Captain Hunt could find only 32 survivors with whom to set up a hasty perimeter defense, for his other platoon was still pinned down in the antitank trap near the coral ridge. Hurriedly a captured Japanese machine gun was rushed into use, for this handful of men soon found themselves isolated on the extreme left flank of the division and the object of determined counterattacks by small enemy groups.

By this time, the 3d Battalion's 81mm mortar platoon, which had suffered 11 casualties and lost a base plate soon after landing, was working its way southward on the crowded beach, seeking room to set up firing positions. The early confusion of the landing was severely intensified by heavy enemy fire, for mortars and artillery continued to shell the shallow beachhead, while Japanese on the coral ridge some 70 yards inland swept the area with light and heavy machine gun and rifle fire. From time to time, the ammunition in a shattered, blazing tractor would explode, scattering burning debris over the beach and its scurrying occupants. To avoid certain destruction, succeeding waves of amphibian vehicles merely dumped their contents in the midst of support platoons engaged in clearing out small pockets of enemy resistance and hurried back to the reef for another load.

Efforts of 3/1 to expand the beachhead area proved disappointing. Not only had a gap been opened between elements of Company K, but its contact with Company I, attacking on the right through swampy terrain near the 2d Battalion, had been severed. Within 15 minutes of The Point's seizure, Lieutenant Colonel Sabol ordered two platoons from his reserve (the recently landed Company L) to fill the gap between the two assault companies. Before these riflemen could complete the mission, they too were stopped by heavy fires from the southern portion of the same ridge that had kept the right assault platoon of Company K pinned down. Despite repeated attempts at both flanking and frontal assaults, the reserve group failed to dislodge the entrenched foe. Thus there was no resumption of the advance to establish contact. The battalion commander, meanwhile, had thrown in his last reserve platoon to plug the undesirable gap in Company K's lines between The Point and the long coral ridge.

While 3/1 attempted to remedy its frontline problems, the Japanese had become aware of this opening between Company K's assault platoon and had thrust massed troops into the area. When the reserve platoon arrived on the scene, these enemy soldiers aggressively resisted all attempts by the small Marine force to expel them. Since he had exhausted all the battalion's reserves,

Lieutenant Colonel Sabol requested regimental assistance to deal with this dangerous enemy-held salient in the Marine line.

The Marines of 1/1's Company A hurled themselves into the breach between The Point and the ridge, but superior and concentrated Japanese fire from the coral ridge to their right front caused the attack to bog down by inflicting severe casualties. For several hours, the Marines pressed determined attacks, including tank-infantry assaults, against both the enemy salient and the dug-in foe on the ridge. Finally, elements of Company A succeeded in storming the southern slopes of the ridge where some Marines secured a foothold and made contact with Company I on their right. Late in the afternoon, Company E of 1/1 passed through the depleted ranks of Company A to press the attack, but enemy fire from the ridge halted the advance for the day.

After commitment, the regiment's reserve battalion established contact between the assaulting rifle companies and narrowed the gap between The Point and the ridge, but the opening still was there and the danger to the division's left flank remained. Had the Japanese launched a major counterattack down the corridor between the ridge and the sea, they might have succeeded in penetrating to the beaches, which were cluttered with the men, gear, and supplies brought in by later waves. The effect upon the beachhead could have been disastrous; in fact, the possibility existed that the Marines might have been driven into the sea.

To counter this threat, Colonel Puller used the remainder of the regimental reserve, as well as headquarters personnel and 100 men of the 1st Engineer Battalion, to form a secondary line of defense blocking the route down the corridor. The feared counterattack in force did not come, either because the Japanese failed to capitalize upon this tactical opportunity or because the Marines' fire support overwhelmed enemy attempts at massing the troops necessary to exploit the gap.

in contrast to the opposition encountered by 3/1, the 2d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Russell E. Honsowetz) found relatively less resistance. Upon hitting WHITE Beach 2, the assault companies of 2/1 spread out and drove inland, as a corporal later recorded in his diary:

I rushed forward with the others--dashing, dodging and jumping over logs and bushes. We must have moved in a hundred yards or so when we came to a swamp. . . . I fell flat on my face and pushed my nose deep into the moist jungle floor, waiting for more fire from the Japs; maybe I could spot them . . . started to wade into the swamp, the Nips again opened fire-burst after burnt, and some did find the mark. . . .¹⁵

Advancing inland against resistance described as moderate, the Marines, making use of all their organic weapons and paced by surviving LVT(A)s, pushed on through the heavy woods and swamps, bypassing well-organized enemy strongholds or eliminating them with flamethrowers and demolitions, until they reached the O-1 phase line--about 350 yards inland--by 0945. Here, in the wooded area facing the airfield, the battalion made a firm contact with

elements of the 5th Marines, thus securing the right flank of the regiment, and held up, awaiting orders to proceed to the next phase line. The 2d Battalion remained here, however, until the following morning because of the precarious situation on the left.

CENTRAL DRIVE TO THE AIRFIELD¹⁶

The 5th Marines, commanded by Colonel Harold D. Harris, landed in the center with two battalions abreast, the other as reserve following closely. As the left flank unit, the 1st Battalion came in over ORANGE Beach 1 with two rifle companies in assault, while the 3d Battalion landed in the same formation over ORANGE 2. The enemy had made extensive use of double-horned mines on both beaches. Altogether, there were three rows of them, laid in a checkerboard pattern and emplaced at about one-meter intervals. Rough weather prior to D-Day had deposited almost a foot of sand on these mines and substantially decreased their effectiveness. A number of LVTs and DUKWs were disabled by them, however, and became easy targets for the enemy artillery. Another period of rough weather soon after D-Day washed the sand from atop these mines and made their location and removal easier.¹⁷

The assault troops of 1/5 (Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Boyd) disembarked from their LVTs about 25 yards inland and began a rapid advance eastward through the coconut palms. Encountering only scattered Japanese riflemen and an occasional machine gun, the infantrymen pushed on until they reached the open area on the west edge of the airfield at 0900. Shortly after reaching the phase line O-1, they tied in with Marine elements on both flanks.

Across the airfield lay phase line O-2, but when orders did not come for the advance to continue, the battalion readied its riflemen and automatic weapons along a defensive line. Other Marines with grenade launchers and bazookas took up positions to provide cover both along the front and in depth; four 37mm antitank guns were placed in defilade in shell craters across the front; and machine guns were set up to serve as breakthrough guns in the event the Japanese counterattacked. When three tanks of Company B, 1st Tank Battalion, arrived, they were spaced out and placed in hull defilade among the bomb craters.

