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SECOND REPORT
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Covering combat operations 1 March 1944 to 1 March 1945
By
FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING
COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES FLEET,
AND CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
(Issued 27 March 1945)
SECOND REPORT
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL .......................................... 96
I INTRODUCTION ............................................... 97
II COMMAND AND FLEET ORGANIZATION ............................. 100
United States Fleet ........................................ 100
Organization of United States Naval Force in the Pacific ... 100
Organization of United States Naval Force in the Atlantic-
Mediterranean .......................................... 101
III COMBAT OPERATIONS: PACIFIC ................................. 103
Hollandia and Fast Carrier Task Force Covering Operations .. 104
Marianas Operations ........................................ 106
Progress along New Guinea Coast ............................ 112
Western Caroline Operations ................................ 114
Reoccupation of Philippine Islands ......................... 117
Assault on Inner Defenses of Japan ......................... 129
Continuing Operations ...................................... 132
IV COMBAT OPERATIONS: ATLANTIC-MEDITERRANEAN ................... 134
United States Atlantic Fleet ............................... 134
United States Naval Forces in Europe-
The Normandy Invasion .................................. 135
Eighth Fleet-Italy ......................................... 143
Eighth Fleet-Invasion of Southern France ................... 143
V FIGHTING STRENGTH ........................................... 146
Ship, Planes and Ordnance .................................. 146
Personnel .................................................. 152
Supply ..................................................... 155
Health ..................................................... 157
The Marine Corps ........................................... 159
The Coast Guard ............................................ 159
VI CONCLUSION ................................................. 161
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UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
12 March 1945
TO:
The Honorable James
Forrestal Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Twelve months ago I presented to the late Secretary Knox a report of the
progress of our naval operations and the expansion of our naval
establishment since the beginning of the war.
Long before the war Frank Knox saw clearly and supported strongly the
necessity for arming the United States against her enemies. He knew that
a powerful Navy is essential to the welfare of our country, and fought
with all his energies to build a Navy that could carry the attack to the
enemy. How well he succeeded is now a matter of history.
The manner in which the Navy has carried the attack to the enemy during
the twelve months from 1 March 1944 to 1 March 1945 is the subject of
the report which I present to you at this time.
In reading this report, attention is especially invited to the
significant role of amphibious operations during the entire period. In
fact, amphibious operations have initiated practically all of the Allied
successes during the past three years.
Fleet Admiral Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations
Page 97
Introduction:
My previous report presented an account of the development of the Navy
and of combat operations up to 1 March 1944. This report covers the
twelve months from 1 March 1944 until 1 March 1945. Within this period
the battle of the Pacific has been carried more than three thousand
miles to the westward-from the Marshall Islands into the South China Sea
beyond the Philippines-and to the Tokyo approaches. Within this same
period the invasion of the continent of Europe has been accomplished.
These successes have been made possible only by the strength and
resolution of our amphibious forces, acting in conjunction with the
fleet.
During these twelve months, there occurred the following actions with
the enemy in which the United States Navy took part
20 March 1944 Landings on Emirau Island, St. Matthias Group,
northeast of New Guinea
Bombardment of Kavieng, New Ireland
30 March- Carrier Task Force Attacks on Western Carolines
1 April 1944
22 April 1944 Landings in Hollandia Area, New Guinea
29 April- Carrier Task Force Attacks on Central and Eastern
1 May 1944 Carolines
17 May 1944 Landings in Wakde Island Area, New Guinea
19-20 May 1944 Carrier Task Force Attach on Marcus Island
23 May 1944 Carrier Task Force Attack on Wake Island
27 May 1944 Landings on Biak Island, Dutch New Guinea
6 June 1944 Invasion 0f Normandy
11-14 June 1944 Preliminary Carrier Task Force Attacks on Marianas
Islands
13 June 1944 Bombardment of Matsuwa Island, Kurile Islands
15 June 1944 Landings on Saipan, Marianas Islands
15-16 June 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Iwo Jima
and Chichi Jima, Volcano and Bonin Islands
17 June 1944 Capture of Elba, Italy
19-20 June 1944 Battle of the Philippine Sea
23-24 June 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Pagan Island,
Marianas Islands
24 June 1944 Carrier Task Force Attack on Iwo Jima,
Volcano Islands
25 June 1944 Bombardment of Cherbourg, France
26 June 1944 Bombardment of Kurabu Zaki, Paramushiru,
Kurile Islands
2 July 1944 Landings on Noemfoor Island, Dutch New Guinea
4 July 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Iwo Jima,
Chichi Jima and Haha Jima, Volcano and
Bonin Islands
21 July 1944 Landings on Guam, Marianas Islands
24 July 1944 Landings on Tinian, Marianas Islands
30 July 1944 Landings in Cape Sansapor Area, Dutch New Guinea
4-5 August 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Iwo Jima and
Chichi Jima Volcano and Bonin Islands
15 August 1944 Invasion of Southern France
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31 August- Carrier Task Force Attacks on Iwo Jima,
2 Sept. 1944 Chichi Jima and Haha Jima, Volcano and
Bonin Islands
6-14 Sept. 1944 Preliminary Carrier Task Force Attack on
Palau Islands
7-8 Sept. 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Yap
9-10 Sept. 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Mindanao,
Philippine Islands
12-14 Sept. 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on the Visayas,
Philippine Islands
14-15 Sept. 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Mindanao,
Celebes and Talaud
15 Sept. 1944 Landings on Peleliu, Palau Islands
Landings on Morotai
17 Sept. 1944 Landings on Angaur, Palau Islands
21-22 Sept. 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Manila,
Philippine Islands
23 Sept. 1944 Landing on Ulithi
24 Sept. 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on the Visayas,
Philippine Islands
28 Sept. 1944 Landings on Ngesebus, Palau Islands
9 Oct. 1944 Bombardment of Marcus Island
10 Oct. 1944 Carrier Task Force Attack on Okinawa Island,
Nansei Shoto
11 Oct. 1944 Carrier Task Force Attack on Aparri, Luzon,
Philippine Islands
12-15 Oct. 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Formosa and Luzon
18-19 Oct. 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Northern and
Central Philippines
20 Oct. 1944 Landings on Leyte, Philippine Islands
21 Oct. 1944 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Luzon and
the Visayas, Philippine Islands
23-26 Oct. 1944 Battle for Leyte Gulf
5,6,13,14,19, Carrier Task Force Attacks on Luzon, Philippine
25 Nov. 1944 Islands
11 Nov. 1944 Carrier Task Force Attack on Ormoc Bay, Leyte,
Philippine Islands
11-12 Nov. 1944 Bombardment of Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands
21 Nov. 1944 Bombardment of Matsuwa Island, Kurile Islands
7 Dec. 1944 Landings at Ormoc Bay, Philippine Islands
8, 24, 27 Air-surface Attack on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands
Dec. 1944
14, 15,16 Carrier Task Force Attack on Luzon,
Dec. 1944 Philippine Islands
15 Dec. 1944 Landings on Mindoro, Philippine Islands
3-4 Jan. 1945 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Formosa
5 Jan. 1945 Bombardment of Suribachi Wan, off Paramushiru,
Kurile Island
Air-surface Attack on Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima
and Haha Jima, Volcano and Bonin Islands
6-7 Jan. 1945 Carrier Task Force Attacks on Luzon,
Philippine Islands
9 Jan. 1945 Landings at Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, Philippine
Islands
Carrier Task Force Attack on Formosa
12 Jan. 1945 Carrier Task Force Attack on French Indo-China
Coast
15 Jan. 1945 Carrier Task Force Attack on Formosa
16 Jan. 1945 Carrier Task Force Attack on Hong Kong,
Canton and Hainan, China
21-22 Jan. 1945 Carrier Task Force Attack on Formosa and
Nansei Shoto
24 Jan. 1945 Air-surface Attack on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands
29-30 Jan. 1945 Landings in Subic Bay Area, Luzon, Philippine Islands
31 Jan. 1945 Landing at Nasugbu, Luzon, Philippine Islands
13-15 Feb. 1945 Bombardment of Manila Bay Defenses,
Philippine Islands
14 Feb. 1945 Landings at Mariveles, Luzon, Philippine Islands
16 Feb. 1945 Landings on Corregidor Island, Luzon,
Philippine Islands
16-17 Feb. 1945 Carrier Task Force Attack on Tokyo
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19 Feb. 1945 Landings on Iwo Jima, Volcano islands
Bombardment of Kurabu Zaki, Paramushiru,
Kurile Island
25-26 Feb. 1945 Carrier Task Force Attack on Tokyo and Hachijo Jima
28 Feb. 1945 Landings on Palawan, Philippine Islands
[In the above list, all dates are given as of local time in the area of
the action.]
No listing of actions with the enemy, however complete, can include the
ceaseless and unrelenting depredations of our submarines in the Pacific.
In the earlier phases of the war they operated by themselves far beyond
the range of any of our surface ships or aircraft. Their constant
presence in the westernmost reaches of the Pacific limited the freedom
of the enemy’s operations: their frequent and effective attacks depleted
his shipping and diminished his logistic as well as his combatant
strength. The rapid advance of our other forces, both sea and air, has
been due in no small measure to the outstanding success with which our
submarine activities have been carried on in waters where nothing but
submarines could go. During the current phases of the war, our
submarines are not only continuing independent operations, but are also
working in concert with the task fleets which are now exerting such
heavy pressure on the Japanese.
The account of combat operations in this report is based on special
summaries recently made by the fleet commanders concerned. In some
instances, this information will be found to differ slightly from
communiques previously issued, due to the subsequent accumulation of
additional facts. However, it should be understood that there has been
no opportunity yet for an exhaustive analysis from an historian's point
of view of the great mass of operational reports in my files. I can
furnish at this time no more than outline sketches of the highlights of
combat operations. The preparation of carefully documented historical
studies is underway, but the results will not be available during the
progress of the war.
Limits of space further require that this account of combat operations
be restricted to those actions which have had a significant or decisive
effect upon the progress of the war. Similarly, because of the greatly
magnified scale of the operations described, it has been impossible to
cite the names of individual ships and commanders in most cases. To
retain any semblance of continuity, it has been necessary to omit the
details of the constant activity of many naval air, surface, and shore-
based units which have performed invaluable services of patrol, supply
and maintenance on a vast scale. Land-based planes and PT boats have
incessantly harassed the beleaguered Japanese garrisons which have been
by-passed in our progress across the Pacific. Seabees and other naval
forces on shore have made great contributions to the conversion of
islands seized in amphibious operations into useful bases for further
attack upon the enemy. Countless ships and planes have contributed to
the safe progress of troops and supplies along far-flung lines of
communication. The operations of these forces, which have frequently
involved bitter combat with the enemy, cannot, because of the nature of
this report, be further elaborated upon.
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Chapter II
UNITED STATES FLEET
THE basic organization of the United States Fleet has remained unchanged
during the twelve months covered by this report. The Headquarters of
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, located in Washington since
December 1941, has continued to function as originally conceived, but
with the growth in complexity and volume of work, I felt the need of
assistance in matters of military policy concerning both the United
States Fleet and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Consequently the post of Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations was created, and on 1 October 1944,
Vice Admiral (now Admiral) R. S. Edwards reported for duty in that
capacity. On the same date Vice Admiral (now Admiral) C. M. Cooke, Jr.,
reported as Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
and Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) B. H. Bieri reported as Deputy Chief
of Staff.
ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN THE PACIFIC
United States Pacific Fleet
Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas continue under the command of
Fleet Admiral C. W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and
Pacific Ocean Areas. As the scene of operations moved into the far
western Pacific, Fleet Admiral Nimitz's headquarters at Pearl Harbor
became increasingly remote. Therefore in January 1945 advance
headquarters were established at Guam, from which the Commander in Chief
could supervise operations more closely.
Seventh Fleet
The Seventh Fleet (Vice Admiral [now Admiral] Thomas C. Kinkaid,
Commander) continues to operate in the Southwest Pacific Area. Vice
Admiral Kinkaid is under the command of General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, Commander in Chief of that Area.
Sea Frontiers
On 15 April 1944 a series of changes in the command organization of
waters along the Pacific coast of the United States was made. The
Northwest Sea Frontier, which has been composed of the Northwestern
Sector (Oregon and Washington) and the Alaska Sector, was abolished. The
Northwestern Sector was incorporated into the Western Sea Frontier, and
the Alaska Sector was established as the Alaskan Sea
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Frontier (Vice Admiral F. J. Fletcher, Commander). At the same time the
17th Naval District was created including the Territory of Alaska and
its waters. This change consolidated all sea frontier and correlated
activities on the west coast of the United States under the Commander,
Western Sea Frontier (Vice Admiral D. W. Bagley), and incidentally
brought the jurisdictional limits of the naval sea frontiers into
conformity with the Army defense organizations on the Pacific coast of
the United States.
On 8 November 1944, the functions of the Commander, Western Sea
Frontier, were greatly enlarged in scope in order to afford more
effective logistic support for war operations of United States forces in
the Pacific. On 17 November 1944, Admiral R. E. Ingersoll assumed duties
as Commander, Western Sea Frontier, relieving Vice Admiral Bagley.
On 28 November 1944, Vice Admiral Bagley relieved Vice Admiral R. L.
Ghormley as Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier.
The Philippine Sea Frontier (Rear Admiral J. L. Kauffman, Commander) was
established as a separate command under Commander Seventh Fleet
(Southwest Pacific Area) on 13 November 1944.
ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN THE ATLANTIC-MEDITERRANEAN
United States Atlantic Fleet
The U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Admiral Ingersoll, Commander in Chief, until 15
November 1944, when relieved by Admiral J. H. Ingram) consists of the
forces operating in the United States area of strategic responsibility,
which is, roughly, the western half of the Atlantic Ocean. The Fourth
Fleet, operating in the South Atlantic, is a unit of U.S. Atlantic
Fleet. Vice Admiral (now Admiral) Ingram was Commander Fourth Fleet
until November 1944, when relieved by Vice Admiral W. R. Munroe.
United States Naval Forces, Europe
U.S. Naval Forces, Europe (Twelfth Fleet), Admiral H. R. Stark,
Commander, is an administrative command, embracing all United States
naval forces assigned to British waters and the Atlantic coastal waters
of Europe. Admiral Stark is responsible for the maintenance and training
of all United States naval units in his area. For operations connected
with the invasion of the continent of Europe, he assigns appropriate
task forces to the operational control of the British Admiral commanding
the Allied naval contingent of General of the Army Dwight D.
Eisenhower's supreme command which embraces all Army, Navy and Air
elements involved in activities connected with the Western Front.
United States Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters (Eighth Fleet) Vice Admiral
(now Admiral) H. K. Hewitt, Commander, includes all United States naval
forces in the Mediterranean. Vice Admiral Hewitt is under the British
naval Commander in Chief of the Allied naval forces in the area, who is,
in turn, under the command of the
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Supreme Commander of the area (formerly General of the Army Eisenhower,
later Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson, at present Field Marshal
Alexander of the British Army.)
Sea Frontiers
There are four sea frontiers in the Western Atlantic. The Eastern Sea
Frontier (Vice Admiral H. F. Leary, Commander) consists of the coastal
waters and adjacent land areas from the Canadian border to Jacksonville.
The Gulf Sea Frontier (Rear Admiral [now Vice Admiral] Munroe,
Commander, until 17 July 1944, when relieved by Rear Admiral W. S.
Anderson) consists of the coastal waters from Jacksonville westward,
including the Gulf of Mexico and adjacent land areas. The Caribbean Sea
Frontier (Vice Admiral A. B. Cook, Commander, until 14 May 1944, when
relieved by Vice Admiral R. C. Giffen) consists of eastern Caribbean and
adjacent land and water areas. The Panama Sea Frontier (Rear Admiral H.
C. Train, Commander, until 1 November 1944, when relieved by Rear
Admiral H. C. Kingman) consists of western Caribbean waters, adjacent
land areas, and those waters of the Pacific constituting the western
approaches to the Panama Canal. The Commander of the Panama Sea Frontier
is under the Commanding General at Panama. The other western Atlantic
sea frontier commanders are directly under Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet.
The Moroccan Sea Frontier (Commodore B. V. McCandlish, Commander) is
under Commander Eighth Fleet.
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Chapter III
The Pacific
DURING the year 1944, the whole of the United States Navy in the Pacific
was on the offensive. My previous report, summarizing combat operations
to 1 March 1944, showed the evolution by which we had passed from the
defensive, through the defensive-offensive and offensive-defensive
stages, to the full offensive. To understand the significance of our
operations in the account which follows, the reader must be aware of the
basic reasons behind them.
The campaign in the Pacific has important elements of dissimilarity from
the campaign in Europe. Since the "battle of the beaches" was finally
won with the landings in Normandy last June, the naval task in Europe
has become of secondary scope. The European war has turned into a vast
land campaign, in which the role of the navies is to keep open the
trans-Atlantic sea routes against an enemy whose naval strength appears
to be broken except for his U-boat activities. In contrast, the Pacific
war is still in the "crossing the ocean" phase. There are times in the
Pacific when troops get beyond the range of naval gun support, but much
of the fighting has been, is now, and will continue for some time to be
on beaches where Army and Navy combine in amphibious operations.
Therefore, the essential element of our dominance over the Japanese has
been the strength of our fleet. The ability to move troops from island
to island, and to put them ashore against opposition, is due to the fact
that our command of the sea is spreading as Japanese naval strength
withers. As a rough generalization, the war in Europe is now
predominantly an affair of armies, while the war in the Pacific is still
predominantly naval.
The strategy in the Pacific has been to advance on the core of the
Japanese position from two directions. Under General of the Army
MacArthur, a combined Allied Army-Navy force has moved north from the
Australian region. Under Fleet Admiral Nimitz, a United States Army-
Navy-Marine force has moved west from Hawaii. The mobile power embodied
in the major combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet has, sometimes
united and sometimes separately, covered operations along both routes of
advance, and at the same time contained the Japanese Navy.
In November 1943 South Pacific forces secured a beachhead on
Bougainville, on which airfields were constructed for the neutralization
of the Japanese base of Rabaul on New Britain. Simultaneously Southwest
Pacific forces were working their way along the northern coast of New
Guinea.
In November 1943 Pacific Ocean Areas forces attacked the Gilbert
Islands, and at the end of January 1944 the Marshall Islands-the first
stepping stones along the road from Hawaii. To control the seas and
render secure a route from Hawaii west-
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ward, it was not necessary to occupy every atoll. We could and did
pursue a "leap frog" strategy, the basic concept of which is to seize
those islands essential for our use by-passing many strongly held
intervening ones which were not necessary for our purposes. This policy
was made possible by the gradually increasing disparity between our own
naval power and that of the enemy, so that the enemy was and still is
unable to support the garrisons of the by-passed atolls. Consequently,
by cutting the enemy's line of communicating bases, the isolated ones
became innocuous, without the necessity for our expending effort for
their capture. Therefore, we can with impunity by-pass numerous enemy
positions, with small comfort to the isolated Japanese garrisons, who
are left to meditate on the fate of exposed forces beyond the range of
naval support.
This strategy has brought the Navy into combat with shore-based air
forces. It has involved some risks and considerable difficulty, which we
have overcome. However, as we near the enemy's homeland, the problem
becomes more and more difficult. During the first landing in the
Philippines, for example, it was necessary to deal with the hundred or
more Japanese airfields that were within flying range of Leyte. This
imposed on our carrier forces a heavy task which we may expect to become
increasingly heavy from time to time. While shore-based air facilities
are being established as rapidly as possible in each position we
capture, there will always be a period following a successful landing
when control of the air will rest solely on the strength of our carrier
based aviation.
The value of having naval vessels in support of landings has been fully
confirmed. The renewed importance of battleships is one of the
interesting features of the Pacific war. The concentrated power of heavy
naval guns is very great by standards of land warfare, and the artillery
support they have given in landing operations has been a material factor
in getting our troops ashore with minimum loss of life. Battleships and
cruisers, as well as smaller ships, have proved their worth for this
purpose.
As I pointed out above, our advance across the Pacific followed two
routes. At the opening of the period covered by this report, General of
the Army MacArthur's forces were working their way along the northern
coast of New Guinea, while Fleet Admiral Nimitz, by the capture of the
Gilbert and Marshall Islands, had taken the first steps along the other
route. The narrative which follows begins with the operations leading to
the capture of Hollandia on the north coast of New Guinea.
HOLLANDIA AND FAST CARRIER TASK FORCE COVERING OPERATIONS
On 13 February 1944 the final occupation of the Huon Peninsula in
northeast New Guinea was completed. The occupation of the Admiralty
Islands on 29 February 1944 by General of the Army MacArthur's forces
and of Emirau in the St. Matthias group, north of New Britain, by
Admiral W. F. Halsey's forces on 20 March had further advanced our
holdings. In these two operations, the amphibious attack forces were
commanded respectively by Rear Admiral W. M. Fechteler and Rear Admiral
(now Vice Admiral) T. S. Wilkinson. On 20 March battleships and
destroyers bombarded Kavieng, New Ireland.
