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OPERATION NEPTUNE

TWO YEARS of planning and preparation led up to the Allied landings in 
Normandy on 6 June 1944. British and American staffs had to work out 
every foreseeable detail for an undertaking that would involve the major 
military resources of the two Allied powers; immense stocks of shipping, 
aircraft, and supplies were assembled in the British Isles in an effort 
that taxed the war industries of both countries; before D Day the Allied 
air forces had carried out several months of bombing operations which 
were an integral part of the invasion itself.

The first decisions were strategic in the broadest sense, since the 
opening of a front in Western Europe had to be considered in reference 
to over-all Allied plans for offensive operations against Germany, as 
well as the developments of the war in Russia and of the war against 
Japan. In May 1943 the Anglo-American conference in Washington concluded 
this stage of strategic planning; Prime Minister Churchill and President 
Roosevelt together with their highest military advisers decided to 
launch an offensive in 1944 against Hitler's Atlantic Wall.

Allied planners, after weighing all the possibilities, finally selected 
50 miles of coast in western Normandy, from the Vire Estuary to the 
Orne, as the assault area for securing a lodgement. This area was near 
good, relatively undamaged ports in southern and southwestern England, 
and was in range of fighter planes operating from English bases; the 
major French ports of Cherbourg and le Havre were within striking 
distance; and air attacks on railways and river bridges might be able to 
isolate the region behind the assault area from the main enemy centers 
of supply and reinforcement to the east. In comparison with the stretch 
of coast northeast of the Seine (Pas-de-Calais), along the narrowest 
part of the English Channel, western Normandy was somewhat further from 
English bases but was not as heavily fortified. At the Quebec Conference 
in August 1943 Allied leaders approved the choice of this battleground 
for invasion.

The staffs of ground forces, air forces, and navies had now entered the 
second stage of planning for the largest amphibious operation in 
military history. The tactical difficulties to be faced were only one 
part of a problem that required complete coordination and teamwork, not 
merely between the military forces of two nations but also between all 
arms of those forces. Planning necessarily included preparation for 
operations over an extended period of time, and had to cover far more 
than the initial task of securing beachheads. In some respects the 
critical factor was the Allies' ability to reinforce and supply the 
assault rapidly enough both to meet enemy counterattacks and to prepare 
for a larger Allied offensive beyond the landing area. The Allied navies 
and services of supply had to solve logistical problems on which would 
depend the fate of the whole undertaking. 

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In this phase of planning, as main policies were worked out in ever more 
complex detail by staffs of subordinate commands, the work was 
coordinated under the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command, Lt. Gen. 
Sir Frederick E. Morgan. In his organization, British and American 
officers of all the services worked side by side in shaping their joint 
enterprise. The fusion of Allied planning staffs under a single command 
involved a principle which was carried into the command organization for 
the operation itself. On 21 January 1944 Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
called from the North African Theater of Operations, had his first 
meeting with the high Allied planning staff in England. He took formal 
command at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, on 13 
February.

Planning now approached the final stage. The approximate target date (Y 
Day) had been set as 31 May, after earlier designation as 1 May; the 
postponement was made in order to obtain a larger supply of assault 
craft and to give more time for the preliminary air operations to 
produce their desired effect. By February, the staffs of higher commands 
had finished their plans, which would determine the major outline of the 
assault, and the plans of lower echelons were nearing completion. What 
remained was the difficult task of shaping last details, with due regard 
to ever increasing intelligence of enemy defenses and to the experience 
gained in training exercises. Final loading plans, among the most 
complex features of the whole operation, were subject to change as late 
as May because of uncertainties as to the number of ships and craft 
available.

