| Editor's Note (1948) |
|---|
|
This substantial and well-document monograph is still (June, 1948) the most complete
study which has been made of the strategic background of the invasion of Normandy, and
of naval participation in that operation. The author had access not only to U.S. naval
documents, but also to papers of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the British Chief of Staff,
and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was thus able to produce a work of extraordinary
value, especially in its early part. The complexity of the problems dealt with in the first
three chapters is so great, however, and the range of sources so wide, that these pages
cannot pretend to contain the final word on the subjects which they cover. No doubt the
history of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, when it has reached Operation OVERLORD,
will provide materials for correcting shortcomings in the present volume.
This study was finished in the summer of 1946. It was submitted to the Historical Officer of the U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, and somewhat revised by him, then it was forwarded by COMNAVEU to the Director of Naval History. It has not yet been extensively criticized by U.S. naval commanders of the operations described, but has been submitted to some few such officers. For information on other aspects of this operation, the reader is referred to Volume IV of this series; also to the first study in Volume VII. On file in the Office of Naval Records are two brief narratives of small naval units: "ComNavEu Special Intelligence Unit", and "ComNavEu Forward Intelligence Unit"; both of these present interesting additional details concerning U.S. Naval Intelligence aspects of the operation. At the beginning of each chapter of this monograph will be found an analytical table of contents of the chapter. |
| Editor's Note (2006) |
| The source document used for this web posting (Naval Administrative History of World War II) is a carbon copy of a typewritten document from 1948 that appears to have been a first draft compilation which was not well-proofread before it was bound for preservation. It contains errors and inconsistencies in punctuation, hyphenation, usage, capitalization, numbering, and alphabetization. In preparing this historical document for posting on the web, current proofreaders focused on readability rather than on exact reproduction of the original. Misspelled words and mistakes needing clarification were corrected without indicating the change from the original. For example: "Pointe du Hoe" was changed to "Pointe du Hoc," and "Operation TINBEL" to "TINDEL." Other inconsistencies in the original, such as "RAdm," "Radm," "Rear Adm," "Cincs," and "CinCs" are found throughout the document and are for the most part repeated verbatim in this version. Footnotes were moved to endnotes to make the web-formatted document easier to read. Therefore, when the Index refers to a page number, the reference will sometimes be found in the endnotes instead of on the page number referenced. The footnotes refer to Sections I, II, etc., when they mean Part 1, Part 2, etc.). In summary, the original document appears to have been hastily assembled from notes, letters, and directives, not as a scholarly or well-edited document. Therefore it can be expected to have a wide variety in usage, grammar, spelling, and punctuation. The current editors have not attempted to correct or standardize all the variations. |
| Section | Title | Pages | ||
| Chapter I | THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND OF OVERLORD | 1 | ||
| Part I | Introductory: Policy and Strategy in World War II | 1 | ||
| A. | Definition of Operation OVERLORD | 1 | ||
| B. | U.S. Policy and Grand Strategy | 2 | ||
| C. | American-British Combined Strategy (ARCADIA Conference Decisions, Washington, January 1942) | 5 | ||
| D. | 1942 Situation of the United Nations Coalition: Allocation of U.S. Forces | 6 | ||
| Part II | Combined Strategy in the European Theater | 10 | ||
| A. | Combined Planning of Future Operations (January-July 1942) | 10 | ||
| B. | Mediterranean Strategy 1942-1943: British Strategic Concepts | 14 | ||
| C. | Planning the Assault On Germany: OVERLORD and American Strategic Concepts | 21 | ||