The caution exercised by the battalion during this phase of the operation derived from the preparatory phase. Shortly before the division left the Russell Islands, a careful study of aerial photographs had unearthed something

that bore a very marked resemblance to tank tracks. A tank-supported counterattack debauching from the area north of the airfield seemed highly probable, since this area offered both cover and concealment. Based on this conclusion, the bulk of the anti-tank weapons and the limited number of tanks available to the 5th Marines were assigned to back up 1/5.¹⁸

By early afternoon, a battery of 2/11's 75mm pack howitzers was ashore and digging firing positions just to the right rear of 1/5. All of the artillery batteries' guns, ammunition, and equipment had to be manhandled to this position from the beach, since antitank obstacles prevented the use of LVTs. The mission of 2/11 was to support the attack of the 5th Marines, as well as to supply reinforcing fires in the zone of the 1st Marines. By 1510, the battalion's Fire Direction Center (FDC) was functioning and, 55 minutes later, the first artillery mission was fired at a Japanese gun emplacement. As these howitzers went into action, they replaced the LVT(A)s in providing supporting fire for infantry units.

Although 1/5 was to remain poised on phase line O-1 because of the 1st Marines' failure to advance, the 5th Marines' 3d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Austin C. Shofner) was to surge deep into the interior of Peleliu. It came in over Beach ORANGE 2 with Company I on the left, K on the right, and L in reserve. After the assault troops oriented themselves, they immediately cleared the beach and attacked directly east. Company I soon tied in with elements of 1/5 and gained the first objective, phase line O-1, within an hour of landing.

Company K, meanwhile, had run into trouble. In fact, for at least 15 minutes after H-Hour, it was the right flank unit of the entire division landing. The LVTs carrying 3/7, scheduled to land on Beach ORANGE 3, encountered some serious underwater obstacles, which, coupled with the heavy enfilading fire from the right, caused the drivers to veer to the left. Accordingly, about half of 3/7's assault units actually landed on Beach ORANGE 2, where they became intermingled with 3/5's elements.¹⁹

No sooner had 3/5's Company K extricated itself from the predicament on the beach and begun its advance, than a heavy enemy mortar barrage on the southern part of Beach ORANGE 2 and just inland halted its forward progress. When the barrage lifted a half hour later, and after elements of 3/7 took up their positions on the right flank of Company K, the delayed movement toward phase line O-1 began. Upon reaching the edge of the airfield, the attacking company ran into several mutually-supporting concrete and log pillboxes, which had to be reduced before the first objective could be reached. About 1000, however, the company tied in with Company I on the first phase line.

When the push to the east was resumed some 30 minutes later, Company K retained contact with the advancing

elements of 3/7 on the right flank, but quickly lost touch with Company I on the left, for this unit had the responsibility of remaining tied in with 1/5. As Company K continued to push through the scrub forest, the commanding officer had trouble maintaining contact between his platoons. Not only did the thick undergrowth limit visibility to a few feet, but enemy snipers kept up a heavy harassing fire. Company L, which had been sent up to plug the gap between Companies I and K, found the going much easier through the light underbrush in its zone. Shortly after noon, the two assaulting companies were stalled by a series of mutually supporting pillboxes and trenches manned by Japanese with automatic weapons. Only after a platoon of tanks could be brought up was this obstruction reduced, but by this time, contact between Company K and elements of 3/7 on the right had been severed.

The 2d Battalion (regimental reserve), meanwhile, had finished landing over Beach ORANGE 2 by 1015. Quickly clearing the beach, 2/5 pushed on to the front, where it relieved Company I. This unit then passed around the rear of Company L and assumed a position between the other assaulting companies of 3/5, thereby reducing Company K's frontage. Following its relief of Company I, the 2d Battalion launched a vigorous drive eastward. Later that afternoon, 2/5 shifted the direction of its attack northward. Upon the completion of this turning movement, during which time the battalion's left flank was kept anchored to 1/5's static defensive positions, the assault elements of the 2d Battalion were deployed around the en- tire southern edge of the airfield. On the battalion's right and still retaining contact was Company L of 3/5, which was attacking straight across the island in coordination with the other rifle companies of 3/5.

After the reduction of the nest of pillboxes that had pinned 3/5 down, the battalion's advance resumed. Control of that afternoon's attack, however, proved extremely difficult and, even today, what actually happened is not completely known. In advancing through the thick scrub jungle that was devoid of any easily recognizable landmark, the riflemen were guided by maps that only sketchily portrayed the terrain. Difficulties in maintaining direction, control, and contact were compounded by steady enemy resistance. Flank elements had to take but a few extra steps to the side and contact became lost with neighboring units. The battalion's control problem was further complicated because of the earlier loss of the LVT carrying practically all of the wire and equipment of 3/5's communication platoon. Although most of these Marines managed to wade ashore and join the battalion early in the afternoon, they had been able to salvage for future use little of the vital equipment.

During the delay caused by the Japanese pillboxes, 3/5 had lost contact on its right flank with elements of 3/7. Shortly after resuming the advance, Lieutenant Colonel Shofner received a radio message from 3/7's command post (CP) stating that its left flank unit was on a north-south trail about 200 yards ahead of 3/5's right flank element. Shofner ordered Companies I and K to push rapidly forward. The left

flank unit of 3/7, meanwhile, was to hold up waiting for Company K to come abreast. The two 5th Marines companies pressed on across the island, almost reaching the eastern beaches, but never did contact any of 3/7's elements. About 1500, another radio message from 3/7's CP informed Shofner that the position of 3/7's left flank unit had been given incorrectly. Actually, at the time Company K began its push inland, 3/7's left flank was some 200 yards in the rear of that 5th Marines company. The attack of Company K, while 3/7's left flank elements held up, served to widen the existing gap.

When the true location of 3/7's left flank became known, Shofner ordered Company K to bend its right flank back in an effort to tie in with the adjoining regiment. Because its rifle platoons were already committed, the company had to press headquarters personnel into service in order to extend the line far enough, but even then the flanking 3/7's elements were not sighted by dark. During this late afternoon attack, moreover, Shofner's unit was experiencing trouble in retaining contact between its rifle companies. Only 3/5's left flank unit, Company L, managed to press its advance eastward, all the while remaining tied in with elements of 2/5 on the left. Company L was to have the distinction of being the only Marine unit to cut completely across the island and reach the opposite beach on D-Day.

All cohesion as a battalion ceased about 1700 when 3/5's CP was struck by a well-placed enemy mortar barrage which wounded the battalion commander. Following Shofner's evacuation, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt, executive officer of the 5th Marines, assumed command, only to be faced with the problem of regaining control over the scattered units. Setting out on a personal reconnaissance, Walt first located Company L, one platoon of which was still tied in with 2/5 on the airfield while the other two were preparing a perimeter defense for the night some 100 yards farther south in the jungle. After ordering the two isolated platoons back to the airfield to set up a linear defense in conjunction with 2/5, the battalion commander next discovered the long-lost left flank of 3/7, which was already digging in for the night on the edge of the airfield some 400 yards in from the beach.