Services of Supply, commanded by Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, was completing 
its program of mounting the supplies for an operation which has been 
described as “an assault of materiel, operated by man.” Planning for 
this aspect of the invasion had begun in April 1942, and along with it 
went the work of preparing facilities and assembling stores, work which 
was interrupted by the need to furnish 50,000 tons of cargo for the 
invasion of North Africa in November 1942. By June 1944 the number of 
United States troops in the United Kingdom had risen to 1,526,965, half 
of them arriving after the end of 1943. The stock pile for invasion-over 
and above basic loads and equipment-was 2,500,000 tons. In the process 
of mounting the assaults, 1,200 troop concentration camps and 100 
marshaling camps had to be set up and operated, and 144,000 tons of 
supplies were preloaded, waiting for D Day.

Navy and Air Forces

Allied naval forces in the NEPTUNE operation, commanded by Admiral Sir 
Bertram H. Ramsay, faced a task of primary importance. They had to 
convey the ground forces to the area for assault on a hostile and 
defended shore, assist their landings by gunfire support, protect their 
lines of communication against enemy surface and underwater attack, and 
insure the flow of supplies for an indefinite period of future 
operations. Some 4,100 ships and craft of all types were involved in the 
assault, including major units of both British and American fleets.

The Allied air forces, under command of Air Chief Marshal Sir Traford L. 
Leigh-Mallory, were assigned a complex role both defensive and offensive 
in character. They would protect the huge assault convoy at every stage 
on its approach to Normandy and throughout the battle for the beaches. 
Offensively, they had the mission of assisting the operation by landings 
of airborne troops, by air bombardment of coastal defenses, and by 
attacks on enemy lines of reinforcement and supply. 

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In a very real sense, the invasion began with air force operations that 
had commenced long before D Day. From the summer of 1943 to the 
following spring, the U. S. Eighth Air Force had concentrated its 
attacks on German aircraft industries and airfields, with the primary 
purpose of preventing the enemy from increasing his strength in the air. 
Both by destruction of factories and of enemy planes met in combat this 
program was successful, and its success counted in the invasion. In 
addition to losing between 5,000 and 6,000 planes in the period, the 
enemy was unable to enlarge his first-line force in preparation for the 
expected assault.

In April and May 1944, while continuing attacks on Germany often enough 
to force concentration of enemy air strength in that area, the heavy 
bombers entered on a phase of operations directly related to the 
impending assault. This was a series of heavy attacks on marshaling 
yards and airfields in France, the Low Countries, and western Germany, 
over an area large enough to preclude any indication of the precise 
invasion area. The attack on marshaling yards was designed to paralyze 
repair and maintenance facilities, thus wearing down the capacity of 
railways for movement of troops and supplies and forcing the enemy to 
maximum use of road transport. During May the range of air attacks was 
gradually narrowed, coming to a climax in the three days preceding D 
Day. However, even in this period of final blows against rail junctions 
and airfields a majority of the targets were along the Channel coast 
east of the Seine.

Ninth Air Force medium bombers and fighter-bombers had also shared in 
the preparatory phases of the campaign. Beginning in April and 
continuing with increased vigor in May, they delivered attacks on enemy 
airfields in northern France, with the aim of ultimately neutralizing 
all fields within 130 miles of the assault beaches. During May, 36 
airfields from Brittany to Holland received one or more attacks. 
Marshaling yards were also a target of medium bombers; between 1 March 
and 5 June, 36 yards in Belgium and northern France were hit in a total 
of 139 attacks. Results were excellent. The important yard at Creil, 
near Paris, was estimated as 60 percent out of commission on 24 May. 
Late in that month, rail bridges on the Seine and the Meuse Rivers were 
given first priority. By 4 June, all rail bridges (10) between Rouen and 
Conflans, inclusive, were knocked out, and all but 1 of the 14 road 
bridges. Fighter-bomber attacks on enemy rolling stock during May 
inflicted considerable damage. On 21 May, in the most active day for 
this type of work, 500 aircraft claimed results of 46 locomotives 
destroyed and 32 damaged, and damage to 30 trains. The Ninth Air Force 
was also busy on reconnaissance missions, which included heavy activity 
north of the Somme River as well as in the invasion area.

Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force switched the main effort of its 
attacks during May from Germany to France and the Low Countries. Of 
37,250 tons dropped during the month, 28,703 were directed at targets 
which were chosen as part of the “softening-up” program leading to the 
invasion.

21 Army Group

The ground forces in the Normandy operation were led by Gen. Sir Bernard 
L. Montgomery, commanding 21 Army Group. His troops would assault in 
three main areas (Map No. 1) [1] with initial strength of six reinforced 
infantry divisions landing from the sea and of three airborne divisions.

[1] Maps numbered in roman are bound in sequence on the inside of the 
back cover

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(Map No. 1)

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On the left the Second British Army would attack with three divisions 
(two of I Corps, one of XXX Corps) on three landing beaches. A brigade 
of the 6 British Airborne Division was to be dropped behind the beach 
defenses to secure vital bridges over the Orne River, between Caen and 
the sea. The objectives for D Day of the Second British Army included 
Bayeux, Caen, and Cabourg.

The First U. S. Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, was 
responsible for the other two assault areas. VII Corps (Maj. Gen. J. 
Lawton Collins, commanding) would land one division just north of the 
Vire Estuary (Beach “Utah”). In the early morning hours of D Day, four 
to five hours before the assault from sea, the 82d and 101st Airborne 
Divisions were scheduled to be dropped in the area southeast and west of 
Ste-Mere-Eglise, where their mission was to capture the crossings of the 
Merderet River, secure the line of the Douve River as a barrier to the 
south, and assist the landings at Utah Beach. At the end of D Day, VII 
Corps should control the area east of the Merderet from just south of 
Montebourg to the Douve.

Between the other assault areas, V Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Leonard 
T. Gerow planned its attack on a 7,000-yard stretch of beach to be known 
as “Omaha.” [2] The scheme and objectives of this assault will be 
described later in detail.

General Montgomery's intention after the initial beachheads were 
secured, was to hold in the area south and east of Caen while the First 
U. S. Army meantime maneuvered to cut of the Cotentin peninsula and 
capture Cherbourg. This port, to be opened as a major supply channel for 
further operations, was to be taken by D+15. The First Army, reinforced 
to a strength of three corps, was then to attack south toward Coutances 
and the base of the Brittany peninsula. Tentative phase lines allowed 
for capture of the Cerisy Forest area by D+5 or 6; St-Lo and Caumont by 
D+9. These phase lines were set with the most favorable possible 
development of the operation in mind. They insured readiness for maximum 
progress but represented neither a hard-and-fast schedule nor an 
optimistic forecast.

Enemy strength in France and the Low Countries (Map No. 1) was estimated 
at 60 divisions, having been built up from 53 since February 1944. Of 
these, 17 were infantry divisions, 26 were characterized as “limited 
employment” units (coastal defense units of limited mobility), 7 were 
training units, and 10 were panzer or panzer grenadier divisions. The 
armored divisions were located at inland points whence they could be 
moved as striking forces into a threatened coastal area. As a possible 
indication of where the German high command expected the assault, no 
fewer than

22 divisions guarded the region from the Seine to Holland.

The sector in which the blow was actually to fall came under the German 
Seventh Army, commanded by Col. Gen. Friedrich Dollmann with 
headquarters at le Mans in Normandy. LXXXIV Corps was responsible for 
the defense of the French coast from the Orne River to the northeast 
corner of Brittany. At the end of the winter the enemy force in or very 
near the assault area was estimated at only five infantry divisions, 
plus minor ground force elements. During May, Allied intelligence found 
evidence of reinforcement by two infantry divisions and (just south of 
Caen) the 21st Panzer Division. As a mobile reserve, two panzer 
divisions had come into the Alencon-Evreux region, from which they could 
reach the assault area quickly. A number of the enemy units in Brittany 
would also be available as reinforcement within a few days, and (depend-

[2] From “O” Force, assigned to the area.

