FMFRP 12-90
Second Marine Division
Report on Gilbert Islands
Tarawa Operation
U.S. Marine Corps
PCN 140 129000 00
FMFRP 12-90
Second Marine Division
Report on Gilbert Islands
Tarawa Operation
U.S. Marine Corps
PCN 140 129000 00
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps
Washington, DC 20380-000126 September 1991
FOREWORD
1. PURPOSE
Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-90, Second Marine Division Report on Gilbert Islands-Tarawa Operation, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 series are a special category of publications: reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere.
2. SCOPE
This reference publication is the after-action report of the 2d Marine Division on its landing at Tarawa. This manual traces how an amphibious operation was conceived, planned, and executed, and then provides for lessons learned to be used in later battles/campaigns. Viewpoints and suggestions come from every source from within the division. Interesting and instructional, it is a book which every officer and SNCO should at least read, ingesting the many points to be learned.
3. CERTIFICATION
Reviewed and approved this date.
BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
M.P. CAULFIELD
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps
Director, MAGTF Warfighting Center
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia
2295
AFJ/jt1HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, IN THE FIELDDecember 23, 1943.
From: CG. To: CG, 5th Phib Corps
Subject: Report on GALVANIC Opn.
References: (a) CC+, 5th Phib Corps Serial 00252, dated 5Nov43.
(b) CG, 5thPhib Corps dispatch 160059.
Enclosures: (A) Report on GALVANIC Opn, CT 2.
(B) Report on GALVANIC Opn, LT 1/2.
(C) Report on GALVANIC Opn, LT 2/2.
(D) Report on GALVANIC Opn, LT 3/2.
(E) Report on GALVANIC Opn, CT 6.
(F) Report on GALVANIC Opn, LT 1/6.
(G) Report on GALVANIC Opn, LT 3/6.
(H) Report on GALVANIC Opn, CT 8.
(I) Report on GALVANIC Opn, LT 1/8.
(J) Report on GALVANIC Opn, LT 2/8.
(K) Report on GALVANIC Opn, LT 3/8.[Included in full report, but not listed here]:
Reports of Battalion Commanders.
- In compliance with references, the enclosures are submitted. It is not practicable for this headquarters to analyze and comment on the recommendations contained in each of the enclosures at this time.
The report of LT 2/6, at present on detached duty with the 2d Def Bn at TARAWA, will be forwarded at a later date.
The following comments and recommendations, lettered in order corresponding to the questions of paragraph 1 of reference (a), are submitted by this headquarters with the understanding that they may apply solely to the GALVANIC operation, or to amphibious operations against Atolls very similar to LONGSUIT:
- Not all of the equipment carried on this operation was required. Organic combat equipment for offensive action against a limited objective was excessive, particularly in the case of artillery. Each article of equipment must be given careful consideration for each specific operation.
All subordinate units have recommended that the combat pack be eliminated for combat troops engaged in a similar operation. This headquarters feels, however, that this recommendation should not be made until it has been definitely determined that, without the combat pack, the individual Marine has adequate provision for carrying all essential items of supplies
and equipment, particularly the entrenching tool, without decreasing his mobility or efficiency. in this connection it is noted that in recent operations lack of hostile artillery fire and aerial bombing has tended to minimize the importance of having entrenching tools immediately on hand at all times. This tendency may prove costly in future operation.
Only a small percentage of vehicles were landed, but the number taken on the operation is not considered excessive. The remainder would have been required ashore if the assault elements had not been withdrawn to the new base so soon, or if the situation ashore had required a longer mopping-up period in the atoll. At least one company of the Motor Transport Battalion should be equipped with DUKWs for atoll operations. It is believed that consideration should be given to the advisability of employing amphibious jeep ambulances to evacuate wounded.
1/4 ton 4x4 TCS's could not be landed dry in the assault phase and consequently were of little value. A radio-equipped amphibious jeep is recommended for similar operations.
Ammunition prescribed for the operation was considered adequate except for hand grenades. The number of offensive, thermite, and smoke hand grenades in a unit of fire should be greatly increased. It is recommended that the amounts assigned to each caliber for a unit of fire be adjusted to meet normal requirements, and that the number of units by caliber and weapon for each operation be specified to meet the anticipated needs for the operations. Specific recommendations concerning revision of present units of fire will be submitted later.
Dannert wire, sand bags, and fuel were considered excessive for the needs of assault troops in this operation. The total amount of these supplies to be unloaded should be determined by the estimated initial defense requirements of the Garrison Forces. Rations carried ashore by assault troops can be limited to as little as 1/3 C, D, or K rations. Experience Indicates that this is adequate for forty-eight (48) hours under strenuous combat conditions.
Detailed recommendations on specific articles of equipment and supplies will be submitted in separate reports.
Recommendations on the use of pallets are not submitted at this time inasmuch as only a limited number were received immediately prior to departure from WELLINGTON and they could not be properly loaded for a fair test. The construction of the pallet Is considered sound inasmuch as a few were towed across the reef with entirely satisfactory results.
- AKAs and APAs were not unloaded at the same time. Unloading complications which arose resulted from the unloading of garrison forces at the same time that the assault forces were unloading supplies which were carried mainly for garrison forces. For future operations of this type, it is recommended that only assault troops, their equipment, and initial supplies, boated in LVTs be landed from the AKAs. When this is done, APAs can be withdrawn to a reasonably safe distance from the area. The continued supply for assault troops should be made from one or more AKAs. Supplies remaining on board the APAs constitute reserve supplies to be landed only on call or in the event the AKA becomes a casualty. However, for operations in which opposition is light and a beachhead can be quickly gained, it is recommended that the APAs be completely unloaded initially, and that the AKAs arrive in the discharging area only on call.
It 1s the opinion of this headquarters that in this operation the Garrison Forces arrived in the area too soon and unnecessarily complicated the unloading problems. It is recommenced that only the Special Weapons Group, one or two C.B. companies, and reconnaissance elements of the Garrison Forces accompany the assault force, to remain when the assault force is withdrawn. All other elements of the Garrison Forces should remain at the staging base or other safe area on call until an adequate beachhead, or the entire atoll, is secured in order to reduce beach and transport area congestion.
The Shore Party personnel provided for this operation is considered sufficient, However, consideration must be given to each operation and the Shore Party composed to best fit the beach on which it is intended that they function.
The equipment of the Shore Party was augmented by six (6) light tractors from the Motor Transport Bn. No increase In Shore Party equipment is recommended for normal amphibious Operations. It was found impracticable in the assault phase to erect any beach markers. It is recommended that the landing of this equipment be deferred until a beachhead of adequate depth is secured to permit the landing of the bulk of the supplies.
The basic organization of the Shore Party is satisfactory; however, to function smoothly the following must be considered:
- At least one (1) month prior to an operation, the Shore Party, in its entirely (including Navy elements), be formed, billeted, and trained as an organization.
Shore Parties remain under Div control and land on Div order.
Shore parties be embarked aboard ships as a separate unit which is not under command of the Lt. Commander but
aboard ship for transportation.
Once assigned to that organization, all officers and men remain with that unit until the Shore Party disbands.
It is considered essential that replacement personnel above authorized strength be assigned to the division for initial assignments to the service platoons of the Shore Party in order that the efficiency of combat units will not be impaired when Shore Party personnel are drawn from them.
The equipment and supplies of engineer elements of the Shore Party were adequate and appropriate. Consideration of each piece of engineer equipment as it is needed in the operation was made prior to the formulation of the loading plans.
- No major change is recommended in the basic Division-Shore Party SOP.
Specific recommendations concerning Shore Party operations are being submitted as the subject of a separate report.
Water distillation plants functioned efficiently.
The Coral Reef caused no appreciable damage to the LVTs.
The front and sides of the cabs of the assault LVT(1)s were equipped and 6mm armor plate, which was generally successful in providing protection against small arms fire including .31 caliber. The front and sides of the cabs of the assault LVT(2)s were equipped with 3/8" boiler plate, which was not sufficiently 'hard' to turn the hit of a .30 cal bullet. Small arms fire readily penetrated all sections of the LVTs not provided with some kind of extra protective plating. Some LVTs (it is impossible to give an exact figure at this time) were knocked out by anti-boat gun, mortar, and small arms fire; some LVTs had to be abandoned when the gas tanks were set on fire by hostile fire. It is apparent, from the large number of driver casualties, that the driver's compartment must be provided with hardened armor plate sufficient to turn 20mm fire. The belly, bow, and, in fact all areas of the tractor exposed to frontal or flanking fire, should be provided with some kind of "bolt-on" protective plate.