The enemy had concentrated a considerable force at Wewak, on the
northern
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coast of New Guinea, several hundred miles west of the Huon Peninsula.
Hollandia, more than two hundred miles west of Wewak, had a good
potential harbor and three airstrips capable of rehabilitation and
enlargement. In order to accelerate the reconquest of New Guinea, it was
decided to push far to the northwest, seize the coastal area in the
vicinity of Aitape and Hollandia, thus by-passing and neutralizing the
enemy's holdings in the Hansa Bay and Wewak areas. This operation was
made possible by the availability of the fast carrier task force of the
Pacific Fleet to perform two functions, namely to neutralize enemy
positions in the Western Carolines from which attacks might be launched
against our landing forces or against our new bases in the Admiralties
and Emirau, and to furnish close cover for the landing.
Carrier Task Force Attacks on Western Carolines
Under command of Admiral R. A. Spruance, Commander Fifth Fleet, a
powerful force of the Pacific Fleet, including carriers, fast
battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, attacked the Western Carolines.
On 30 and 31 March, carrier-based planes struck at the Palau group with
shipping as primary target. They sank 3 destroyers, 17 freighters, 5
oilers and 3 small vessels, and damaged 17 additional ships. The planes
also bombed the airfields, but they did not entirely stop Japanese air
activity. At the same time, our aircraft mined the waters around Palau
in order to immobilize enemy shipping in the area.
Part of the force struck Yap and Ulithi on 31 March and Woleai on 1
April.
Although the carrier aircraft encountered active air opposition over the
Palau area on both days, they quickly overcame it. Enemy planes
approached the task force on the evening of 29 March and 30 March but
were destroyed or driven off by the combat air patrols. During the three
days' operation our plane losses were 25 in combat, while the enemy had
114 planes destroyed in combat and 46 on the ground. These attacks were
successful in obtaining the desired effect, and the operation in New
Guinea went forward without opposition from the Western Carolines.
Capture and Occupation of Hollandia
The assault on Hollandia involved a simultaneous three-pronged attack by
Southwest Pacific forces. Landings at Tanahmerah Bay and, 30 miles to
the eastward, at Humboldt Bay trapped the Hollandia airstrips situated
12 miles inland. The third landing, an additional 90 miles to the
eastward at Aitape, provided a diversionary attack, wiped out an enemy
strong point, and won another airstrip. Approximately 50,000 Japanese
were cut off and the complete domination of New Guinea by Allied forces
was hastened. The operation was under the command of General of the Army
MacArthur. Three separate attack groups operated under a single attack
force commander, Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) D. E. Barbey, who also
commanded the Tanahmerah Bay attack group. Rear Admiral Fechteler
commanded the Humboldt Bay group and Captain (now Rear Admiral) A. G.
Noble the Aitape group. This amphibious operation was the largest that
had been undertaken in the Southwest Pacific area up to that time. Over
200 ships were engaged. A powerful force of carriers, fast battleships,
cruisers and destroyers from the Pacific Fleet, commanded by Rear
Admiral (now Vice Admiral) M. A. Mitscher, covered the landings.
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Throughout 21 April, the day before the landings, the carriers launched
strikes against the airstrips in the Aitape-Hollandia area, which had
previously been bombed nightly since 12 April by land-based aircraft. On
the night of 21-22 April, light cruisers and destroyers bombarded the
airfields at Wakde and Sawar. The amphibious landing took place on the
22nd, and on that and the following day planes from the Pacific Fleet
carriers supported operations ashore, while keeping neighboring enemy
airfields neutralized. Prepared defenses were found abandoned at Aitape;
at Hollandia and Tanahmerah Bay there were none. The enemy took to the
hills and the landings were virtually unopposed. Once ashore, all three
groups encountered difficulties with swampy areas behind the beaches,
lack of overland communications, and dense jungles. In spite of these
obstacles, satisfactory progress was made. At the end of the second day
the Aitape strip had been occupied and fighters were using it within
twenty-four hours. The Hollandia strips fell a few days later.
As soon as the airstrips were in full operation and the port facilities
at Hollandia developed, we were ready for further attacks at points
along the northwestern coast of New Guinea.
Carrier ask Force Attack on Central and Eastern Carolines
Returning from support of the Hollandia landings, the fast carrier task
force attacked Truk on 29 and 30 April. Initial fighter sweeps overcame
almost all enemy air opposition by 1000 on the morning of the 29th, and
thereafter over 2200 sorties, dropping 740 tons of bombs, were flown
against land installations on Truk Atoll. Our planes encountered
vigorous and active antiaircraft fire, but did exceedingly heavy damage
to buildings and installations ashore. One air attack was attempted on
our carriers on the morning of the 29th, but the approaching planes were
shot down before they could do damage. Our plane losses in combat were
27 against 63 enemy planes destroyed in the air and at least 60 more on
the ground.
For over two hours on 30 April a group of cruisers and destroyers
bombarded Satawan Island, where the enemy had been developing an air
base. Although existing installations were of little importance, the
bombardment served to hinder the enemy's plans and furnished training
for the crews of our ships. Similarly, a group of fast battleships and
destroyers, returning from Truk, bombarded Ponape for 80 minutes on 1
May. There was no opposition except for antiaircraft fire against the
supporting planes.
MARIANAS OPERATIONS
During the summer of 1944, Pacific Ocean Areas forces captured the
islands of Saipan, Guam and Tinian, and neutralized the other Marianas
Islands which remained in the hands of the enemy.
The Marianas form part of an almost continuous chain of islands
extending 1350 miles southward from Tokyo. Many of these islands are
small, rocky, and valueless from a military viewpoint; but others
provide a series of mutually supporting airfields and bases, like so
many stepping stones, affording protected lines of air and sea
communication from the home islands of the Japanese Empire through the
Nanpo Shoto [Bonin and Volcano Islands] and Marianas to Truk; thence to
the Eastern
Page 107
(Plate 8 here.)
Page 108
Carolines and Marshalls, as well as to the Western Carolines, the
Philippines and Japanese-held territory to the south and west. Our
occupation of the Marianas would, therefore, effectively cut these
admirably protected lines of enemy communication, and give us bases from
which we could not only control sea areas further west in the Pacific
but also on which we could base aircraft to bomb Tokyo and the home
islands of the Empire.
As soon as essential points in the Marshall Islands had been secured,
preparations were made for the Marianas operation. Admiral Spruance, who
had already conducted the Gilberts and Marshalls operations, was in
command. Amphibious forces were directly under Vice Admiral (now
Admiral) R. K. Turner and the Expeditionary Forces were commanded by
Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC. Ships were assembled,
trained, and loaded at many points in the Pacific Ocean Areas. More than
600 vessels ranging from battleships and aircraft carriers to cruisers,
high-speed transports and tankers, more than 2,000 aircraft, and some
300,000 Navy, Marine and Army personnel took part in the capture of the
Marianas.
Enemy airbases on Marcus and Wake Islands flanked on the north our
approach to the Marianas. Consequently, a detachment of carriers,
cruisers, and destroyers from the Fifth Fleet attacked these islands
almost a month before the projected landings in order to destroy
aircraft, shore installations, and shipping. Carrier planes struck
Marcus on 19 and 20 May and Wake on 23 May. They encountered little
opposition and accomplished their mission with very light losses due to
antiaircraft fire.
From about the beginning of June, land-based aircraft from the
Admiralties, Green, Emirau and Hollandia kept enemy bases, especially at
Truk, Palau, and Yap, well neutralized. The fast carriers and
battleships of the Fifth Fleet, under Vice Admiral Mitscher, prepared
the way for the amphibious assault. Carrier planes began attacks on the
Marianas on 11 June with the object of first destroying aircraft and air
facilities and then concentrating on bombing shore defenses in
preparation for the coming amphibious landings. They achieved control of
the air over the Marianas on the first fighter sweep of 11 June and
thereafter attacked air facilities, defense installations, and shipping
in the vicinity.
Initial Landings on Saipan
Saipan, the first objective, was the key to the Japanese defenses;
having been in Japanese hands since World War I, its fortifications were
formidable. Although a rugged island unlike the coral atolls of the
Gilberts and Marshalls, Saipan was partly surrounded by a reef which
made landing extremely difficult. To prepare for the assault scheduled
for 15 June, surface ships began to bombard Saipan on the 13th. The fast
battleships fired their main and secondary batteries for nearly 7 hours
into the western coast of Saipan and Tinian Islands. Under cover of this
fire, fast mine sweepers cleared the waters for the assault ships, and
underwater demolition teams examined the beaches for obstructions and
cleared away such as were found.
The brunt of surface bombardment for destruction of defenses was borne
by the fire support groups of older battleships, cruisers and
destroyers, which preceded the transports to the Marianas and began to
bombard Saipan and Tinian on 14 June.
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Early on the morning of 15 June the transports, cargo ships, and LST's
of Vice Admiral Turner's amphibious force came into position off the
west coast of Saipan. The bombardment ships delivered a heavy, close
range pre-assault fire, and carrier aircraft made strikes to destroy
enemy resistance on the landing beaches. The first troops reached the
beaches at 0840, and within the next half hour several thousand were
landed. In spite of preparatory bombing and bombardment, the enemy met
the landing force with heavy fire from mortars and small calibre guns on
the beaches. Initial beachheads were established, not without
difficulty, and concentrated and determined enemy fire and
counterattacks caused some casualties and rendered progress inland
slower than was anticipated.
The 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions landed first and were followed the next
day by the 27th Army Infantry Division. Although Saipan had an area of
but 72 square miles, it was rugged and admirably suited to delaying
defensive action by a stubborn and tenacious enemy. The strong
resistance at Saipan, coupled with the news of a sortie of the Japanese
fleet, delayed landings on Guam.
Battle of the Philippine Sea
This sortie of the Japanese fleet promised to develop into a full scale
action. On 15 June, the very day of the Saipan landings, Admiral
Spruance received reports that a large force of enemy carriers,
battleships, cruisers and destroyers was headed toward him, evidently on
its way to relieve the beleaguered garrisons in the Marianas. As the
primary mission of the American forces in the area was to capture the
Marianas, the Saipan amphibious operations had to be protected from
enemy interference at all costs. In his plans for what developed into
the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Admiral Spruance was rightly guided by
this basic mission. He therefore operated aggressively to the westward
of the Marianas, but did not draw his carriers and battleships so far
away that they could not protect the amphibious units from any possible
Japanese "end run" which might develop.
While some of the fast carriers and battleships were disposed to the
westward to meet this threat, other carriers on 15 and 16 June attacked
the Japanese bases of Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. During this strike to
the northward our carrier planes destroyed enemy planes in the air and
on the ground, and set fire to buildings, ammunition and fuel dumps,
thus temporarily neutralizing those bases, and freeing our forces from
attack by enemy aircraft coming from the Bonins and Volcanos. The forces
employed in the northward strike were recalled to rendezvous west of
Saipan, as were also many of the ships designated to give fire support
to the troops on Saipan.
On 19 June the engagement with the Japanese fleet began. The actions on
the 19th consisted of two air battles over Guam with Japanese planes,
evidently launched from carriers and intended to land for fueling and
arming on the fields of Guam and Tinian, and a large scale lengthy
attack by enemy aircraft on Admiral Spruance's ships. The result of the
day's action was some 402 enemy planes destroyed out of a total of 545
seen, as against 17 American planes lost and minor damage to 4 ships.
With further air attacks against Saipan by enemy aircraft unlikely
because of the enemy's large carrier plane losses, and with its basic
mission thus fulfilled, our fleet headed to the westward hoping to bring
the Japanese fleet to action. Air searches
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were instituted early on the 20th to locate the Japanese surface ships.
Search planes did not make contact until afternoon and, when heavy
strikes from our carriers were sent out, it was nearly sunset. The enemy
was so far to the westward that our air attacks had to be made at
extreme range. They sank 2 enemy carriers, 2 destroyers and 1 tanker,
and severely damaged 3 carriers, 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, 1 destroyer
and 3 tankers. We lost only 16 planes shot down by enemy antiaircraft
and fighter planes. Precariously low gasoline in our planes and the
coming of darkness cut the attack short. Our pilots had difficulty in
locating their carriers and many landed in darkness. A total of 73
planes were lost due to running out of fuel and landing crashes but over
90 per cent of the personnel of planes which made water landings near
our fleet were picked up in the dark by destroyers and cruisers. The
heavy damage inflicted on the Japanese surface ships, and prevention of
enemy interference to operations at Saipan, made these losses a fair
price to pay in return.
The enemy continued retiring on the night of the 20th and during the
21st. Although his fleet was located by searches on the 21st, planes
sent out to attack did not make contact. Admiral Spruance's primary
mission precluded getting out of range of the Marianas, and on the night
of the 21st, distance caused the chase to be abandoned. The Battle of
the Philippine Sea broke the Japanese effort to reinforce the Marianas;
thereafter, the capture and occupation of the group went forward without
serious threat of enemy interference.
Conquest of Saipan
During the major fleet engagement, land fighting on Saipan continued as
bitterly as before. Between 15 and 20 June the troops pushed across the
southern portion of the island, gaining control of two enemy airfields.
During the next ten days, from the 21st to the 30th, the rough central
section around Mount Tapotchau was captured. The Japanese, exploiting
the terrain, resisted with machine guns, small arms and light mortars
from caves and other almost inaccessible positions. This central part of
the island was cleared of organized resistance, and the last stage of
the battle commenced. By 1 July, the 2nd Marine Division had captured
the heights overlooking Garapan and Tanapag Harbor on the west coast,
while the 4th Marine Division and 27th Army Division had advanced their
lines to within about five miles of the northern tip of the island. From
1 to 9 July the enemy resisted sporadically, in isolated groups, in
northern Saipan. On 4 July the 2nd Marine Division captured Garapan, the
capital city of the island. One desperate "banzai" counterattack
occurred on 7 July but this was stemmed and all organized resistance
ceased on the 9th. Many isolated small groups remained, which required
continuous mopping up operations; in fact, some mopping up still
continues.
While the campaign ashore went on, it was constantly supported by
surface and air forces. Surface ships were always ready to deliver
gunfire, which was controlled by liaison officers ashore in order to
direct the fire where it would be of greatest effectiveness. Carrier
aircraft likewise assisted. Supplies, ammunition, artillery and
reinforcements were brought to the reef by landing craft and were
carried ashore by amphibious vehicles until such time as reef obstacles
were cleared and craft could beach. The captured Aslito airfield was
quickly made ready for use, and on 22 June
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Army planes began operation from there in patrols against enemy
aircraft. Tanapag Harbor was cleared and available for use 7 July.
Japanese planes from other bases in the Marianas and the Carolines
harassed our ships off Saipan from the time of landing until 7 July.
Their raids were not large and, considering the number of ships in the
area, these attacks did little damage. An LCI was sunk and the
battleship MARYLAND damaged. An escort carrier, 2 fleet tankers, and 4
smaller craft received some damage, but none serious enough to require
immediate withdrawal from the area.
While these activities went on in Saipan, the fast carriers and
battleships continued to afford cover to the westward, and also to
prevent the enemy from repairing his air strength in the Bonins and
Volcanos. On 23 and 24 June, Pagan Island was heavily attacked by
carrier planes. Iwo Jima received attacks on 24 June and 4 July and
Chichi Jima and Haha Jima on the latter date. The 4 July attack on Iwo
included bombardment by cruisers and destroyers. These attacks kept air
facilities neutralized and destroyed shipping.
Reoccupation of Guam
As has been seen, the unexpectedly stiff resistance on Saipan, together
with the sortie of the Japanese fleet, had necessitated a postponement
of landings on Guam. This delay permitted a period of air and surface
bombardment which was unprecedented in severity and duration. Surface
ships first bombarded Guam on 16 June; from 8 July until the landing on
the 21st the island was under daily gunfire from battleships, cruisers
and destroyers, which destroyed all important emplaced defenses. This
incessant bombardment was coordinated with air strikes from fields on
Saipan and from fast and escort carriers. The destruction of air
facilities and planes on Guam and Rota, as well as the neutralization of
more distant Japanese bases, gave us uncontested control of the air. The
forces engaged in the reoccupation of Guam were under the command of
Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) R. L. Conolly.
Troops landed on Guam on 21 July. As at Saipan the beach conditions were
unfavorable and landing craft had to transfer their loads to amphibious
vehicles or pontoons at the edge of the reef. With the support of
bombarding ships and planes, the first waves of amphibious vehicles
beached at 0830. There were two simultaneous landings; one on the north
coast east of Apra Harbor and the other on the west coast south of the
harbor. Troops received enemy mortar and machine gun fire as they
reached the beach. The 3rd Marine Division, the 77th Army Infantry
Division and the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade, under command of Major
General R. S. Geiger, USMC, made the landings; from 21 to 30 July they
fought in the Apra Harbor area, where the heaviest enemy opposition was
encountered.
The capture of Orote Peninsula with its airfields and other
installations, made the Apra Harbor area available for sheltered and
easier unloading. Beginning on 31 July, our forces advanced across the
island to the east coast and thence pushed northward to the tip of Guam.
While enemy opposition was stubborn, it did not reach the intensity
encountered on Saipan, and on 10 August 1944 all organized resistance on
the island ceased. Air and surface support continued throughout this
period.
The elimination of isolated pockets of Japanese opposition was a long
and difficult
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task even after the end of organized resistance. As at Saipan, the rough
terrain of the island, with its many caves, made the annihilation of the
remaining small enemy forces a difficult task. The enemy casualty
figures for Guam illustrate the character of this phase. By 10 August
the total number of Japanese dead counted was 10,971, and 86 were
prisoners of war. By the middle of November, these numbers had increased
to 17,238 enemy killed and 463 prisoners.
Occupation of Tinian
The capture of Tinian Island, by forces commanded by Rear Admiral (now
Vice Admiral) H. W. Hill, completed the amphibious operations in the
Marianas in the summer of 1944. Located across the narrow channel to the
southward of Saipan Tinian was taken by troops who had already
participated in the capture of the former island. Intermittent
bombardment began at the same time as on Saipan and continued not only
from sea and air, but from artillery on the south coast of Saipan. A
joint naval and air program for "softening" the defenses of Tinian went
on from 26 June to 8 July, and thereafter both air and surface forces
kept the enemy from repairing destroyed positions. There were heavy air
and surface attacks on 22 and 23 July, the days immediately preceding
the landing, and these completed the destruction of almost all enemy gun
emplacements and defense positions. The landings, which took place on
beaches at the northern end of Tinian, began early on 24 July. Beach
reconnaissance had been conducted at night and the enemy was surprised
in the location of our landing. Troops of the 2nd and 4th Marine
Divisions landed in amphibious vehicles from transports at 0740 on the
24th. They met only light rifle and mortar fire, and secured a firm
beachhead. Like Saipan and Guam, Tinian presented a difficult terrain
problem, but enemy resistance was much less stubborn than on the other
islands. On 1 August the island was declared secure, and the assault and
occupation phase ended on the 8th.
Throughout this period, surface and air units provided constant close
support to the ground troops. In addition, on 4 and 5 August units of
the fast carrier task force virtually wiped out a Japanese convoy, and
raided airfields and installations in the Bonin and Volcano Islands.
Damage to the enemy was 11 ships sunk, 8 ships damaged, and 13 aircraft
destroyed; our losses were 16 planes.
PROGRESS ALONG NEW GUINEA COAST
Before and during the Marianas operation, Southwest Pacific forces under
General of the Army MacArthur engaged in a series of amphibious landings
along the north coast of New Guinea. These operations were undertaken to
deny the Japanese air and troop movements in western New Guinea and
approaches from the southwest to our lines of communication across the
Pacific, thus securing our flank. Unlike the Hollandia operation, which
was supported by carriers and battleships of the Fifth Fleet, they
involved the use of no ships larger than heavy cruisers.
Occupation of the Wakde Island Area
In order to secure airdromes for the support of further operations to
the westward, an unopposed landing was made on 17 May 1944 by U. S. Army
units at
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Arara, on the mainland of Dutch New Guinea, about 70 miles west of
Hollandia. Under command of Captain (now Rear Admiral) Noble, a naval
force of cruisers, destroyers, transports and miscellaneous landing
craft landed the 163rd Regimental Combat Team reinforced. Extending
their beachhead on D-day along the coast from Toem to the Tor River, the
troops made shore-to-shore movements to the Wakde Islands on 17 and 18
May. By 19 May, all organized enemy resistance on the Wakde Islands had
ceased.