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ing on the success of Allied air attacks) divisions from north of the 
Seine and south of the Loire could be brought to Normandy. Allied 
estimates of enemy build-up, assuming no interference to his road and 
rail movement, fixed his maximum possible strength in the assault area 
at 18 to 20 divisions, including 8 armored, by D+3.

At this same date Allied forces ashore were scheduled to number 13 
divisions, including elements of 2 armored divisions. [3] The success of 
the invasion would depend in considerable measure on the outcome of a 
race between Allied build-up and enemy reinforcement, in which it was 
hoped that the operations of the Allied air forces against rail and road 
communications would impose a decisive handicap on the Germans.

V Corps Planning

As the highest U. S. Army field-force headquarters then in Britain, V 
Corps Headquarters began in July 1943 to share in the early planning for 
employment of American forces in assault on the continent. On 12 
September, by directive of the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied 
Headquarters, V Corps' work was focused on the specific problem of an 
assault landing in Normandy. By October the headquarters of First U. S. 
Army and U. S. 1st Army Group were established in Britain. Since the 
decisions taken at higher levels determined the mission and objectives 
of subordinate units, the work had to be done concurrently and with 
constant interchange of views between the different levels of command 
and between the different services. The final plans for ground forces 
were produced in a series from January to May, beginning with 21 Army 
Group. First Army NEPTUNE Plan was issued on 25 February, V Corps' plan 
on 26 March, and that of the 1st Infantry Division on 16 April.

No final decisions on troop lists and loading were possible until even 
later dates, and revisions of detail in many parts of the plans were 
necessary as late as the end of May.

A special planning group, headed by Col. Benjamin B. Talley, had been 
put in charge of shaping the V Corps NEPTUNE Plan. As the First Army and 
V Corps planning groups proceeded in their work, they felt the necessity 
of practical experiment with the problems involved in an amphibious 
operation on the scale proposed, particularly those of mounting and 
loading assault troops. A training center at Ilfracombe, northwest 
Devonshire, for study of assault techniques had been in use since 1942, 
and experiments on methods of loading and landing had been conducted 
near Dartmouth since September 1943 with cooperation of the British 
Navy. In December a stretch of coast at Slapton Sands (South Devonshire) 
was provided by the British Government as an assault training area for 
American forces. Here the conditions of tide, beach, and terrain were 
roughly similar to those on the Normandy coast, and the area was large 
enough to permit large-scale exercises and the use of live fire 
including naval and air bombardment. From January on, this training 
ground was used for every type of experiment and for exercises involving 
naval, air force, and service force units as well as the assault 
infantry and tanks.

In addition to its training value, the work done here was of direct 
influence on the planning, particularly in the case of exercises 
conducted on a scale large enough to embrace major units. Exercise 
“Duck,” held in January, involved a division plus corps troops and took 
in all the stages of assault from concentration and marshaling to a 
landing after air bombardment and naval fire. From this exercise it was 
learned that three divisions could be mounted from the Plymouth-
Portland-Falmouth-Dart-

[3] Also several British and U. S. tank units attached to infantry 
divisions or employed as corps troops.

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mouth port areas, instead of one as previously supposed. In March, 
Exercise “Fox” was staged at corps level and involved two divisions. 
From 3 to 8 May, “Fabius I” concluded the series of larger exercises 
with what amounted to a dress rehearsal for the NEPTUNE operation. The 
troops used a scheme of maneuver closely similar to that of the NEPTUNE 
plans, and the concentration and embarkation took place in areas soon to 
be used for NEPTUNE mounting. Throughout these months, training and 
planning went hand in hand, and the Planning Group used lessons learned 
at Slapton Sands in its final adjustments and revision of details. V 
Corps NEPTUNE Plan, consisting of an operations plan proper and 22 
annexes (practically all of these completed by revisions in April or 
May), totaled 326 legal-size pages with 23 maps and charts.