- For atoll operations, LVTs are absolutely necessary and must be provided on a sufficient scale (a minimum of 300 per Division) to boat all combat elements. LVT(A)(1)s should be provided on a scale sufficient to provide 75 per division. A detailed report relative to the LVT is being made subject of a separate letter in reply to 5th Phib Corps dispatch, 292350 of November, 1943. Amphibious jeeps and DUKWs must be made available in quantities determined by the nature of the operations.
A detailed description of enemy fortifications has already been compiled by D-2 at Headquarters, 5th Phib Corps and will be submitted as a separate report when available.
The 4.5" Barrage Rockets were mounted only on LCSs. It is believed that a total of eight (8) rockets were fired as the assault waves approached the beach but their effectiveness can not be estimated inasmuch as Naval Gunfire was falling on the beach at the same time. It is the opinion of this headquarters that barrage rockets will cause no material damage to emplacements, but should be very effective against exposed personnel. It is believed that the LVT(A)(1) carrying a 75mm gun would provide better supporting fire.
The 2.36 Rocket Launcher AT, M-1 (Bazooka) was not used in this operation inasmuch as they were received at WELLINGTON too late to issue to the troops. However, it is believed that this weapon might have been effective against the lighter emplacements encountered provided that the electrical firing system could be kept dry during the ship-to-shore movement.
The M9-A1 AT rifle grenade was found to be very effective against light tanks, the smaller emplacements, and the apertures of larger emplacement. It is recommended that the universal launcher now available for issue that can be used on the Carbine, M1, and M1903 rifles be issued in lieu of the launcher now in use in this command, and that a replacement launcher be packed with each box of grenades.
A time interval of three (3) minutes was prescribed for the first waves of assault LVTs. Inasmuch as almost all LVTs were unable to proceed inland over the beach, it is believed that a five (5) minute time interval between wave would have been more desirable in preventing the congestion that resulted.
Detailed recommendations concerning several of the above subjects will be submitted as soon as additional data becomes available for more thorough analysis.
JULIAN C. SMITH
TAC-vcm Hq. 2dMar
In the Field
17Dec43
From: CO To: CO 2dMarDiv Subject: Report of Opns, GALVANIC, CT 2. Reference: (a) Ltr CG 2dMarDiv, serial 002MD2 dated 11Nov43.
- In accordance with the reference, the following information is submitted.
- All the equipment carried on the operation was not necessary. It was found that equipment other than individual and that organic equipment needed for offensive combat was extraneous. In regard to Individual equipment, the pack should be eliminated for use in the offense. No appreciable number of vehicles were landed and it was found that they were not needed. Radio "Jeeps" were of absolutely no value, because they could not be landed.
The ammunition prescribed for the operation was adequate. It is recommended that assault troops be equipped with the "Bazooka".
All supplies other than ammunition, demolitions, water, medical and rations were found to be excessive, these excess supplies should he carried on AKAs not on assault APAs.
No additional comments at this time. Detailed recommendations are being prepared.
Neither pallets or sleds were used or their use observed by this organization.
- It is not believed that the AKAs were unloaded at the same time as the APAs. The points where supplies could be landed were so few and limited that the APAs had supplies in boats many hours before they could be landed.
The first echelons of the garrison forces arrived at the proper time.
It is believed that the size of the shore party would have been adequate had we been able to use It.
- It is not known whether or not the equipment of the shore party was adequate because of the unnatural situation existing on BETIO.
It is not known whether or not the shore party organization was satisfactory as it had no chance to properly function.
The supplies and equipment of assault engineers should be augmented by more "bangalore torpedoes", more demolitions and a self-propelled, armored, high capacity flame thrower.
It is recommended that the labor details of the shore party should be an organic part of the shore party organization at all times and should not be drawn from assault units.
No water distillation plant was observed in operation.
No damage to amphibian tractors crossing the reef was noted other than that caused by enemy gunfire and mines.
Small arms fire penetrated unarmored parts of the amphibian tractor, punctured pontoons, punctured radiators, wounded and killed personnel.
Amphibian tractors are absolutely essential in this type of operation.
Enemy beach fortifications consisted of numerous concrete, steel and sand-coconut log pill boxes in which were emplaced machine guns, riflemen and anti-boat guns. In addition there was highly developed trench and tunnel systems connecting emplacements. There were numerous, large, excellent bomb proof shelters. Just off the beach was a wall of sand, coral and coconut logs which amphibian tractors could not climb. Light and medium tanks provided a mobile defense. There were numerous tank traps and barricades. Anti-aircraft guns served a dual purpose as anti-aircraft and anti-boat guns. All beaches were heavily defended in depth and due to the flat terrain the majority of the enemy weapons could engage targets in all directions.
The 4.5" Barrage Rocket was mounted only on the two flank LCSs. They each fired one salvo during the approach to the beach. No estimate of their effectiveness is practicable due to the fact that naval gunfire and air engaged the same beach targets at about the same time.
- The "Bazooka" was not available and therefore not used.
The AT Grenades were somewhat effective against pill boxes but due to the structure of the pill box walls they were unable to penetrate and were only effective when they could be projected through the small gun slots in the pill box. They proved most effective against the light tankette. The time interval between waves of LVTs was three (3) minutes and was satisfactory.
D.M. SHOUP
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND BATTALION, SECOND MARINES,
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.20 December 1943.
From: CO, Landing Team 2/2 TO: CG, Second Marine Division. Subject: Report of Operations, GALVANIC. Reference: (a) CG, 2d MarDiv, Letter, Serial 002MD2, dated 11Nov43.
- In compliance with reference (a.), the following report is submitted:
Q. Was all of the equipment carried on the operation required? If not, what types and quantities were unnecessary? (Data on motor vehicles is especially desired.)
A. No. Defensive, organizational combat; camp galley and combat packs. Only 30% 1/4 ton trucks instead of 60% should be carried on APA. Preference given to medium tanks or higher priority.Q. Was the ammunition prescribed for the operation adequate or excessive? If excessive, what types and what quantities do you consider could have been omitted, and what would you recommend carrying on future similar operations?
A. No.Were the quantities and types of supplies prescribed for this operation adequate or excessive? If you consider them excessive, what would you recommend be omitted and what would you recommend be carried on similar future operations?
A. Excessive in the case of PX supplies and automatic supplies. Only cigarettes were needed and no automatic supplies were needed.Q. Any additional comments or recommendations desired?
A. More medium tanks.Pallets.
- Q. Were pallets feasible?
No.Q. Was the sled or the toboggan type the better?
A. Sled type was better.Q. Would it be possible to eliminate all slings on the pallet, and use
only the slings carried by vehicles and not slow down operations?
A. No.Q. Was any difficulty encountered in use of pallets? If so, where, and how can It be eliminated.
A. Yes, pallets not strong enough and each pallet should have a cable at each corner.Ships.
- Q. Did unloading the AKA at the same time the APAs were unloaded complicate unloading on the beach?
A. Yes.Q. Did the first echelons of the Garrison Forces arrive too soon? Too late?
A. Not observed.Q. Was the size of the shore party adequate at each beach?
A. Not observed.Q. Was the equipment for shore parties adequate?
A. Not observed.Q. Was shore party organization satisfactory?
A. Not observed.Q. Was the equipment and supplies of organic engineer element adequate and appropriate for engineer missions?
A. No. Needed more portable bangalore torpedoes and a self-propelled (armored) flame thrower of large capacity.Q. Do you recommend any change in shore party organization, SOP?
A. No.Q. Report on operation of any water distillation plant used.
A. None used.Q. What damage caused to Amphibian Tractors crossing reefs?
A. None noted.(Q) What damage was caused to Amphibian Tractors from small arms fire?
A. Bullets penetrated sides and bow of Amphibian Tractors.(Q.) Give your opinion on the use of Amph.Tracs in this type operation.
A. Very good. Armored tractor with easier debarkation characteristics is desirable.Q. Give detailed description of enemy beach fortifications.
A. Barbed wire in water ten yards from beach; numerous rifle pits behind sea wall. Reinforced concrete pill boxes and anti-boat gun emplacements.Q. Was the 4.5" Barrage Rocket used?
A. Not used.
- Q. Was the 4.5" Barrage Rocket used?