Occupation of Biak Island
Because of the need for a forward base from which to operate heavy
bombers, an amphibious assault was made on Biak Island, beginning on 27
May. The attack force, under the command of Rear Admiral Fechteler,
composed of cruisers, destroyers, transports and landing craft, departed
Humboldt Bay on the evening of 25 May and arrived off the objective
without detection. Initial enemy opposition was weak and quickly
overcome, but subsequently the landing force encountered stiff
resistance in the move toward the Biak airfields. Air support and
bombardment were furnished by B-24's, B-25's and A-20's, while fighter
cover was provided by planes from our bases at Hollandia and Aitape.
After the initial landing on Biak Island, the enemy, entrenched in caves
commanding the coastal road to the airstrips, continued stubborn
resistance and seriously retarded the scheduled development of the air
facilities for which the operation had been undertaken. Furthermore, it
became apparent that the enemy was planning to reinforce his position on
Biak. To counter this threat, a force of 3 cruisers and 14 destroyers
under the command of Rear Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley, RN was given the
mission of destroying enemy naval forces threatening our Biak
occupation. On the night of 8-9 June, a force of 5 enemy destroyers
attempting a "Tokyo Express" run was intercepted by Rear Admiral
Crutchley's force. The Japanese destroyers turned and fled at such high
speed that in the ensuing chase only one of our destroyer divisions,
commanded by Commander (now Captain) A. E. Jarrell, was able to gain
firing range. After a vain chase of about three hours the action was
broken off.
Occupation of Noemfoor Island
On 2 July 1944, a landing was made in the vicinity of Kaimiri Airdrome
on the northwest coast of Noemfoor Island, southwest of Biak Island. The
amphibious attack force, under the command of Rear Admiral Fechteler,
consisted of an attack group, a covering group of cruisers and
destroyers, a landing craft unit, and a landing force built around the
148th U. S. Infantry Regimental Combat Team reinforced. Landing began at
0800, and all troops and a considerable number of bulk stores were
landed on D-day. Prior to the landing nearby Japanese airfields were
effectively neutralized by the 5th Air Force.
Enemy opposition was feeble, resistance not reaching the fanatical
heights experienced on other islands. There were not more than 2000
enemy troops on Noemfoor Island and our casualties were extremely light,
only 8 of our men having been killed by D-plus-6 day. Again, forward air
facilities to support further advance to the westward had been secured
at a relatively light cost.
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Occupation of Cape Sansapor Area
On 30 July 1944 an amphibious force, under the command of Rear Admiral
Fechteler, carried out a landing in the Cape Sansapor area on the
Vogelkop Peninsula in western New Guinea. Rear Admiral R. S. Berkey
commanded the covering force.
The main assault was made without enemy air or naval resistance. Beach
conditions were ideal and within a short time secondary landings has
been made at Middleberg Island and Amsterdam Island, a few thousand
yards off shore.
Prior to D-day Army Air Force bombers and fighters had neutralized enemy
areas in the Geelvink-Vogelkop area and the main air bases in the
Halmaheras. On D-day, when it became evident that the ground forces
would encounter no resistance Army support aircraft from Owi and Wakde
were released for other missions and naval bombardment was not utilized.
Again, casualties sustained were light: one man killed, with minor
damage to small landing craft.
This move brought our forces to the western extremity of New Guinea. It
effectively neutralized New Guinea as a base for enemy operations, and
rendered the enemy more vulnerable to air attack in Halmahera, the
Molukka Passage and Makassar Strait. Enemy concentrations had been
bypassed in our progress up the coast, but due to the absence of roads,
the major portion of enemy transport was of necessity water-borne. Here
our PT boats did admirable service, roaming east and west along the
coast, harassing enemy barge traffic, and preventing reinforcements from
being put ashore.
WESTERN CAROLINES OPERATIONS
Following closely upon the capture of the Marianas, Fleet Admiral
Nimitz's forces moved to the west and south to attack the Western
Caroline Islands. Establishment of our forces in that area would give us
control of the southern half of the crescent shaped chain of islands
which runs from Tokyo to the southern Philippines. It would complete the
isolation of the enemy-held Central and Eastern Carolines, including the
base at Truk.
Admiral W. F. Halsey, Jr., Commander Third Fleet, commanded the
operations in the Western Carolines. Additions to the Pacific Fleet from
new construction made an even larger force available to strike the
Western Carolines than the Marianas. Nearly 800 vessels participated.
Vice Admiral Wilkinson commanded the joint expeditionary forces which
conducted landing operations. Major General J. C. Smith, USMC was
Commander Expeditionary Troops, and Vice Admiral Mitscher was again
commander of the fast carrier force. Troops employed included the 1st
Marine Division and the 81st Army Infantry Division.
Preliminary Strikes by Fast Carrier Task Force
Prior to the landings in the Western Carolines, wide flung air and
surface strikes were made to divert and destroy Japanese forces which
might have interfered. Between 31 August and 2 September, planes from
the fast carriers bombed and strafed Chichi Jima, Haha Jima and Iwo
Jima. Cruisers and destroyers bombarded Chichi
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least 6 ships, and damaged installations, airfields and supply dumps.
Our forces lost 5 aircraft. On the 7th and 8th, planes from the same
carriers attacked Yap Island.
Simultaneously, other groups of fast carriers devoted their attention to
the Palau Islands where the first Western Carolines landings were to
take place. In attacks throughout the group from 6 to 8 September, they
did extensive damage to ammunition and supply dumps, barracks and
warehouses.
The plan was for Pacific Ocean Areas forces to land on Peleliu Island in
the Palau group on 15 September, simultaneously with a landing on
Morotai by Southwest Pacific forces. In order to neutralize bases from
which aircraft might interfere with these operations, carrier air
strikes on Mindanao Island in the southern Philippines were made. These
attacks began on 9 September and revealed the unexpected weakness of
enemy air resistance in the Mindanao area. On 10 September there were
further air attacks, as well as a cruiser-destroyer raid off the eastern
Mindanao coast, which caught and completely destroyed a convoy of 32
small freighters.
The lack of opposition at Mindanao prompted air strikes into the central
Philippines. From 12 to 14 September, planes from the carrier task force
attacked the Visayas. They achieved tactical surprise, destroyed 75
enemy planes in the air and 123 on the ground, sank many ships, and
damaged installations ashore.
In direct support of the Southwest Pacific landing at Morotai, carrier
task force planes attacked Mindanao, the Celebes, and Talaud on 14-15
September. On the 14th destroyers bombarded the eastern coast of
Mindanao. There was little airborne opposition and our forces destroyed
and damaged a number of aircraft and surface ships.
Landings on Peleliu and Angaur
Ships and troops employed in the Western Carolines landings came from
various parts of the Pacific. Three days of surface bombardment and air
bombing preceded the landing on Peleliu. During this time mine sweepers
cleared the waters of Peleliu and Angaur Islands and underwater
demolition teams removed beach obstructions. The Peleliu landing took
place on 15 September, the landing force convoys arriving off the
selected beaches at dawn. Following intensive preparatory bombardment,
bombing and strafing of the island, units of the 1st Marine Division
went ashore. Despite difficult reef conditions, the initial landings
were successful. The troops quickly overran the beach defenses, which
were thickly mined but less heavily manned than usual. By the night of
the 16th, the Peleliu airfield, which was the prime objective of the
entire operation, had been captured. After the rapid conquest of the
southern portion of the island, however, progress on Peleliu slowed. The
rough ridge which formed the north-south backbone of the island was a
natural fortress of mutually supporting cave positions, organized in
depth and with many automatic weapons. Advance along this ridge was slow
and costly. The Japanese used barges at night to reinforce their troops,
but naval gunfire dispersed and destroyed many of them. Enemy forces had
been surrounded by 26 September, although it was not until the middle of
October that the assault phase of the operation was completed.
The 81st Infantry Division went ashore on Angaur Island, six miles south
of Peleliu, on 17 September. Fire support ships and aircraft had
previously prepared
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the way for the assault transports. Beach conditions here were more
favorable than at Peleliu. Opposition also was less severe, and by noon
of 20 September the entire island had been overrun, except for one knot
of resistance in rough country. Prompt steps were taken to develop a
heavy bomber field on Angaur. Part of the 81st Division went to Peleliu
on 22 September to reinforce the 1st Marine Division, which had suffered
severe casualties.
The southern Palau Islands offered no protective anchorage. Before the
landings of the 15th, mine sweepers had been clearing the extensive mine
fields in Kossol Roads, a large body of reef-enclosed water 70 miles
north of Peleliu. Part of this area was ready for an anchorage on 15
September, and the next day seaplane tenders entered and began to use it
as a base for aircraft operation. It proved to be a reasonably
satisfactory roadstead, where ships could lie while waiting call to
Peleliu for unloading, and where fuel, stores and ammunition could be
replenished.
Marine troops from Peleliu landed on Ngesebus Island, just north of
Peleliu, on 28 September, by a shore-to-shore movement. The light enemy
opposition was overcome by the 29th. Later several small islands in the
vicinity were occupied as outposts.
No landing was made on Babelthuap, the largest of the Palau group. It
was heavily garrisoned, had rough terrain, would have required a costly
operation, and offered no favorable airfield sites or other particular
advantages. From Peleliu and Angaur the rest of the Palau group is being
dominated, and the enemy ground forces on the other islands are kept
neutralized.
As soon as it became clear that the entire 81st Division would not be
needed for the capture of Angaur, a regimental combat team was
dispatched to Ulithi Atoll. Mine sweepers, under cover of light surface
ships, began work in the lagoon on 21 September and in two days cleared
the entrance and anchorage inside for the attack force. The Japanese had
abandoned Ulithi and the landing of troops on the 23rd was without
opposition. Escort carrier and long range bombers kept the air
facilities at Yap neutralized so that there was no aerial interference
with landing operations. Although Ulithi was not an ideal anchorage, it
was the best available shelter for large surface forces in the Western
Carolines, and steps were taken at once to develop it. Landings on
Morotai
Occupation of the southern part of Morotai Island was carried out by the
Southwest Pacific forces of General of the Army MacArthur to establish
air, air warning and minor naval facilities. This action was further
designed to isolate Japanese forces on Halmahera, who would otherwise
have been in a position to flank any movement into the southern
Philippines. It was timed simultaneously with the seizure of Palau by
Pacific Ocean Areas forces. On 15 September 1944 an amphibious task
force composed of escort carriers, cruisers, destroyers, destroyer
escorts, attack transports and miscellaneous landing ships and craft,
all under the command of Rear Admiral Barbey, approached Morotai.
Practically no enemy opposition was encountered, and personnel
casualties were light; difficulty was experienced, however, in beaching
and unloading, due to coral heads and depressions in the reef adjacent
to the landing areas.
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Prior to D-day Army land-based planes from Biak and Noemfoor carried out
heavy strikes on enemy air facilities in Ceram, Halmahera, northern
Celebes, Vogelkop and southern Philippine areas. Carrier fighter sweeps
combined with further bombing operations prevented hostile aircraft from
reaching Morotai on D-day. Naval gunfire support was furnished by
destroyers and two heavy cruisers. During subsequent covering operations
we sustained our first naval loss in the Southwest Pacific Area, except
for planes and minor landing craft, since the Cape Gloucester operations
in December 1943; the destroyer escort SHELTON was torpedoed and sunk by
an enemy submarine.
REOCCUPATION OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
After providing support for the Palau landings, the Third Fleet fast
carrier task force returned to the attack on enemy power in the
Philippines. From waters to the east, they conducted the first carrier
attack of the war on Manila and Luzon. Under cover of bad weather the
carriers approached without detection. On 21 and 22 September planes
from the carriers attacked Manila and other targets on Luzon, inflicting
severe damage on the enemy and suffering only light losses.
On 24 September carrier planes struck the central Philippines. They
completed photographic coverage of the area of Leyte and Samar, where
amphibious landings were to take place in October, and reached out to
Coron Bay, a much used anchorage in the western Visayas. Many enemy
planes and much shipping were destroyed. The light air opposition
revealed how effective the first Visayas strikes of 10 days previous had
been. Following the strikes of the 24th, the fast carrier task force
retired to forward bases to prepare for forthcoming operations.
Initial plans for re-entry into the Philippines intended securing
Morotai as a stepping stone with a view to landings by the Seventh
Amphibious Force on Mindanao some time in November. The decision to
accelerate the advance by making the initial landings on Leyte in the
central Philippines was reached in middle September when the Third Fleet
air strikes disclosed the relative weakness of enemy air opposition. It
was decided to seize Leyte Island and the contingent waters on 20
October and thus secure airdrome sites and extensive harbor and naval
base facilities. The east coast of Leyte offered certain obvious
advantages for amphibious landings. It had a free undefended approach
from the east, sufficient anchorage area, and good access to the
remainder of the central islands in that it commanded the approaches to
Surigao Strait. Moreover, the position by-passed and isolated large
Japanese forces in Mindanao. The accelerated timing of the operation and
choice of the east coast for landing required, however, the acceptance
of one serious disadvantage-the rainy season. Most of the islands in the
Philippines are mountainous and during the northeast monsoon, from
October to March, land areas on the east sides of the mountains have
torrential rains.
Forces under General of the Army MacArthur carried out the landings in
the Philippine Islands. For this purpose many transports, fire support
ships and escort carriers were temporarily transferred from the Pacific
Fleet to the Seventh Fleet, which is a part of the Southwest Pacific
command.
The Central Philippine Attack Force, composed of Seventh Fleet units,
greatly
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(Plate 9 here.)
Page 119
augmented by Pacific Fleet forces, was under the command of Vice Admiral
Kinkaid. This large force was divided into the Northern Attack Force
(Seventh Amphibious Force, Rear Admiral Barbey commanding) and the
Southern Attack Force (Third Amphibious Force, Vice Admiral Wilkinson
commanding), plus surface and air cover groups, fire support,
bombardment, mine sweeping and supply groups. It comprised a total of
more than 650 ships, including battleships, cruisers, destroyers,
destroyer escorts, escort carriers, transports, cargo ships, landing
craft, mine craft, and supply vessels. Four army divisions were to be
landed on D-day.
The Third Fleet, operating under Admiral Halsey, was to cover and
support the operation by air strikes over Formosa, Luzon and the
Visayas, to provide protection for the landing against heavy units of
the Japanese fleet, and to destroy enemy vessels when opportunity
offered.
Preliminary Strikes by Fast Carrier Task Force
Preparatory strikes to obtain information on installations, and to
destroy air and surface strength which might hinder our success in the
Philippines, lasted from 9 to 20 October.
While a cruiser-destroyer task group bombarded and damaged installations
on Marcus Island on 9 October, ships of the fast carrier forces were
approaching the Nansei Shoto [Ryukyu Islands]. Long range search-planes
and submarines "ran interference" for the force, attacking and
destroying enemy search-planes and picket boats, so that our heavy
forces achieved tactical surprise at their objective. Carrier aircraft
attacked Okinawa Island in the Nansei Shoto on 10 October. The Japanese
apparently were taken by surprise. Not only was little airborne
opposition met, but shipping had not been routed away from the area.
Many enemy ships were sunk and airfields and facilities severely
damaged.
On 11 October while the force was refueling, a fighter sweep against
Aparri on the northern end of Luzon disorganized the relatively
underdeveloped and lightly garrisoned fields there.
The next attack, on Formosa and the Pescadores, took place on 12 and 13
October. These strikes on aviation facilities, factory warehouses,
wharves and coastal shipping, were expected by the enemy and, for the
first time in this series of operations, a large number of enemy planes
were over the targets and antiaircraft fire was intense. In spite of
opposition, 193 planes were shot down on the first day and 123 more were
destroyed on the ground.
At dusk on the 13th, part of the task force was skillfully attacked by
aircraft and one of our cruisers was damaged. Although power was lost,
the ship remained stable, due to prompt and effective damage control,
and was taken in tow. With a screen of cruisers and destroyers, and
under air cover from carriers, the slow retirement of the damaged ship
began. At that time the group was 120 miles from Formosa and within
range of enemy aircraft on Okinawa, Luzon, and Formosa. Enemy planes
kept the group under constant attack and succeeded in damaging another
cruiser on the evening of the 14th. She also was taken in tow, and both
vessels were brought safely to a base for repairs. (This was "CripDiv
1", LWJ)
In order to Prevent further air attacks while the damaged ships retired,
the
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carriers launched repeated fighter sweeps and strikes over Formosa and
northern Luzon on 14 and 15 October.
Beginning on 18 October the carrier planes again struck the Philippines.
In strategical as well as direct tactical support of the landings of
Southwest Pacific forces at Leyte on the 20th, the strikes of the 18th
and 19th were aimed at the northern and central Philippines. On 20
October some of the fast carriers furnished direct support to the Leyte
landing and others conducted long-range searches for units of the enemy
fleet. Thus, Japanese airfields in and around Manila and in the Visayas
were kept neutralized during the initial assault phase of the Leyte
landing, while at the same time carrier planes from the Third Fleet
furnished direct support to the landings by bombing and strafing beaches
and interior areas on Leyte throughout the day. On 21 October there were
sweeps and strikes to southern Luzon and the Visayas, including an
attack as far west as Coron Bay. Carrier planes also continued long-
range searches with negative results.
Leyte Landings
During the 9 days preceding the landing on Leyte, the task groups
sortied from New Guinea ports and the Admiralties and moved toward Leyte
Gulf. On 17 October (D-minus-3 day) preliminary operations commenced
under difficult weather conditions. By D-day the islands guarding the
eastern entrances to Leyte Gulf were secured. The approach channels and
landing beaches were cleared of mines and reconnaissance of the main
beaches on Leyte had been effected.
After heavy bombardment by ships' guns and bombing by escort carrier
planes had neutralized most of the enemy opposition at the beaches,
troops of the X and XXIV Corps were landed as scheduled on the morning
of 20 October. The landings were made without difficulty and were
entirely successful. Our troops were established in the central
Philippines, but it remained for the naval forces to protect our rapidly
expanding beachheads from attack by sea and air.
In the amphibious phase of the Leyte operation, YMS 70 sank in a storm
during the approach and the tug SONOMA and LCI (L) 1065 were sunk by
enemy action. The destroyer ROSS struck a mine on 19 October and the
light cruiser HONOLULU was seriously damaged by an aerial torpedo on 20
October.
Battle for Leyte Gulf
The Leyte landings were challenged by Japanese naval forces determined
to drive us from the area. Between 23 and 26 October a series of major
surface and air engagements took place with far reaching effect. These
engagements, which have been designated the Battle for Leyte Gulf,
culminated in three almost simultaneous naval actions, the Battle of
Surigao Strait, the Battle off Samar, and the Battle off Cape Engano.
They involved the battleships, carriers, and escort carriers, cruisers,
destroyers and destroyer escorts of the Third and Seventh Fleets, as
well as PT boats and submarines.
Three enemy forces were involved. One of these, referred to hereinafter
as the Southern Force, approached Leyte through Surigao Strait and was
destroyed there by Seventh Fleet units on the night of 24-25 October. A
second, or Central Force
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passed through San Bernardino Strait in spite of previous air attacks by
Third Fleet carrier planes and attacked Seventh Fleet escort carriers
off Samar on the morning of the 25th. Finally, a Northern Force
approached the Philippines from the direction of Japan and was attacked
and most of it destroyed by the Third Fleet fast carrier force on the
25th.
On the early morning of 23 October, two submarines, DARTER and DACE in
the narrow channel between Palawan and the Dangerous Ground to the
westward discovered the Central Force, then composed of 5 battleships,
10 heavy cruisers, 1 to 2 light cruisers, and about 15 destroyers. These
submarines promptly attacked, reporting four torpedo hits in each of
three heavy cruisers, two of which were sunk and the third heavily
damaged. DARTER, while maneuvering into position for a subsequent
attack, grounded on a reef in the middle of the channel, and had to be
destroyed after her crew had been removed. Other contacts were made
later in the day in Mindoro Strait and off the approach to Manila Bay,
resulting in damage to an enemy heavy cruiser.
On the 24th carrier planes located and reported the Central Force (in
the Sibuyan Sea) and the Southern Force (proceeding through the Sulu
Sea) sufficiently early to permit aircraft from Vice Admiral Mitscher's
fast carriers to inflict substantial damage.
The third enemy force, the Northern, was not located and reported until
so late on the afternoon of the 24th that strikes could not be launched
against it until the next morning. While these searches and strikes were
being made, the northernmost of our fast carrier task groups was
subjected to constant attacks by enemy land-based planes.
Although about 110 planes were shot down in the vicinity of the group,
one of the enemy aircraft succeeded in bombing the light carrier
PRINCETON. Large fires broke out on the damaged carrier and despite
heroic efforts of cruisers and destroyers to combat them, PRINCETON
suffered a series of devastating explosions which also caused damage and
casualties to ships alongside. After hours of effort to save the ship,
it became necessary to move the task group to meet a new enemy threat
(the reported sighting of the Northern Force), and PRINCETON was sunk by
torpedo fire from our own ships. It should be noted that PRINCETON was
the first fast carrier lost by the United States Navy since the sinking
of HORNET in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on 26 October 1942.
