| DD581/A16-3 | U.S.S. CHARRETTE (DD581) | |
| Serial 003 | Care Fleet Post Office | |
| San Francisco, Calif. | ||
| 17 August 1945. |
| From: | The Commanding Officer. |
| To: | The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. |
| Via: | (1) The Commander Destroyer Division ONE HUNDRED TWO. (2) The Commander SEVENTH Fleet. |
| Subject: | Action Report -- 26 July 1945 to 17 August 1945 -- Interception, inspection, and seizure of Japanese Hospital Ship, TACHIBANA MARU. |
| Reference: | (a) CANF SWPA OpOrder No. 2-45. (b)PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 1CL-45. |
| Enclosure: | (A) Report of Medical Officer on Visit and Search Party. (B) Track Chart. |
1. On 26 July 1945, reported to Commander SEVENTH Fleet for duty in accordance with CTF 74 dispatch 240950 of July 1945. Departed Manila 27 July and arrived Morotai 29 July. Departed that port for Banda Sea 31 July. Made contact with TACHIBANA MARU at 2030, 2 August, trailed her throughout the night, and sent visit and search party aboard at 0658, 3 August 1945. Upon receipt of information that she was carrying ammunition, sent prize crew aboard and proceeded to Morotai.
1. The Commander Destroyer Division ONE HUNDRED TWO in CHARRETTE reported with CHARRETTE and CONNER (DD-582) to Commander SEVENTH Fleet for special duty on 26 July 1945. In accordance with arrangements made by CTF 74, a squad of Marines was sent from TUSCALOOSA (CA-37) and NEW ORLEANS (CA-32) to report to CHARRETTE and CONNER for use in prospective prize crews. Three Japanese language interpreters were supplied by Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
2. Departed Manila at 1700, 27 July 1945 for Morotai via standard routes, arriving at the destination 1030, 29 July. Fueled and made preparations for task at hand. Topped off with fuel 31 July and departed 1029 for Banda Sea via Molukka Passage and Ceram Sea, remaining outside range of shore based radars and possible coast watchers.
3. Our mission was the interception and examination of the Japanese hospital ship TACHIBANA MARU. Aircraft reports had placed her west of Kai in the afternoon of 31 July, headed eastward. Previous aircraft reports indicated that her probable speed was 11 knots, with a 16 knot maximum and a 14 knot cruising speed. Her estimated time of departure from the Kai group to Soerabaja, Java, was 3 August. The initial plans called for taking a station at earliest meeting point, assuming she left Kai at 0600, 2 August, and then conducting a search from ahead, making maximum use of radar for coverage.
To conserve fuel, an initial setup of one boiler operation with cross-connected plant was used until entry into Ceram Sea when fully split operation was resumed. A speed of 12 knots was used. Visit and search parties were organized and trained as were prize crews. Special emphasis was placed on use of small arms and hand grenades under tutelage of Marine detachment.
4. At 1100, 2 August, a contact report was received indicating a Japanese hospital ship in position 05°40'00"S, 129°45'00"E, course 245°(T), speed 10 knots. This unit's position was then 04°25'00"S, 125°40'00"E. At this time the decision was made by Commander Destroyer Division ONE HUNDRED TWO to take a course to intercept, assuming TACHIBANA MARU to be making 16 knots on course 245°(T). Accordingly, course was changed and speed increased to 16 knots. Subsequent investigation of the problem indicated the desirability of detaching one vessel to proceed to make an interception on the assumption that the TACHIBANA MARU was making reported speed. A geographic plot of the factors involved showed that practically 100 per cent coverage of probable locus of vessel could be obtained if this was done at such a time as to pass southward of the Licipara and Schildpad groups. This was predicated on the assumption that the target vessel would continue in the direction of Soerabaja. This decision was reached by Commander Destroyer Division ONE HUNDRED TWO and accordingly CHARRETTE was directed to proceed on this search at 1530, 2 August. In event contact was not made by 2200, both vessels were to retire along course 245°(T), CONNER at 13 knots, CHARRETTE at 16 knots, until 0600, when CONNER was to reverse course and rejoin CHARRETTE; upon rejoining an in-and-out search from ahead would be initiated. At 2040, 2 August 1945, radar contact was made on TACHIBANA MARU bearing 130°(T), distance 35,000 yards. A check disclosed that she had made good course 255°(T), speed 11 knots, from reported position at 1105.
