DD228/A16-3
( CF-5 )

March 4, 1942

From:	The Commanding Officer.
To:	The Commander U.S. Naval Forces Southwestern Pacific
Via:	The Commander Destroyer Division FIFTY-EIGHT
Subject:	Report of action of Allied Naval Forces with Japanese Forces off Soerabaja, Java, N.E.I., February 27, 1942.
Reference:	(A)	Article 712 U.S. Navy Regulations.
Enclosure:	(A)	Executive officer's statement dated March 6, 1942.

1. The U.S.S. John D. Ford, with Lieutenant Commander Edward N. Parker, U.S. Navy, Commander Destroyer Division FIFTY-NINE embarked, got underway from Soerabaja, N.E.I., during the evening of February 25, 1942, in company with the R.N.N. cruiser De Ruyter, Commander Striking Force embarked, R.N.N. cruiser Java, U.S.S. Houston, R.N.N. destroyers KORTENAER and Witte de With, U.S.S. John D. Edwards, Commander Destroyer Division FIFTY_EIGHT embarked, U.S.S. Alden, Paul Jones, and Pope. This force made a sweep along the north coast of Madoera seeking enemy transports or men-o-war, but located nothing and returned to Soerabaja early the following morning. On the evening of the 26th, this force, less U.S.S. Pope, joined by the British cruisers H.M.S. Exeter and Perth, and destroyers H.M.S. Jupiter, Encounter, and Electra, got underway and made a similar sweep. As before the enemy was not located. The force continued on past Soerabaja in a westerly direction.

2. At 0735 on the 27th planes were first reported to this vessel by means of the TBS from the Houston. These were apparently located by means of RADAR installed on one of the British ships, as they were 25 miles away. Reports continued to come in; however, none were sighted until 0947. At 1300 course was reversed and the force headed for Soerabaja, entering the mine fields. At 1445 the force, having obtained contact reports from allied airplanes, again reversed course while in the mine field and stood out to encounter the enemy who was known to be in the vicinity of the Bawean Islands. The force reported consisted of two cruisers, six destroyers, and twenty-five transports. The weather and sea conditions were good with sea from the east, wind from the east and moon almost full.

3. At 1525 speed was set at 20 knots, course 315 true. The formation was as follows: The main body in column, order of ships De Ruyter, Exeter, Houston, Perth, and Java. The Jupiter was well ahead of formation, the Encounter and Electra on starboard bow of main body with the two Dutch destroyers on the port bow. The four U.S. destroyers were astern of the main body in column in following order: John D. Edwards, Alden, John D. Ford, and Paul Jones. At 1529 the cruisers ahead opened fire on planes overhead and the ships scattered. No bombs were seen to fall at this time. At 1534 some bombs were observed, however, none were close. At 1540 the disposition was reformed. Intermittent reports were received of planes in the distance, but none were sighted.

4. At 1615 the enemy was first sighted bearing 342 true, distance about 20 miles. The Houston commenced firing at 1617 to starboard, the other cruisers except the Java following. The four U.S. destroyers at this time took position on the disengaged quarter of the main body, a relative position which was maintained throughout most of the engagement. The two British destroyers closed our formation taking position approximately abeam of the main body on the off side of the action. At 1629 speed was changed to 25 knots, course to 248 true. The Japanese force appeared to consist of two battleships, either of the Kongo or Ise class, seven cruisers, three of which were of the Atago class and a number of destroyers. The range appeared to be about 20,000 yards. The battle continued with the two battle lines on approximately parallel courses heading in a westerly directioon. At 1631 the De Ruyter appeared to be hit. She and the Houston appeared to be taking the brunt of the battle. Japanese planes overhead were spotting and apparently doing a good job as about every fourth salvo was a straddle. At 1655 the Java appeared to be hit. During this time two columns of smoke were observed which appeared to be hits on the enemy by our main body. Just after the Java was hit torpedoes were fired on the starboard of the main body, all ships turned left to avoid being hit. At 1706 we again paralleled the enemy and action was resumed. At 1708 heavy smoke was seen coming from the stacks of the Exeter and she was noticed to slow down, the three cruisers astern overtaking and passing her. An additional enemy force of three cruisers and several destroyers were noted on our starboard bow well over the horizon at this time. The main body started falling off to the left, the De Ruyter lagging behind making an attempt to close the enemy. Simultaneously with this maneuver enemy destroyers launched torpedoes on the starboard bow. The De Ruyter appeared to have hit and sunk one of the attacking destroyers. The Kortenaer was torpedoed at 1714 and sank quickly. Two minutes later all of the ships were retiring on course about 180 true. At this time a torpedo was observed on our port quarter distance about 75 yards by control and the foretop converging at about a 20 degree angle and overtaking this vessel. Judicious conning from control by Lieutenant Mack undoubtedly saved the ship from being hit. The torpedo passed the port beam about 25 yards away, initially at about 6 feet depth and then commenced to surface. No wake was observed from the torpedo. After this several reports were made of periscopes in the vicinity. This completed what could be called phase I.