Battle of Surigao Strait
A part of the enemy's Southern Force entered Surigao Strait in the early
hours of 25 October. Seven ships (2 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser and 4
destroyers) advanced in rough column up the narrow strait during
darkness toward our waiting forces. The enemy was first met by our PT
boats, then in succession by three coordinated destroyer torpedo
attacks, and finally by devastating gunfire from our cruisers and
battleships which had been disposed across the northern end of the
strait by the officer in tactical command, Rear Admiral (now Vice
Admiral) J. B. Oldendorf. The enemy was utterly defeated. This action is
an exemplification of the classical naval tactics of “crossing the T.”
Rear Admiral Oldendorf had deployed his light forces on each
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flank of the approaching column and had sealed off the enemy's advance
through the strait with his cruisers and battleships. By means of this
deployment he was able to concentrate his fire, both guns and torpedoes,
on the enemy units before they were able to extricate themselves from
the trap. The Japanese lost 2 battleships and 3 destroyers almost before
they could open fire. The heavy cruiser and one destroyer escaped, but
the cruiser was sunk on the 26th by our planes. Other ships of the
Southern Force which did not engage in the night battle were either
later sunk or badly damaged by aircraft attack. In the night action, the
destroyer ALBERT W. GRANT was severely damaged by gunfire; our other
ships suffered no damage.
Battle off Samar
Throughout the 24th the Third Fleet carriers launched strikes against
the Central Force which was heading for San Bernardino Strait. This
force consisted of 5 battleships, 8 cruisers and 13 destroyers. As they
passed through Mindoro Strait and proceeded to the eastward, our planes
launched vigorous attacks which sank the new battleship MUSASHI-pride of
the Japanese Navy, 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer, and heavily damaged other
units, including the battleship YAMATO, sister ship of MUSASHI, with
bombs and torpedoes. In spite of these losses and damage which caused
some of the enemy ships to turn back, part of the Central Force
continued doggedly through San Bernardino Strait and moved southward
unobserved off the east coast of Samar. Our escort carriers with
screens, under the command of Rear Admiral T. L. Sprague, were dispersed
in three groups to the eastward of Samar, with the mission of
maintaining patrols and supporting ground operations on Leyte. Shortly
after daybreak on 25 October the Japanese Central Force, now composed of
4 battleships, 5 cruisers and 11 destroyers, attacked the group of
escort carriers commanded by Rear Admiral C. A. F. Sprague. A running
fight ensued as our lightly armed carriers retired toward Leyte Gulf.
The 6 escort carriers, 3 destroyers and 4 destroyer escorts of Rear
Admiral C. A. F. Sprague's task group fought valiantly with their
planes, guns and torpedoes. Desperate attacks were made by planes and
escorts, and smoke was employed in an effort to divert the enemy from
the carriers. After two and one-half hours of almost continuous firing
the enemy broke off the engagement and retired towards San Bernardino
Strait. Planes from all three groups of escort carriers, with the help
of Third Fleet aircraft, which struck during the afternoon of the 25th,
sank 2 enemy heavy cruisers and 1 destroyer. Another crippled destroyer
was sunk and several other enemy ships were either sunk or badly damaged
on the 26th as our planes followed in pursuit.
In the surface engagement, the destroyers HOEL and JOHNSTON, the
destroyer escort ROBERTS and the escort carrier GAMBIER BAY were sunk by
enemy gunfire. Other carriers and escort ships which were brought into
the fray sustained hits; these included the escort carriers SUWANEE,
SANTEE, WHITE PLAINS and KITKUN BAY. Enemy dive bombers on the morning
of 25 October sank the escort carrier SAINT LO. Approximately 105 planes
were lost by Seventh Fleet escort carriers during the Battle for Leyte
Gulf.
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Battle off Cape Engano
Search planes from Third Fleet carriers had located the enemy Southern
and Central Forces on the morning of 24 October, and had ascertained
that they were composed of battleships, cruisers and destroyers, without
aircraft carriers. As it was evident that the Japanese Navy was making a
major effort, Admiral Halsey reasoned that there must be an enemy
carrier force somewhere in the vicinity. Consequently he ordered a
special search to be made to the north, which resulted in the sighting
by one of our carrier planes on the afternoon of the 24th of the enemy
Northern Force-a powerful collection of carriers, battleships, cruisers
and destroyers-standing to the southward.
During the night of the 24th-25th, our carrier task force ran to the
northward and before dawn launched planes to attack the enemy.
Throughout most of 25 October the Battle off Cape Engano (so named from
the nearest point of land at the northeastern tip of Luzon Island) went
on with carrier aircraft striking the enemy force, which had been
identified as consisting of 1 large carrier, 3 light carriers, 2
battleships with flight decks, 5 cruisers, and 6 destroyers. Beginning
at 0840 air attacks on these ships continued until nearly 1800. Late in
the day a force of our cruisers and destroyers was detached to finish
off ships which had been crippled by air strikes. In that day's work all
the enemy carriers, a light cruiser, and a destroyer were sunk, and
heavy bomb and torpedo damage was inflicted on the battleships and other
Japanese units.
Early on the morning of the 25th, Admiral Halsey received the report
that the Central Force, which his carrier planes had attacked the day
before, had pushed on through San Bernardino Strait, had turned
southward along the coast of Samar and was attacking Rear Admiral
Sprague's escort carriers. Consequently, Admiral Halsey dispatched a
detachment of fast battleships and carriers to the assistance of these
Seventh Fleet units. Meanwhile the Central Force had turned away and
begun to retire northward to San Bernardino Strait in the face of the
heroic defense put up by the escort carriers and the expectation of
attack by other of our forces. Third Fleet aircraft reached this Central
Force after it had begun to retire and inflicted additional serious
damage. On the afternoon of 25 October our carrier planes probably sank
2 heavy cruisers and a light cruiser, blew the bow off a destroyer, and
damaged 4 battleships and other cruisers and destroyers. Fast surface
ships of the Third Fleet reached the scene of action after the enemy had
re-entered San Bernardino Strait. However, they encountered a straggler
on the 26th, which was promptly sunk. This straggler was identified as
either a cruiser or destroyer.
On 26 October aircraft from Third Fleet carriers attacked the retiring
Japanese forces again, doing further damage to the surviving
battleships. By the end of that day, the Battle for Leyte Gulf was over
and the three enemy forces were either destroyed or had retreated out of
range of our ships and planes. Thus the major Japanese threat to our
initial Philippine landing was averted and the enemy's total surface
power severely crippled. The losses of our Third Fleet in the action
amounted to 40 planes in combat, in addition to the light carrier
PRINCETON.
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November Carrier Task Force Strikes
While part of the fast carrier task force retired to fuel and
reprovision at forward bases, the remainder continued in action in
support of the Leyte campaign. During this period the fast carrier task
force was commanded by the late Vice Admiral J. S. McCain. On 27 October
planes from carriers bombed and strafed a cruiser and a destroyer off
Mindoro.
No major naval actions developed during the remainder of 1944, but the
Third Fleet was constantly active in providing vigorous support for the
operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. Although Japanese
installations in the Philippines and to the northward had been heavily
damaged by the September and October strikes, they were not destroyed.
On 2 November enemy planes attacked a carrier task group of the Third
Fleet and, although 10 of the Japanese aircraft were shot down, several
ships were damaged and some personnel casualties were suffered.
Carrier aircraft of the Third Fleet struck at Manila and the airfields
in the vicinity on 5 and 6 November. They destroyed 439 planes, sank a
cruiser, a destroyer, a destroyer escort, a submarine chaser, an oiler,
2 transports and a freighter, as well as damaging 44 vessels. They hit
numerous ground installations and destroyed railroad facilities.
On 11 November planes from the fast carriers attacked and destroyed a
Japanese convoy entering Ormoc Bay on the west coast of Leyte Island.
They sank 4 transports, 5 destroyers and 1 destroyer escort, and shot
down 13 enemy aircraft. This effectively ended one major attempt by the
enemy to reinforce his Leyte garrison.
Another two-day series of strikes on Luzon by aircraft from the fast
carriers occurred on 13 and 14 November. Antiaircraft fire over the
targets was light on the first day, but increased the second. Carrier
aircraft sank 3 transports, 3 freighters, and 3 destroyers, and damaged
43 vessels. Eighty-four enemy planes were destroyed in the two days'
raid.
Another air attack on Luzon targets came on the 19th. There was little
airborne opposition, only 16 planes being shot down at the target, but
100 were destroyed on the ground and with those shot down near the
carriers, 124 enemy planes were eliminated during the day. Few shipping
targets could be located and the total in that category was 1 freighter
and 2 small craft sunk with 13 vessels damaged.
On 25 November the last strike in support of the Leyte operation was
launched against Luzon. This time, a light cruiser, a mine layer, a
destroyer escort, 6 freighters, and a tanker were sunk, and 29 vessels
were damaged. Over the target our planes shot down 25 aircraft and
destroyed 32 on the ground. Enemy air attacks on the carriers were
heavier than usual, and 31 enemy planes were shot down near our ships.
During the November strikes the air combat losses of the fast carrier
task force were 97 planes.
Landings at Ormoc Bay
In order to cut the enemy overwater lines of supply and reinforcement
and to separate enemy round forces on Leyte, an additional amphibious
landing was made
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at Ormoc Bay, on the west coast of the island, on 7 December. Naval
forces commanded by Rear Admiral A. D. Struble put Army troops ashore 3
miles southeast of Ormoc against sporadic resistance. The destroyer
MAHAN and destroyer transport WARD were, however, so heavily damaged by
enemy aerial torpedoes that it was necessary for them to be sunk by our
own forces. Several days prior to the landing, the destroyer COOPER was
lost in a night action, while engaged in an anti-shipping sweep in this
vicinity, and on 11 December the destroyer REID was sunk during an enemy
air attack on a supply convoy en route to Ormoc Bay.
Landings on Mindoro
On 15 December Southwest Pacific forces landed on the southwest coast of
Mindoro Island, nearly 300 miles northwest of Leyte, in order to seize
the San Jose area and establish air facilities there. Enemy air on
Luzon, not having been entirely neutralized, attacked the convoy en
route. Our ships suffered some damage but continued the approach. The
landing was without opposition from shore but sporadic air attacks
resulted in the sinking of a few LST’s. In moving from Leyte to Mindoro,
our forces obtained the advantages of more favorable weather for
airfield construction and aircraft operations.
Occupation of southwest Mindoro presented a more serious threat to
Manila and to Japan's shipping lanes through the South China Sea. As an
immediate and strong reaction by the enemy was expected, carrier planes
of the Third Fleet promptly began making Manila Bay untenable. Securing
tactical surprise, they struck at dawn 14 December, the day before the
Mindoro landings. Local air control was gained and held continuously for
three days. In attacks on 14, 15 and 16 December our carrier aircraft
sank or destroyed 27 vessels and damaged 60 more, destroyed 269 Japanese
planes, and bombed air and railroad facilities. Enemy aircraft did not
molest the carriers during this strike, but 20 of our planes were lost
in combat.
On 17 December sea conditions began to deteriorate east of Luzon where
the Third Fleet was scheduled to refuel: a typhoon of severe intensity
developed with great rapidity along an erratic course. Although the main
body of the fleet escaped the center of the storm, the destroyers HULL,
SPENCE and MONAGHAN were lost.
Landings at Lingayen Gulf
The mid-December carrier strikes on Manila Bay had led the enemy to
expect further landings in that area. When we by-passed southern Luzon
and landed on the south and southeast coast of Lingayen Gulf on 9
January, the enemy was again taken by surprise.
Luzon, the largest of the Philippine Islands, with an area roughly the
size of Virginia, is generally mountainous, but is cut by two large
valleys. The central plain, extending from Lingayen to Manila Bay-about
100 miles long and from 30 to 50 miles wide-contains Manila, the
capital, the major concentration of population and wealth, numerous
airfields, and a network of roads and railways. Prompt seizure of this
area would strike at the heart of the enemy defenses in the Philippines,
provide bases for the support of further operations against the
Japanese, and deny the enemy the freedom of the South China Sea. The
most vulnerable part of the central plain
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is at Lingayen, where the low land does not offer the same opportunities
for defense as do the approaches to Manila Bay.
The Luzon Attack Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Kinkaid, under the
over-all command of General of the Army MacArthur, was composed of
Seventh Fleet units largely augmented by Pacific Fleet forces, and
numbered more than 850 ships. This was divided into the Lingayen Attack
Force (Vice Admiral Wilkinson commanding), the San Fabian Attack Force
(Vice Admiral Barbey commanding), a reinforcement group (Rear Admiral
Conolly commanding), a fire support and bombardment group (Vice Admiral
Oldendorf commanding) and surface and air covering groups (Rear Admiral
Berkey and Rear Admiral C. T. Durgin, respectively, commanding). The
Luzon Attack Force was to transport, put ashore and support elements of
the 6th United States Army (Lieutenant General Walter Krueger
commanding) to assist in the seizure and development of the Lingayen
area.
The Third Fleet, operating under Admiral Halsey, with its fast carrier
task force commanded by Vice Admiral McCain, was to cover and protect
the operation by air strikes over Luzon, Formosa and the Nansei Shoto.
Complete surprise was attained in attacks on Formosa and the southern
Nansei Shoto on 3 and 4 January. There was little airborne opposition,
but unfavorable weather conditions somewhat reduced the toll of enemy
ships, planes and facilities destroyed. Luzon was hit 6 January, with
the zone of operations extending southward to the Manila Bay area in
order to give special attention to enemy airfields. Overcast weather
prevented blanketing of the northern Luzon fields, and the attack was
consequently renewed on the 7th.
Landings in Lingayen Gulf were scheduled for 9 January. During the
passage of the attack force to Lingayen there was no enemy surface
opposition. One Japanese destroyer put out from Manila Bay, and was sunk
by our escorting destroyers. There was, however, intensive air attack
both during the passage and the preliminary operations in Lingayen Gulf,
which resulted in the loss of the escort carrier OMMANEY BAY the fast
mine sweepers LONG, HOVEY and PALMER and considerable topside damage to
other ships. For three days prior to the assault, Vice Admiral
Oldendorf's battleships, cruisers and destroyers bombarded the area,
while mine sweepers were at work and beach obstacles were being cleared.
Immediately prior to the landings the bombardment by heavy ships and the
air strikes from escort carriers were intensified; the assault waves
were preceded by rocket-firing and mortar-carrying landing craft, which
took up the frontal fire against the beaches, while the heavier calibre
fire was directed inland and to the flanks.
The Lingayen Attack Force landed the XIV Army Corps on the southern
shore of Lingayen Gulf, while the San Fabian Attack Force simultaneously
put the I Army Corps ashore on beaches in the Damortis area to the
northeastward. Only very light resistance was met at the beaches, and
the troops advanced rapidly inland in spite of unfavorable terrain
conditions. Bombardment and bombing had already silenced or destroyed
the great majority of fixed defenses and dispersed their personnel.
While the troops were going ashore in Lingayen Gulf on 9 January, the
Third Fleet fast carrier task force was striking Formosa. This target
was chosen to lessen the enemy air strength which had been operating
against Seventh Fleet forces on
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earlier days. As a result of this operation there was little enemy air
interference with the actual Lingayen landings: the Third Fleet in
addition netted 1 enemy ships sunk and 58 damaged for its day's work.
Although the troops pressed rapidly southward on Luzon, and were soon
out of range of naval fire support, a heavy force of battleships,
cruisers, destroyers and escort carriers remained in Lingayen Gulf for a
considerable length of time to cover the landing of reinforcements and
supplies and prevent enemy surface, subsurface, and air interference.
Third Fleet Covering Operations
In continued support of the Lingayen operations, the Third Fleet fast
carrier task force made a thrust into the South China Sea, especially
seeking the destruction of any major units of the Japanese Fleet that
might be encountered there. None were found, but the air strikes of 12
January on the coast between Saigon and Camranh Bay achieved much
shipping destruction. One enemy convoy was entirely destroyed and two
others were severely mauled: the shipping tally totaled 41 ships sunk
and 31 damaged. One hundred and twelve enemy planes were destroyed, and
docks, oil storage and airfield facilities were heavily damaged. Air
opposition was negligible.
Formosa was struck again on the 15th, against very slight opposition,
while fighter sweeps and searches were made to Amoy, Swatow, Hong Kong
and Hainan. Poor weather, however, greatly reduced the score of shipping
destruction.
To complete the Third Fleet's visit to the China coast, Hong Kong,
Canton and Hainan were struck in force on 16 January. A considerable
amount of shipping was damaged or destroyed. Extensive destruction was
inflicted on docks, refineries and the naval station in the Hong Kong
area, while huge oil fires were started at Canton. Air opposition was
again negligible.
In the course of this thrust into waters that the enemy had hitherto
considered his own, 3800 miles were traversed in the South China Sea
with no battle damage to our ships. No enemy aircraft had been able to
approach the fast carrier task force closer than 20 miles.
Formosa and the southern Nansei Shoto were again attacked on 21 January
under favorable weather conditions. Heavy damage was inflicted on
aircraft, shipping, docks and the industrial area at Takao. On the
following day Okinawa in the Nansei Shoto was struck. The destruction of
enemy aircraft and airfield facilities in all these strikes led to a
marked lessening of Japanese air effort against the Luzon assault
forces.
Operations against Manila
During the remainder of January, General of the Army MacArthur's troops
pressed steadily southward from Lingayen Gulf down the central plain. To
accelerate the progress of operations against Manila and to open sea
access to its harbor, additional amphibious landings were carried out in
southwestern Luzon at the end of the month. On 29 January an amphibious
assault force, commanded by Rear Admiral Struble, put the XI Army Corps
ashore in the San Narciso area, northwest of Subic Bay. This move, which
was designed to cut off Bataan Peninsula, was entirely
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unopposed. Mine sweepers made exploratory sweeps off the landing beaches
with negative results, and as it was evident that no enemy forces were
present the scheduled bombardment of the area was not carried out. The
troops moved rapidly inland and reached Subic by noon. On the following
day, the 30th, troops were landed on Grande Island in Subic Bay, again
without opposition. Mine sweeping of Subic Bay continued, with negative
results, and this fine harbor was made available for further operations
against the Manila entrance.
An assault force commanded by Rear Admiral Fechteler landed elements of
the 11th Airborne Division at Nasugbu, 15 miles directly south of the
entrance to Manila Bay, on 31 January. In this instance the naval
bombardment was confined to destroyers and smaller ships. Although the
troops reached their objective without opposition, a number of small
high-speed craft attacked the naval force, and PC 1129 was sunk in the
ensuing action.
On 13 February a force of light cruisers and destroyers, commanded by
Rear Admiral Berkey, commenced a preliminary bombardment of the
entrances to Manila Bay, and on the following day continued to shell
Corregidor Island and the southern portion of Bataan Peninsula. Mine
sweepers began clearing Manila Bay. On the 15th, while the bombardment
of Corregidor and the mine sweeping continued, troops landed at
Mariveles on Bataan against very light opposition, and on the 16th
landings were made on Corregidor itself.
The ability to place troops ashore in protected and mined waters was
made possible by naval gunfire against the fixed defenses of Corregidor,
and the sweeping of mines in the channel between Corregidor and
Mariveles. In considerably less than two months from the initial
landings at Lingayen Gulf, General of the Army Mac Arthur's forces had
covered the ground that had required more than four months for the
Japanese in 1942. In comparing the methods used by the two invaders for
seizing positions controlling the entrance to Manila Bay, it is
interesting to note that in both cases the attacking forces had control
of the sea and air. The Japanese relied principally on field artillery
from Bataan against our guns on Corregidor. Our method employed naval
strength as the spearhead of amphibious assault, thus allowing the
ground force commander flexibility in selecting the time and place of
the attack.
Landings on Palawan
At the close of February various operations against enemy holdings in
different parts of the Philippines were in progress, in which forces of
the Seventh Fleet were participating. On the 28th, the last day covered
by this report, a force of cruisers and destroyers commanded by Rear
Admiral R. S. Riggs bombarded Puerto Princesa, on the east coast of
Palawan. An amphibious attack group, commanded by Rear Admiral
Fechteler, put troops ashore shortly after. No opposition was
encountered: the town and two nearby airfields were quickly seized. This
landing secured virtual control of the westernmost of the Philippine
Islands, and provided the sites for air bases that will assist in
hindering enemy water transport from the Netherlands East Indies.
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ASSAULT ON INNER DEFENSES OF JAPAN
The amphibious operations of the spring, summer and autumn of 1944
carried our forces such great distances across the Pacific that in
February 1945 they were enabled to begin the assault upon the inner
defenses of the Japanese Empire itself.