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ASSAULT PLAN

THE MISSION OF V CORPS was to secure a beachhead in the area between 
Port-en-Bessin and the Vire River, from which they would push southward 
toward Caumont and St-Lo, conforming with the advance of the British 
Second Army. The Corps would arrive at the beachhead in four stages. The 
initial assault force (Force “O”) consisted of the 1st Division, 
reinforced to include four infantry regiments with strong attachments of 
artillery, armor, and engineers, as well as attachments of engineer and 
service units for movement to the beach. Chief components of the 1st 
Division were its own 16th and 18th Regimental Combat Teams, the 116th 
Regimental Combat Team and the 115th Infantry attached from the 29th 
Division, and the Provisional Ranger Force of two battalions (2d and 
5th). Force “O” numbered 34,142 men and 3,306 vehicles.

The follow-up force (Force “B”) was scheduled to arrive off the assault 
beach after noon on D Day and numbered 25,117 men and 4,429 vehicles. It 
included the 29th Division, consisting of the 175th Infantry and 
(attached from the 1st Division) the 26th RCT. Scheduled to arrive on 
D+1 and D+2, the preloaded build-up contingent had as main component the 
2d Division and

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totaled some 17,500 men and 2,300 vehicles. Schedules for the later 
build-up completing the transfer of V Corps to Normandy, called for the 
arrival between D+2 and D+15 of 27 residual groups involving 32,000 
troops and 9,446 vehicles. All of these totals included a large number 
of units attached to V Corps for movement only.

The loading plans of Force “O" and Force "B” were designed to fit an 
operation which would develop from an assault by one reinforced division 
into attack by two divisions abreast. Unity of command in the critical 
first stages would thus be assured. Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, 
commanding the 1st Division, would conduct the initial assault with a 
force that included two units of the 29th Division, and plans for the 
landings and for movement inland

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were made so as to permit the early assignment of divisional zones to 
the 1st and 29th Divisions. These zones would go into effect on corps 
order, when Maj. Gen. Charles H. Gerhardt would assume command of the 
29th Division with its normal components. In the meantime, in order to 
pave the way for this step, Brig. Gen. Norman D. Cota, assistant 
divisional commander of the 29th, was to land with the 116th RCT and 
assist General Huebner in handling the 29th Division units until they 
reverted.

The 1st Division was a veteran unit which had served through the 
campaigns of North Africa and Sicily. The 29th and 2d Divisions would 
experience their first action in Normandy.

Terrain

The coast of Normandy offers only a few areas favorable for large-scale 
landing operations in the one assigned to V Corps (Maps Nos. II and 
III). Cliffs, reefs, and the wide tidal ranges combine to present

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natural difficulties. The estuary at the mouth of the Vire River is 
marked by extensive shallows, exposed at low tide, and flanked on the 
east by reefs that extend to Grandcamp. Beyond that seaside village 
cliffs averaging 100 feet in height tower above a narrow beach as far as 
Pointe de la Percee. Five miles further east, cliffs reappear at the 
shore line, and the beach is spoiled by rock ledges which continue as 
far as Port-en-Bessin.

It was on this five-mile, cliffless interval that V Corps planned its 
assault landings, designating the sector as “Omaha” Beach.

That part of the stretch regarded as suitable for landing operations was 
about 7,000 yards long, on a shore which curves landward in a very 
slight crescent and is backed with bluffs which merge into the cliffs at 
either end of the sector.

The beach slopes very gently below highwater mark. With a tidal range of 
18 feet expected at the period of the assault, low tide would expose a 
stretch of firm sand averaging about 300 yards in distance from low-
water mark to high. The enemy had placed “underwater” obstacles on this 
tidal flat. At high tide, men and vehicles wading

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up the beach could expect trouble with irregular runnels parallel to the 
shore, scoured out by the tidal current and two and one-half to four 
feet deep.