A. Not used.Q. Was the 2.36 Rocket Launcher A.T., M-1 (Bazooka) effective against pill boxes.
A. Not used.Q. Was the A-T grenade effective against pill boxes.
A. Yes.Q. What time distance was prescribed between boat waves and was it satisfactory?
A. Between LVT waves--3min., between LVT wave and boats--14 min., between boat waves--10min., this time distance was satisfactory.H. J. RICE,
MaJor, USMC.
Co 2dMar, 2dMarDiv 21Dec43
D.M. SHOUP
HEADQUARTERS FIRST BATTALION, SECOND MARINES,
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD18 December, 1943.
From: CO. To: CG, 2nd Mar Div, FMF. Via: CO, 2nd Mar, 2nd Mar Div, FMF. Subject: Report of operation, GALVANIC. Reference: C.G. Ltr RNeCt/jtl, Serial 002WD2, dated 11Nov43.
- Individual combat equipment only was used. Combat packs were fount to be unnecessary for first two days of operation.
The ammunition prescribed was adequate. One cartridge belt full of S.A. ammunition and one unit of fire for the mortars and machine guns was sufficient for the first twenty-four hours of the operation. Two hand grenades (frag.) per rifleman should be carried initially, with early replenishment desirable. The number of demolition kits issues on the present basis proved to be inadequate. There should be one per rifle squad and at least eight for the weapons company. An early replenishment of T.N.T., fuse, and caps is desirable. The heavy machine gun (191VA-1) was used on the light tripod (1919A-4), and was found to be satisfactory in every way, The resulting reduction in weight increased the mobility of the machine gun platoon, and greatly simplified getting the guns into position when the routes of approach were under fire.
Ammunition, water, and rations only are necessary for the first few days of an operation. Mess equipment should be omitted initially.
The use of pallets was not observed.
Unloading of the AKAs and APAs outside of ammunition, water, and rations, was not observed.
The arrival the Garrison Forces was not observed.
No shore party operations were observed.
No engineer equipment or supplies observed.
Water distillation plants were not observed.
Damage to amphibian tractors crossing reefs was not observed.
Many amphibian tractors were disabled by S.A. Fire.
Amphibian tractors were absolutely necessary for this operation.
Enemy beach fortifications consisted of emplacements for individual riflemen, connected by communication trenches. These were strongly built of coconut logs, with a layer of coconut logs covered with dirt for overhead cover. At intervals along the beach were pillboxes, constructed of several layers of coconut logs, with dirt between them, or in some cases, of reinforced concrete. Most pill boxes had very limited fields of fire.
The 4.5" Barrage Rocket was not observed.
The 2.36 Rocket Launcher A.T., M-1 was not used.
The A T grenade was moderately effective against the weaker pill boxes.
The time distance prescribed between boat waves was 10 minutes. This was not followed after leaving the L.D. due to the necessity of transferring into amphibian tractors.
W.B. KYLE
CO, 2dMarines
DIXON GOEN.19December 1943.
HEADQUARTERS, THIRD BATTALION, SECOND MARINES,
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.20 December 1943.
From: CO LT 3/2 To: CG 5th Phib Corps. Via: (1) CO CT2.
(2) CG, 2ndMarDlv.Subject: Report of Opns, GALVANIC. Reference: (a) Ltr CG, 5th Phib Corps, Serial 00252, dated 5NOV43.
(b) Ltr CG, 2ndMarDiv, Reinf, Serial 002MD2 dated 11NOV43.
- All answers correspond numerically to the questions as numbered in the above reference. It must be borne in mind that these answers apply only to the Tarawa Opn and not to an extended opn over a considerable area.
No. The operation was of such short duration that only individual and certain special equipment was necessary. Motor vehicles were not required and they were very difficult to land. Combat vehicles such as medium tanks end half tracks were especially required.
Adequate. Except .50 cal MG which was excessive. Demolitions should be greatly increased with the assault troops. Issue of heavy type 81mm Mortar shells should be resumed.
Adequate.
All com equipment should be waterproofed, and equipped with flotation gear. Small arm clips of ammo should be wrapped in oil paper. Assault troops should be equipped with Bazookas. Replace light tanks with mediums. Leave 37mm antitank guns behind. Half tracks are good; but a 105mm assault gun in a light tank chassis is far better. In anticipation of concrete fortifications, the 155 assault gun with delayed action shell is necessary. Numbers of flame throwers must be increased. Individuals take only arms, ammo, belt, 2 first aid kits, canteen, entrenching tool, light cleaning rod and brush, and two (2) D type rations.
Not used.
- Not Accomplished on our beach.
It is believed that the Short Party would have been adequate had the situation gone according to plan.
As in (g).
As in (g).
Increase size and amount of demolitions.
No.
Not observed.
None, except by mines.
Killed and wounded drivers, troops, stopped engines, and set them on fire.
Very necessary.
Fortifications were in depth from the beach inland. MG and anti-boat gun emplacements on the beach were built to accommodate from 4 to 8 men. Structure on these were mostly coconut logs held in position by steel spikes, and camouflaged by sand. The majority of the beach fortifications were of this type but concrete was noted on some. A portion of the fortifications were linked together by communication trenches or tunnels. All were mutually supported by others. On most of the beach front, the interval between these fortifications was between 5 to 20 feet, and other larger pill-boxes were from 10-20 yards behind (inland) them. Several large caliber cannon emplacements were also noted on this beach proper. These emplacements were built up 10 to 20 feet and were made entirely of concrete and steel.
In direct support of the landing by one support craft.
- Not observed.
Mounted on LCS.
Not observed.
Employed against area targets, before landing.
Not observed.
No recommendations because not observed.
- Not used.
Yes, when fired into the entrances.
Waves prescribed to hit the beach at H hours, H plus 3, H plus 6, H plus 14, H plus 20. Satisfactory.
J.F. SCHOETTEL.
CO, 2dMar, 2dMarDiv
D.M. SHOUP21Dec43.
Headquarters, Sixth Marines
Second Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force,
In the Field19 December, 1943.
From: Commanding Officer, Combat Team Six. To: Commanding General, Fifth Amphibious Corps. Via: Commanding General, Second Marine Division. Subject: Report of Operations, Galvanic. Reference: Letter Commanding General, Second Marine Division, Serial 0021MD2, dated 11 November, 1943.
- In accordance with the above reference, the following comments are submitted. Sub-paragraphs coincide with sub-paragraphing of reference.
No, it is felt that assaulting troops were too heavily laden with unnecessary gear; as a result, most of this gear, including necessary arms and equipment, was discarded in the water or on the beach. A greater degree of combat efficiency and mobility could be attained by assault units carrying only the following:
No vehicles were landed or needed by this CT.
Weapon, with cartridge belt.
Two canteens.
First aid packet.
Bayonet, with M-1 or .03 rifle.
Poncho, folded over cartridge belt.
Entrenching tool on belt.
Two-thirds "D" ration in pocket.
Ammunition was adequate, not excessive, but it is recommended that the grenade allowance be increased to four (4) per man - Two (2) fragmentary - One (1) WP - One (1) thermite. Fragmentary grenades were of no value in knocking out "L" shaped or compartmented emplacements, but smoke or fire would force them into the open or physically incapacitate them momentarily. Also it is recommended that the 60mm mortar illuminating shell be made available to aid in infiltration and counterattacks.
Supplies were adequate, but it is recommended that the "I" priority be revised to better meet the supply problems in landings on small atolls.
- Tanks: It is recommended that medium tanks replace the light tanks entirely, and that the latter be converted to flame throwers. The light tank does not mount a heavy enough weapon to knock out enemy emplacements, whereas, the 75 mm carried by the medium tank will knock out emplacements. The light tank, as an armored mobile flame thrower with a large fuel capacity, could greatly aid assaulting units.
No pallets, sleds or toboggans were used.
- The AKA assigned this CT did not unload.
Arrived at the proper time.
This CT did not use the SP in its entirety, but for the gear and supplies it was necessary to unload, the SP was adequate. It is recommended that the CT SP not be landed until the beach is sufficiently cleared for their proper functioning. It is also recommended that a regimental officer with a small staff, who has a knowledge of loading details of all ships in that particular Transdiv, be retained aboard the ship to coordinate unloading and to expedite movement of needed supplies to the beach. It is further recommended that an AK be loaded only with essential combat items for all arms and to lay in close to the beach and to stay in that position regardless of air or sea attack forces the other ships to sea. (This ship to be in effect a floating stock room under Division control). This may sacrifice a ship, but troops on the beach would be assured by needed supplies.