The occupation of Saipan, Tinian and Guam had established shore-based
air forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas in positions from which continuing
air attacks could be made against the Volcano and Bonin Islands, and
from which long-range bombers could operate against Japan. To operate
with the greatest effectiveness and a minimum of losses, long-range
bombers should be provided with fighter support. Iwo Jima in the Volcano
Islands, 750 miles from Tokyo, provided three sites for airfields, and
was admirably situated for the establishment of a fighter base for
supporting Marianas-based B-29's operating over the home islands of the
Empire. The possession of Iwo Jima would also permit medium bombers to
attack Japan, deprive the enemy of an important aerial lookout station,
and reduce his air attacks on our Marianas bases.
The operations for the capture of Iwo Jima were under the command of
Admiral Spruance, Commander Fifth Fleet. Vice Admiral Turner was in
over-all command of the amphibious forces, and the Expeditionary Forces
were commanded by Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC. Major
General Harry Schmidt, USMC commanded the Fifth Amphibious Corps; Major
General Clifton B. Cates, USMC, the 4th Marine Division; Major General
Keller E. Rockey, USMC the 5th Marine Division; and Major General Graves
B. Erskine, USMC the 3rd Marine Division. The fast carrier task force,
operating in support of the assault, was once more commanded by Vice
Admiral Mitscher.
It was anticipated that enemy resistance would be severe. Iwo Jima had
been heavily fortified by the Japanese over a period of many years
because it is the only island in this strategically important group
which lends itself to construction of airfields. As the island is only
five miles long and less than two miles wide, the enemy could cover the
whole shoreline with artillery and machine gun fire and could
concentrate on the only two landing beaches. There was no opportunity
for maneuver to select an undefended landing place, and hence there
could be no surprise once we had begun reduction of the major defenses
of the island. Consequently preparations had to be made for the most
intensive ground fighting yet encountered in the Pacific. Landing forces
of 60,000 Marines, put ashore by a naval force of more than 800 ships,
manned by approximately 220,000 naval personnel, are evidence of the
scale of the attack and the determination of opposition expected.
Preliminary Air-Surface Attacks on Iwo Jima
For seven months prior to the February 1945 assault, Iwo Jima was
subjected to air attacks and surface bombardments, which increased in
frequency and intensity from December 1944 onward. Planes from the fast
carrier task force struck the island on 15, 16, 24 June, 4 July, 4-5
August and 31 August-2 September; on 4 July and 2 September bombardment
by surface ships was carried out.
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Beginning just before midnight on 11 November and continuing until 0100
on the 12th, cruisers and destroyers commanded by Rear Admiral A. E.
Smith bombarded Iwo Jima, making special efforts to damage air
installations. There was moderate shore battery fire during the first
part of the bombardment, but none of our ships suffered damage. Numerous
explosions were seen and several large fires were started.
Early in December bombers of the Seventh Army Air Force, operating under
the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, began daily attacks on Iwo
Jima, and Marine Corps bomber squadrons, based in the Marianas, began a
daily series of night harassing flights against enemy shipping in the
area. These constant raids were supplemented periodically by intensified
air attack and surface bombardment.
On 8 December and again on 24 December attacks by P-38's, B-29's and B-
24's were followed by over an hour's bombardment by Rear Admiral Smith's
cruisers and destroyers. A number of large fires were started ashore
during each attack. The bombarding ships suffered no damage.
On 27 December Army B-29's and P-38's bombed Iwo Jima once more, and the
same surface ships returned to fire on shore targets for an hour and a
half. Little opposition was encountered on either day, although one of
our ships received slight damage from shore batteries. Light personnel
casualties aboard one of our destroyers resulted from a hit from an
enemy destroyer escort which was pursued and sunk at sea.
Chichi Jima and Haha Jima in the Bonin Islands, as well as Iwo Jima,
were bombarded on 5 January 1945 by Rear Admiral Smith's surface ships,
while Army aircraft of the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas,
bombed airstrip installations on Iwo. Fire from enemy shore batteries
was meager.
A battleship-cruiser-destroyer force, commanded by Rear Admiral O. C.
Badger, attacked Iwo Jima on 24 January in a coordinated action with
Strategic Air Force bombers and B-29's of the 21st Bomber Command. Air
installations and shipping were attacked, with no interception by enemy
planes and only slight antiaircraft fire. One Japanese cargo vessel blew
up and two others were left burning.
Attack on Tokyo
Carrier aircraft of the Fifth Fleet attacked Tokyo on 16 February,
exactly one year after the first carrier strike on Truk. Fleet Admiral
Nimitz's communique announcing the strike stated: "This operation has
long been planned and the opportunity to accomplish it fulfills the
deeply cherished desire of every officer and man in the Pacific Fleet."
Landings on Iwo Jima were scheduled for 19 February. Consequently on the
16th pre-invasion bombardment and bombing of Iwo Jima began, while the
fast carrier task force struck Tokyo. This attack on the enemy's capital
was designed to provide strategic cover for the operations against Iwo
by destroying air forces, facilities and manufacturing installations, as
well as to bring to the Japanese home front a disrupting awareness of
the progress of the war.
Approaching the coast of Japan under cover of weather so adverse as to
handicap enemy air operations, our forces obtained complete tactical
surprise; our attack was
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vigorously pressed for two days. All enemy efforts to damage our ships
were unsuccessful. Against a loss of 49 of our planes, 322 enemy
aircraft were shot out of the air and 177 destroyed on the ground. A
Japanese escort carrier at Yokohama was bombed and set on fire; she went
down by the bow and was left lying on her side. Nine coastal vessels, a
destroyer, 2 destroyer escorts and a cargo ship were sunk. Hangars,
shops and other installations at numerous airfields were destroyed; the
Ota aircraft factory was damaged; and the Musashine Tama and Tachigawa
engine plants were heavily bombed. Upon completion of the 17 February
strike, the fast carrier task force retired towards Iwo Jima to give
more direct support of the landing operations.
Landings on Iwo Jima
After three days of intensive bombardment by surface ships of the Fifth
Fleet and bombing by Navy carrier and Army shore-based planes, the 4th
and 5th Marine Divisions began landing operations at 0900, 19 February,
on the southeast shore of Iwo Jima. This bombardment and bombing made
initial opposition light, except for some mortar and artillery fire at
LST’s and boats, but resistance rapidly developed in intensity during
the day. The enemy was soon laying down a devastating curtain of
artillery, rocket and mortar fire on the beaches, and the remainder of
the day saw bitter fighting as the Marines inched ahead against
determined resistance from heavily fortified positions. The troops who
came ashore encountered an intricate system of defenses, as well as some
of the most modern weapons that the enemy has employed in the present
war. The defending garrison, estimated at 20,000, was emplaced in an
interlocking system of caves, pillboxes and blockhouses, with both the
guns on Mount Suribachi (at the southern tip of the island) and in the
high northern area commanding the Marines' positions, the beaches and
the sea approaches. By the end of the first day, the Marines had
advanced across the width of the island at its narrow southwestern tip,
isolating the Japanese on Mount Suribachi from the main enemy forces in
the north.
During the early morning hours of 20 February, an enemy counterattack
was broken up by the 27th Marines; by the end of the day our troops had
captured Motoyama Airfield No. 1.
Desperate fighting continued during the third day: by 1800 more than
1200 Japanese dead had been counted, and one had been captured. The 3rd
Marine Division landed, as reserves, and moved into line between the 4th
and 5th Divisions. Although enemy air strength was generally light, it
succeeded in sinking the escort carrier BISMARCK SEA. During the night
of 21-22 February, the enemy counterattacked again and again, but each
assault was hurled back. The following morning the Marines renewed the
attack; by noon they were advancing slowly under adverse weather
conditions, knocking out enemy strongpoints. During the afternoon the
enemy counterattacked again, exerting maximum pressure on both flanks of
the Marine spearhead which was pointed toward Motoyama Airfield No. 2;
the attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.
The southern part of Motoyama Airfield No. 2 was occupied on 23
February. Simultaneously other troops stormed the steep slopes of Mount
Suribachi, capturing the summit and winning gun positions which
commanded the island. At 1035 the
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28th Marine Regiment hoisted the United States flag over the extinct
volcano. The capture of these heights eliminated some of the enemy
mortar and artillery fire which had been directed against our troops on
the previous days, while mortar fire from Kangoku Rock, northwest of the
island, was eliminated by a destroyer. Throughout the entire period,
close support was constantly furnished by carrier aircraft and naval
gunfire. Unloading continued on the beaches; roads were being
constructed, and the captured airstrips being restored to operational
condition.
By 25 February, Marines of the three divisions, spearheaded by tanks,
had captured approximately half of the island, including Motoyama
Airfield No. 2, and were closing in on the main village. The advance was
made against fanatical resistance from rockets, bazooka-type guns,
pillboxes and interlocking underground strongholds. On one flank alone,
100 caves, 30 to 40 feet deep, had to be knocked out one by one.
By the end of February, Marine Corps observation and artillery spotting
planes were operating from Motoyama Airfield No. 1; the 3rd and 4th
Marine Divisions had captured hills which further reduced the enemy's
fire power and allowed a freer supply flow on the beaches. The Japanese,
despite heavy losses, continued to offer maximum resistance, but the
Marines were established on high ground, and the conquest of Iwo Jima
was assured.
Renewed Attack on Tokyo
Tokyo was again attacked on 25 February by Vice Admiral Mitscher's fast
carrier task force, which struck the island of Hachijo, off the coast of
Honshu, the following day. Weather conditions were extremely adverse,
but at least 158 planes were destroyed and 5 small vessels sunk.
Numerous ground installations were attacked. The Ota and Koizumi
aircraft plants were heavily damaged; radar installations, aircraft
hangars, and 2 trains were demolished. Our forces lost 9 fighter planes
in combat; the ships of the task force suffered no damage during the
attack, but minor damage was inflicted upon two light units during
retirement.
On 1 March 1944 our forces were in the Marshall Islands and northeast
New Guinea. On 1 March 1945 they were established in Iwo Jima, 750 miles
from Tokyo.
CONTINUING OPERATIONS
In addition to the great battles and the major combats, there were many
vital continuing operations against the Japanese in the Pacific.
Although less spectacular, they were none the less significant in
exerting pressure on the enemy at every possible point. These
activities, with the exception of those by submarines, took place in
areas where campaigns had already been fought and where the fruits of
those campaigns were now capitalized on. Favorable positions and bases
gained from the enemy became points of attack on his more remote
holdings.
Northern Pacific
From bases in the Aleutians our air and surface forces kept up a
constant attack on Japanese positions in the northern and central Kurile
Islands. In spite of chronically bad weather, Army and Navy planes flew
both attack and photographic mis-
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sions to the Kuriles many times each month. They not only observed
Japanese activity, but also destroyed important installations, supply
dumps and shipping units. A task force of cruisers and destroyers
commanded by the late Rear Admiral E. G. Small bombarded Matsuwa Island
in the Kuriles on 13 June and Kurabu Zaki, an important enemy air base
on the southeast tip of Paramushiru, on 26 June. Matsuwa Island was
again bombarded on 21 November by a task force commanded by Rear Admiral
J. L. McCrea. On 5 January 1945, Rear Admiral McCrea's forces bombarded
Suribachi Wan, off Paramushiru, returning on 19 February to bombard
Kurabu Zaki.
Submarines
The activities of Pacific Fleet and Seventh Fleet submarines grew more
extensive and varied after 1 March 1944. As previously, they operated
aggressively against enemy combat ships and commerce. No waters of the
Pacific were too remote for their operations and their patrols carried
them to the interior lines of Japanese sea communication, where they
have littered the bottom of the ocean with the sunken wrecks of a large
part of Japan's once great merchant fleet, as well as many naval
vessels. Their contribution to the success of our advance in the Pacific
is noteworthy. Besides their combat patrols, the submarines have
rendered invaluable service on reconnaissance missions and have rescued
many aviators shot down during strikes against various Japanese bases.
Pacific Fleet submarines have been under the command of Vice Admiral C.
A. Lockwood, Jr., during the period covered by this report. Seventh
Fleet submarines were under the command of Rear Admiral R. W. Christie
until 30 December 1944, when he was relieved by Rear Admiral J. Fife,
Jr.
The British Pacific Fleet
Recently we have had the pleasure of welcoming the arrival in the
Pacific of a strong task force of the Royal Navy, commanded by Admiral
Sir Bruce A. Fraser, G.C.B., K.B.E. This potent addition to the Allied
naval power in the Far East has been placed under the operational
control of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and will work
side by side with our armed forces in the common effort against the
Japanese. Australian cruisers, destroyers and attack transports-under
the command of Rear Admiral V. A. C. Crutchley, V.C., D.S.O., RN later
Commodore J. A. Collins, C.B. RAN, and now Commodore H. B. Farncomb,
M.V.O., D.S.O., RAN-have continued to operate as an integral part of our
naval task forces, as they have in previous years.
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Chapter IV
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
DURING the past year the combat operations of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet
have been concerned primarily with antisubmarine activities, in
coordination with the sea frontier commands. Escort systems in certain
trans-Atlantic convoy routes are also the responsibility of the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. As was announced in the monthly
statements of the President and the Prime Minister, the antisubmarine
war has been on a fairly low scale during the past year. The German
submarine force apparently has been engaged in "licking its wounds"
after the rough handling it received in 1943. Its operations were badly
interfered with by the invasion of the Continent in June, which knocked
out the many U-boat bases on the French coast and forced the Germans to
use bases less conveniently located in Norway and the Baltic. It is
assumed that the long period of relative quiescence has been employed
for building more effective types of submarines. The possibility of a
renewed outbreak of submarine activity must, therefore, be guarded
against. The remarks in my previous report as to the necessity for
complete secrecy concerning our antisubmarine methods still hold. I
consider it of the greatest importance that the material and technique
we have developed for dealing with the submarine menace be kept to
ourselves until the conclusion of the war, to the end that the Japanese
may not be able to apply our antisubmarine methods against our
submarines operating in the Pacific.
An important duty of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet has been the maintenance of
what might be called a general reserve of battleships, cruisers and
other ships needed to make up a balanced task force. While possibility
of a breakout of what was left of the German surface fleet remained,
this force was held in readiness to deal with surface raids on Atlantic
commerce. From time to time, particularly during the landings in
northern and southern France, these ships were assigned first to the
invasion of Normandy and then to the Eighth Fleet for the invasion of
southern France. With the successful accomplishment of these operations,
the need for heavy surface ships in the Atlantic area was reduced, and a
large part of this general reserve has been shifted to the Pacific
Fleet.
One of the little publicized but valuable tasks of the Atlantic Fleet
has been to train for service elsewhere the large number of ships and
landing craft built on the Atlantic coast. This has enabled the best use
to be made of the facilities on the east coast. and has prevented
overcrowding of the congested harbors on the Pacific coast. The same
system is used in training patrol plane squadrons, which insofar as is
practicable are fully trained in the Atlantic Fleet before being
transferred to combat duty in the Pacific. The fact that during the past
year some 3300 ships and craft were "shaken down" in the Atlantic Fleet
operational training command indicates the magnitude of these training
operations. An important element in this activity is the preparation of
new submarines for war, carried on by the Submarine Force of the
Atlantic Fleet, and the education of submarine officers and men in the
schools at the Submarine Base at New London. The outstanding success of
our submarines in the Pacific is in a large measure due to the sound
preliminary training they receive in the schools and the school
submarines in the Atlantic.
The Atlantic Fleet has worked in close cooperation with the British,
Canadian, French, Brazilian and Netherlands Navies. The Brazilians have
developed a very efficient antisubmarine force of surface ships and
aircraft which, operating as an integrated part of the South Atlantic
detachment of the Atlantic Fleet, took its full share of the task of
knocking out the German submarine effort directed against the convoy
routes off the east coast of South America. Netherlands vessels have
continued to serve with distinction in our antisubmarine forces.
UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE-THE NORMANDY INVASION
After a long period of careful planning, the assembly of United States
Army and Air forces in Great Britain for the invasion of France began
early in 1943. The military organization set up for the cross-channel
invasion involved ground, naval and air forces of a number of our
Allies. The United States naval contingent was assembled and trained
under the Commander Twelfth Fleet (Admiral Stark), who at the
appropriate time turned it over to the operational control of the Allied
Naval Commander in Chief.
The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, General (now General
of the Army) Dwight D. Eisenhower, arrived in London and assumed command
in January 1944. Meanwhile, his three principal subordinates had already
been appointed: Allied Naval Commander in Chief, the late Admiral Sir
Bertram H. Ramsay, RN; Commander in Chief Twenty-first Army Group,
General (now Field Marshal) Sir Bernard Montgomery, RA; and Air
Commander in Chief, the late Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-
Mallory, RAF.
The success of our amphibious operations in North Africa, Sicily and
Italy had demonstrated that, given air and sea superiority, there would
be small doubt of our initial success, even against so strongly
fortified a coast as northern France. The critical factor was whether,
having seized a beachhead, we would be able to supply and reinforce it
sufficiently fast to build an army larger than that which the enemy was
certain to concentrate against ours. The operation thus had two phases
of almost equal importance-the assault and the build-up. In both, the
Navy would play a key part.
The Baie de la Seine beaches in Normandy were selected for the assault
because of their proximity to the relatively undamaged ports of southern
and western England and because they were within easy range of fighter
plane bases in England. The
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region was not so heavily fortified as the Pas de Calais area, and could
be more easily isolated from other German forces by destruction of the
Seine River bridges. The major deficiency of this region was the lack of
a good harbor for a quick build-up after the assault. Thus artificial
harbors had to be devised to meet the deficiency.
The date of the assault was determined chiefly by weather and tide
conditions. The late spring or early summer presented the most favorable
weather prospects, and the long days enhanced our air superiority. A
spring tide was desirable so that as many as possible of the beach
obstacles would be exposed at low water and landing craft could be
floated far up the beach at high tide. The time of day was determined so
as to allow some daylight for preliminary bombardment before the troops
landed, and a half-tide for beaching the first wave, in order to enable
the landing craft to pass over rocks which existed at certain of the
beaches.
There was little chance of effecting substantial surprise. The final
assembly of ships and craft in British ports was so large as to be
beyond concealment. All that could be done was to confuse the enemy as
to the time and place of the landing.
Joint Army-Navy training began in September 1943. In the spring of 1944
several large scale rehearsals were conducted in order to perfect our
technique and to achieve effective coordination between the troops and
the vessels of the expeditionary force.
The general scheme of the operation provided for landing United States
troops in United States vessels on the western half of the area to be
attacked, while the British and Canadians took the eastern half. The
naval assault force was consequently divided into the Western [United
States] Task Force and the Eastern [British] Task Force. The Western
Naval Task Force, under the command of Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral)
A. G. Kirk, transported and landed the First United States Army,
commanded by Lieutenant General O. N. Bradley. This task force was
comprised of two assault forces: "O," commanded by Rear Admiral J. L.
Hall, Jr., and "U," commanded by the late Rear Admiral D. P. Moon, and a
follow-up force commanded by Commodore C. D. Edgar. Each assault force
in turn contained the necessary transports, bombardment ships, landing
craft, escort craft, gunfire support craft, mine sweepers and control
craft required to transport and land Army forces. Force "O" was
designated to land elements of the V Corps, including the 1st and 29th
Infantry Divisions and the 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions on "Omaha"
beach, which was the Vierville-Colleville sector of the Baie de la
Seine, extending from Port-en-Bessin to Carentan Estuary. Force "U"
landed elements of the 7th Corps on "Utah" beach, near St. Martin-de-
Varreville.
The United States Eighth Army Air Force, the United States Ninth Army
Air Force and the Royal Air Force were available in the United Kingdom
at the time of the invasion. During the final preparatory period (D-
minus-90 to D-day) air bombing commitments included industrial,
strategic and coast defense targets in northern France, the low
countries and western Germany. As D-day approached, attacks were
intensified until the maximum effort of planned heavy, medium and
fighter bomber missions were executed the night of 5-6 June. A low
ceiling on the morning of 6 June hampered the scheduled pre-landing
bombing of "Omaha" beach by heavy bombers; to which some of the
difficulty later experienced in gaining a foothold on "Omaha" beach may
be attributed. The fighter cover throughout the operation limited the
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German air force to ineffective sporadic night attacks. The old United
States battleships ARKANSAS, TEXAS and NEVADA delivered naval gunfire
support, beginning with the preliminary bombardment, and continuing
until the troops had advanced beyond range of their major calibre guns.
The cruisers TUSCALOOSA and QUINCY and some 30 United States destroyers
functioned as fire support ships, together with units of the British,
Free French and Dutch Navies. Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo commanded the fire
support group of Force "U" and Rear Admiral C. F. Bryant the comparable
group in Force "O."