| D. | Planning Offensive Operations: 1943 British Proposals | 25 | ||
| Part III | Grand Strategy of the OVERLORD Plan | 29 | ||
| A. | Quebec Conference Decisions: Views of British Chiefs of Staff | 29 | ||
| B. | Strategical Implications of OVERLORD: The American Position | 32 | ||
| C. | The General War Situation, November 1943 | 33 | ||
| Part IV | Tripartite Strategic Agreements: The EUREKA Conference (Teheran) | 41 | ||
| A. | Soviet Strategic Concepts | 41 | ||
| B. | U.S.-British Positions At the EUREKA Conference | 44 | ||
| C. | Final Approval of OVERLORD At Teheran | 45 | ||
| D. | Allied Program for Victory in Europe: Political Implications | 47 | ||
| Chapter II | PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS FOR CROSS-CHANNEL (OVERLORD) OPERATIONS | 51 | ||
| Part I | Early Plans for Cross-Channel Operations | 51 | ||
| A. | Introduction: British Planning 1940-1941 | 51 | ||
| B. | Combined Planning, January-June 1942 | 58 | ||
| C. | Preliminary Cross-Channel Plan: ROUND-UP 1943 | 65 | ||
| D. | Plan for a Sacrifice Operation: SLEDGEHAMMER 1942 | 70 | ||
| E. | Build-up of U.S. Forces in the United Kingdom (Operation BOLERO) | 72 | ||
| Part II | The OVERLORD Plan: COSSAC Appreciation and Outline, 1943 | 79 | ||
| A. | Casablanca Conference Decisions: January 1943 | 79 | ||
| B. | COSSAC: Functions and Organization | 83 | ||
| C. | The COSSAC Appreciation and Outline Plan for OVERLORD, July 1943 | 89 | ||
| Part III | OVERLORD and ANVIL: Planning the 1944 Grand Assault | 98 | ||
| A. | Quebec Conference Approval of OVERLORD, August 1943 | 98 | ||
| B. | Plans for Landings On the French Mediterranean Coast (ANVIL Operation) | 102 | ||
| C. | Strategy and Logistics of 1944 Amphibious Operations | 105 | ||
| D. | 1944 Modifications of OVERLORD and ANVIL Plans: December 1943-March 1944 | 110 | ||
| Part IV | Air Operations in Relation to OVERLORD | 120 | ||
| A. | COSSAC Plan for Air Operations | 120 | ||
| B. | Plans for Combined SICKLE-POINTBLANK Air Operations | 123 | ||
| C. | Coordination of U.K. and Mediterranean Air Operations - 1943 | 126 | ||
| D. | OVERLORD Plan for the Air Offensive in 1944 | 128 | ||
| Part V | OVERLORD Cover and Deception Operations | 133 | ||
| A. | COSSAC Cover Plan | 134 | ||
| B. | British and Combined Organization for Cover and Deception Operations | 137 | ||
| C. | OVERLORD Cover Plans: JAEL and BODYGUARD | 139 | ||
| D. | Outline of OVERLORD Deception Operations | 145 | ||
| E. | Operations VENDETTA (and ZEPPELIN) in the Mediterranean (ANVIL) | 149 | ||
| F. | Operation FORTITUDE (and TINDEL) in Relation to OVERLORD in North Europe | 151 | ||
| G. | Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH (in Relation to NEPTUNE) Pas de Calais Threat | 156 | ||
| H. | Organization of Radio Deception Operation | 152 | ||
| I. | Results of Cover and Deception Operations | 166 | ||
| Chapter III | THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND OF OVERLORD | 170 | ||
| Part I | Formation of the OVERLORD System of Command | 171 | ||
| A. | Unity of Command: U.S. and British Systems | 171 | ||
| B. | 1942 Plans for a Supreme Allied Command | 174 | ||
| C. | 1943 Discussions of Combined Command Systems (Casablanca Conference: COSSAC Proposals) | 179 | ||
| D. | Quebec Conference Decisions: Delay in Designation of Supreme Allied Commander | 182 | ||
| E. | Establishment of OVERLORD Command: General Eisenhower Designated S.A.C. | 186 | ||
| Part II | Developments of OVERLORD System of Naval Command. | 193 | ||
| A. | Designation of Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief (ANCXF) | 193 | ||
| B. | Relations of Royal Navy and U.S. Navy Organizations With ANCXF | 195 | ||
| C. | Organization of the TWELFTH U.S. Fleet and of Task Force 122 | 202 | ||
| D. | Command Arrangements and Operation Plan, Task Force 122 | 207 | ||
| Part III | NEPTUNE Naval Command | 213 | ||
| A. | Pre-NEPTUNE Phase (25 Oct 1943 - 27 May 1944) | 213 | ||
| B. | NEPTUNE Phase (May 27 to July 10, 1944) | 217 | ||
| C. | Post-NEPTUNE Phase (10 July 1944 - 14 July 1944) | 220 | ||
| D. | Chronological Summary of Naval Command Developments -- OVERLORD Operation | 222 | ||
| Part IV | Integrated Command of Allied Forces OVERLORD Operations | 226 | ||
| A. | Chain of Integrated Command | 226 | ||
| B. | Division of Responsibilities for Planning | 228 | ||