26 July 1945:
Arrived Manila late afternoon. Reported to Commander SEVENTH Fleet for special mission in accordance with CTF 74 dispatch 240950 of July 1945.
27 July 1945:
The Commander Destroyer Division ONE HUNDRED TWO reported in person to Commander SEVENTH Fleet and received CANF SWPA OpOrder No. 2-45 and additional verbal information. Conference of ComDesDiv 102 and the Commanding Officers, U.S.S. CHARRETTE and U.S.S. CONNER held upon his return. At 1330 three Japanese interpreters reported aboard for duty. At 1530 one squad of Marines from U.S.S. TUSCALOOSA reported aboard for temporary duty. At 1714 stood out of Manila enroute Morotai via standard routes.
28 July 1945:
Enroute Morotai.
29 July 1945:
Enroute Morotai. 1028 Arrived Morotai and at 1102 went alongside HMAS BISHOPDALE (IX-166) to fuel. At 1242 cleared BISHOPDALE and at 1313 anchored in berth C-1.
30 July 1945:
Anchored Morotai. Obtained barbed wire, hand grenades, riot gun shells, and walkie-talkie radio sets for use in forth coming operation.
31 July 1945:
Anchored Morotai. Topped off provisions. At 0852 got underway and proceeded alongside BISHOPDALE to top-off fuel. At 1025 got underway and stood out of harbor, followed by CONNER. 1101 Set curse 180°(T), speed 12 knots. Engineering plant operating fully cross-connected on one boiler for maximum economy. 1107 Changed course to 245°(T). 1120 Changed course to 302°(T). 1147 Changed course to 359°(T). 1313 Changed course to 294°(T). CONNER formed column open order. 1647 Changed course to 216°(T). 2029 Changed course to 195°(T).
1 August 1945:
Enroute Banda Sea. 0825 Changed course to 151°(T). 1600 Received contact report that a hospital ship was at latitude 05°18'00"S, longitude 131°37'00"E, course 115°(T), speed 5 knots at 1315 Item. 1700 Sea began to build up. 1840 Secured air search radars; put two boilers on main steam line; fully split engineering plant. 2222 Changed course to 268°(T).
2 August 1945:
Enroute Banda Sea. 0220 Changed course to 160°(T); entered Banda Sea. 0958 Changed course to 141°(T), enroute estimated earliest meeting point. 1055 Made radar contact on low flying plane; started air search radar. Plane identified as friendly but unable to establish contact with it. Sea continued to build up, now running force 4 to 5, wind and sea from southeast. Sky overcast with occasional squalls. At 1120 received contact report that an unidentified hospital ship was at latitude 05°40'00"S, longitude 129°45'00"E; at 1005 on course 245°(T), speed 10 knots. At 1155 changed course to 148°(T) and increased speed to 16 knots. At 1530 CONNER was directed to continue on present course and speed; CHARRETTE took course 116°(T) and increased speed to 18 knots. At 1855 evening fix showed that CHARRETTE was behind desired position on search course due to bucking wind and sea; increased speed to 20 knots. At 2035 made radar contact on object bearing 130°(T), distance 35,000 yards, and at 2040 sighted lights of vessel. Tracking by C.I.C. showed course to be 255°(T), speed 10 knots. Began maneuvering to take station astern of target, distance 15 miles. At 2115 ComDesDiv 102 recalled CONNER and at 2335 CONNER took station 7.5 miles on port beam of CHARRETTE.