About 124,000 United States naval officers and men participated directly
or indirectly in the invasion. Of these, 87,000 were aboard landing
craft and small escort vessels, 15,000 were aboard the combatant ships,
and 22,000 were attached to the amphibious bases in England.
By 1 June, when the loading of troops began, 2,493 United States Navy
ships and craft had been assembled for the operation, and of these only
14 were unable to take part because of material difficulties.
On 3 June all troops had been loaded and briefed, but because of weather
conditions the timing of the operation was still undetermined. At least
four days of good weather were needed, commencing with D-day, which was
initially set for 5 June. It was apparent on 3 June that unfavorable
weather was developing, and early on 4 June the order for a postponement
of 24 hours was broadcast. By the evening of 4 June, much improved
conditions were forecast for the morning of the 6th, although there were
some doubt as to how long the favorable condition would continue.
However, because of tide and light considerations, the uncertainty of
the weather immediately following D-day was accepted, and on the evening
of 4 June, a confirmation of 6 June as D-day was broadcast.
The terrain where the landings were made was of great natural defensive
strength, augmented by many strongly protected and cleverly concealed
gun emplacements, machine gun nests and pill boxes, together with slit
trenches, tank traps, and antitank ditches. In addition, between the
high and low water levels on the beaches there were installed several
rows of underwater obstacles consisting of hedgehogs, tetrahedrons and
pole ramps interconnected by barbed wire and thickly sown with mines.
Artillery and machine guns were placed for enfilading fire along the
beaches, and in some cases were completely concealed and protected from
seaward by concrete walls covered with earth.
The assault plans contemplated overcoming these defenses by the
employment of naval gunfire and air bombardment to destroy or neutralize
as many of the emplaced installations as possible, to breach the
underwater obstacles under cover of an assault by infantry and tanks,
and to storm the remaining defenses with succeeding waves of infantry
supported by naval gunfire.
The Assault on "Omaha" Beach
Force "O," the larger of the two American assault forces, had as its
target the Vierville-Colleville sector of the Normandy beaches, called,
for the purpose of these landings, beach "Omaha." On its eastern flank
was Port-en-Bessin, which marked the dividing line between the British
and American areas. On its western flank was
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the Carentan estuary, which separated it from Force "U's" beach, "Utah,"
on the Cherbourg peninsula.
The ships and craft of Force "O" loaded at Portland, Weymouth and Poole
on the south coast of England. Cross-channel convoys began moving on 5
June, and were joined by Rear Admiral Bryant's fire support group, which
had assembled at Belfast. No enemy action hindered the movement, but a
choppy sea with a 20-knot wind from the southwest made landing
operations difficult, though possible. Mine sweepers cleared channels,
and ARKANSAS, TEXAS and other combat ships opened their scheduled fire
on shore batteries. Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, the planned
air bombing was badly hampered by weather conditions, and certain
LCT(A)'s [landing craft armed with M-4 tanks] and amphibious tanks
failed to reach the beach on schedule. In addition, the 352nd Field
Division of the German Army happened to be holding exercises in the
area, and immediately joined the coastal defense troops in opposing our
attack.
The tanks, infantry and demolition parties which landed at H-hour were
subjected at once to a heavy cross-fire from artillery, mortars and
machine guns, and losses were severe. Troops continued, however, to move
in toward the beach, and by 1030 the entire landing force had been
committed, though numerous personnel both of the assault waves and the
Army-Navy shore party were pinned down on the beach just above high
water by enemy fire. Destroyers and gunfire support craft stood in as
close to the beach as the depth of water would allow and engaged all
enemy guns which they could observe. The first encouraging news came at
1100 when German soldiers began to leave their posts and surrender. At
1300 Colleville was taken, and by 1330 our troops had begun a general
advance up the slopes of the beach. At about 1430 Commodore Edgar's
follow-up force arrived with the remaining regiments of the 1st and 29th
Divisions; by late afternoon, except for sniping and occasional
artillery and mortar fire, hostile action against the beach area had
ceased, and the work of organizing the beaches for further unloading was
progressing in orderly fashion.
Our heavy ships had no trouble in putting the enemy's major shore
batteries out of action promptly. Our chief difficulties came from the
light artillery and machine guns which the enemy had sited to fire up
and down the beach instead of out to sea. These guns, which were very
difficult to detect, waited for our troops to land before opening fire.
Specially trained Navy Shore Fire Control Parties attached to Army units
were put ashore early in the assault to inform our ships by radio of the
location of such targets, but many of them were unable to set up their
radio equipment because of casualties and enemy fire. At this juncture 8
United States and 3 British destroyers closed the beach and took many
enemy positions under fire. This unplanned bombardment, which was
directed in part from the ships and in part from those Shore Fire
Control Parties which had succeeded in establishing communications,
deserves great credit. The battleships and cruisers for the most part
fired with air spot at targets designated by Shore Fire Control Parties
or by planes which were busily searching for enemy guns inland from the
beaches. By 1300 on 6 June the Shore Fire Control Parties had begun to
function according to schedule. Acting on their directions. TEXAS and
the other ships repeatedly took enemy troops, tanks and vehicles
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under fire several miles inland. On D-plus-2 day, for example, TEXAS'
14-inch guns demolished the railway station at Isigny and effectively
scattered a convoy of German vehicles moving through the town square. It
is not surprising that a German Government broadcast on 16 June,
recorded by the BBC expressed admiration of the military value of this
naval gunfire. These "floating batteries," it said, "enabled the
invaders to achieve overpowering artillery concentrations at any point
along the coast." By D-plus-4 day, when the Army's forward line reached
the forest of Cerisy, the enemy was beyond the range of our ships.
On the morning of 7 June, the first of the build-up personnel convoys of
transports arrived off the beach. Just to seaward of the assault area
the transport SUSAN B. ANTHONY struck a mine and eventually sank, though
all personnel aboard were taken off. During the forenoon, surveys for
the establishment of the artificial harbor and the small craft shelters
were begun.
The Assault on "Utah" Beach
The mission of Force "U" was to establish tank-supported infantry on the
beach area, designated "Utah," near St. Martin-de-Varreville. Consisting
of approximately 865 vessels and craft, Force "U" was organized in ports
along the English coast between Plymouth and Torquay, although the fire
support group of heavier ships assembled at Belfast.
The safety of Force "U's" cross-channel movement lay with three
squadrons of United States and three flotillas of British mine sweepers.
In general, all waters through which our convoys were to pass were
suitable for mining, and the final leg of the course assigned Force "U"
lay squarely across a very probable mine field on Cardonnet Bank. The
only casualty occurred when the mine sweeper OSPREY was sunk.
The assault on "Utah" beaches progressed substantially as planned.
Bombardment by the fire support ships, supplemented by aerial bombing,
preceded the landing of waves of amphibious tanks and landing craft
carrying troops of the 4th Infantry Division, which were supported by
rocket-firing landing craft. Our forward troops encountered no small
arms fire, and the little artillery fire directed against the beach from
several distant batteries proved inaccurate and ineffectual. Main
battery fire from NEVADA and QUINCY had breached the seawall in five
places, materially aiding our advance inland. Our amphibious tanks,
proceeding through rough waters under their own power, managed to
survive the heavy swells, engaged enemy installations on the forward
beachhead and pressed on inland.
Following the initial assault against "Utah" beach, the landing of
subsequent waves proceeded with but slight deviation from schedule.
Nearly all of the beach obstacles were exposed and Army engineers and
Navy demolition teams were able to clear lanes for the passage of
subsequent waves of troops and vehicles. Although our concentrated air
and naval bombardment had temporarily neutralized the enemy's coastal
batteries, thus affording the earlier assault waves a reasonably safe
landing, the enemy from 1100 onwards brought the beach under accurate
artillery fire. Aided by Shore Fire Control Parties, our support ships
replied. Some of the enemy batteries were extremely hard to knock out,
but by early afternoon all but
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three had been silenced. These tended to come to life unexpectedly and
to fire a few rounds when landing craft offered good targets. Otherwise
they caused little hindrance to the work on the beaches. During the
first twelve hours we landed 21,328 troops, 1742 vehicles and 1695 tons
of supplies.
In the course of the "Utah" landings the destroyers MEREDITH and
GLENNON, the destroyer escort RICH the mine sweeper TIDE and several
landing craft were lost.
During the next few days the batteries of the fire support ships were
turned against targets well inland and to the west as the VII Corps
fought its way toward Cherbourg, and requests for these support missions
continued until the Army had advanced beyond the ships' range. Our
troops were now more than half way across the Cotentin peninsula, and
were advancing northwest along the coast towards Cherbourg against
stubborn opposition.
The Normandy Build-up
Once the Army had been successfully established on the beaches, the
Navy's primary responsibility was supply. The enemy had fortified and
defensively manned the ports to such an extent as to make the military
cost of direct attack upon them extreme. On the other hand, to attempt
the assault of a continent over open beaches, affording no protection
from the vagaries of the weather, would place the entire operation in
jeopardy.
The solution of this problem was one of the most dramatic creations of
the war-the artificial harbors, or "Mulberries," and the small boat
shelters, or "Gooseberries." There were to be two of the former-
"Mulberry A" in the American sector (at St. Laurent in "Omaha" area),
and "Mulberry B" in the British sector at Arromanches-and five
"Gooseberries," three in the British sector and one on each of the two
American beaches.
The "Gooseberries," created by sinking a number of old warships and
merchant ships in a line in 2.5 fathoms of water just off the beaches,
were to provide a refuge for small craft in rough weather. The
blockships were to proceed to the beaches under their own power, and be
sunk quickly by internally placed explosives. The "Gooseberries" were a
relatively simple undertaking.
The "Mulberries" were much more complicated. Conceived by the British,
the tremendous task of manufacturing and assembling the many components
had to be carried out with complete secrecy, lest the enemy gain a clue
as to our intention to assault a harborless part of the French coast.
It was necessary to tow "Mulberry" units and other essential parts of
the invasion armada across the channel. This inconspicuous but important
role was carried out by a large pool of British and American tugs. The
latter had come across the Atlantic under their own power, many of them
manned by civilian masters and crews who had had little experience with
naval or military operations. TUG CONTROL operated from Lee Tower, Lee-
on-Solent, and was headed by Captain (now Commodore) Edmond J. Moran,
USNR.
On 7 June all elements had been towed from England, and Rear Admiral
Hall, Commander of Force "O," at "Omaha" beach, gave permission to begin
"operation Mulberry" Specially trained Seabees sank hollow concrete
caissons, each mounting
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an AA gun, in designated positions by flooding through built-in valves.
Inside the breakwater thus formed were established two Loebnitz floating
pierheads. These were connected to the beach by a floating roadway
composed of bridgework mounted on pontoons, and two sunken causeways
constructed of the same material used in pontoon causeways and Rhino
barges. Protecting both the breakwater and the blockships of the nearby
"Gooseberry" was a line of steel caissons secured end to end and moored
to buoys. The work of installation and construction of "Gooseberries"
and "Mulberries" progressed rapidly and smoothly, with all blockships in
place by D-plus-4 day.
By this time the delays caused by the unfavorable weather and by the
failure of the assault at "Omaha" to proceed as planned had been
overcome, and the build-up began to move rapidly and on schedule. At
"Utah," in spite of the problems of handling a great number of ferry
craft in a small area, often under shell fire, unloading was nearly up
to schedule by D-plus-4 day. On the 8th the first pontoon causeway had
been successfully established at "Utah," although at the outset it could
not be employed because of shell fire. During the first week of
occupation we succeeded in landing approximately 74,000 troops, 10,000
vehicles, and 17,000 tons of supplies.
Then came the storm. During the night of 18 June the wind began to
freshen, and by mid-afternoon of the 1 9th it was blowing a moderate
gale from the northeast. Ferry service ceased, all craft took shelter
inside the "Gooseberry" or "Mulberry," and unloading of almost every
type was brought to a halt. It continued to blow steadily for the next
three days, with the seas making up to destructive proportions. When the
storm ended on the morning of 22 June, the beach was a shambles. More
than 300 craft had been washed up high and dry, many of them damaged
beyond salvage. The only ferry craft undamaged were the DUKW’s, which
had remained safely parked ashore during the storm.
The blockships of the "Gooseberry" shelter had held together, although
several of them had broken their backs and all had settled, but the
storm had been disastrous to the "Mulberry." The concrete caissons had
either broken apart or had become submerged in the bottom sands. The
roadway to one of the Loebnitz pierheads had been smashed by the impact
of LCT’s driven against it, and many of its pontoons were flooded. The
causeway had held together but was twisted. Many of the steel caissons
had carried away from their moorings and had drifted about as a menace
to shipping. Others were flooded and half submerged.
The British "Mulberry" suffered less from the storm than the American,
which was exposed to heavier seas and had been built on deeper sands,
where the scour was far more severe. Consequently, it was decided to
abandon the American harbor. The British one was completed, partly with
material salvaged from the American.
A major port was absolutely necessary if unloading schedules were to be
maintained through the fall and winter. The first to fall to our troops
was Cherbourg.
Bombardment of Cherbourg
To assist the VII Corps, which was advancing on the port of Cherbourg
from the land side, the fire support group of the Western Naval Task
Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Deyo, bombarded the shore batteries
which commanded the waters
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leading to Cherbourg harbor. These enemy coastal defenses consisted of
20 casemated batteries [guns covered by steel and concrete walls and
roofs], three of which had 280-mm guns with an estimated range of 40,000
yards [approximately 20 miles].
The force, consisting of the battleships NEVADA, TEXAS and ARKANSAS,
United States cruisers TUSCALOOSA and QUINCY, British cruisers GLASGOW
and ENTERPRISE, and 11 destroyers, approached the coast shortly before
noon on 25 June. The intention was to avoid engaging the enemy batteries
as long as possible in order to close the shore and provide the support
requested by our troops. The Germans, waiting until our ships arrived
well within range, opened fire. The destroyers interposed with smoke,
but the enemy fire increased in volume, and shortly afterwards the mine
sweepers, which had preceded the force, were obliged to withdraw to the
northward.
By 1230 the enemy's fire had become so heavy and accurate that our ships
were directed to maneuver independently, and they steamed back and forth
in a line ranging from four to eight miles offshore. While the heavy
ships fired at targets inland designated by Shore Fire Control Parties
and spotting planes, the destroyers endeavored to silence the enemy
coastal batteries. The latter were only partly successful, and our ships
continued to be under shore fire until, having completed their mission,
they retired shortly before 1500. This abnormal exposure of ships to
heavy shore guns, without adequate counterfire, was well warranted by
the urgent need of supporting our invading troops. The Army later
reported that of 21 firings requested on inland targets 19 were
successful.
Of the seven heavy ships engaged (battleships and cruisers) all but one
were either hit or had fragments on board, and all were closely missed
frequently. The destroyer OBRIEN was considerably damaged, and the
destroyers BARTON and LAFFEY slightly damaged. Personnel casualties-14
dead and 28 wounded for the entire force-were remarkably small. The VII
Corps occupied Cherbourg two days later, assaulting and capturing the
remaining shore batteries from the rear.
Under the command of Commodore W. A. Sullivan, task forces composed of
British and American salvage and fire fighting units did phenomenal work
repairing ships and craft, and clearing the major ports for dockside
unloading of cargo. This important but difficult task was performed with
rapidity. Cherbourg's port facilities were in operation early in July.
Although we soon secured several minor ports, a second major port was
not available until Le Havre surrendered on 12 September. It was opened
to small craft in three days, and was in full operation within a month.
For some time, however, shipping in the approaches to Le Havre was
seriously harassed by enemy mining. Although organized resistance in
Brest ended on 19 September, its facilities were so damaged, and it was
then so distant from the battle front, that it did not appear worthwhile
to restore the port.
With the approach of winter, it became apparent that only three
liberated ports in northern France could be operated on a year round
basis. These were Cherbourg, Le Havre, and Rouen, unloading having begun
at the last port in mid-October. Antwerp in Belgium, a British
commitment, became early in December an important avenue of supplies to
our troops. A United States Naval Port Office was opened there, and
daily unloadings of up to 22,000 tons of United States stores were
handled.
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EIGHTH FLEET-ITALY
Support of the Anzio Beachhead
On 22 January 1944 a combined British-American operation secured a
beachhead at Anzio on the west coast of Italy, some 60 miles behind the
German lines. The landing progressed as scheduled against slight initial
opposition; however, the enemy reacted strongly, and rapidly assembled a
powerful force around the beachhead. Resistance and counter-attacks were
so severe that extraordinary effort was required to maintain and support
the Army in this area; the capacity of the small captured port of Anzio
and the adjoining beaches was so small that scarcely any part of the
Army was free from enemy observation and artillery fire. The beachhead
was raided by enemy aircraft 277 times during the first twelve weeks
after landing. On 25 May the beachhead forces joined those advancing
from the main front; throughout the four months preceding this junction,
cruisers and destroyers constantly furnished gunfire support by
bombardment of enemy targets on shore. Screening and patrol vessels
guarded the anchorage from air-surface attack and amphibious craft
transported supplies and fresh troops from the Naples area to Anzio,
returning with prisoners and other personnel.
Continuously throughout the year British and U. S. Eighth Fleet motor
torpedo boats were on patrol to intercept enemy corvettes, torpedo boats
and the barges with which the enemy desperately sought to carry on
coast-wise support of his armies in Italy. Destruction of enemy naval
strength and coastal commerce in the Ligurian Sea was the prime
objective.
Capture of Elba
An amphibious assault resulting in the capture of the island of Elba was
carried out on 17 June by a naval task force under the command of Rear
Admiral T. H. Troubridge, RN. United States destroyers, mine sweepers,
patrol and landing craft formed part of the combined force. One of the
immediate objects in securing the island, which is situated only five
miles from the coast of Italy, was to set up a heavy battery opposite
the mainland to curtail the movement of enemy supply convoys which
hugged the coast. The army forces to be landed comprised the French 9th
Colonial Division and support elements totaling 11,200 more under the
command of General of Army Corps Henri Martin, French Army. Although the
attacking forces outnumbered the defenders about five to one, the
strongly defended beaches were well alerted and several hours of severe
fighting were required to secure the initial beachhead. All organized
resistance ended on 19 June.
EIGHTH FLEET-INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE
Landings in southern France were an integral part of the over-all Allied
strategy in Western Europe, and as conceived were a logical sequence to
the invasion of northern France. By the beginning of 1944, planning was
underway and Vice Admiral Hewitt, Commander Eighth Fleet, had been
appointed naval commander for the operation with the designation of
Commander Western Task Force. Beaches finally selected for landings were
east of Toulon, in the Cavalaire-Frejus area, since the
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necessary forces and supplies required for a quick thrust up the Rhone
Valley could be advantageously landed there.
The general situation in the western Mediterranean was favorable for
amphibious operations during the summer. The submarine menace was
rapidly being brought under control, and enemy naval surface strength
was not a serious threat. As a result of losses sustained in the
invasion of Normandy, the enemy air force was no longer able to operate
in strength in the Mediterranean. The coast to be assaulted had fair
beaches with strong enemy defenses; however, these defenses lacked
depth, and the enemy had few available reserves for counter-attack.
All forces allocated for the invasion of southern France were included
in the Western Task Force under the over-all command of the Supreme
Allied Commander, Mediterranean, General (now Field Marshal) Sir Henry
Maitland-Wilson. Tactical command was jointly exercised by the Naval
Commander, Vice Admiral Hewitt; the Army Commander, Major General (later
Lieutenant General) A. M. Patch (now deceased); and the Air Commander,
Brigadier General G. P. Saville. Command of the joint Army and Navy
forces of the Western Task Force after embarkation was vested in the
Naval Commander until the Commanding General landed and assumed command
of the Army forces on shore.
Intensive bombing of targets in southern France in support of the
invasion commenced on 29 April with a damaging raid on the airport
installations of Toulon. Thereafter, according to a plan carefully
coordinated with the allied bombing of Europe from England, the assault
area was isolated by destruction and damage to bridges, tunnels,
viaducts and railroad yards, without definite indication to the enemy of
the precise location of the projected landings. This bombing was carried
out by the Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force and comprised about
5,400 sorties which dropped 6,700 tons of bombs.
On 9 August the first of the assault convoys sailed from Naples, and
thereafter further convoys left other ports in order to arrive in the
assault area on the morning of the 15th. All convoys arrived on
schedule, and 880 ships and craft and 1,370 shipborne landing craft were
present. This allied naval force included 515 United States, 283
British, 12 French and 7 Greek ships and craft and 63 merchant ships of
various nationalities.
About eight hours before the main landings, French commandos and units
of the First Special Service Forces were landed near Cape Negre and on
the Hyeres Islands by forces under command of Rear Admiral L. A.