Not observed.
Not observed in this operation, but is felt that SP's draw too heavily on combat units. It is recommended that LT's be allowed an overage of personnel (200 men and officers) to be used as SP labor units and if need be, as replacements for assault troops.
No, the most important function of engineers in similar operations to Tarawa is demolition and flame throwers. It is recommended that engineer units carry more demolitions and flame throwers and that each LT have such a unit available.
See (l).
Not used.
Not observed.
No apparent damage from SA fire.
LVTs executed the passage of the reef, but it is recommended that consideration be given to landing at low tide. The AmphTrac's land speed is greater than its speed in the water, and it is felt that the speed attained moving across a dry reef would enable them to move quickly under the naval and air barrage onto the beach, debark troops, catch the Japs in their shelters, and knock out beach defenses before the Japs, had time to man the defenses.
Beach fortifications were generally of reinforced concrete and cocoanut logs.
No.
No. Had it been available, it would have been of great value in destroying Jap emplacements which held up our advance and caused nany casualties.
No, it was too light and had no marked effect on the target.
LT's of this CT landed separately in reserve. There was no time distance prescribed.
M.G. HOLMES
Hq, lstBn, 6th Marines, 2nd MarDiv, FMF, In the Field. 6 December, 1943.
From: CO, LT 1/6. To: C G, 2nd MarDiv, FMF. Via: CO, CT-6. Subject: Report of Operations, Galvanic. Reference: (a) Ltr CG, 2ndMarDiv, RMC CT/541, serial 002ND2 (Secret), dated 11Nov43.
- In Accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted:
The following equipment carried on the operation was not required:
Gas mask.
Combat packs -- It is recommended that in a similar future operation of expected short duration, the entrenching tool be secured to the cartridge belt and the combat pack be landed as part of the transport pack at the conclusion of the operation. The articles carried in the pack were neither needed nor used until the completion of the operation.
Vehicles -- No vehicles were landed by this LT nor were they needed. It is recommended that LVT be used for the landing of the troops and subsequently for supply and evacuation missions.
The ammunition prescribed seemed to be adequate but not excessive. This LT used approximately three and one half units of small arms, 60mm and 81mm ammunition from the night of 21 November to the morning of 24 November. It is believed the allowance of grenades should be approximately doubled and consist of 30% Thermite and 10% C.N. grenades. It is suggested that some sort of an illuminating shell that could be fired in back of the enemy attacking forces to silhouette them would Increase the value of the 60mm in night defense missions. Such a shell is included in the unit of fire but has never been received.
The quantities and types of supplies prescribed are believed to have been adequate. An accurate opinion on this is not possible, however, due to the lack of actual facts to the contrary and the handling of supplies by Division instead of LT's.
- Additional comments and recommendations --
(1) Tanks -- The tanks are capable of opening the emplacements. They must be closely followed, however, by the infantry since they do not destroy the majority of the enemy in the emplacements. The tanks are ineffective at night. Due to poor visibility, the tanks do not discover and destroy more than seventy-five per cent of the emplacements.Recommendations ---
(1) Tanks -- More medium tanks be employed on future similar operations. Light tanks equipped with flame throwers be employed to follow up the medium tank. A tank liaison team similar to the SFCP team be attached to each LT. A spotter with the assault companies, a liaison officer with Battalion CO and necessary communication personnel would be adequate. Inability to call back and control the attached tanks when they had missed a strong pillbox or were needed elsewhere, caused this LT CO to hold out one tank with radio at his CP in order to effectively coordinate the tanks, artillery, NGF, air support and Infantry.(2) Flame Throwers -- Six flame throwers were employed by this LT in seizing assigned objectives. The combination tanks, flame throwers, and riflemen proved effective in destroying the enemy with minimum losses. Two flame thrower teams followed in close support of the tanks protected by a platoon of Infantry. The remaining four worked with the next rifle platoon in mopping up. When the leading platoon was held up, the next platoon with two of the four reserve flame thrower teams passed through and continued the attack.
Recommendations --
(2) Flame throwers -- Additional flame throwers and teams (approximately 12 total) be assigned each LT. Sufficient supply personnel be part of the assault engineers to keep fuel and spare parts within 75 yards of the advancing troops at all times. Use of the flame throwers was limited due to the rapid expenditure of fuel and minor repairs needed. Spare parts and fuel were difficult to procure during all phases of the operation.
(3) Heavy Machine Guns -- It is recommended that whenever possible, heavy machine guns should be brought ashore particularly by reserve elements making a covered landing.
(4) Supply and Evacuation --
The supply and evacuation problem of this LT was greatly increased since 125 members of the battalion were in the shore party and therefore not available. It is recommended that such personnel be available to the LT for supply and evacuation missions when not being used on the shore party.
LVTs were invaluable both in furnishing supplies to the front and in evacuating the wounded therefrom.
The combat pack may be effectively lightened by carrying only two "D" rations and eliminating the "C~and "X" rations. The troops do not have the desire or time to eat more than this while they are engaged, and the extra rations are just additional weight. This LT did not eat from 0630, 22 November to 0930, 23 November. During that time it was engaged in continuous fighting and advanced approximately 1400 yards. No ill effects were reported, salt and water being the main necessities during actual combat.
Pallets were not used by this LT as there were no tractors to pull them.
The shore party of this LT did not function with this LT or on the same island.
Not observed.
Not observed.
Not observed.
Not observed.
Not observed.
Not observed.
Not observed.
Not observed.
- It is the opinion of this LT that LVTs are the most practical means of landing troops and accomplishing supply and evacuation missions.
Enemy beach fortifications in this LT's sector consisted of emplacements, obstacles and mines:
Emplacements:
Open type emplacement -- these were usually three to five feet deep varying in size depending on the number of troops they were to accommodate. The revetment consisted of coconut logs. Under the same heading may be included trenches which consisted mainly of individual foxholes leading into a connecting trench. Very few enemy were found in this type of emplacement although there were a large number of such emplacements prepared.
Covered emplacement-- these emplacements usually consisted of one room approximately five to six feet deep, covered with coconut logs with sand piled on them, and varying in size depending on the number of troops they were to accommodate. They usually had from two to four fire ports. Hand grenades and flame throwers were effective against this type of emplacement using the ports or the entrance.
Concrete emplacement -- these emplacements varied in size but were usually very large accommodating from twenty to one hundred and fifty enemy. They had from four to ten fire ports. Grenades and flame throwers were not completely effective against this type of emplacement since it usually had several rooms, tunnels or partitions behind which the enemy was comparatively safe. The emplacement was usually covered completely by sand with tile exception of the fire ports and entrance.
Obstacles:
Barbed wire -- usually double-apron.
Concrete obstacles with iron rails as spikes placed one hundred yards seaward from high water mark. It is believed they were capable of stopping an LVT.
Tank traps -- approximately six feet deep and twelve feet wide.
- Mines -- land mines capable of completely wrecking LVTs and killing all hands aboard were placed in great quantities on GREEN BEACH SOUTH. It is not known to this LT if mines were found on the southern beach of the island.
The 4.5" Barrage Rocket was not used by this LT.
The 2.36 Rocket Launcher A.T., M-1 (Bazooka) was not used by this LT.
The M-9 A.T. grenade was used by this LT against enemy emplacements and pillboxes and was not effective. The M-9 A-1 A.T. grenade was not available.
An LCR landing was made by this LT on a covered beach and the time interval of five minutes and distance of one hundred yards between waves was satisfactory.
W.K. JONES.
Third Battalion, Sixth Marines,
Second Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force,
In the FieldDecember 1, 1943.
From: CO, LT 3/6. To: CG, 2dMarDiv. Via: (1) CG, CT 6. Subject: Report of opn, Galvanic. Reference: (a) Ltr CG, 2dMarDiv, RMc2T/jil, serial 002ND2 dated 11Nov43.
- In accordance with reference (a), the following comments are submitted:
Vehicles were neither needed nor used by this battalion in this operation. If they had been used, they could have been landed only at high tide due to the coral reef. It is therefore suggested that amphibious tractors be used in lieu of vehicles for holding supplies. Tanks were a vital factor in the success of the operation and it is highly recommended that medium tanks replace the light tanks.