3 August 1945:
Trailing TACHIBANA MARU from position 15 miles astern. At 0258 passed Guning Api Island abeam to port, distance 10 miles. Target vessel changed course to 275°(T). At 0505 went to general quarters and at 0525 set Condition I-Easy. Commenced breakfast for visit and search party, boat crews, and then remainder of ship's company. At 0530 increased speed to 23 knots to close target and at 0637 signaled her to lie to; observed people throwing items over the side, apparently in weighted bags. At 0650 stopped all engines, lying to. At 0658 visit and search party in charge of Lieutenant Commander E. R. PETERSON, USN, boarded TACHIBANA MARU in latitude 06°29'00"S, longitude 125°41'00"E. At 0715 Lieutenant Commander PETERSON reported that TACHIBANA MARU had departed Kai at 2100 Item 1 August enroute Soerabaja; that she had 1500 patients on board and ship's company, including medical personnel. he further stated that the medical officer with the visit and search party believed that the majority of the "patients" were in good health. ComDesDiv 102 directed that the search be continued. At 0750 he reported finding mortar shells packed in boxes marked with red crosses and labeled medical supplies. Marine guard and prize crew immediately dispatched to TACHIBANA MARU; CONNER directed to send prize crew details, and Lieutenant Commander PETERSON was directed by ComDesDiv 102 to take over the vessel, informing her captain that she was to be taken into port for further examination. 0818 Samples of contraband delivered aboard CHARRETTE. 0840 Bogey reported bearing 185°(T), distance 25 miles. 0845 Bogey identified as friendly, but never sighted. 0908 Eleven (11) officers, consisting of captain of TACHIBANA MARU and ten (10) troop officers were delivered aboard. 0935 Seventeen (17) more troop officers and ship's company were delivered aboard; twenty-two (22) being sent to CONNER. TACHIBANA MARU under command of Lieutenant Commander E. R. PETERSON, USN, with prize crew from CONNER and CHARRETTE, set course 355°(T), speed 10 knots, enroute Morotai. Sea still force 4 to 5 from southeast. CONNER took station ahead, CHARRETTE on starboard quarter of prize. 1148 Went alongside TACHIBANA MARU to deliver food to prize crew and resumed station at 1211. 1309 Changed course to 359°(T). 2030 Reversed course to 179°(T) and ran for one hour on anti-snooper patrol astern of formation. At 2130 reversed course to 359°(T) and increased speed to 20 knots, rejoining formation at 2345 and resuming formation speed of 10 knots.
4 August 1945:
Enroute Morotai with prize. 0604 Changed formation course to 045°(T). 0714 Changed formation course to 078°(T). 1255 Went alongside TACHIBANA MARU to deliver food to prize crew. 1330 Resumed station astern. 1411 Changed formation course to 046°(T). Wind and sea moderated during day; sea now force 1. 1700 Wind and sea commenced making up; sea force 3 to 4. 2214 Changed course to 351°(T).
5 August 1945:
Enroute Morotai with prize. 1102 Went alongside TACHIBANA MARU to deliver supplies and transfer prisoners. 1121 Breeches buoy line carried away when strongback on MARU parted. Lieutenant L.M. CARTALL, MC, USN, was shaken up when strongback pinned him to dock but not otherwise injured. Recovered gear and after altering course to 015°(T), at 1141 resumed transfer of supplies to MARU. Two (2) Japanese officers who were apparently trying to foment trouble were transferred to this vessel along with Dr. CARTALL. 1615 Changed course to 030°(T).
6 August 1945:
Enroute Morotai with prize. 0125 Changed course to 113°(T). 0502 Changed course to 180°(T). 0612 Took station ahead of TACHIBANA MARU to lead her into Morotai, CONNER taking station astern. 0925 After having led TACHIBANA MARU into berth C-21, anchored in berth C-22, where CHARRETTE was boarded by news correspondents and photographers. ComDesDiv 102 proceeded to make arrangements for temporary transfer of POW's to the Army to permit careful examination of contents of TACHIBANA MARU. 1545 TACHIBANA MARU went alongside Navy Pier, Morotai, where all POW's were taken into custody by the 93rd Division, U.S. Army (Major General JOHNSON, AUS, Commanding). 1925 Transferred POW's from CHARRETTE to shore.
7 August to 12 August 1945:
Anchored Morotai, furnishing daily working parties to unload TACHIBANA MARU and clean her up. Unloaded approximately thirty (30) tons of assorted ammunition, including 8 Cm. field howitzer shells, knee mortar projectiles, hand grenades, and rifle and machine gun ammunition. Also unloaded approximately four hundred (400) rifles and carbines, fifteen (15) light machine guns, forty-five (45) knee mortars, and four (4) 8 Cm. field howitzers equipment. Over two hundred (200) truckloads of trash were also unloaded and burned. Some apparently useful intelligence material was found; this was forwarded by officer messenger by air to Commander SEVENTH Fleet in Manila. Other less important pieces were retained aboard for future deliver. On 11 August CONNER departed Morotai as escort for YOCHOW to which had been transferred seven hundred (700) POW's and all ammunition recovered from TACHIBANA. On 12 August reloaded the MARU with guns, equipment and provisions.