Davidson. Rear Admiral T. E. Chandler (subsequently killed in the
Philippine Islands in January 1945) commanded a group of gunfire support
ships of this force. No resistance was met on the islands and only
inaccurate machinegun and small arms fire on the mainland.
In the meantime, diversionary groups were operating to the eastward in
the Nice-Cannes area and to the westward between Toulon and Marseille,
where a mock landing and repulse were staged at LaCiotat, producing
considerable enemy reaction.
The bombing in tactical support of the landings commenced before
daylight on D-day. This was followed at dawn with heavy and medium
bombing for one hour and twenty minutes by more than 1,300 aircraft
along a 40 miles front. The execution of this plan, in conjunction with
naval gunfire and barrages of rockets, appeared to paralyze the enemy
defenses on all the initial assault beaches.
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Preceded by this coordinated neutralizing attack of 1,300 aircraft and
53 gunfire support ships, the assault took place at 0800, about two
hours after daylight, on 15 August. The main amphibious landings were
carried out in three principal sectors. The attack in the Frejus-St.
Raphael sector was made by forces under the command of Rear Admiral S.
S. Lewis; the St. Maxime-St. Tropez area under the command of Rear
Admiral B. J. Rodgers; and the attack on the beaches in Pampelonne and
Cavalaire Bays under the command of Rear Admiral F. J. Lowry. Gunfire
support groups for these main landing forces were commanded by Rear
Admiral Deyo, Rear Admiral Bryant and Rear Admiral R. M. Mansfield, RN,
respectively. Two escort carrier groups operating off the coast
furnished airplane spotters for the shore bombardment, provided
protection for our assault forces against air attack, and assisted the
Army Air Force in its attack upon the enemy. This naval air force was
under command of Rear Admiral Troubridge, RN with Rear Admiral Durgin
commanding one of the groups.
The amphibious assaults of 15 August established a firm beachhead.
Eleven army divisions were used in the operation. The United States Army
3rd, 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions and the French 1st Armored
Division comprised the assault forces. The remaining divisions, landed
during the follow-up and build-up periods, were entirely French. With
strong air support, the Army continued vigorous and rapid thrusts inland
and successfully kept the enemy from making a concerted stand. The
weakened German defense was stunned by the power and effectiveness of
coordinated blows from sea and air.
On the morning of 17 August an operation by a light diversion force was
carried out in the Ciotat area. Returning from this operation the
destroyer ENDICOTT and two small British gunboats encountered two German
corvettes, which were engaged and sunk about 13 miles from Cape
Croisette Light; 211 survivors were taken prisoner.
On 18 August, rapid progress by the Army continued, and sustained naval
effort was required to speed up unloading to meet the requirements of
our rapidly advancing forces.
In the days that followed, United States ships engaged German coast
defense batteries along the coast and repulsed attacks by light enemy
forces. By 29 August the last defenders of Toulon and Marseilles had
surrendered. With the capture of these ports, naval emphasis was shifted
to mine sweeping and port clearance. Ships and craft were released from
duty in the assault area as rapidly as their services could be spared.
On 1 September U. S. Naval Detachment Marseille was established. While
Army engineers were clearing the land side of the port of Marseille with
full Navy cooperation, additional Seabee personnel were engaged in the
rehabilitation of part of the port of Toulon. On 25 September, with the
closing of the last beaches used for maintenance, the amphibious phase
of the campaign was considered ended. During this phase, naval vessels
carried out 850 separate shore bombardment missions, with more than
54,000 rounds fired, and mine sweeping forces swept 550 mines. The
invasion of southern France achieved highly satisfactory results with
comparatively small losses. As no further large scale amphibious
operation appeared in prospect in the Mediterranean, forces were
returned as rapidly as practicable to the United States for use in other
war areas.
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Chapter V
SHIPS, PLANES AND ORDNANCE
NAVAL accomplishments in this mechanized age are dependent upon
production. The best officers and men can do little without an adequate
supply of the highly specialized machinery of warfare. Our guiding
policy is to achieve not mere adequacy, but overwhelming superiority of
material, thereby insuring not only victory, but early victory with the
least possible loss of American lives. The excellence of our material is
unquestioned. The genius of American research and industry has put us a
long step ahead of our naval enemies in effectiveness of ships, planes
and weapons. As regards quantity of ships, planes and weapons, the
balance of power is, also, decisively on our side. The magnificent
productive capacity of the United State has given us the greatest navy
in all history.
The Navy is deeply grateful to industry for its accomplishments, which
have enabled the Navy to play a large and effective part in the landings
of the Allied armies in Europe, as well as to prosecute the Pacific war
with a vigor evidenced by the rapid advance towards Japan in recent
months. We have gone ahead rapidly because we have been able to keep
steady pressure on the enemy. It is of the utmost importance that we not
only maintain this pressure but intensify it. There must be no
relaxation of the fighting effort, nor of the industrial effort that
makes the fighting effort possible. I make a special point of this
because of recent indications that industry is having difficulty in
meeting the needs of the armed services. This is cause for concern,
since, if the industrial output falls off, the effect will be to prolong
the war at great cost in American lives as well as money.
Ship Production Program
As the war develops, the changing nature of operations results in
shifting of production emphasis from vessels of one type to another. For
example, during the first five month of 1944, the need for landing craft
was paramount. After the landings in France and the capture of Saipan
and Guam, large assault transports had the right-of-way in preparation
for operations in the far reaches of the Pacific. Some of the small ship
programs have come to completion during the past year, while the
construction of the larger vessels goes on with undiminished intensity.
The ship construction program is under constant review. The effect of
building too many vessels of any particular type would be as serious as
building too few, since the construction of unnecessary craft would
involve waste of manpower and critical materials urgently needed for
other parts of the war effort. It is not easy to keep the shipbuilding
program in balance. It has been necessary to cut back certain programs
and to expand others with little warning. This has been embarrassing to
industry,
Page 147
(Plate 11 here.)
Page 148
but I am convinced that the over-all result has been good. Within
reasonable limits, we have obtained what we needed without drawing on
the productive capacity of the country for things that we do not need.
Since last March, two new IOWA Class battleships-MISSOURI and WISCONSIN-
have joined the Fleet. Aircraft carriers have come into service with a
steady flow. The small escort carriers, built for the Navy by the
Maritime Commission, have been tested in battle and found to be
effective fighting units within the expected limitations imposed by
their relatively small size, power and speed. The first two 12-inch
large cruisers-ALASKA and GUAM-were commissioned during 1944. Heavy
cruisers of the BALTIMORE Class, as well as many light cruisers, have
been added to the fleet. Destroyers have come into service in large
numbers. Auxiliary vessels have been built and acquired in quantity, so
that the ever increasing huge demands for transports, supply ships,
repair ships, tenders, tankers, tugs, and floating hospitals have almost
been met. Many of these auxiliary vessels have been built by the
Maritime Commission through designs developed by the Navy Department.
The success of our widespread operations in the Pacific is due in no
small measure to our good fortune in having an increasing supply of well
designed and well built auxiliary vessels.
Among the smaller types, landing craft have been all important. During
the past 12 months, the Navy has acquired 6,000 of these, ranging in
size from tank lighters to the 457-foot landing ship (dock). In
addition, more than 29,000 smaller landing boats of all types have been
produced. The effectiveness of our landing craft has been demonstrated
from the shores of Normandy to the beaches of Iwo Jima.
Our landing craft, initially conceived merely as carriers of troops and
cargo. have been found capable of considerable combat value of their
own, due to recent developments in rocket armament and light-weight
rapid-fire guns.
The so-called amphibious vehicles, craft that are equally at home on
water and on land, have proved their value and are under constant
improvement.
As new ships are added daily to the fleet, the maintenance problem grows
more difficult. The skilled crews of our vessels do much to keep their
ships in repair. Fully equipped repair units follow the fleet as one
advanced base after another is captured. The huge machine shops in our
repair ships are always near at hand when a man-of-war needs help. By
these means, much is done in forward areas to effect battle repairs and
normal upkeep.
However, really serious repair problems must be dealt with in our navy
yards. Here, manpower shortage has begun to present a critical problem.
Battle damage repair has kept some of our combatant ships out of the
fighting line for far too long a time. Plate numbers 10 and 11
graphically illustrate the vast increase in hulls and machinery to be
maintained. Plate number 12 shows the fall in shipyard employment. The
possibility that the situation may get worse is cause for concern.
Aircraft
At the beginning of the current year, most of our fighters were either
Hellcats or Corsairs, while a greatly improved version of the Wildcat
was operative from escort carriers. In production are still newer
fighters, including those which are jet-propelled.
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One of the most important innovations of the year has been the
employment in combat of night fighters armed with machine guns, cannon
and rockets.
The Sea Hawk is now replacing the Seagull as our standard scout
observation plane. The Seagull had previously replaced in part the
Kingfisher.
The Helldiver, which as proved its worth time and again in the Pacific
campaigns, is now our dive-bomber. It carries, over considerably longer
ranges and at much higher speeds, twice the bomb load of the older
Dauntless. Experimentation is being vigorously pushed to produce dive-
bombers with even better performance.
(Plate 12 here.)
The Avenger, a torpedo-bomber, has replaced the Devastator, and is in
turn about to be supplanted by new models now in production. All are
designed to increase the load, range and rates of climb of the present
torpedo-plane. A new night torpedo-bomber has already come into use.
The Catalina, a long range twin-engine patrol plane, still in great
demand for air-sea rescue work, has been generally supplanted for patrol
work by the larger Mariner and the Liberator. Its bombing work has been
taken over in part also by the Ventura and the Privateer. Experimental
patrol planes now envisaged will carry greater loads of fuel or bombs at
considerably higher speeds than those of the present day.
The Mars, which entered regular service this past year, has proved to be
a most efficient cargo carrier in terms of cost per ton-mile. Plans for
the experimental transport program now contemplate pressurized cabin
planes for high-speed, high-altitude transports.
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Amphibious gliders, rotary wing devices, and target aircraft for the
improvement of antiaircraft fire, are also under intensive development.
Ordnance
The present technique of amphibious operations has imposed upon the
fleet the role of acting as support artillery for our ground forces.
Today this artillery support is of major importance, as landings are
normally preceded by terrific naval bombardments. After landings have
been effected, naval gunfire is often called upon for the destruction of
specific targets, to assist the advance of our troops.
Engagements with other sea-going targets are usually relatively brief.
Shore bombardment, however, is a tremendously heavy consumer of
ammunition, and has increased enormously the volume requirements for
firepower. For example, our bombardments from 7 December 1941 to July
1944 (not including the shelling of Saipan) used approximately 40,000
tons of projectiles. During the one-month bombardment of Saipan, from 13
June to 12 July, the ships of the attacking task force fired 11,000 tons
of shells. In many cases in the Pacific it has been found possible to
neutralize enemy installations before our troops have landed. For
example, in an official report of the Guam action it was stated that
"coastal defense guns, heavy and light AA guns, dual-purpose guns and
all types of defense installations were rendered impotent prior to the
landing of troops . . . It is believed that not one fixed gun was left
in commission on the west coast that was of greater size than a machine
gun."
These shore bombardments have changed ordnance requirements and
standards affecting high-capacity shells, rockets, bombs, and fuses. At
the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Navy had virtually no high-
capacity ammunition [so-called because it contains an extremely high
amount of explosive]. Since then, production of this type of projectile
has risen rapidly, and currently accounts for 75 per cent of the output
of shells from six to sixteen inches in calibre. Monthly naval
production of all types of major calibre ammunition now exceeds the
total quantity delivered during World War I.
The multiplicity of tasks which must be performed in rendering impotent
an enemy-held shore involves far more than volume of fire, however.
There are many different types of projectiles and many different types
of fuses, but the nature of the objective is the major factor in
determining their employment. For example, armor-piercing shells (the
only type effective against armored ships) are relatively ineffective
against personnel or light structures ashore.
During the year the rocket has become a major weapon. Beach barrage
rockets, first used by the Navy in the invasion of North Africa in the
fall of 1942, have assisted our landing craft, as well as our heavier
ships, to act as support artillery for ground forces. Their great
usefulness begins when the barrage and bombing by big guns and planes
cease. At this time, when landing troops are most exposed to enemy
mortars and machine guns, rockets provide effective fire support. Seven
main types of rockets, ranging from 2.25 inches to 5 inches and larger,
are now being produced in quantity. Production in 1944 was approximately
ten times that of 1943.
Approximately nine hundred ordnance research projects are currently in
progress. Although combat experience has proved the efficiency of our
ordnance, it has
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(Plate 13 here.)
Page 152
also emphasized the necessity for the greatest possible concentration on
research and development.
The weekly procurement of ordnance equipment during 1944 equaled the
total yearly production during 1938. In addition to equipping our naval
vessels, we have armed approximately 5500 merchant ships. Although a
number of construction programs are due for completion shortly, heavy
demand for such expendable items as high-capacity ammunition and rockets
will continue until final victory is won.
PERSONNEL
On 19 July 1944, the President authorized the Navy to base its plans
upon a total strength of 3,389,000 by 30 June 1945. On 31 December 1944,
the personnel strength of the Navy consisted of 300,101 officers,
2,833,904 enlisted men and women, 84,627 officer candidates, and 8,893
nurses. The growth of all branches of the naval service has been as
follows:
7 Dec. 1941 31 Dec. 1942 31 Dec. 1943 31 Dec. 1944
Navy 337,349 1,259,167 2,381,116 3,227,525
Marine Corps 66,048 238,423 405,169 472,682
Coast Guard 25,336 141,769 171,941 169,832
The enormous increase in enlisted personnel is graphically indicated in
Plate 13. Within the past twelve months the Navy has gained by the
experience of its personnel from flag officers to gun pointers. A large
number of senior commanders have been tried and tested in combat, as
have many of the Reserve officers, whose continued professional
improvement and excellent performance of duty have made them not only an
indispensable but an integral part of the Navy team.
Training
Of the personnel on active duty on the last day of February 1945, only
about 10 per cent were in service before Pearl Harbor. It is not
surprising, therefore, that in June 1944 we were conducting no less than
947 training schools with a daily average attendance of 303,000. Because
the peak of recruitment was reached and passed during the year under
consideration, it has been possible to eliminate, consolidate, or adapt
to other purposes, a few of the training facilities.
In the early months of the war, when the need was most urgent for large
numbers of trained personnel, it was frequently impossible to provide
the degree of specialization desired. To some extent this has been
remedied by the institution of operational and precommissioning training
ashore; this development has become invaluable in molding crews into
integrated combat units. The time required to reach petty officer rank
varies according to rating, branch, length of specialized training, and
vacancies in the complement of the ship or activity to which the man is
assigned. The trend is in the direction of still more training ashore,
starting with a recruit training period of at least 10 weeks.
One of the most important aspects of our training program is the urgent
need for turning over to the fleet men who are familiar not only with
the fundamental skills, but with the very latest practices required in
the jobs they are to fill. This
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means that there must be accurate and up-to-date information on the
duties and responsibilities of men in fleet assignments. Job analysis
specialists are serving aboard combatant vessels to observe and tabulate
the operations performed in various billets, the skills required, and
the equipment used. This information is used in writing the
qualifications for the various rates; in establishing curricula for
schools training men for particular rates; and in preparing self-study
training courses.
As the war has progressed, many new ratings and subdivisions have been
added. There are now more than 450 petty officer ratings and enlisted
specialties. To overcome the lack of opportunity for training while at
sea and to utilize to best advantage time spent ashore while ships
undergo repairs, a program of refresher training has recently been
organized at special training centers. These courses serve to bring
personnel up to date with the latest advances in tactics and equipment,
and thereby promote the efficiency of operating units.
Of officers commissioned since Pearl Harbor, approximately 131,000 were
appointed directly from civilian life, 97,000 from officer candidate
programs, and 58,000 from enlisted sources. By direct commissioning it
was generally possible from 1942 to mid-1944, the period of greatest
expansion, to meet the immediate requirements of the service.
Procurement of officers from civilian life for general sea duty was
closed on 17 August 1944; since then our principal source of young sea-
going officers has been the six Reserve Midshipmen's Schools. Towards
the end of 1944 a General Line School at Hollywood, Florida, was opened
to provide already commissioned officers with an eight weeks' course of
training of sufficient scope to qualify them as junior division
officers. The procurement of chaplains, doctors and electrical engineers
from civilian life still continues, in order to meet urgent needs.
It is anticipated that we will be able to meet most of our developing
needs for new officers through the officer candidate programs-aviation
cadet (V-5) reserve midshipmen (v-7), college v-12)-and by commissioning
enlisted personnel of the Regular Navy and Naval Reserve. These
appointments to commissioned rank from within the service have steadily
increased.
At the end of February 1945 approximately 12,500 aviation cadets were
under instruction. During the year ending 28 February 1945,
approximately 20,000 officers were commissioned after completing four
months' deck and engineering training at the Reserve Midshipmen's
Schools: 91 per cent of these were products of the Navy college program
(V-12). At the end of February 1945, reserve midshipmen numbered 8,600;
the v-12 program was operating 269 units at 185 colleges and
universities, with an attendance of 52,000. Through the active
assistance and guidance of university authorities, v-12 curricula have
been designed to meet our operating needs; the methods used in selecting
candidates have enabled us to obtain the most promising material
available. Recent congressional authorization has made possible the
institution of a plan of transition from the V-12 to an expanded NROTC
program.
The Seabees [Construction Battalions] now number approximately 235,000
men and 8,500 Civil Engineering Corps officers. Of these more than
three-fourths are serving overseas, not only building the shore
facilities required for offensive operations but also providing logistic
support for combat forces. Landing with the first
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waves of assault troops, Seabees have participated in almost every
amphibious operation yet undertaken.
During the past year the Women's Reserve has grown to a total of more
than 83,000 officers and enlisted women, who are serving in nearly every
type of shore activity. At 500 shore stations throughout the United
States and more recently in Hawaii, permission having been given them to
volunteer for overseas duty at certain non-combat bases in the American
area, WAVES have been assigned as direct replacements for men or to fill
expanding complements. At the peak of the WAVES training program there
were approximately 40 schools preparing them for duty. Beginning on 1
December 1944, however, the Navy established revised recruiting quotas,
reducing monthly enlistments to 500. This number, it is believed, will
cover current requirements, although it will be increased if future
needs show that additional women can be used.
During the latter part of 1944, a new system of classifying Reserve
officers was established; symbols were devised to designate as
accurately as possible the qualifications necessary for specific types
of duty at sea and ashore.
Needs of Personnel
Faced with a war of uncertain length requiring prolonged service, it has
been our responsibility to see that military spirit and efficiency are
maintained at the highest possible level. In 1944 this involved
increasingly close attention not only to material requirements but to
the needs and aspirations of personnel. Continuing emphasis was placed
upon the effective administration and extension of insurance,
dependents' benefits, and family allowance programs, which support the
morale of the individual by providing for his long-range welfare and for
that of his dependents.
During the year the voluntary off-duty education program was also
greatly expanded. It is in operation at overseas and continental bases
and stations, is being extended to the fleet, and is an integral part of
the rehabilitation program in naval hospitals. During 1944 about 100,000
personnel were enrolled in correspondence courses, 250,000 in courses
involving class-room instruction, and self-study materials and reprints
of standard texts were supplied for an additional 750,000.
Plans for Demobilization
Since there still exists a critical need for combat and seagoing
officers and enlisted personnel, no demobilization of personnel can take
place until the defeat of Japan is at hand. When Germany is defeated, we
will be confronted with the enormous task of transporting men and
material from the European theater to the Pacific. The end of the war in
Europe will therefore result in a redistribution rather than a reduction
of naval strength.
However, for more than a year, we have worked on demobilization methods
and have completed tentative plans. We are considering priority for
severance, and intend, when the time comes, to give due consideration to
length of service, service outside the continental limits, combat
service, and parenthood.
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Postwar Navy
Because the postwar size of the Navy is yet to be determined, no precise
estimate of the number of naval personnel that will be required is
possible. The deciding factor will be the needs of the Navy in order to
carry out the strategic commitments of the nation. It is assumed in all
the plans now under consideration that many more officers and men will
be needed than can be provided by personnel now in the Regular Navy.
These comprise but 16 per cent of the wartime Navy. Accordingly, serious
attention is being given to regulations under which Reserve officers may
transfer to the Regular Navy, and to the organization of the Naval
Reserve in the postwar period. In December 1944 a board was appointed to
consider these problems and make recommendations concerning the means by
which an effective and realistic Naval Reserve may be maintained, and by
which Reserve officers of the highest quality and of appropriate age and
rank may be attracted towards a naval career, in which they will receive
the same training as and compete on an equal basis with Regular
officers.
SUPPLY
The supply of combatant forces is a major problem of vital importance at
sea, as it is on land. The Navy has two distinct phases of this problem
with which to deal: the moving of supplies into advanced shore bases,
and the supply of ships while they are at sea.