The amount of ammunition carried by this Landing Team proved to be adequate in the types carried. However more incendiary grenades were needed and less fragmentary grenades. It is estimated that each LT should have an initial supply of at least one (1) fragmentary and one (1) incendiary grenade per man as a unit of fire. In addition, there should be more belted .30 caliber ball machine gun ammunition, with no tracer, in the initial supply. The 81mm mortar platoon should be supplied with at least two hundred (200) rounds of the "heavy" shell (Shell HE, M45 w/PDF, M45, super quick-delayed) for future operations of this type. This shell is very effective in destroying material and emplacements.
It is recommended that each LT be equipped with Rocket Launchers AT M-1 (Bazooka) in accordance with tables of organization. Although this weapon was not used in this operation, it is felt that it could have been used to good advantage in breaching pill boxes and in conjunction with the flame throwers.
The weapons company machine gun platoons had 1ittle opportunity to employ their fire power in an assault of this type. It is recommended that in future operations of this nature, these platoons be equipped with at least two (2) flame throwers per platoon, in addition to the Bazookas, thereby enabling them to give valuable close support to rifle companies.
Pallets were not used by this LT as there were no tractors on the beach with which to tow them.
At BOXCLOTH, the first echelons of the Garrison Forces arrived at the right time. However, delaying their arrival another day would have given the provisional troops time to investigate the area, and thus be of more aid to the Garrison Forces.
As the shore party functioned on an unopposed beach, there was sufficient personnel, and the breakdown of working parties proved adequate. Therefore no changes are recommended for the present shore party SOP when functioning on an undefended, or lightly defended beach.
The assault engineer units did not have sufficient demolition kits. As demolitions and flame throwers were of prime importance in clearing pillboxes of Japs, it is highly recommended that every available man in assault engineer units be equipped with demolitions or flame throwing equipment.
It is the opinion ot this LT that enough praise cannot be given to the work of the amphibian tractors. We did not land troops in them, but they aided extremely in bringing supplies from landing boats to the beach, and in bringing water, rations, and ammunition to the front line troops.
This LT made an unopposed landing on a beach Iightly held by our own forces. As most of the enemy beach installations were destroyed upon our arrival, it is believed LTs making the initial landing could give a more detailed description of pill boxes and emplacements.
When this LT was ordered to land on the North half of Beach Green, the tide was out, and much coral was encountered about two thousand (2000) yards from the beach. Landing boats could get no closer to the beach, so troops were forced to wade ashore. At this point the time interval between waves was disregarded, for the prime factor was in getting the troops ashore.
K.F. MC LEOD
EEH/ggbHq, 8thMar, 2dMarDiv, FMF,
In the Field2 December 1943.
From: The Commanding Officer, Combat Team Eight. To: The Commanding General, Second Marine Division. Subject: Report of operations, Galvanic. Reference: (a) Ltr CG 2dMarDivReinf Serial 002MD2 dated 11Nov43.
- In accordance with reference (a) the following report is submitted. Paragraph numbers refer to directive CG 5thAmphibCorps quoted in reference (a):
No. The following equipment was unnecessary for the troops on shore:
Pack
Change of clothing
Blankets
Fork, haversack
Knife, haversack
Can, meat w/cover
Shelter-half w/accessories
Net, mosquito
All priorities II & III
All vehicles except jeep ambulances, radio jeeps, prime movers for guns, and tractors.Excessive amounts of the following types of ammunition were carried:
50 caliber (3 units were carried, 1 was needed)
37 mm AP (3 units were carried, 1 was needed)
37mm HE (3 units were carried, 2 were needed)
Grenades, AT (3 units of M9 were carried but were not used, one unit of M9A1 would be sufficient)An insufficient amount of the following types were carried:
Grenades, smoke (200 per LT were carried, 400 were needed) Grenades, incendiary (200 per LT were carried, 400 were needed) 60 MM Mortars (3 units were carried, 5 were needed) 81 MM Mortars (3 units were carried, 5 were needed)
- An excessive quantity of the following types of supplies were carried:
Sandbags (150,000 per LT were carried, 5,000 were needed) Dannert wire (500 rolls per LT were carried, 20 were needed)
The following supplies were carried but not used at all:
"B" rations, insecticide and insect repellent cloth, osnaburg.
None of the priority II & III equipment carried on this operation was used. It is recommended that none be carried.
Consideration should be given the advisability of loading in amphibious barges, or shallow-draft, sealed pontoons, expendable as are the belly fuel tanks of an airplane, supplies for 3 days combat for the assault units employed. These supplies to be solely combat supplies as distinct from the housekeeping equipment contemplated in the normal logistical shore party landing exercise. Such supplies could be towed to the beach by boat as far as possible, thence dragged ashore by man power or tractor, or anchored off shore or allowed to drift in as wind and tide permitted. Details of design of such a vehicle or container should be made a matter of immediate study.
Pallets were not used. No comment.
Not observed.
Yes, but note the unusual circumstances of all unloading being done at the end of the pier.
Not observed.
Not observed.
Not observed.
No change is recommended in shore party SOP at this time. Shore party organization is, and should be designed so that it can be modified to meet the needs of each specific mission, having in mind the type of beach, tactical situation, and strategic considerations involved in each operation.
Not observed.
Not under cognizance this Hq.
- Not under cognizance this Hq.
More speed and armor is desired. Amphibious tractors are indispensable for assault and supply. Personnel should be trained in taking advantage of cover and on mutually supporting each other on discharge of troops.
Subject of study by 2 section to be reported later.
None used
None used
M9 grenades were not sensitive enough to detonate on impact on sand covered emplacements.
Not observed. This will be covered in LT reports.
ELMER E. HALL
lstBn, 8th Mar, 2dMarDiv, FMF,
In the Field.23 November, 1943.
From: CO, LT 1/8. To: CG, 2dMarDiv. Via: CO CT8
CO CT2Subject: Report of Opns, GALVANIC. References: (a) Ltr CG, 5th Phib Corps, Serial 00252, dated 5Nov43.
(b) Ltr CG, 2dMarDiv, Reinf, Serial 002MD2, dated 11Nov43.Enclosure: (a) Description of Beach Defenses.
- In compliance with reference (b) the following report is submitted:
Equipment carried on operation from the APA to the beach by assault troops could be reduced by deleting gas masks, combat packs, and types "C" and "K" rations. The following; motor vehicles could not be landed on the beach, and it is believed were not required on this type operation.
Prime movers for 37mm guns and 75mm pack howitzers.
TCS radio jeeps.
Ambulance jeeps.
All organizational transportation.
Three-hundred (300) gallon water trailers.
Excessive ammunition.
Two units of fire .50 cal.
Two (2) units fire, AP shot M74, 37mm AT gun.
Two (2) units fire, M43A1, 81mm mortar.
Ammunition to be carried on future similar operations:
Three (3) units fire small arms.
One (1) unit fire .50 cal.
Three (3) units fire GE, MG3, 37mm gun.
Three (3) units fire canister, 37mm gun.
One (1) unit fire AP shot, M74, 37mm gun.
Five (5) units fire, grenade, hand frag MII.
Seventy-five (75) per landing team, grenade smoke, HE, M8.
Three (3) units fire, grenade, AT M9A1.
Three (3) units fire, grenade, thermite M14.
Three (3) units fire, 60mm mortar.
Three (3) units fire, HEM56, 81mm mortar.
Fifty (50) torpedo, bangalore per landing team.
Ten (10) 55-lb demolition charge per landing team.
Artillery did not support this landing team consequently no observation was made.
- Excessive supplies.
All automatic supplies.
To be carried on similar future operations.
PX supplies (to remain aboard APA and to be issued gratuitously after operation).
One (1) field desk and typewriter (to remain aboard APA).
Twenty-five percent replacement clothing consisting of utility suits complete (to remain on APA and issued after operation to the wounded, whose clothes are usually stripped off by medical personnel).
Comments and recommendations.
That aa:h landing team have attached two (2) assault engineer platoons, equipped with three (3) flame throwers per platoon. This is essential in view of the fact that landing teams did not have guns of sufficient caliber to knock out most enemy emplacements encountered in this operation. It was found that in order to completely destroy personnel in emplacements, it was necessary to burn them out with flame throwers.
That all personnel be trained in simple demolitions, such as making up dynamite hand charges.
That the light tank lacks fire power heavy enough to knock out reinforced emplacements.
That the 75mm self-propelled (half-track) proved very valuable and effective against light and medium emplacements. It is recommended that each landing team have attached a minimum of two (2).