At the high-water mark, the tidal flat terminated [4] in a bank of 
coarse shingle, sloping up rather steeply to a height of some 8 feet. In 
places it was as much as 15 yards wide, and the stones averaged 3 inches 
in diameter. On the eastern two-thirds of the beach, the shingle lay 
against a low sand embankment or dune line and constituted a barrier 
which was impassable for vehicles. On the western part of the beach the 
shingle piled against a sea wall, first (near the Vierville exit, D-1) 
of stone masonry sloping seaward, then of wood. The wall varied in 
height from 4 to 12 feet and was broken by a gap several hundred yards 
wide where the tidal flat ended in shingle and embankment. Immediately 
behind the sea wall a paved,

[4] As a result of defensive preparations by the Germans, the effects of 
the assault bombardment, and (above all) the work done by engineers to 
clear the beach for supply operations after the assault, many features 
of the beach at the time of the assault were largely destroyed. The sea 
wall and shingle embankment were completely removed, and many of the 
beach villas were razed or reduced to rubble. The road system was 
entirely changed.

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promenade beach road ran from Exit D-1 to Exit D-3, then became a rough 
track going as far as Exit E-3.

Between the dune line (or sea wall) and the bluffs lay the beach flat. 
Very narrow at either end of the main landing one, this level shelf of 
sand widened to more than 200 yards near the center of the stretch. 
Except at the Vierville end, the flat had large patches of marsh and 
high grass, usually near the edge of the bluffs. Toward Exit D-1, a 
number of summer villas lined the shelf behind the promenade road, and 
at Exit D-3 lay a small village, les Moulins, with buildings clustered 
on the road running back inland from the beach. Many of these had been 
razed by the Germans to improve fields of defensive fires. East of les 
Moulins there were only a few scattered houses.

Bluffs 100 to 170 feet in height rise sharply from the flat and dominate 
the whole beach area. The slopes are generally steep, but in varying 
degree. They are most abrupt between Exit D-1 and Exit D-3; farther 
east, the rise is easier but reaches higher elevations (150 to 165 feet) 
fairly close to the beach flat. The grass-covered slopes are more uneven 
than they appear when viewed from only a short distance. Many small 
folds or irregularities provide opportunity for cover from flanking 
fires, and from Exit E-1 eastward the bluff sides are partly covered 
with low scrub and brush. Along most of the stretch, the bluff ends in a 
clear-cut crest line as it reaches the edge of the inland plateau; 
toward the eastern end, where the slopes are longer and more gradual, 
the edge is not sharply defined.

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(Photos)

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At four points along Omaha Beach small wooded valleys slope back inland 
and provide natural corridors for exit from the beach flat. A paved road 
led off the coast at Exit D-1; the other draws had unimproved roads. 
These corridors were, inevitably, key areas both in the plan of attack 
and in the arrangement of defenses. The advance inland of assaulting 
units would depend on opening exit roads for traffic and supply from the 
beach, and armor used in the attack could only get up to the high ground 
through the draws. Near the eastern end of the beach a very shallow and 
fairly steep draw, followed by a rough trail leading inland, was marked 
for development as a fifth exit route (F-1).

Once up the steep slopes bordering the beach, attacking troops would get 
the impression of coming out on a gently rolling plain. Actually, there 
is a gradual rise to a height of land which parallels the coast about 
2,000 yards inland and reaches over 250 feet in altitude south of 
Colleville. There is no marked “ridge” line whatever, and except for 
unusually open fields near the bluff between Exits D-1 and E-1, 
observation in the whole area is severely limited by the numerous 
hedgerows, orchards, and patches of trees. Three villages, Vierville, 
St-Laurent, and Colleville, [5] 500 to 1,000 yards inland, were so 
situated near the heads of draws and along the coastal highway as to 
figure inevitably in the defense of main exit routes. These were farming 
villages, with a certain amount of activity in summer as modest beach 
resorts. Their stone houses were clustered on or near the coastal 
highway that connected them with Grandcamp and Bayeux.