The United States Navy has for years given great attention to developing
means for replenishing fuel, food and ammunition at sea. Before the war
began (even as far back as 1916) we had the so-called "Fleet Train"
composed of tankers and other auxiliary vessels specially designed for
this purpose. Since the war began, we have developed improved types of
ships and better technique in using them, with the result that our fleet
in the Pacific has been able to keep at sea for long periods of time.
This has given us a decided advantage over the Japanese Navy, which is
largely dependent on bases as sources of supply, and therefore has much
less mobility.
The question of how to supply a fleet must be settled largely on
geographical grounds. If the ocean combat area is small, as is the case
in European waters, and if it is possible to set up shore-based
establishments at strategic points, there is little need for a Fleet
Train. However, the problem that we have had to solve in the Pacific is
how to project a fleet throughout a vast ocean area initially dominated
by the enemy. We are solving this problem by rapidly establishing repair
and supply bases in enemy islands as we capture them, and by pushing our
supplies forward in ships of the Train, now referred to as the Service
Force, to supply our task forces at sea. To paraphrase Napoleon, a fleet
swims on its stomach. It has to swim long distances to get at the
Japanese. The success of this scheme is a tribute to the far-sighted
planning of those who, with clarity of vision concerning the problem of
naval logistics in the vast reaches of the Pacific, directed naval
affairs during the past 30 years.
The Navy has, I think, the right to be proud of its floating supply
system. It has performed its functions successfully since the beginning
of the war, largely because of actual experience doing this sort of
thing in peacetime exercises. The other part of the problem-the moving
of supplies to advance bases-has been less successful,
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largely because in peacetime we had less opportunity to obtain such
actual experience. Performance has, however, improved, and during the
past twelve months in the advance across the Pacific the handling of the
supply problem has been good. It is being further improved.
Logistic operations in the Pacific require that great quantities of
material be landed with and immediately following the first wave of the
assault troops. Not only must we supply the ammunition and provisions
needed for the assault troops, but we must also commence to build at
once the airfields necessary to secure local control of the air without
carrier assistance. Immediately following, there must be moved in repair
facilities for ships and depots for supplying stores for base
activities, ships of the fleet, and vessels of the Fleet Train. Docks
and other harbor facilities must be improvised rapidly. The amount of
material that is involved is enormous. Air squadrons require living
quarters, supply depots, and repair shops on a large scale. Extensive
facilities are necessary for ship repairs, to the end that minor battle
damage may be remedied without the necessity of returning the ships to
the mainland. Large quantities of spare parts must be kept on hand and
given careful and specialized handling, so that no ship may be
immobilized for want of something necessary to put a vital mechanism
into operating condition. Quantities of ordinary stores and ammunition
must be handled and protected from the weather.
All necessary material must be provided long before an operation
commences and must be stored initially in the continental United States.
In consequence the naval supply system for the Pacific Ocean consists of
a "pipe line," beginning hundreds of miles inland from the western coast
of the United States and extending across the Pacific to the
Philippines, with branches to our many ocean bases. The management of
this "pipe line" is a difficult problem. The capacity of the "pipe line"
is limited, and it requires careful control to insure that the most
necessary things get through and that the line be not clogged by the
shipment of unessential items. Care must be taken that there is an
adequate reserve at the start of the "pipe line," and at intermediate
points, but this reserve must not be allowed to reach undue size, since
the hoarding of material in storehouses would be a very real handicap to
the war effort. The loading of cargo ships must be painstakingly
planned, in order to give high priority to the most important cargo.
Cargo ship schedules must be carefully worked out so that ships may
unload promptly when they reach their destinations; we cannot afford to
waste shipping by having vessels lie idle while waiting their turn to
unload at their destinations.
The Navy's trans-ocean service of supply is in many respects like any
commercial trans-ocean freight business, but it is complicated by the
lack of organized ports at the distant termini, and by the fact that the
urgency of certain types of cargo is constantly shifting with changes in
the military situation. The problem has been attacked by taking into the
Navy men of experience in the shipping world, who are bracketed together
with naval officers to form teams conversant with all its phases. For
the most part shipments to advanced bases are carried in commercial
vessels, supplied by the War Shipping Administration, and loaded and
unloaded under the direction of the Navy. Assault ships [transports and
cargo ships specially fitted to support the first wave of a landing],
tankers and other vessels that serve the fleet in combat areas are, as a
rule, naval vessels.
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On shore, in the western United States, where the flow of supplies
largely originates, the problem has become more and more difficult as
the scope of the Pacific operations increases. So important has this
task become that recently one of the most senior officers in the Navy,
Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, was shifted from the assignment of Commander in
Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, in which he had served with
distinction since the early days of the war, to the command of the
Western Sea Frontier to handle the vital and complex operating and
logistic tasks in that area. Recognition of the magnitude of the
logistic problem was again emphasized in the promotion of Vice Admiral
F. J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, to the rank of Admiral on
29 January 1945.
It should be added that supply operations in the Pacific are not solely
naval. The Army has a task of at least equal magnitude in supplying its
air and ground forces. The supply systems of the two services have been
merged together, as much as possible, under Fleet Admiral Nimitz in the
Central Pacific and under General of the Army MacArthur in the Southwest
Pacific. In some cases, in which only one service uses an item, that
item is handled entirely by the service concerned. For example, the
supply of spare parts peculiar to the Super-Fortress bombers is handled
entirely by the Army, while battleship ammunition, being used only by
the Navy, is handled only by the Navy. Certain items in common use are
pooled for handling by joint Army-Navy agencies. In other instances, it
has been found convenient to have one service look out for the needs of
both; fuel in the Pacific is handled entirely by the Navy, while rations
for all personnel on shore are handled by the Army.
In the foregoing discussion I have stressed the problems in the Pacific,
because they are the most difficult with which to deal from the naval
logistic point of view, due mainly to the absence of port facilities in
the island bases we have captured, and to the distances involved. In the
Atlantic the problem has been easier, because of the more highly
developed nature of the ports we have occupied, but the over-all volume
of material to be moved and handled has required the maximum service
from every ship that could be made available. Extensive logistic
operations were also carried out in the Mediterranean. The most
spectacular of these efforts was the creation of artificial harbors
during the landings in Normandy, previously described. Here United
States naval personnel installed and operated the unique breakwater
caissons and flexible pier-heads (of British design and fabrication) at
the beaches where United States troops landed. The Normandy operation
was a striking example of close logistic support of masses of troops
during the landing attack.
HEALTH
Despite the great increase in combat operations and the extremely
unhealthful conditions in many occupied areas, the health record of the
Navy compares favorably with past experience. In terms of total naval
strength, recent tabulations indicate an estimated rate for casualty
deaths of 3.3 per thousand in 1944 as compared with the final rate of
3.0 per thousand for the previous year. Again, on the basis of
preliminary calculations, the total death rate from all causes is
estimated at 5.8 per thousand for the year 1944 against the final figure
of 5.4 per thousand in 1943.
Experience in this war indicates that of the wounded men who live until
they receive medical attention, 98 out of every 100 survive. We are
sparing no effort,
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therefore, to bring medical assistance as close to the battle lines as
possible. Accordingly, battle casualties among our medical personnel
have been substantial, as in many assaults they have landed
simultaneously with the attacking forces. Moreover, it has been found
practicable, when there are no off-shore obstacles, to beach landing
craft fully equipped surgically. The use of new jeep ambulances is
further keeping the handling of wounded men to a minimum. Amphibious
tractors, together with newly designed elevators or davits, are being
successfully employed to carry wounded promptly, despite difficult
terrain conditions, to hospital ships anchored outside reef formations.
The extensive use of whole blood, penicillin, plasma, new types of
bandages, and serum albumen is proving effective in saving many lives.
The administrative problems which arise during a large-scale landing are
considerable. Lately it has been found practicable to divide surgical
landing craft in two groups-one to care for the slightly wounded, the
other to care for the more serious cases. Medical personnel are
correspondingly divided into specialized teams, and liaison units are
formed to locate and cooperate with the beach dressing stations.
Resuscitation teams are organized to appraise and diagnose injuries and
treat casualties suffering from shock. Surgical teams, specializing in
certain types of wounds, provide operating rooms, procure and prepare
supplies, administer anesthetics, and perform necessary operations.
During several landings last year psychiatrists were assigned to medical
divisions to handle cases of combat fatigue. In order to manipulate this
complex organization, it has been found desirable to station a medical
officer aboard the control ship where he can receive reports and
transmit quickly the necessary orders. Systems have been worked out
which enable ships to interchange medical equipment efficiently during
combat.
On many Pacific islands disease and unsanitary conditions provide
serious obstacles to the maintenance of good health. Sanitary measures
must be applied as soon as territory is won. The introduction of new
insect control methods during the year has brought excellent results.
The incidence of dysentery and other epidemic diseases that were
troublesome during earlier operations lowered markedly. Hundreds of
cases of pulmonary tuberculosis, broncho pneumonia, bacillary dysentery
and malnutrition among the natives were treated. Volunteer native
nurses, who were recruited in large numbers, were of considerable
assistance in caring for both civilian and military patients.
The Navy has provided for the health of thousands of men aboard ships,
submarines and planes, and has maintained and operated a system of
fleet, advance base, base and naval hospitals, hospital ships and
dispensaries. During the year a number of new hospitals and hospital
ships were commissioned; several large hotel properties and estates were
acquired and converted into convalescent hospitals; and numerous new
fleet, advance base and base hospitals, as well as other field units,
were established. Also, many new dispensaries were set up to serve the
various continental shore activities.
Naval medical research during the year fell into four large divisions;
that relating to naval service in general, to naval aviation, to the
submarine service, and to the Marine Corps. Among the new developments
were personnel selection tests and techniques, protection equipment and
devices (relating to such matters as chemical
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warfare, flash burns, sunburn, sound, immersion and armor), aids to
survivors at sea, insecticides and fungistatic agents, training devices,
field equipment, and various preventive medicine and surgery techniques.
THE MARINE CORPS
In 1939 the Marine Corps comprised 19,500 officers and men, little more
than the equivalent of one division. It is now composed of 478,000 men
and women. There are now six full divisions of combat troops in the
field, and 118,086 officers and men in Marine Corps aviation.
The greater part of this strength is devoted to the combat divisions and
supporting troops, who have so notably furthered our progress in the
Pacific by their participation in the amphibious operations described
earlier in this report. Twelve thousand Marines are assigned to
combatant naval vessels as integral parts of the crews. Others are on
duty guarding naval establishments within the United States and at
advanced bases.
Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, have carried out an intensive
officer training program, including advanced studies at its new Command
and Staff School, set up to train officers for staff duties in Marine
battalions, regiments and divisions. Some 400 officers have been
graduated from the Command and Staff School; since 1 March 1944, the
Reserve Officers' School has graduated 2,939 officers; and the Officer
Candidates' School, as of 1 January 1945, has graduated 3,237
commissioned officers. The Aviation Ground Officers' School, organized
in January 1944, has turned out 650 trained specialists to relieve
pilots for operational duties. The elementary and specialist training of
enlisted men is conducted in recruit depots, sea schools, training
centers and other schools, including those of the Army and Navy, when
available. In general, the policy has been to transfer basic training
activities to the East Coast.
The expansion of the Corps and the altered circumstances of recent
operations have necessitated several changes in organization. During
March and April of 1944 defense battalions were converted into
antiaircraft artillery battalions and field artillery battalions; all
Marine raider units were merged into the 4th Marine Regiment. On 15
April the 1st Marine Amphibious Corps was redesignated the 3rd
Amphibious Corps. On 5 June Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith was
designated type commander of ground forces attached to the Fleet Marine
Force in the Pacific Ocean Areas.
The Marine Corps Women's Reserve, now completing its second year of
service, reached its total authorized strength of 18,000 in June 1944.
Approximately 1700 of their number have been requested for duty in
Hawaii.
THE COAST GUARD
The Coast Guard, which is a part of the Navy in time of war, has
performed a great variety of duties, both within the United States and
abroad, as part of the naval combatant forces, as well as in furtherance
of normal Coast Guard functions. As of 31 December 1944 Coast Guard
personnel totaled 169,832.
Coast Guard personnel man nearly 300 vessels of the fleet-transports,
cargo
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vessels, fuel ships, destroyer escorts and landing craft of various
types-which have participated in numerous amphibious operations in both
the Atlantic and Pacific-as well as 600 Coast Guard cutters and 3,000
small craft employed in escort service and harbor security duty. Two
hundred and twenty-one cargo vessels under Army control are manned by
Coast Guard crews.
Acting as volunteer port security forces, Coast Guard personnel have
been assigned to safeguard the nation's ports, with their 5,000,000
linear feet of wharfage.
The Coast Guard has continued to improve aids to navigation along our
inland and coastal waterways. The safe movement to the seaboard of
landing craft built in the upper Mississippi River basin and on the
Great Lakes has been accomplished by Coast Guard pilots, utilizing well
marked channels. Intracoastal waterways, recently extended in the Gulf
area, have been marked to permit safer movement of vital war materials.
A major function of the Coast Guard has been the inspection of merchant
vessels and safety appliances thereon. The efforts of Coast Guard
inspectors to ensure that merchant vessels carry adequate safety
equipment, and that their crews attain greater efficiency in operation,
has contributed to the decline of casualties among our merchant seamen.
In home ports, lifeboat drills and safety instruction have been given by
the Coast Guard. Marine inspectors detailed to ports in the United
States and abroad have examined merchant officers and seamen for
upgrading, and have administered discipline.
In carrying out its function of life saving, the Coast Guard, under
direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has undertaken the task of
developing improved methods and devices for rendering emergency
assistance to aircraft and surface vessels in distress and to rescue
survivors thereof. In connection with the recovery of these survivors,
the use of helicopters from shore and surface craft is being thoroughly
evaluated.
SPARS [Women's Reserve of the Coast Guard] are performing practically
every type of non-combatant duty, thus releasing men for service at sea.
Their enlistment, except for replacements, was terminated in November
1944; the SPAR officer training program was completed in December. As of
31 December 1944, there were 9,829 SPARS
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Chapter VI
AT the conclusion of my previous report, I commented upon the successful
teamwork between the Army and Navy, which has so effectively furthered
the progress of the war. Within the past twelve months the character of
our operations has increasingly necessitated a free and rapid
interchange of forces of the several services, so that the greatest
possible strength can be brought to bear against the enemy at the place
and the time that will do the most good. It is a matter of basic policy
to freeze the smallest possible number of forces in permanent assignment
to any single area, and to leave the major portion of the fleet as a
mobile unit which is ready for service where it is most vitally needed.
As an example, during the past year Admirals Halsey and Spruance, in
turn commanding major units of the Pacific Fleet, have been moving back
and forth between the Central and Southwest Pacific in support of the
westward advances of Fleet Admiral Nimitz in the Pacific Ocean Areas and
of General of the Army MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific Area. As a
general principle, all naval forces are placed under a naval commander
of the nation which has the primary naval responsibility in the area of
operations. During the invasion of Normandy and in the Mediterranean,
United States naval forces operated under British naval commanders,
while British and Australian naval forces are under our operational
control in the Pacific.
The harmonious integration within and between the services has been
particularly essential in amphibious operations, where personnel of one
service have served under the command of another. In any amphibious
operation, command of all forces engaged rests in the hands of the naval
commander until the troops have been put ashore and have established
their command organization. At this point the landing force commander
advises the naval commander that he has assumed command of his troops
ashore.
The function of the Navy in an amphibious operation falls into four main
phases. During the "approach" phase, the Navy commands passage to the
area of landings for the invasion forces, bombards shore batteries,
landing beaches and supporting areas, conducts mine sweeping operations
and removes beach obstacles. Frequently the bombing of landing beaches
and shore defenses is a joint function of Army and Navy aircraft. In the
"landing" phase, the Navy, by employment of special landing craft, puts
the invasion forces and all their equipment ashore, under cover of
ships' guns and carrier aircraft. In the "support" phase, after the
consolidation of the beachhead, the Navy continues to provide artillery
and air support to the forces ashore for as long a time as they remain
within range of ships' guns, and until shore based aviation can relieve
our carriers of the task of air support. In the "supply" phase, the Navy
guarantees the security of the supply lines of the invasion forces and
obstructs the enemy's efforts to reinforce his troops by sea.
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The extent and varied character of naval participation in amphibious
operations have required vast quantities of ships, men and material.
Consider, for example, the Lingayen Gulf landings on 9 January 1945. The
naval attack and covering forces for this operation consisted of 1,033
ships, ranging in size from battleships and carriers on down through
landing craft. The naval personnel in this force numbered upwards of
273,000. The Army forces put ashore on D-day and during the following
four days were slightly more than two-thirds of this number. Similarly,
in the landings on Iwo Jima, approximately 800 naval vessels were
involved, with a total personnel of over 220,000. Approximately 60,000
Marines were landed in the first three days of the operation, a ratio of
ships' personnel to troops landed of slightly less than 4 to 1.
The experience of more than three years of war has demonstrated the
soundness of our concept of a "balanced fleet," in which aircraft and
ships work together as a coordinated team. There has been no dispute as
to "carriers versus battleships." Aircraft can do some things which
ships cannot do. Ships can do some things which aircraft cannot do.
Working together, surface ships, submarines and aircraft supplement each
other so that the strength of the unified team is greater than the sum
of the parts.
Given the conditions under which naval war is now fought, it is
impossible for a fleet to operate effectively without air power of its
own. Our superiority in carrier strength has enabled us to take giant's
strides across the Pacific in spite of the enemy's island network of air
bases. The fast carrier task forces of the Pacific Fleet, consisting of
carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers, have repeatedly made
bold offensive thrusts into distant waters, inflicting significant
damage on the enemy's shipping and installations. They have supported
amphibious operations, controlling the air both before and after
landings and until air strips could be completed. They have equally
proved their worth in the two major actions with the Japanese fleet
which have taken place during the past year. The clearest evidence of
their effectiveness is seen in the box score of damage inflicted upon
the enemy by Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet between 24 August 1944 and 26
January 1945. During these five months, while the Third Fleet was
engaged in supporting the Western Carolines and Philippine Island
operations, 4,370 enemy aircraft were destroyed, 82 enemy combatant
ships sunk and 372 enemy auxiliaries and merchant ships sunk (excluding
small craft), against a loss in combat by the Third Fleet of only 449 of
our own planes and the light carrier PRINCETON.
The amphibious landings of the past twelve months have repeatedly shown
the value of naval gunfire in gaining victory and in saving the lives of
our assault troops. Shore bombardments in preparation for landings,
during the landings, and for as long after as troops are within range of
ships' guns, have been carried out on a scale not contemplated in the
past. New methods, joint procedures, and new materials have been
developed. A sufficient volume of fire is laid down to knock out the
shore and beach defenses and to drive off the beach defense personnel.
Initially fire is carried out by heavy ships and support aircraft.
Battleship fire provides the only gun (or weapon for that matter) which
is sufficiently powerful and accurate to knock out reinforced concrete
pillboxes eight to ten feet thick, and other similarly strong land gun
emplacements. Just prior to landing, destroyers, gunboats, and rocket
ships lay
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down heavy barrages of fire; ships and aircraft continue to give support
as the troops move in. Although ships are designed primarily to fight
other ships, their effectiveness against heavy shore batteries has been
well proven in this war, as in the past. The risk of so exposing ships
is justifiable if the object sought is sufficiently important, more
especially when command of the sea is not in jeopardy. The Normandy
landing was an especially convincing demonstration of the value of naval
gunfire in support of troops, not only as they land but also as they
move inland off the beaches. The new applications of naval gunfire in
amphibious operations, as well as in fleet actions, have demonstrated
that the battleship is a versatile and essential vessel, far from
obsolete.
We have heard much of things being ahead of schedule in the Pacific.
Actually we have had no schedule, except to go as far and as fast as the
means in hand would permit. It can be said that the war today is ahead
of our expectations of last year. This should stimulate rather than sap
our determination to carry on with every means we can muster. I have
said before, and I repeat-a quick and easy Pacific victory cannot be
taken for granted, even after the European war is over. While we rejoice
in the reoccupation of Guam and of the Philippines, from which our
forces were driven three years ago, we must constantly realize that we
are only now gaining a position from which we can assault the heart of
the Japanese strength. That is our goal, and the enemy is welcome to
know that we shall continue to press him with every means at our
command. But the very speed of our advance has created new production
problems. Our accelerated operations are placing a heavy strain upon
reserves of certain vital items, while production of certain necessities
is falling behind mounting requirements. It is only by unrelenting
support and effort on the home front that our advance can continue.
While we contemplate with pride the accomplishments of the past twelve
months-accomplishments without precedent in naval history-we must never
forget that there is a long, tough and laborious road ahead.