Not until 2100, however, did Walt and his runner find Company I, and then only after a difficult passage through the jungle in the dark. The Marines, isolated from all other friendly troops and in a perimeter defense, were some 200 yards south of the airfield and about 300 yards short of the eastern shore. Walt dispatched the company toward the airfield with orders to tie in on the right flank of Company L. Some 100 yards farther southwest from Company I, the battalion commander located the last of his units, Company K. It was sent back to the airfield to tie in between Company I and the left flank company of 3/7, thereby finishing the forming of a defensive line along the edge of the airfield.

The new line was never fully completed, however, for Company I failed to locate its assigned position on the edge of the airfield due to the darkness. The unit finally deployed in the woods in front of the gap in the 5th Marines'

lines, thereby minimizing the danger. That night, as the commanding officer admitted. "No Japanese counterattack as such hit our lines, which was, of course, fortunate."²⁰

PROGRESS TO THE SOUTH²¹

The 7th Marines, commanded by Colonel Herman H. Hanneken, landed over Beach ORANGE 3 in column of battalions. The 3d Battalion (Major E. Hunter Hurst) landed at H-Hour, with the 1st following immediately, while the 2d was to remain afloat as division reserve. To carry out their mission more efficiently, the two assaulting battalions made use of an unusual command structure:

During the landing and initial operations ashore, Company A was attached to 3/7; to revert to control of CO 1/7 upon his landing. Company A had the mission of advancing south in the left half of 1/7 zone of action. This maneuver was to provide initial flank protection for 3/7 as it was advancing eastward. The support company of 3/7 was attached to CO 1/7 for the landing and reverted to CO 3/7 upon landing.²²

Exposed as it was on the extreme right flank, the 7th Marines was subjected to heavy antiboat, mortar, and machine gun fire from Japanese weapons sited on the southwest promontory and the small unnamed islet nearby,²³ as well as to the artillery and mortar fire that was falling along the entire landing front. Both "natural and manmade obstacles on the reef necessitated [an] approach to the beach in column rather than normal wave formation"²⁴ and, as explained earlier, approximately half of the lead battalion landed to the left of its assigned beach in 3/5's landing area.

Despite the resultant confusion and dispersion, 3/7 quickly reunited and attacked inland with Company I on the left and K on the right. Fortunately, the battalion had encountered fewer than 30 live Japanese still on the beach, and these were so dazed from the preparatory fires that they were disposed of quickly by the assault troops as they pushed inland. Although mines, barbed

wire entanglements, and spotty resistance from enemy soldiers in mutually supporting pillboxes and trenches hindered the advance, the Marines obtained unexpected help from one enemy obstacle, a large antitank trench just inland of Beach ORANGE 3. Spotted early that morning by an air observer, its existence was radioed to the staff of 3/7 just prior to landing. According to Major Hurst, the trench simplified the reorganization problem:

Once officers were able to orient themselves, it (the antitank ditch) proved an excellent artery for moving troops into the proper position for deployment and advance inland since it crossed the entire width of our zone of action approximately parallel to the beach. With respect to the battalion CP, I am convinced that it enabled us to join the two principal echelons of CP personnel and commence functioning as a complete unit at least an hour earlier than would otherwise have been possible.²⁵

By 0925, 3/7 had seized its beachhead at a cost of 40 Marine casualties and, with two companies in assault, the battalion was moving rapidly inland against resistance described as moderate. In little over an hour, the front had advanced some 500 yards farther east into the island's interior, and Company K reported the capture of an enemy radio direction tower. Early in the afternoon, however, Company I came up against a well organized defense "built around a large blockhouse, the concrete ruins of a barracks area, several pillboxes, concrete gun emplacements and mutually supporting gun positions."²⁶ To prevent needless casualties, the Marines were halted pending the arrival of the landing team's tanks which had been briefed for this particular mission.

As the Shermans moved up, making a wide sweep around the antitank trench, they chanced upon some Marines working their way along the southern fringe of the airfield. When the troops identified themselves as being of Company I, the tank commander attached his Shermans to this group of Marines and operated with them for some time before discovering that they were from 3/5's Company I instead of 3/7's Company I. All this time, of course, Hurst's battalion had been held up, awaiting the arrival of the tanks. Accordingly, 3/7's "the schedule, which had worked perfectly up to that point," explained the commanding officer, "was thrown completely off by the delay entailed, and I believe that to be principally responsible for our not reaching the east beach on the first day."²⁷

While waiting for the Shermans to arrive and reduce the obstructions to its advance, Company I of 3/7 lost all contact with 3/5's Company K on the left flank. Accordingly, Major Hurst placed Company L, which had landed with 1/7, in a reserve position behind Company I and echeloned it toward the left rear to safeguard that flank and to allow the attack to continue. Patrols from Company L were dispatched to

the north in search of the adjoining regiment's right flank unit, but the foremost patrol emerged upon the airfields hundreds of yards in the rear of the unit it was attempting to locate.

The 1st Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel John J. Gormley), meanwhile, had landed but suffered from the same antiboat fire and underwater obstacles that had scattered the lead battalion. As a result, some of 1/7's men ended up on ORANGE 2. Once ashore, the 1st quickly regrouped and began clearing the beach. Its zone of action was on the extreme right of the division landing, that portion of the beach which Company A of 1/7 had seized earlier when landing attached to 3/7. This company, after rejoining its parent unit, attacked directly east on the left, while Company C advanced southward on the right, and Company B remained in reserve. Until about noon, the resistance to the battalion's advance was described as light, although heavy mortar fire was received.

Immediately after moving off the beach, the Marines ran into a thick mangrove swamp which extended across a large portion of 1/7's front. When Marines of Company C tried to make their way along the only path skirting the western (right) edge of the watery obstacle, they received heavy machine gun and rifle fire from Japanese entrenched in pillboxes constructed out of large pieces of coral. As a result, their progress was seriously hindered. Company A, on the other hand, had worked its way around the eastern fringe of the swamp only to find itself some 250 yards within 3/7's zone of action. Lieutenant Colonel Gormley ordered the reserve company up to tie in between the assaulting companies, as the heavy fighting which had begun about noon continued.

Since the 7th Marines had failed to keep on schedule, all of its elements pushed on as rapidly as possible in the gathering dusk. Not until 1715 did the frontline units receive orders to dig in for the night. No sooner did the Marines attempt to tie in their lines, than the enemy began executing a forward movement by means of light machine gun teams operating in mutual support. Lateral movement along the front became difficult and the Marines were forced to organize only hasty defensive positions.