South of the tableland lies the valley of the Aure River, running from 
east to west, flowing about two miles behind the beach at Port-en-Bessin 
and five miles south of it at Pointe de la Percee (Map No. III). West of 
Trevieres the valley plain had been flooded to form a barrier over a 
mile wide. Above the Trevieres the Aure was fordable by infantry. Only 
on the northern side of the valley are the slopes at all pronounced; at 
two points (just north of Trevieres and at Mount Cauvin) the ground 
close to the river on the north is 150 to 200 feet above the stream, 
giving good observation into the valley and its main approaches from the 
south.

South of the Aure the ground rises again, at first very gradually, 
toward the height of land crowned by Cerisy Forest, 12 miles south of 
the coast and nearly 400 feet above sea level. Several small streams 
flowing north toward the Aure divide this rising ground into a series of 
low north-south ridges. In V Corps' estimates for the operation the 
Cerisy Forest figured as an important tactical objective, necessary to 
hold if the beachhead was to be secure. It not only included commanding 
ground, within medium artillery range of the coast, but  offered cover 
for assembly of enemy forces. 

The region west and southwest of Omaha Beach figured prominently in D-
Day plans, for early junction with VII Corps depended on progress in 
that direction. The flooding of the lower Aure Valley had nearly made a 
peninsula, 10 miles long and 5 miles wide, comprising the low tableland 
stretching from Formigny-Trevieres west to the Vire Estuary. In it lay 
some of the strongest German fortifications, controlling the sea 
approaches to Carentan, and through it from east to west ran the 
principal highway from Paris (Caen) to Cherbourg and the Cotentin. The 
town of Isigny, where the highway crossed the Aure, would be a key point 
in any effort to link the beachheads of V and VII Corps; all east-west 
communications near the coast funneled through Isigny, and

[5] All three have compound names, with the ending "-sur-Mer." For 
convenience, and. since there is no danger of confusion with other 
localities, these endings are omitted.

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from it V Corps could debouch on the lowlands near Carentan.

The road net south and west of Omaha is characterized by the absence of 
main north-south routes; the few major highways in the corps one would 
be laterals rather than axials. The most important artery is the 
Carentan-Isigny-Bayeux road just noted. Another highway, well paved for 
two-way traffic, links Bayeux with the junction point of St-Lo, crossing 
the Cerisy Forest. From Port-en-Bessin to Grandcamp runs a 15-foot, 
hard-surface road paralleling the coast about a mile inland. North-south 
roads in the region, at best secondary, are winding and usually narrow; 
they were expected to present difficulties in the form of steep 
shoulders and narrow bridges. Local communications are served by many 
small lanes and tracks, designed for the needs of farmers, but regarded 
as unsuitable for military use except by infantry. Any advance inland 
would require, for the supporting vehicular traffic, a great deal of 
engineering work to develop small roads into suitable north-south 
axials. Deployment from any of the roads was estimated as likely to be 
difficult because of the ever present hedges, often combined with 
embankments. The double-track railroad from Paris (Caen) to Cherbourg 
runs from east to west across the high ground a few miles south of the 
Aure. Cutting this line at Bayeux and Caen, and denying its use to the 
enemy, was a primary objective in the D-Day attack of the British Second 
Army.