| C. | Division of Responsibility between Army and Navy | 230 | ||
| D. | Division of Responsibility for the Build-up | 232 | ||
| Chapter IV | NEPTUNE OPERATIONS PLANS | 233 | ||
| Part I | The Enemy Situation | 233 | ||
| A. | German Land Forces | 233 | ||
| B. | The German Defense Plans | 234 | ||
| C. | Coastal Defenses, Fortifications and Obstacles | 235 | ||
| D. | German Coastal Batteries and Mobile Artillery | 241 | ||
| E. | Disposition of Garrison Troops and Mobile Forces | 243 | ||
| F. | German Naval Forces | 246 | ||
| G. | German Air Forces | 250 | ||
| Part II | Considerations Relative to the NEPTUNE Plan | 253 | ||
| A. | Basic Principles of the NEPTUNE Operation | 253 | ||
| B. | Beaches and Lodgment Areas | 254 | ||
| C. | Anticipated Development of the Land Campaign | 262 | ||
| D. | Method of Amphibious Attack for NEPTUNE | 263 | ||
| E. | The Timing of the NEPTUNE Assault | 273 | ||
| F. | Plans for Movement of Forces | 276 | ||
| Part III | General Plan for the Normandy Landings | 279 | ||
| A. | The Preliminary Phase | 279 | ||
| B. | The Preparatory Phase | 279 | ||
| C. | The Assault Phase | 281 | ||
| D. | The Build-up Phase | 285 | ||
| Part IV | Composition and Organization of Forces | 287 | ||
| A. | Army Forces, Allied Expeditionary Force | 287 | ||
| B. | Air Forces, Allied Expeditionary Force | 289 | ||
| C. | Naval Forces, Allied Expeditionary Force | 291 | ||
| D. | Chain of Combined High Command | |||
| E. | Chain of Naval Command | |||
| F. | Army Order of Battle | |||
| G. | Integrated Chain of Command | |||
| H. | Organization of Western Task Force | |||
| I. | Organization of Eastern Task Force | |||
| J. | Composition of Naval Forces | |||
| Part V | The Naval Plan | 301 | ||
| A. | Outline Review of NEPTUNE Operation | 301 | ||
| B. | Loading and Assembly of Forces | 305 | ||
| C. | Program of Assault and Follow-Up Forces | 308 | ||
| D. | The Build-up for Offensive Land Operations | 311 | ||
| E. | Supporting Naval Operations | 313 | ||
| F. | Supporting Air Operations | 323 | ||
| G. | Ancillary Operations | 325 | ||
| H. | Chronological Order of Events | 332 | ||
| Chapter V | NAVAL PREPARATIONS FOR CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS | 338 | ||
| Part I | U.S. Naval Preparations | 338 | ||
| A. | ComNavEu Organization and Action | 338 | ||
| B. | Twelfth Fleet and Task Force 122 | 341 | ||
| C. | Establishment of Eleventh Amphibious Forces | 343 | ||
| D. | Landing Craft and Bases (LanCrabEu) | 346 | ||
| Part II | Preparations of Bases for Amphibious Forces | 348 | ||
| A. | Naval Bases and Training Areas in Southwest England: Relations with C-in-C Plymouth | 348 | ||
| B. | Repair and Port Facilities | 351 | ||
| C. | Arrival and Organization of Amphibious Forces | 355 | ||
| Part III | Organization and Training of U.S. Naval Forces | 358 | ||
| A. | Organization and Activities, Eleventh Amphibious Forces | 358 | ||
| B. | Coordination in Training with U.S. Army Formations | 359 | ||
| C. | Amphibious Training Exercises -- 1944 | 360 | ||
| D. | Organization and Training of U.S. Naval Assault Forces | 362 | ||
| E. | Readiness, U.S. Naval NEPTUNE Forces | 367 | ||
| Part IV | Readiness of U.S. Naval NEPTUNE Forces | 367 | ||
| Part V | Brief Review of Royal Navy Preparations | 371 | ||
| Part VI | Loading and Assembly: NEPTUNE Forces | 375 | ||
| Chapter VI | THE OPERATION BEGINS | 381 | ||
| Part I | Developments During May 1944 | 381 | ||
| A. | The Naval Assault Forces | 381 | ||
| B. | Enemy Reactions | 382 | ||
| C. | Promulgation of Operation Orders | 384 | ||
| D. | Security Problems and Measures | 386 | ||
| E. | Command Questions | 387 | ||
| F. | Questions of Air-Navy Coordination | 388 | ||
| G. | MULBERRY Problems: Tug Shortage | 389 | ||
| H. | Visits of Important Personages | 390 | ||
| Part II | Designation and Postponement of D-Day | 392 | ||
| A. | 5 June Designated as D-Day | 392 | ||
| B. | NEPTUNE Forces in Movement | 393 | ||
| C. | Weather Intervenes: Postponement of Assault | 394 | ||
| D. | The Supreme Commander's Dilemma: 6 June Fixed as D-Day | 396 | ||
| Part III | The Assault Movement of NEPTUNE Forces | 400 | ||
| A. | General Outline of the Movement | 400 | ||
| B. | Composition and Timing of Convoys | 401 | ||
| C. | Routing and Navigation | 405 | ||