Although several localized counterattacks were launched against the 7th Marines' lines during the hours of darkness, only one posed any real danger. Company C was hit at approximately 0200, when a strong Japanese force swarmed out of the swamp and attacked the Marines' night defenses. Some enemy troops even succeeded in penetrating the forward positions, whereupon a number of beach party personnel were pressed into service as a mobile reserve. During the four hours of fighting, the Marines inflicted some 50 casualties upon the attackers before the Japanese broke off the action.²⁸

JAPANESE COUNTERATTACKS²⁹

It was not until late afternoon of D-Day that the Japanese, whose failure to seize tactical advantage from the fluid situation was puzzling, made their major bid to drive the invaders into the sea, but by then it was too late. The Marines had already established a beachhead and had made preparations to frustrate any bold attempt by the enemy to smash through to the vital supply dumps and unloading areas.

First warning of the Japanese intentions came about 1625, when particularly heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire began falling on Marine positions. Then, at 1650, Japanese infantry in estimated company-strength appeared on the northern edge of the airfield and began advancing across it. To Marines hoping for a massive banzai charge to facilitate their task of wiping out enemy resistance, the cool professional way in which these enemy soldiers negotiated the open area, taking maximum advantage of every dip and shell hole in the terrain over which they passed, was disappointing.

A large number of Japanese tanks, meanwhile, was forming up behind the protective shield of the ridges to the north of the airfield. They debouched in two columns upon the open terrain about 600 yards to the left front of 1/5 in full view of the Marines. After skirting the northern fringe where the jungle growth gave some scant cover, the enemy tanks swung out "in what can best be described as two echelon formation [and] headed for the center of the 1st Battalion. About half of the enemy tanks had from eight to a dozen Japanese soldiers riding (tied) on the outside of the tanks."³⁰

These light tanks, really tankettes by American standards,³¹ soon came abreast the infantry advancing in dispersed formation across the open airfield and quickly left them far behind. The Japanese tank commander employed his only sound tactic, which was racing straight ahead at full throttle for the Marine lines. If the tank officers had attempted to coordinate their attack with the slower moving infantry, not one of the enemy tanks would have gained the Marine lines, for many of the organic weapons of a rifle battalion could have knocked them out.

Fortunately for the Marines, the place where this tank/infantry attack was aimed, the junction between the 1st and 5th Marines in the woods southwest of the airfield, was held by the units best organized to withstand a determined thrust of this type. Colonel Harris, knowing that the forward elements of his 5th Marines would end up facing the level terrain where conditions were ideal for tank maneuvers, had ordered

that heavy machine guns and 37mm antitank guns be unloaded with the assault troops and set up on phase line O-1 as soon as this initial objective was seized. It was for this reason that Lieutenant Colonel Boyd had placed the three Shermans attached to his 1st Battalion in hull defilade when further advance did not seem likely. Although the Americans had exact intelligence as to the number of enemy tanks and expected some form of violent reaction from the Japanese during the day, the sudden appearance of the tanks on the airfield and the speed of their charge towards the Marine lines caused some surprise.

The course of the enemy tank attack ran diagonally across the front of 2/1, whose men opened up with every weapon they had. Two of the tanks suddenly veered right and crashed into the battalion's lines. Some 50 yards inside, the tanks hurled over an embankment and landed in a bog. When the Japanese attempted to escape their mired vehicles, nearby infantrymen quickly dispatched them.

Although all except one of 2/1's attached Shermans had returned to the beach to rearm, they only had to move some 50 yards to gain a clear field of fire and to engage the enemy tanks.³² Once the Marines opened fire, the dust became so dense that sighting by the Shermans was possible only between the dust clouds, which slowed down their rate of fire. The first few rounds had been armor-piercing, but these shells, to the Marines' dismay, passed completely through the thin hulls of the Japanese light tanks to detonate harmlessly on the ground. After the gunners switched to high explosive ammunition, however, the effect of the Shermans' fire was devastating.

Other Marine tanks working through the woods on the southern side of the airfield with advance elements of 2/5, meanwhile, spotted the enemy armor early and "moved out on the airstrip and were shooting as soon as the first Jap tank touched the other side of the airport."³³ The part that these Shermans played in the following action was witnessed by Lieutenant Colonel Walt from an advantageous position just right of the 1/5 lines:

. . . four Sherman tanks came onto the field in the 2/5 zone of action on the south end of the airfield and opened fire immediately on the enemy tanks. These four tanks played an important role in stopping the enemy tanks and also stopping the supporting infantry, the majority of which started beating a hasty retreat when these Shermans came charging down from the south. They fought a running battle and ended up in the midst of the enemy tanks.³⁴

Men of 1/5, meanwhile, opened up with their 37mm's and heavy machine guns, while their immobile Shermans added cannon fire. Just inside the battalion's front lines were set up the only artillery pieces ready to function at this time. Battery E of 2/11 began firing

at maximum rate as soon as the Japanese tanks appeared on the airfield. Once the enemy vehicles came within range, Marines employing bazookas and grenade launchers took them under fire. Overhead, a Navy dive bomber swooped down to plant a 500-pound bomb right in the midst of the onrushing enemy tanks, adding air power's destructive capability to the holocaust already engulfing the counterattack from every available Marine weapon in range.

Under the weight of this combined fire, the tank-infantry charge quickly began melting away. Some of the tanks exploded, spreading flaming fragments far and wide, while the hitchhiking soldiers just seemed to disintegrate. Not all of the Japanese tanks were knocked out, however, and these survivors smashed into the front lines of 1/5. Penetrating far to the rear past startled Marines, these tanks created confusion and dismay among the beachhead defenders.

As the commanding officer of 1/5 described the scene, these tanks "were running around wildly, apparently without coordination, within our lines firing their 37mm guns with the riders on those tanks carrying external passengers yelling and firing rifles."³⁵ One Japanese vehicle headed straight for the firing howitzers in an attempt to overrun them. A Battery E gunner hit the tank with the first round of direct fire, stopping it in its tracks, and a bazooka team finished the job. Another tank nearly reached the beach before firepower from rear area troops knocked it out. Marines in frontline positions, however, did not panic. once the enemy vehicles passed them, they remained in place, ready to engage the following Japanese infantrymen.