That each landing team be equipped with two (2) ED-9 switchboards in lieu of the large, heavy monocord board.
That a water-proof carrier be provided for the EE-8 telephones.
That this landing team suffered one-hundred (100) percent failures in the TBY radios due to the fact that these sets are not water-proof. A lighter water-proof extra-high frequency set should be adopted for communication within assault companies, and the TBY, water-proofed, for communications from battalion to companies.
That the Air Liaison and Naval Gunfire TCS radio jeep be replaced with the TBX radio.
Pallets - PalLets were not loaded or used by this landing team.
The shore party of this landing team did not function as a separate shore party, but was spilt into working parties on HELEN, CORA, and aboard an LST.
This landing team did not land in amphibian tractors. It is the opinion of the undersigned that they proved excellent in transporting supplies from the beach to inland dumps.
Enemy beach fortifications (see enclosure A)
The 4.5" barrage rocket was not used by this landing team.
This landing team was not equipped with the 2.36 Rocket Launcher.
The AT M9A1 grenade was effective against light pillboxes.
This landing team landed as a reserve in LCVPs with the following time interval between waves.
1st wave - H.
2d wave - H+5
3rd wave - H+15
4th wave - H+25L.C. HAYS, JR.
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND BATTALION, EIGHT MARINES,
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.17 December, 1943.
From: The Commanding Officer, LT 2/8. To: The Commanding General, Second Marine Division. Subject: Report of Opns, GALVANIC. Reference: Ltr. CG, 2ndMarDiv., Serial 002MD2, dated 11Nov43.
- The following report is submitted in accordance with the above reference.
Since this Battalion was ashore less than 5 days, no equipment other than organic combat equipment and water containers were necessary. This Battalion had 6 1/4 ton trucks, 3 300 gallon water trailers 1 1/4 ton ambulance and 1 TCS radio jeep aboard. During the 5 days ashore, none of these vehicles were landed. If this Battalion had remained on Helen Island for an indefinite period, it is believed that 3 1/4 ton trucks, 3 300 gallon water trailers, and 1 1/4 ton ambulance would have been adequate.
It is believed that the 3 units of fire carried by this LT was adequate except that the medium tanks and half tracks should carry more AP. Say 40% HE, 40% AP, and 20% APC.
The supplies carried were considered adequate in quantity and type. 1/3 D ration and one tube of dextrose are adequate for 36 hours.
None.
Not observed.
Not observed
Not observed.
Not observed.
Not observed, but from maneuvers held previous to the landing, it is believed to be satisfactory.
Not observed.
No.
Not observed.
No apparent damage to those used on Red Beach #3.
None observed.
It is believed that Amphibian Tractors are absolutely necessary for a successful landing in this type of operation.
The enemy had very little wire or other obstructions from the edge of the reef to the beach on that portion of Red Beach #3 from the main pier east to Burns Phillips Pier. Approximately 20 feet from the high tide mark was a rampart 4 to 5 feet high, built of cocoanut logs. Ten yards in from this rampart was a row of emplacements about 20 feet apart. These emplacements were built of cocoanut logs and steel. Some were machine guns and others anti-boat gun emplacements. All were covered. The space between the emplacement and rampart was filled with coral to such a height that very little of the emplacement was visible from the sea. About 30 feet in from the emplacement was a rifle fire trench and on Red Beach #3 this trench faced south across the airport. There were no heavy caliber guns on Red Beach #3 and it is believed that in case of an attack from the south, that the troops manning the emplacements would come out and man the fire trench where they would have had an excellent field of fire.
The 4.5 Barrage Rockets were used only on one LCS on Red Beach #3 and the number and results were not observed.
Not used.
Not used.
The following time distance between waves was prescribed.
1st wave LVTs
2nd wave LVTs
3rd wave LVTs
4th wave LVTs
5th wave LVTs
6th wave LVTsH hour.
H plus 3 minutes.
H plus 6 minutes.
H plus 14 minutes.
H plus 20 minutes.
H plus 25 minutes.It is believed that this time distance is too small for all but the second wave.
H.P. CROWE.
Major, U.S. Marine Corps.
HEADQUARTERS, THIRD BATTALION, EIGHTH MARINES,
SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
AT SEA.26 November, 1943.
From: The Commanding Officer, Landing Team 3/8. To: The Commanding General, Second Marine Division. Via: The Commanding Officer, Combat Team Eight. Subject: Report of operations, Galvanic. Reference: (a) Ltr CG, 2dMarDlv, Serial 002 MD2, dtd 11Nov43.
- In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted concerning the points covered by paragraphs 1 (a) to (t).
- Equipment carried on operation was excessive. No vehicles other than ambulance jeeps, prime movers (jeeps) for 37 mm guns, prime movers (jeeps) for 75mm pack howitzers, bull dozers, tanks, and one ton trucks should be carried by Landing Teams. Landing Teams should not be loaded down with such items as heavy wire (Dannert), extra fuel, low priority gear, etc. A small amount of barbed wire and sand bags are essential for defense of phase lines during an operation and should be carried by each Landing Team. The fuel carried on the vehicle should be sufficient for two days. The amount of individual equipment carried was excessive. No combat packs are necessary for this type of operation.
The following is recommended as standard, individual equipment for assault waves.
Organic weapon - - - - one unit of fire
Cartridge belt
2 canteens of water
One canteen cover filled with 3 or 4 grenades
First aid packet
Poncho
Cleaning brush and small can of oil tied to belt
One third "D" ration and one third "K" ration carried in pocket.
One waterproof packet of salt tablets
Leggings
Camouflage paint, applied
Lifebelt, Inflated until on beachThe following is recommended an minimum number of vehicles to be carried by a Landing Team for this type of operation.
(a) Infantry Battalion 2 Cargo jeeps
2 Ambulance jeeps
1 TCS jeep
2 Water trailers(b) Artillery Battery 4 Jeeps (prime movers)
2 TCS jeeps
2 1 ton, 4X4, cargo trucks, w/1 ton trailers
1 Water trailer(c) Engineers (for shore party) 2 Tractors, w/angle dozer
1 Jeep
1 Ambulance jeep
1 Water purification unit
(d) 37mm Platoon 4 Jeeps (Prime movers
1 Truck, 1 ton w/trailer(e) Medical Company, Collecting Section 1 Ambulance jeep (f) Tank Platoon 6 Light or medium tanks
1 TCS jeep(g) Shore Fire Control Party and Air Liaison Group 2 TCS jeeps Ammunition prescribed was adequate except for mortar ammunition. Five units of fire are recommended for all types of mortars with priority of unloading. Belted machine gun ammunition must have high priority. If assault units are equipped with flame throwers and demolition kits, additional TNT, dynamite, and fuel for flame throwers must be carried.
Supply of rations carried by Landing Team was excessive. Individuals can carry only 2/3 rations (1/3 "D" and 1/3 "K". It is recommended that each Landing Team carry, in addition to the individual's ration, the following: 2 days "K"; 3 days "C"; and 700-5 gallon water cans, to be filled not earlier than D-1 day. No other group equipment need be carried by a Landing Team. All priority 2 and 3 gear should be brought in later by LST.
Some provision must be made for post exchange supplies and clothing for wounded, evacuated, personnel. They normally are evacuated with absolutely nothing and some arrangement must be made to reclothe them and supply them with necessary toilet articles, cigarettes, etc.
Pallets - use of pallets was not observed.
Since all unloading during the early stages was done from the end of the pier, the entire Shore Party set-up was very confused; and any remarks would be pertinent for this operation only and of no value for the next operation. SOP 4-3 is still feasible but supplies cannot be brought in until a fairly deep beach-head is established. It is my belief that all APAs should be completely unloaded in LSTS with ammunition, water, and medical supplies on 21/2 ton amphibious trucks near the ramp. At night of "D" day) push LST UP to the edge of the reef at low tide and drive trucks or amphibious tractors into beach over previously marked route. Load all heavy gear Into vehicles at the edge of the reef. Trying to manhandle or float equipment in from edge of reef would require more manpower than is available to a Landing Tem shore party. Organizational hand carts are extremely valuable for moving ammunition and water to front line units.
See "F" above.
See "F" above.
No. Assault engineers need additional spare flame throwers and demolition kits. Also, all assault troops must be able to use this equipment at any time and should be eo equipped. Spare parts, accessories, and fuel for flame throwers must be carried.
No.