13 August to 17 August 1945:
Anchored Morotai. 0700 Underway to fuel from HMAS BISHOPDALE. 0920 Anchored in berth C-1. 1240 Nine hundred fifty-one (951) POW's and internees were delivered to TACHIBANA MARU and twelve (12) officers to CHARRETTE. at 1332 underway from Morotai enroute Manila via standard routes. On 15 August received official notification that Japan had capitulated. Arrived Manila 17 August 1945 and reported to Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
None.
No damage to own vessel or enemy prize.
2. No plans of the TACHIBANA MARU were available, but reasonably good photographs were. General assignments were made from those for stationing prize crew members to establish initial control. The fact that she carried 1500 troops presented a delicate situation, and it is believed that the appearance of U.S. Marines so suddenly on the scene created a surprise very beneficial to the prize crew. Also casual observation seems to indicate that the state of the weather acted in our favor, producing a useful degree of seasickness among the enemy troops.
3. Space for the prisoners transferred to this vessel was obtained by clearing the forward crew's compartment. This gave the prisoners a private compartment with only two easily guarded exits. No trouble was experienced with them at any time. After things settled down, all except those too seasick to do so were given opportunity to bathe and their clothing laundered. Apparently they were contented; the captain of the TACHIBANA MARU sending his thanks to the commanding officer for the excellent care they had received.
4. No special problems arose for C.I.C. Initially it had been intended to take a station which would permit a direct search from ahead, but subsequent information of location of target dictated a search from the bow. The correctness of this decision and execution of the plan is shown by the interception.
1. All hands concerned with the actual boarding, including the boat handling details on board this vessel, displayed excellent seamanship in boats, despite the heavy seas and rolling.
2. The conduct of the prize crew cannot be too highly praised, especially when examination of the TACHIBANA MARU after unloading prisoners revealed that the Japanese were sleeping on rifles, machine guns, ammunition, and hand grenades. As a matter of fact, machine guns were located in one living compartment on the 4th day of searching, and only then when nearly all gear had been removed from the space. The fact that no uprising occurred can only be attributed to the eternal vigilance on the part of the prize crew and the fact that the prizemaster had deemed it advisable to remove all senior officers at the onset of the operation. This prize was literally "loaded with explosives."
3. Under the heading of personnel mention should be made of the excellent assistance rendered by the 93rd Division of the U.S. Army (Major General JOHNSON, AUS, Commanding) and by the 13th Airforce (Colonel Troops MILLER, USA, Commanding). The Army went to great pains to be helpful throughout, and without their assistance the operation would have been considerably complicated.
1. The employment of long lead telephones for inter-party communications and short range voice radios for inter-ship communications in an operation of this kind is highly recommended. No basic recommendations are submitted regarding prize crews or visit and search parties because of the fact that each situation must be judged on its individual merits. The prize crew employed on this occasion, armed as it was with sub-machine guns, riot guns, hand grenades, and pistols, and totaling eight (80) men, was deliberately constructed with the object of establishing and maintaining control over 1500 troops. Such a party would obviously be impractical and unnecessary in the case of an average merchant vessel carrying a crew of 50 or 60 untrained fighting men. That our prize crew accomplished its mission without any signs of trouble must be at least partially attributed to the factor of surprise and speed of execution of this operation.
2. It is earnestly believed that some sort of a revolt would have resulted had it been necessary to depart Morotai immediately, without the opportunity of ridding the ship of Japanese while a thorough search was conducted. Surprise and seasickness had worn off the troops; our own men were tired; and ample arms were actually available in the alleged wards to have necessitated drastic action from the convoying destroyers, with the probable attendant loss of most of our prize crewmen on board. The fact that the wards had a platform about four (4) feet off the deck, made it almost impossible to control everyone within; in fact it was impossible to see all the occupants. It is further believed that the transfer of all ammunition and seven hundred (700) prisoners to the YOCHOW, made available by Commander SEVENTH Fleet, was of enormous assistance. The remaining prisoners were fairly easily handled, and space was adequate for the. The removal of all ammunition removed a mental hazard as well as a physical one. Additional barricades were established and prize crew given an opportunity to rest during this period.
G. P. JOYCE.
| cc: | Cominch (Adv.) CinCPac -- CinCPOA (3) CinCAFPac ComDesPac CTF 74 CDS 51 |