When the smoke of battle cleared, no enemy riflemen were in sight. They had either been destroyed by the overwhelming firepower brought to bear upon them or preferred to retreat in the face of it. Two Marines were found crushed to death by enemy tanks and a few other men had been wounded by flying fragments of exploding tanks. One Sherman had even suffered three hits by bazookas, indicative of the confusion caused by the counterattack. The commanding officer of the 1st Tank Battalion, however, thought that the swift collapse of the tank-infantry counterattack was "no grounds for smugness in regard to our antitank prowess. Had the Japanese possessed modern tanks instead of tankettes and had they attacked in greater numbers the situation would have been critical."³⁶

What actually happened during those few brief minutes of furious combat has remained cloudy and unclarified down to the present. For example, if all the claims of individual Marines were accepted, the total of Japanese tanks destroyed that day would be several times higher than what the enemy garrison had on Peleliu. Even the number of tanks engaged in the charge is in doubt, and those destroyed were so fragmentized and riddled by marks of various Marine weapons that no accurate count could be made or credit definitely granted to the weapon responsible for

AFTERMATH of enemy tank attack on Peleliu airfield. (USMC 95921)

.30 CALIBER MACHINE GUN in action on Peleliu. (USMC 95248)

the vehicle's demise. Apparently, two of the Japanese light tanks escaped, leaving 11 as the number destroyed.³⁷

Although foiled in their major attempt to annihilate the invaders, the Japanese did not lose heart. During the rest of the day and night, they pressed against the Marine lines, attempted to infiltrate these positions, and launched numerous localized counterattacks. The next major threat came about 1750, when two Japanese light tanks, this time coordinating their movement with supporting infantry, started across the northern runway, aimed as before at the junction between the 1st and 5th Marines. The heavier weapons of the Marine division quickly dispatched the two tanks, while the approaching soldiers were cut down or scattered well forward of the front lines by the hurricane of automatic fire unleashed by nearby units. About a half hour later, the enemy engaged the Marines at the junction of 1/5 and 2/5 in a fire fight which soon faded out. The next morning in a pre-dawn attack, two more Japanese light tanks accompanied by a group of soldiers attempted an attack upon 1/5's lines, but without any success.

Throughout the hours of darkness, the use of star shells and 60mm mortar illuminating ammunition precluded any surprise movements by the Japanese, while those artillery pieces already ashore kept up harassing fires to prevent regrouping of the enemy's forces. Probably because of this, no major counterattack developed on the extreme left flank of the division to exploit the precarious situation there. The small band of Marines isolated on the Point, however, was reduced through attrition by numerous small, but determined, enemy thrusts until only 18 men, relying on a single captured machine gun, remained to resist a counterattack.

Farther south, Marine units were subjected to infiltration tactics and minor counterattacks by a determined foe throughout the night, but 2/1 and 1/5 were tied in on phase line 0-1. Except for the difficulties of 3/5 and the two assault battalions of the 7th Marines in locating each other and establishing contact, the situation appeared to be in good shape. Before halting for the night, 2/5 had surged half way across the open airfield to make the biggest gain of any Marine battalion for the day. The advance in the southern portion of the island, although nowhere near the optimistic goals set by the division commander, had opened up much-needed space for the emplacing of artillery and the locating of inland supply dumps to relieve some of the beach congestion.

SUPPORT OPERATIONS³⁸

While assault Marines aggressively expanded the shallow beachhead, other

members of the task force labored strenuously to organize the beach area and to maintain a steady stream of vital supplies moving shoreward and inland. On the whole, this essential job was performed well, despite the enemy's heavy artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire upon the beaches. Although the shore party suffered twice the number of casualties on Peleliu than had been the case in any previous 1st Marine Division operation, such losses "did not affect the constant unloading of supplies."³⁹

The decision to create a waterborne supply dump by means of floating barges proved to be "an excellent solution to an extremely important problem . . . and enabled the force ashore to get along on a minimum margin of supply and also avoided congesting the beach with large quantities of supplies before it was prepared for their reception."⁴⁰ Another example of good foresight was the use of large numbers of amphibian trailers, which succeeded in staving "off a threatened shortage of artillery and machine gun ammunition until unloading could be resumed at dawn on Dog plus One."⁴¹

The unloading of mechanized equipment proceeded on schedule so that by late afternoon, most of the cranes and bulldozers were in operation. Some of the shore party's labor forces, however, did not arrive at their assigned locations until the morning after D-Day owing to the lack of LVTs and DUKWs to transport them. The intense enemy fire took its toll of the advancing amphibian waves and "resulted in a continuous shortage of amphibious vehicles into which to transfer boat waves, and these waves hit the beach further and further behind schedule."⁴²

This unfortunate situation was intensified by the fact that damaged LVTs were being dispatched to a repair ship which was already loaded to capacity with other amphibians in need of repair, thereby forcing these LVTs to mill about until they could be taken aboard. "Unnecessary wear and tear on damaged tractors resulted. In addition, as many as four (4) LVTs were towing other LVTs, thereby taking out of service from the beach badly needed tractors."⁴³ When it was discovered that it was possible to bring LCVPs over the reef to the beach at high tide, the situation was alleviated somewhat.

Participating actively in the logistic effort were the forward ground echelons of MAG-11's squadrons. Previously organized working parties operated small boat platoons for the unloading of equipment and evacuating of the wounded, while other Marines served as stretcher bearers, ammunition carriers, and even riflemen and grenade throwers on the front lines. Moreover, some 50 men from VMF(N)-541 landed in a group and manned a second line of defense against Japanese infiltration of the 7th Marines' mortar positions.

Ashore, the assault forces were encountering and solving their own logistic headaches. The trials of the 5th Marines, in particular, revealed that complications arise even in the best laid plans. By afternoon, the heavy fighting experienced by 3/5 during its advance across the island had resulted in a critical supply shortage, for almost all the assault companies' rifle and machine gun ammunition had been expended. Replacement of these essential items to the assaulting battalion, however, was hampered seriously by the LVT shortage and the heavy enemy shelling. Japanese observers kept the entire regimental beach under strict surveillance and continually called down artillery and mortar fire whenever amphibian vehicles reached the shore. Even the 5th Marines' assigned amphibian trailers, which were being employed at Peleliu specifically to provide timely replacement of high expenditure-rate ammunition, did not help to alleviate the shortage. These trailers were not received by the regiment until after the initial supply problem had been solved, and even then, all except two were delivered in damaged condition.

Complicating the whole supply situation for the 5th Marines was the early loss of its assigned beach party commander. This naval officer had been wounded almost immediately upon arrival ashore, and his successor fell to a sniper bullet soon after. As a result, the regimental quartermaster was forced to step in and assume this additional responsibility, an unwanted command of which he was not relieved until late in the afternoon. Just one of the many problems connected with this new task was the mounting number of casualties. Because of the shortage of amphibian vehicles, a speedy evacuation of the wounded was impossible, and the first aid stations on the beaches soon reached the overflowing stage. Too late, the Marine commander learned that the beach party had not marked the regimental beach properly, and when the evacuation LVTs finally arrived, they encountered difficulties in locating their assigned landing points.