| D. | The Assault Forces Reach the Beaches | 407 | ||
| Chapter VII | DEFENSIVE MEASURES -- NEPTUNE OPERATION | 410 | ||
| Part I | Enemy Naval Dispositions, 1944 | 410 | ||
| Part II | Minelaying (Operation MAPLE) | 412 | ||
| A. | Plan for Minelaying | 412 | ||
| B. | Minelaying Operations | 413 | ||
| Part III | Naval Cover for NEPTUNE | 416 | ||
| A. | Countering the German Heavy Fleet | 416 | ||
| B. | Countering U-Boat Movements from the North | 417 | ||
| C. | Sealing the Western Channel | 418 | ||
| D. | Sealing the Straits of Dover | 421 | ||
| E. | Patrols Along the Convoy Flanks | 422 | ||
| Part IV | Assault Area: Screen and Escorts | 425 | ||
| A. | Allied Naval Dispositions | 425 | ||
| B. | Eastern Task Force | 426 | ||
| C. | Western Task Force | 428 | ||
| D. | Convoy Escort Forces | 432 | ||
| Part V | NEPTUNE Minesweeping Operations | 433 | ||
| A. | Plans for Sweeping German Minefields | 433 | ||
| B. | Minesweeping Arrangements in the Assault Area | 435 | ||
| C. | The Passage and False Start | 437 | ||
| D. | The Approach | 438 | ||
| E. | Sweeping Inshore Waters | 442 | ||
| F. | The Enemy's Minelaying Counter-Attack | 443 | ||
| G. | Minesweeping at Cherbourg | 444 | ||
| H. | The Score | 446 | ||
| Part VI | Air Cover Forces for NEPTUNE | 449 | ||
| A. | Coordination of Coastal Command and Naval Operations | 449 | ||
| B. | Air Defense by Combined Allied Air Forces | 454 | ||
| Chapter VIII | BOMBARDMENT AND OTHER DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY LAND FORCES | 458 | ||
| Part I | General Bombardment Plans | 458 | ||
| A. | Coordination of Naval and Air Bombardment | 458 | ||
| B. | Air Bombardment Program | 462 | ||
| Part II | Naval Bombardment Operations | 464 | ||
| A. | Naval Bombarding Forces | 464 | ||
| B. | Pre-Arranged Bombardment Schedule | 468 | ||
| C. | Post H-Hour Armed Bombardment | 469 | ||
| D. | Ammunition Supplies | 473 | ||
| E. | Results of Naval Bombardment | 474 | ||
| Part III | General Bombardment Plans | 477 | ||
| A. | Bombardment of Cherbourg | 477 | ||
| Part IV | Radar Counter Measures | 479 | ||
| Part V | Naval Diversions | 483 | ||
| Chapter IX | THE NEPTUNE ASSAULTS | 487 | ||
| Part I | General Conditions for the Assault | 487 | ||
| A. | Reasons for success of NEPTUNE Operation | 487 | ||
| B. | The Effect of Surprise | 488 | ||
| C. | The Normandy Landings | 490 | ||
| Part II | Western Task Force: Assault Force U | 493 | ||
| A. | General Situation, Western Task Force | 493 | ||
| B. | Assault Force U: Organization and Assembly | 493 | ||
| C. | The Assault on UTAH | 500 | ||
| Part III | Western Task Force: Assault Force O | 507 | ||
| A. | Organization and Assembly | 507 | ||
| B. | OMAHA Beach: Plan for the Assault | 511 | ||
| C. | Assault Force O: Organization and Assembly | 514 | ||
| D. | Assault Force O: The Channel Passage | 515 | ||
| E. | The Assault on OMAHA Beach | 518 | ||
| F | The Battle on OMAHA Beach | 526 | ||
| Part IV | Eastern Task Force: Forces G, J, S | 534 | ||
| A. | The Channel Passage | 534 | ||
| B. | The Assaults: General Narrative | 542 | ||
| C. | Force G: GOLD Area | 546 | ||
| D. | Force J: JUNO Area | 548 | ||
| E. | Force S: SWORD Area | 553 | ||
| Part V | The Assault Ends: The Situation at H Plus 24 Hours | 559 | ||
| Chapter X | THE BUILD-UP FOR THE BATTLE OF FRANCE | 563 | ||
| Part I | The Post-NEPTUNE Naval Task | 563 | ||
| Part II | Far Shore Organization | 565 | ||
| A. | Plans and Preparations for Naval Far Shore Service | 565 | ||
| B. | British Area: Far Shore Naval Organization | 567 | ||
| C. | U.S. Area: American Far Shore Naval Organization | 570 | ||
| D. | Shore Parties, U.S. Area | 571 | ||
| Part III | Naval Far Shore Activities After D-Day (Extracts from ANCXF NEPTUNE Report |
573 | ||
| INDEX | 583 | |||
Source: Historical Section, COMNAVEU. "Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946." vol. 5. (London, 1946) [This manuscript, identified as United States Naval Administrative History of World War II #147, is located in the Navy Department Library's Rare Book Room.]
Indexed at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., in connection with the preparation of S.E. Morison's History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, Volume XI, by Roger F. Schofield, YN1, USN, 9 December 1954.