- None observed.
Not observed but they seemed to continue to function, except those blown up or damaged by enemy fire.
Not observed.
Excellent for both assault troops and for carrying supplies.
Thick, deep, concrete, steel, or log pillboxes with narrow slits allowing limited fields of fire, mutually supporting, and all completely covered with earth or sand to a depth of two to three feet.
None observed.
None observed.
Yes, the M9AT grenade was effective; but it is believed that the M9A-1 would be much more effective.
The time distance between waves was five (5) minutes for this Landing Team, landing in reserve. Since all waves except one landed on or near the end of the pier, great crowding and confusion occurred. However, under ordinary circumstances it is believed that this time distance is satisfactory.
R. H. RUUD.
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Cal.22 December 1943.
REPORTS OF BATTALION COMMANDERS. Major William S. Vasconcellos, 1st Bn, 2nd Marines.
At about 1000 Major Kyle by CO CT2 had given verbal orders to land on Beach Red 2. I then issued orders to the assault companies. This battalion was the reserve of CT2. I was told to transfer the men from the boats to the AmphTracs because the boats could not get over the reef.
Lieutenant John B. H. Wickersham, ExecO, Company "A".
I was in the second wave. I had two assault platoons, with one Machine Gun squad, attached to each. Major Kyle told us to transfer to AmphTracs, land on Beach Red 2, and help 3-2. I landed on what I thought was the right half of Beach Red 2, under heavy rifle and machine gun fire, which came from the boundary between Beaches 1 and 2. I had only three men with me. The rest of the unit had been pinned down and dug in. Early in the afternoon, I collected the rest of my men amounting to about 21. Since it was getting dark, I decided to lie low and the next morning, rejoined 3-2 under Major Ryan. We set up a line on the beach of Beach Red 1, which we held for two days. The Sixth Marines came in the next morning, relieved us, and we went back to Green Beach. An hour later we were recalled back to the lines. On the fourth day, we were given the work to join 1-2, on Beach Black.
All the casualties that I know of in our Company were sustained on the beach.
Captain Maxie R. Williams, CO, Company "B".
I had Company "B" and was ordered to go in on the left of Company "A". We landed about 1030, but were unable to locate Company "A". We landed in front of a machine gun which was inland and towards the third, battalion area. I hit the beach about 150 yards from the pier. About 1230 MaJor Culhane told me to take all available units and move inland. We reached the fighter strip and were stopped by our own bombing and strafing, sustaining two casualties. About 1430 I moved out with Company "F", not being able to contact Major Culhane. We stayed there until dark, and the next morning, were in telephone communication with the Battalion. We received word to remain where we were and move out on order. We moved out later to an unoccupied trench at square 232 with bomb shelters on each flank. We had about forty or fifty casualties In this area. At dusk, Major
Kyle came over with about 300 men. We set up there for the night, receiving supplies by LVTs. On the fourth day we moved to the West end of the Island, receiving no opposition.Captain James R. Clanahan, CO, Company "C".
I received verbal orders to land on Beach Red 2, organize, stand by, and await further orders. Our objective was on the South Beach in area 221. Nothing developed that afternoon. At dark we were ordered to tie in with Companies "A" and "B" I had only a LMG and a BAR to begin with, and the next morning I received a platoon of HMGs from Company "D". They had only the ammunition they carried. In about the center of 221, we set up our defense against pill boxes. The next day we worked on the pill boxes with tanks and scout-snipers.
Q. What were your total casualties?
A. 13 killed; 35 wounded; none missing.Q. Captain Williams, what were your casualties?
A. A total of 86; 21 killed; 3 missing; the rest wounded.Q. Lieutenant Wickersham?
A. 3 officers and 21 enlisted killed; 57 wounded: and 3 missing. Most of those sustained on the beach.Q. How deep was the water when you landed?
A. (Capt Williams): About a foot of water over the reef at 1000.
(Lt Wickersham): About two feet.
(Capt Clanahan): Two feet or more.NOTE: The following information was received as the result of interrogation.
There were plenty of grenades and rifle ammunition. The men fired all the ammunition in their belts, but on the afternoon of D+1 day, we were short on everything.
One belt of rifle ammunition is sufficient.
The M-1 is very good if kept dry from oil; there were no stoppages due to salt water.
The BAR gave trouble as a result of salt water, coral and sand.
The Carbine had very few stoppages; it is a very good weapon. A more accurate rear sight is needed to Include finer adjustments in elevation and windage.
Machine Guns worked well. They can be carried easily with the light tripod, using the HMG. The heavy tripod is too hard to handle, while the light is one piece, and gives a lower silhouette, and is still accurate.Anti-tank grenades - Some discharges became ruptured.
Evacuation of casualties - Our collecting section got in and worked well. There is nothing better for evacuation of casualties than the AmphTracs.
Total Battalion Casualties - Killed:
Wounded:
Missing:6 Off,
6 Off,
75
152
10Enl.
Enl.
Enl.Communications - TBYs worked Very well. TBXs worked fine, but they are too heavy. Being a reserve battalion, we carried no MUs. Highly recommend some kind of container, water-proofed, for floating batteries into the beach.
Rations - There is no use to carry rations because they were not eaten.
Packs - It is recommended that the pack be done away with, and that all gear be attached to the belt.
We should have more demolition kits, at least one per squad, with replacements.
Entrenching tools are a necessity, but no ponchos should be carried on an operation such as Tarawa.
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Cal.22 December, 1943.
REPORTS OF BATTALION COMMANDERS. Major Howard J. Rice, Exec O, 2nd Bn, 2nd Marines.
We began debarking about 0400. We received of Company "F" that they were on the beach, and resistance was stiff. Soon after that message was received our radio went out of commission. We hung off in our boats and were under fire from medium guns. When we hit the reef, enemy fire on the AmphTracs was heavy. On hitting the beach I looked to the left and saw the pier. I determined later that I had landed on the east flank of 230. I got in at H+13. The area was being swept with fire from 227 and 224. With the radio I had at the time, I had contact with one of our companies ahead. I located 3-2 just before dark by runner; the TBX would not work, because the generator was out. From then on, I did not do much.
All the LVTs were used getting in supplies, and taking out wounded. A shore party from 3-2 landed shortly after we did. On D+3 day morning, I got an AmphTrac and joined the Battalion on the pier. Everything was practically secured.
Captain Warren Morris, CO, Company "F".
I landed in the first wave at about 0905, receiving heavy fire by the time we hit the beach. We were supposed to land in the middle of the company area at about the right flank of 220, but instead we landed in the right flank of 222. I got ashore with myself and four out of the eighteen who started. We had two flame throwers in the first wave, neither of which got ashore, but we did get demolition kits in. With an MU I contacted CP of Company "G", and used their TBY to contact the Battalion,
About H+60, I got 15 men from Company "E" in charge of a Sergeant. He did not know where the officers were. About 1200 part of 1-2 came in. We attached a mortar squad to them, and they pushed forward receiving only sniper fire. The 1st Battalion reached 201 with little trouble and built up a line there. We continued around the right flank to form a perimeter defense. We had about 30 wounded there, and a Doctor and some Corpsmen set up an aid station on the beach. We had little trouble that night. Late on D Day I found my Exec and 25 men left of the Company. The next morning Colonel Jordan, who was in charge of the Battalion at the time, told me where our Company was, and I joined them at 201, where we received orders to go to the South Beach. By that time two Companies of 1-2 had joined us.
The remainder of the three Companies, "A" and "B", from 1-2, "F" from 2-2, and 20 men from "E" and "G" went across the South Beach. This was D+1 day. Late that afternoon we got two AmphTracs over with ammunition, water and rations. Colonel Jordan then turned over the Battalion to Major Kyle.Lieutenant James C. Reed, Jr., ExecO, Company "G".
We were in the third wave, and on reaching the coral received heavy fire. We fired the .50 cal. MGs on the AmphTracs as we went in, but the Tracs bounded around considerably. On landing I received orders from Colonel Jordan to push ahead, and by noon we got to the air strip. I had no communication, so I went back to the CP and was ordered to set up in front of the CP, which I did. We moved up the next morning. I had a Sergeant and six men and sent them to the left flank to contact Major Crowe's outfit at the head of the pier.
NOTE: The following information was received as the result of interrogation.
We did not get much fire from the pier itself, because I believe Lt. Hawkins was already on the pier. Some of the assault LVTs went over the parapet one of which went fifty yards inland.