The need on the front lines for water, rations, and ammunition, meanwhile, was so great that every available vehicle of the 5th Marines was kept busy hauling these critical items up to the embattled infantrymen. Accordingly, the work of clearing the rest of the regiment's equipment off the beach was hindered, and the unloading areas steadily became further congested. Despite these handicaps, however, the Marines of the 5th managed to surmount these logistic stumbling blocks by one means or another, and the regiment's drive across the enemy-infested island pressed on.

Like the other assault units of the division, the 5th Marines quickly discovered that the water supply contained in the 55-gallon drums, while drinkable, was extremely unpalatable. The oil drums had been improperly steam-scoured and, as a result, the water in them became fouled. Marines also found that those drums which had not been filled flush with the top had rusted in the tropical heat, polluting the water.

At any rate, the lack of a readily available water supply on the coral

island was "one of the most critical items in this operation."⁴⁴ One tank officer jotted down in his notebook that the infantrymen in the front lines on D-Day were begging for water "like dying men."⁴⁵ The enervating heat of Peleliu, when coupled with the island's lack of surface water, caused numerous cases of heat prostration among the attacking troops. Although these men bounced back to full combat effectiveness after a few days aboard ship where water was plentiful, their much-needed presence during the critical assault phase was lost.⁴⁶

By nightfall, most of the 11th Marines' artillery was ashore and its batteries had completed registration firing,⁴⁷ but not before encountering various complications. Some artillery units, finding their assigned firing positions still in enemy hands, had to search for new sites on the crowded beachhead; others, discovering their designated landing beaches too congested and the enemy fire too intense, had to divert their Marines and equipment to areas more appropriate for getting ashore and setting up to engage the Japanese. Two 105mm howitzer batteries of 3/11 were actually ashore, but still aboard their DUKWs, when ordered back to the LSTs for the night. During the return trip to the ships across the jagged coral reef, the already damaged hulls of three of the DUKWs were further holed, causing them to sink with the loss of all howitzers and equipment aboard. The surviving 105mm's were landed again early the following morning, as was the corps artillery, which had been prevented from landing on D-Day because of the shallow width of the beachhead.

TWENTY-FOUR-HOUR TOE HOLD⁴⁸

Although General Rupertus remained on board ship during D-Day, his assistant, Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith, went ashore with a skeleton staff as soon as confirmation came that the assault battalions of the 5th Marines held a firm foothold on the beach. Smith arrived on Peleliu about 1130 and set up an advance command post in an antitank ditch a short distance inland from Beach ORANGE 2. Almost immediately, he made contact with the CPs of the 5th and 7th Marines, as well as with the command ship, but even attempts by radio failed to bring a response from Puller's regiment.⁴⁹

Earlier, the 1st Marines had suffered the loss of many skilled radio operators and much communications equipment when enemy fire had scored direct hits upon the five LVTs carrying the regimental headquarters ashore. To make matters worse, the CP was no sooner set up ashore when it was hit by a mortar shell that caused further damage and disorganization. Accordingly, neither Puller nor the division had a clear picture of the tactical situation confronting the 1st's assault platoons or of the units' casualties. It was not until late afternoon that Smith was able to talk to Puller by radio, and even then no inkling of the true precariousness of the situation on the division's left flank was gained.

When reports began trickling out to the command ship about the heavy fighting developing ashore, Rupertus' natural concern was over the loss of the initial momentum of the assault. His attention was drawn early to the plight of the 7th Marines, for just after midmorning the division commander learned of the loss by that regiment of 18 LVTs, and shortly before noon he received the 7th Marines' report of "Heavy casualties. Need ammo, reinforcements."⁵⁰ It was, therefore, the failure of the 7th to achieve the speedy conquest of the south rather than the bitter dug-in enemy resistance to the north, which worried the division commander. He knew, moreover, that the 7th Marines had suffered heavy losses.

By noon, Rupertus had ordered that the Division Reconnaissance Company, part of the floating reserve, go ashore for commitment with the 7th Marines.⁵¹ That afternoon, when the situation in the south still had not remedied itself, and after requesting General Smith's and Colonel Hanneken's opinions, Rupertus committed 2/7, the remaining division reserve. Before the BLT could be landed, however, the approach of darkness and the shortage of amphibian vehicles resulted in its being ordered back to the ships. Some of the returning boats failed to locate the Marines' ship in the darkness and spent the entire night searching, while the troops in them remained in cramped quarters. The Marines in two other boats, because of the "confusion caused by conflicting orders,"⁵² were landed by LVTs later in the night. Since neither Smith nor Hanneken really desired the additional combat troops because their arrival would only further congest the already overcrowded beaches, 2/7's inability to land had no decisive effect upon the first day's fighting.

As the day wore on the situation ashore worsened--"it was a pretty grim

outlook at that time,"⁵³ recalled Rupertus' chief of staff, Colonel John T. Selden--the Marine commander began to express anxiety to be on the scene himself, a desire which was intensified when he learned that General Geiger, corps commander, was already ashore. Colonel Selden and other staff members, fearful that a single enemy round might wipe out the entire top echelon during the perilous journey to the beach, finally prevailed upon Rupertus to remain afloat. Selden insisted, however, that the bulk of the command echelon go ashore.

Upon reaching the transfer line, the command group discovered 2/7's Marines still waiting for amphibian vehicles to transport them across the reef. Because he "decided that superimposing a second staff on General Smith was useless and ridiculous,"⁵⁴ and that what was needed ashore was more combat troops and artillery, Colonel Selden arranged for his party to lie off the transfer line until elements of 2/7 cleared it. When LVTs or DUKWs still had not arrived by darkness, Selden sent off a message to Rupertus stating his intention of returning to the command ship, and then brought his party back.⁵⁵

On D-Day, Rupertus had expected that his assault troops would seize Objective O-1, which included a 300-yard penetration behind the northern beaches and all of Peleliu south of the airfield. Then he had hoped to attack across the open runways to capture Objective O-2, which embraced all of the island south of the ridges behind the airfield. Actually, at day's end the Marines had penetrated approximately 300 yards behind the northern beaches, but he'd only a narrow wedge of terrain across the island behind Beach ORANGE 3. This shallow beachhead "had cost the division 210 dead (killed in action, died of wounds, missing presumed dead), and 901 wounded in action; total casualties of 1,111, not including combat fatigue and heat prostration cases."⁵⁶

In contrast to the Marine commander's concern over the progress of his assault troops ashore on Peleliu, the Japanese commander's report on the day's fighting glowed with optimism:

. . . by 1000 hours, our forces successfully put the enemy to rout. . . . At 1420 hours, the enemy again attempted to make the perilous landing on the southwestern part of our coastline. The unit in that sector repulsed the daring counter-attack, and put the enemy to rout once more. However in another sector of the coastline near AYAME [Beach ORANGE 3] the enemy with the aid of several tanks were successful in landing, although they were encountering heavy losses inflicted by our forces. . . . Our tank unit attacked the enemy with such a cat-like spring at dusk, that they were able to inflict heavy damages on the enemy. . . .⁵⁷

Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (III-2) * Next Chapter (III-4)

Footnotes

1. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: III PhibFor STALEMATE II Rpt; ExTrps SAR; IIIAC Palaus Rpt; 1st MarDiv SAR; 1st MarDiv WarD, 15Sep44; 1st MarDiv D-2 Jnl, dtd 15Sep44, hereafter 1st MarDiv D-2 Jnl, with appropriate date; 1st MarDiv D-3 Jnl, dtd 15Sep44, hereafter 1st MarDiv D-3 Jnl, with appropriate date; 1st MarDiv D-3 Periodic Rpt, dtd 15Sep44, hereafter 1st MarDiv D-3 Periodic Rpt, with appropriate date; 4th War Dog Platoon, IIIAC, Peleliu OpRpt, 15-30 Sep44, dtd 20Nov44, hereafter 4th War Dog Plat Peleliu OpRpt; Peleliu Comment File; Japanese CenPac Ops; Smith, Narrative; Hough, Assault on Peleliu; Morison, Leyte; Smith, Approach to the Philippines; Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War; McMillan, The Old Breed; Historical Committee, 81st Infantry Division.

2. Additional sources used for this section are: TF 32 Peleliu and Angaur Rpt; TF 32 OPlan A501-44, dtd 15Aug44; 1st Mar Hist; 5th Mar OpRpt, 17Aug-16Oct44, n.d., hereafter 5th Mar OpRpt, with appropriate date; 3/1 Rec of Events, 26Aug-10Oct44, n.d., hereafter 3/1 Rec of Events, with appropriate date; 3/7 WarD, 24Aug-30Oct44, dtd 18Nov44, hereafter 3/7 WarD, with appropriate date; Boyer, ArmdAmphibianBn; Cdr. C.M. Blackford, USCG, "They were all Giants at Peleliu," USNI Proceedings, v. 76, no. 10 (Oct50), pp. 1114-1117, hereafter Blackford, "Giants at Peleliu."

3. Flying conditions, in fact, were so phenomenally good, not only on D-Day but throughout the period of carrier air support, that on "no occasion was it necessary to deny a mission request from an air liaison party because of adverse weather, and on only a few occasions was it necessary to postpone temporarily the granting of a mission because of local weather conditions." TF 32 Peleliu and Angaur Rpt, Encl F, p. 4.

4. Robert Leckie, Helmet for My Pillow (New York: Random House, 1957), p. 286, hereafter Leckie, Helmet, used with permission.

5. LtCol William E. Benedict ltr to CMC, dtd 27Feb50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafter Benedict ltr. "The two types most frequently encountered were 50 kg. aerial bombs buried with the tail assembly down and a pressure detonating fuse extending some three inches above the ground, and the two-horn naval anti-invasion mine. Regarding the latter, it is of interest to note that a great majority were not armed." 1st MarDiv SAR, Phase II, Part I to Anx C, p. 6.

6. Fort ltr.

7. Chaplain Edgar E. Siskin ltr, reproduced in Hebrew Union College Bulletin (Apr45), pp. 7-8.

8. Hough, Assault on Peleliu, p. 37. Oddly enough, this was the same number that the Japanese claimed to have destroyed on D-Day. Japanese CenPac Ops, p. 84.

9. Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, p. 404.

10. Additional sources consulted for this section are: 1stMarHist; 1/1 UHist, dtd 23Nov44, hereafter 1/1 UHist; 3/1 Rec of Events, 15Sep44; George P. Hunt, Coral Comes High (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), hereafter Hunt, Coral Comes High.

11. For ease of reference, this numerical abbreviation will be used throughout the volume. For example, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines will be referred to sometimes simply as 2/5. This designation should be understood to include the reinforcing troops that make a battalion a BLT.

12. Quoted in Davis, Marine!, pp. 217-218,

13. "If any portion of my plan was to break down, the seizure of the Point must not. Should we fail to capture and hold the Point the entire regimental beach would be exposed to heavy fire from the flank." Hunt, Coral Comes High, p. 17.

14. Davis, Marine!, p. 214. "At a conference on the flagship sometime prior to D-Day Col Puller requested that naval gunfire be put down on this point even though no enemy gun emplacements could be detected from photographs." Col Richard P. Ross, Jr., memo to DirMCHist, dtd 7Nov49. 3/1 Rec of Events, 15Sep44, states that "The entire point and its defenses were untouched by naval gunfire; in fact, the entire length of Beach WHITE One was only moderately damaged by our preparatory firings and bombings."

15. Quoted in McMillan, The Old Breed, p. 283.

16. Additional sources used for this section are: 5th Mar OpRpt, 15Sep44; B-3 Jnl, 15Sep-16Oct44, hereafter 1/5 B-3 Jnl, with appropriate date; 2/5 OpRpt, 17Aug44-1Jan-45, n.d., hereafter 2/5 OpRpt, with appropriate date; 3/5 Rpt of Opns, 26Aug-7Nov44, n.d., hereafter 3/5 Rpt of Ops, with appropriate date; 3/7 WarD, 15Sep44; 2/11 SAR, 24Aug-29Sep44, n.d., hereafter 2/11 SAR; LtCol Robert W. Boyd, "1st Battalion, Fifth Marines, 1st Marine Division in the Palau Operation: A Summary of Offensive Action," (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Schools, Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course 1948-1949), hereafter Boyd, 1/5 PalauOp.

17. BGen Harold D. Harris ltr to HistBr, dtd 12Jun66, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafter Harris ltr.

18. Harris ltr.

19. "It was noted in this connection that having the third battalions of two regiments as adjacent units added to the difficulty of reorganization on the beach since there were two 'I' Companies, two 'K' Companies, and two 'L' Companies involved." 3/7 WarD, 15Sep44.

20. Maj John A. Crown ltr to CMC, dtd 13 Feb50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafter Crown ltr.

21. Additional sources consulted for this section are: 7th Mar R-2 Jnl, 15Sep-17Oct44, n.d., hereafter 7thMar R-2 Jnl, with appropriate date; 1/7 Combined Bn 2-3 Jnls, 15Sep-17Oct44, n.d., hereafter 1/7 Bn 2-3 Jnls, with appropriate date; 1/7 HistRpt, 15Sep-30Oct44, n.d., hereafter 1/7 HistRpt, with appropriate date; 2/7 WarD, 25Aug-26Oct44, n.d., hereafter 2/7 WarD, with appropriate date; 3/7 WarD, 24Aug-30Oct44, dtd 18Nov44, hereafter 3/7 WarD, with appropriate date; 3/5 Rpt of Ops, 15Sep44.