5. At 1726 Commander Striking Force directed all ships to follow him. The main body less the Exeter was reformed, course about 130 true and at 1740, 090 true. At 1745 our main body again opened fire on the enemy, their fire was particularly effective as fire was seen on one of the enemy battleships and two fires noted on one of the cruisers. These did not appear to have been brought under control as long as we could see them. At 1752 the main body changed course to about 240 true.

6. At 1807 we were on course 190 true, when orders were received to attack with torpedoes; however, these were cancelled almost immediately. At about 1815 our force came left to about east, orders were again received to fire torpedoes. The Japanese main body was on our starboard bow distance about 20,000 yards, target angle about 075 degrees. The range was closed to about 14,000 yards and all torpedoes on the starboard side were expended. Course was then changed to permit the firing of the six torpedoes in the port battery. The last one was expended at 1827. The four U.S. destroyers were in column at the time of firing, individual target plan was used. The destroyers then >passed under the stern of our main body and resumed position on their disengaged quarter on course between east and northeast. At 1830 a large explosion was seen in the Japanese battle line, and a little later two distinct columns of smoke. Although it is not known, it is believed that these were the result of the starboard broadside of torpedoes. During this time our ships were retiring under a smoke screen.

7. Retirement commenced towards Batavia, course being gradually changed to the left until at 1856 we were on course 290 true. At 1902 the enemy was observed on our port bow at 1903 gunfire was observed at 240 true. Our main body opened with gunfire, however, no damage was observed to either side. Courses were changed to the right passing north at 1930 and steadying on 060 true at 1936. For the following 20 minutes course was frequently changed between north and east, our speed was 28 knots making an attempt to close on the main body. Flares were frequently dropped by enemy trailing planes. At 1958 course was changed to about 160 true, and at 2014 to 175 true. What appeared to be four enemy destroyers were seen on our port bow at 2023, and as it was believed that they fired torpedoes course was changed to the left to avoid hits. No wakes or torpedoes were sighted by this vessel. Again at 2043 it was believed that torpedoes were fired on our starboard bow and the course was altered to 175 true. This could be called phase II.

8. During the preceding maneuvers our main body, less the Exeter, had been kept in sight. At about 2100 we separated and did not see them any more. At 2115 the four destroyers, now in company, slowed and obtained a navigational fix from the land which was in view ahead and to port. At 2210 we entered the mine field. Shortly thereafter we heard the Pope come up on the TBS and learned that she was on patrol off the entrance, also that the Exeter and one other ship, which we later learned to have been the Encounter, had previously stood in. The Pope was instructed to join us and course was set to pass through the mine fields. At 2300 seven motor torpedo boats, which turned out to be Dutch, passed us standing out. We proceeded through the channel and arrived Soerabaja at 0153 February 28, 1942 and commenced fueling between 3 and 5 AM.

9. The Ford expended eleven torpedoes, the total aboard at this time, at the enemy battle line. There were possibly one or two torpedo hits.

10. No damage was received by this vessel. Damage to the enemy is uncertain, however, the following is believed to be approximately correct: Two hits in their main body in the early stages; one destroyer sunk by the De Ruyter; two hits during phase II, which could have been from damage sustained during phase I; and two hits possibly as a result of torpedo fire.

11. There were no personnel casualties.

12. All personnel conducted themselves in a highly commendable manner and it is recommended that the entire complement of officers and men be given suitable award and recognition. Lieutenant William Paden Mack, U.S. Navy, is to be especially commended for his prompt and correct action in handling a tight situation when the torpedo was sighted approaching the ship; and GELVIN, Joseph Walter, 336 67 75, Y1c, U.S. Navy, for his excellent work on the bridge telephones during the entire engagement and in particular in the above case of passing the word through accurately.

13. The material condition of the Ford is practically the same and is considered only fair for operation in South Australian waters.

14. During the engagement the Houston was observed to be putting up a magnificent battle maintaining a rather rapid rate of fire and evidently preventing the enemy main body from closing at will. The geographical situation was precarious as the whole of the Java Sea seemed to be blocked from Borneo to Java to the west and quite likely protecting forces were to the east. The enemy was far superior in force, supported by aircraft of which the allied forces had none.

J. E. COOPER.

Copy to: CDS-29
               CDD-59