There was a tendency for the men to crouch behind the sea wall. There was also some difficulty in getting them out of the AmphTracs. Low water was about 1200. The LVTs had no trouble getting through the concrete obstacles and the barbed wire.
Two platoons in direct support of the two assault companies had LMGs; two reserve and two support platoons had HMGs. It is recommended that the heavy gun be used on the light tripod. The heavy gun is easier to carry, light tripod has a lower silhouette and gives the dispersion you want. The main reason for not using the LMGs is because of the necessity for carrying spare barrels. Also, the men had more confidence in the heavy.
With the exception of grenades there was no real shortage of any ammunition at any time. However, some rifle ammunition was collected from the dead.
M-1 - Salt water caused numerous stoppages with the M-1s. We had to organize three men on a cleaning detail to work them over. however, the men like it's fire power and still prefer it to the '03.
The BAR did not work too well because of the sand. The main trouble was in the action, and not in the magazine.The carbine is fine. We had few or no stoppages.
Inflated life belts -- There were several wounded men picked up out of the water wearing inflated life belts.
The shore party was used as infantry. The night they started working on the gear organization was good. I do not think the shore party should be brought in early when there is no beach head.
Communication -- Ye had a TNY which we managed to keep dry. Some provision must be made to keep communication equipment water proofed. It is recommended that a duplicate set of signal equipment with a water-proof covering be carried so that it may be floated in in case of emergency.
We did not get any notice of approaching Japanese planes. Our set was on the right frequency, but ships did not want to open up and reveal their position; They had the planes recorded on their radars. We expected that when they got a bogey they would give us the word, but the only time we got it was from our Air Liaison Officer.
Ammunition replenishment was good, but men were wounded in getting 81mm mortar ammunition over the side of the AmphTracs. Perhaps a rubber boat could be towed behind an LVT for that purpose.
The 37mm crews were used as infantry and the breach blocks of the guns were removed and hidden. Two guns however were set up in the triangle and we lost five out of six men. It was reported that these guns fired on some targets.
It is recommended that similar radios be used for tanks and infantry.
The collecting section functioned well but there~ was a shortage of personnel. The present set up is believed to be sound under ordinary circumstances, but not so if casualties are exceptionally high.
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF, c/o meet Post Office, San Francisco, Cal. 22 December 1943.
REPORTS OF BATTALION COMMANDERS Major John F. Schoettel, CO, 3-2.
We debarked according to schedule and later landed on Beach Red 2. We received word that H hour was delayed to 0845, then again to 0900. We crossed the line of departure at about 0830. The LVTs disembarked their troops in the water about 500 yards out receiving fire of medium caliber. One of the guns was on Green Beach firing over the edge at about 229. We called for air support. The water at the time of landing was about waist high. Two of the tanks supporting us were serviceable while all the others were ground out by going into bomb holes on the reef. There were no tanks or half tracks on Beach Red 1. Wounded were transferred to AmphTracs and evacuated. At this time we drew fire from both beaches and withdrew to seaward. It was thought they were all wiped out. We then landed on Beach Red 2, arriving there at about 1600.
Q. Did anybody actually land on Green Beach?
A. No.Major Michael P. Ryan, CO, Company "L".
We landed on the coral to the left of the small ship on the reef, disembarked, and headed in. I was in the Battalion Reserve, Company "L", which came in slowly and very disorganized. As soon as my company came in, we moved in behind Company "I". Men were still coming in in driblets. Two medium tanks got in over the reef, and the Engineers blasted a hole in the sea wall for them to come through. We put three companies abreast, took two medium tanks, but the two tanks were knocked out. It was then about 1630. We could not find a radio in communication with Division and later found the Second Battalion's. The next morning we got another medium tank and Naval gun fire came from somewhere. We sent a message recommending that troops land on Green Beach. We attacked with the tank and Naval gun fire support about 1100. There was little opposition. Upon receiving word that troops would land on Green Beach we sent another message saying that Green Beach South was mined. We had about 150-200 yards inland of Green Beach. The next day we received orders to stand fast, that the Sixth Marines were to our right.
Q. Was there much fire coming from the South coast to the East?
A. No.
Q. Were there many Japs h the personnel dugouts on Beach Red 1?
A. Yes. On coming down we bypassed them, but later got them out with flame throwers.Q. Did anybody land on the east of Beach Red 1?
A. No.Q. What knocked out the AmphTracs?
A. It seemed to be a 40mm; some of them were burning.James W. Crain, CO, Company "K".
I had the left assault company, Company "K". We were to land on the east of Beach Red 1. We were receiving quite a bit of small arms fire including automatic weapons, and there were possibly two anti-boat guns in 224. My TBY got ashore and after some repairs I got in touch with the Battalion Commander. I gave him my position and reported the situation. I found that a machine gun platoon was to my right front, and I joined it. This was about 1100. My left flank platoon leader was cut off with the few men he had, and a few stragglers. He set up a small area on the beach, and held a this strip for about two days, waiting for us to push down that way.
Q. Was there any Jap strongpoint in 227 or 230?
A. Not when we landed. There was no heavy fire in that area. There were some Japs in 227.Q. Was there much opposition inland?
A. No, mostly mortars and snipers, and possibly one or two MGs trained inland.I was supposed to contact Company "E" on Beach Red 2, but I could see no Marines on the beach, so I tied in with Company "I" on the right.
Major Michael P. Ryan, CO, Company "L".
Q. What was your casualty situation?
A. The Doctor set up an aid station on the beach and was there for about three days, when he moved inland for shelter.Q. What was the tie-in with 3-6?
A. They came in the day following 1-6 had took over our lines so that we could reform. We then took over the lines and 3-6 moved in behind 1-6.
NOTE: The following information was received as a result of interrogation.We did not have fluorescent panels when we went in. The old black and white ones were distributed but the fluorescent panels came in aboard ship.
The men shed their packs on the way in, because they were too heavy, although there was little else besides rations in them. It is recommended that no packs be taken.
There were few gas masks discarded for the reason that were too hard to remove.
The entrenching tool is an essential piece of equipment.
Rations -- It is recommended that 1/3 each of C, D, and K be carried.
Ponchos were not needed in this operation, not even for the wounded. They use no cover.
There were no mines on Beach Red 1.
The 50 cal, on the AmphTracs fired but opened up too far out, dispersing the fire. It is believed however, that it keeps the enemy down.
We were about ten minutes from the beach when Naval gun fire lifted and the air was strafing the beach, just about before we landed. My first wave crossed the line of departure at about 0830. The actual operation was excellent as compared to the rehearsal.
The main cause for the delay in reaching the beach was that the transports were in area B instead of A. The transports were practically west of the Island. They were ordered to move 2000 yards north because they were in the support group positions.
HEADQUARTERS, SECOND MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Cal.22 December, 1943.
REPORTS OF BATTALION COMMANDERS Capt. Daniel V. McWethy, Jr., Bn-3, 1st Bn, 8th Marines.
NOTE: In the absence of Major Hays, Capt. McWethy reported for the 1st Bn, 8th Marines.
Everything went along very smoothly from Wellington to the target area. We debarked and arrived at the control vessel at about 1330, where we stayed until 0530 the next morning. We were ordered to land on Beach Red 2 immediately, and the message also stated that there was no opposition.
The first wave landed on the edge of the reef at about 0615, and when the ramps went down it received very heavy fire. 1 believe we received 90% of our casualties in the water. Our total casualties, were, I think, 328 including 90 missing. We lost about 230 men in the water. About 1200 we had just about all of our troops ashore, numbering about 630, but they were greatly disorganized. We encountered no heavy resistance throughout the operation, except in certain emplacements.
NOTE: The following information was received as the result of interrogation.
In coming through the water, the BARs suffered the most because of the salt water, sand and coral. The LMGs had to be worked over and were in operating condition the next day. Our 81mm mortars were gotten over the pier and all landed in good condition, We lost most of our 60mm mortars, The M-1s had to be worked over also before they fired satisfactorily.
We lost all of our TBYs in the water. All telephones were ruined. Two TBXs were landed, one of which was used for air liaison. Each assault company had 4 hand set radios (MUs) and they were all put out of commission by the salt water.
The men like the M-1 very well.
The Carbine gave considerable trouble by reason of sand causing stoppages, but water apparently didn't do any harm. It is thought that the necessary and proper cleaning gear, other than the oiler and thong case, can be carried by the individual Marine.