22. LtCol John J. Gormley ltr to CMC, dtd 3Nov49, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafter Gormley ltr I. "It is believed that the decision made during the planning phase to have LT [Landing Team] 1/7 and LT 3/7 swap a company was a wise one and that much time was saved during the early part of the attack since LT 1/7, landing in column behind LT 3/7, did not have to pass through the beachhead line of another unit." 3/7 WarD, 15Sep44.

23. "While the Naval Gunfire Support plan was under discussion, I strongly urged heavy caliber fire on the unnamed island just south of ORANGE 3, both in the prelanding and assault phases. This island was a Œnatural' for enfilading the reef and ORANGE Beaches. During the ship-to-shore move I did not see a single indication of friendly fire on this target." Harris ltr.

24. LtCol John J. Gormley Itr to CMC, dtd 27Feb50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafter cited as Gormley ltr II.

25. LtCol E. Hunter Hurst ltr to DirMCHist, dtd 23Nov49, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafter Hurst ltr. I.

26. 3/7 WarD, 15Sep44.

27. Hurst ltr I. "Incidentally, this incident is one of many which reflect on the lack of training prior to Peleliu. With adequate tank-infantry training behind us, the tank personnel would have known to which I Co they had attached themselves." Ibid.

28. Gormley ltr I. "It is my recollection that the Reconnaissance Co. was deployed just behind 1/7 on the night of D Day. . . . During the night a runner supposedly from 1/7 CP contacted men with orders to move forward and plug up the lines which were being breached by the enemy. . . . The Second Platoon then moved forward under fire and took its place in a gap about 40 yards . . . [and] accounted for at least 30 of the enemy killed during the night." 1stLt Robert L. Powell, Jr., Itr to CMC, n.d., in Peleliu Comment File, hereafter Powell ltr.

29. Additional sources used for this section are: 5th Mar OpRpt, 15Sep44; 1/5 B-3 Jnl, 15Sep44; 2/5 OpRpt; 3/5 Rpt of Ops, 15Sep44; 2/11 SAR; Boyd, 1/5 PalauOp.

30. Boyd, 1/5 PalauOp, p. 16.

31. The Marine tank commander on Peleliu described the Japanese light tanks as merely "light reconnaissance vehicles" possessing "only ¹/4" to ³/8" armor," and stated that these "tankettes were not worthy of the name tank and were doomed to certain destruction in any heavy action." Stuart ltr.

32. Capt Robert E. Brant ltr to CMC, dtd 9Feb50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafter Brant ltr. ". . . the tank commanders were adjusting fires from their turrets just as if they were on a gunnery range." Ibid.

33. Maj Jack R. Munday ltr to CMC, dtd 13Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafter Munday ltr.

34. LtCol Lewis W. Walt ltr to CMC, dtd 25Mar50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafter Walt ltr.

35. Boyd, 1/5 PalauOp, p. 16.

36. Stuart ltr.

37. 5th Mar OpRpt, 15Sep44; 1/5 B-3 Jnl, 15Sep44; Walt ltr.

38. Additional sources consulted for this section are: 2d MAW UHist; MAG-11 UHist; MAG-11 Palau Rpt; 11th Mar OpRpt, dtd 10Nov44, hereafter 12thMar OpRpt; 5th MarOpRpt; 5th Mar Rpt on Sup and Evac, n.d., hereafter 5th Mar Sup-Evac-Rpt; QM, 5th Mar Rpt on Sup, PeleliuOp, dtd 4/Oct44, hereafter 5th Mar SupRpt; 3/5 Rpt of Ops; 8th Amphibian TractorBn, IIIAC, OpRpt, dtd 30Oct44, hereafter 8th Amphibian TractorBn OpRpt; LtCol W. A. Bean, Canadian Army, Observer's Report--Palau, dtd 31Oct44, hereafter Bean, Observer's Rpt--Palau.

39. 1st MarDiv SAR, Phase II, Part I to Anx C, p. 2.

40. Bean, Observer's Rpt--Palau, p. 13. 1st MarDiv SAR, Phase II, Part I to Anx C, p. 3.

42. Bean, Observer's Rpt-Palau, p. 11.

43. 8th Amphibian TractorBn, OpRpt. "In one case, an LVT with a damaged hull came alongside the repair ship, and not being able to get aboard, sank alongside." Ibid.

44. Worden ltr. "Lack of water during the first three days ashore caused scores of men in my battalion (1/7) to become real casualties--unfit to fight, unable to continue . . . as many casualties as enemy fire." Ibid.

45. Munday ltr.

46. Fortunately, this water situation was alleviated somewhat when potable water was discovered by digging shallow holes in the sand near the shore, and the problem vanished completely once the engineers got their distillation units operating on the island.

47. "By 1800 the artillery had one and a half Bns [Battalions] of 75mm pack howitzers and one and a third Bns of 105mm howitzers in position, registered and ready to furnish supporting fires." 1st MarDiv D-3 Periodic Rpt, 15Sep44.

48. Additional sources used for this section are: 1stMarHist; 11th Mar OpRpt; 7th Mar R-2 Jnl, 15Sep44; 2/7 WarD, 15Sep44.

49. To facilitate communications ashore, the division had been allotted an experimental LVT(A) that had been extensively modified as a mobile radio station. "This vehicle, while not completely successful, performed a highly useful service for General Smith's Advance CP on D-Day." LtCol Frederick A. Ramsey, Jr., ltr to CMC, dtd 28Feb50, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafter Ramsey ltr.

50. 7th Mar R-2 Jnl, 15Sep44.

51. "When he committed the Reconnaissance Company it was not, in the CG's [Commanding General] mind, (in my opinion) that it was a unit but that it was a group of individual infantry replacements." Fields ltr. "This was an improper use of the Reconnaissance Company, as there later developed several opportunities for employment of this company in the manner for which it had been trained." Smith, Narrative, p. 30.

52. 2/7 WarD, 15Sep44.

53. BGen John T. Selden ltr to HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 26Oct49, in Peleliu Comment File, hereafter Selden ltr.

54. Ibid.

55. "During this period, we had to shift position on more than one occasion due to high velocity guns that were beginning to register too close for comfort." Selden ltr.

56. Hough, Assault on Peleliu, p. 75. "These were very heavy losses and could not have been sustained for very many days in succession without destroying the combat efficiency of the division." Smith, Narrative, p. 34.

57. Japanese CenPacOps, p. 85.