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(Photo)

Page 19

American troops who fought in Normandy will always connect the name with 
hedgerow fighting. They were to begin it as soon as they left the bluffs 
above Omaha Beach. Stock raising and fruit growing are the main rural 
activities in this part of Normandy, and the field system is 
characterized by a patchwork layout of irregular fields varying from 
narrow ribbon-like strips to shapes more nearly square. These range in 
size from 10 or 15 to a 100 acres or more, with the greater number 
probably averaging between 50 and 75 acres. Some contain orchards of 
low-growing apple trees, more are used for pasture, and there are 
occasional patches of grain, though the main wheat-growing area of 
western Normandy is in the Orne Valley. Boundaries between fields tend 
to follow NNE-SSW and WNW-ESE axes in the Omaha region, but local 
variations are numerous, and the boundaries could never be counted on to 
provide a safe direction-line for keeping to an axis of advance. 
Hedgerows form the universal substitute for fences in this country and 
vary in character almost as much as do the shapes of the fields. Some 
are low bushes, five to six feet high, growing from the ground level of 
the field and not hard to break through. Others are thick, densely 
matted walls of tough and briery hedge, running up to 10 feet in height 
and interspersed with large and small trees. In many regions (not so 
often in the area just behind Omaha Beach) the hedges grow out of banks 
or dikes of earth, forming natural ramparts sometimes six feet high and 
adding immensely to the strength of the barrier. Many hedge embankments 
are not passable for tanks. Drainage ditches are often found skirting 
the hedge or its embankment, and provide good sites for shelters and fox 
holes. Communication between fields is usually limited to small openings 
at the corners. Occasional narrow trails or sunken roads, running 
between parallel hedgerows (and not always shown on maps) give access to 
fields far off the regular road net.

Fighting in country of this sort presents serious difficulties to 
attacking forces. Each hedgerow across the axis of advance might conceal 
a nest of enemy resistance, in which good positions for flat-trajectory 
weapons could be quickly organized, with short but usually excellent 
fields of fire across the nearest fields. Axial hedgerows could be 
utilized by defenders for delivering flanking fire. Observation would be 
extremely difficult for the attackers (see illustration, p. 120), and 
this might hinder the quick use of supporting heavy weapons and 
artillery fire. In contrast, a defending force could use prearranged 
fires of mortars and automatic weapons sited to cover the hedgerows 
leading toward any prepared positions. Split up by hedgerow walls, 
attacking forces were often to find difficulty in maintaining 
communications on their flanks and in coordinating the attack of units 
larger than a company. Fighting in this country would put a premium on 
initiative and aggressive leadership in small units, and armor could 
have only limited use.

Trevieres, largest village in the area close to Omaha Beach, had a 
prewar population of about 800, and the total population of the region 
shown on Map No. III (excluding Bayeux) was probably under 10,000. 
Following practices that go back to Celtic settlement of the land, 
farmers in this part of Normandy tend to group in small straggling 
villages and hamlets, with houses of stone and rubble-mortar 
construction. If located on important roads or high ground, these 
villages were often destined to become centers of local resistance and 
to suffer accordingly. In terrain so lacking in hills, church towers 
were inevitably regarded as possible observation posts, and their ruins 
testify to the results of neutralizing artillery fire. The occasional 
isolated farms usually

Page 20

consisted of fairly substantial buildings grouped around a court yard; 
many farms of this type became strongpoints in the battles through 
hedgerow country.

Enemy Defenses

In the years which followed the fall of France, the Germans publicized 
the building of an “Atlantic Wall” against any invasion attempts on the 
part of the Allies. In his speech announcing declaration of war on the 
United States, Hitler said (11 December 1941): “A belt of strongpoints 
and gigantic fortifications runs from Kirkenes (Norway) to the 
Pyrenees.... It is my unshakable decision to make this front impregnable 
against every enemy." Commando forays on the coast of France, aerial 
reconnaissance, and reports from the French Resistance and secret agents 
helped Allied Headquarters to amass detailed information on the enemy's 
progress in strengthening his fortifications in the west. On the basis 
of this intelligence Allied plans were checked and revised up to the 
middle of May. The estimates were later found to be substantially 
correct regarding enemy fire power, the underwater and beach obstacles, 
the plans for use of terrain in defense, and the strength of defensive 
emplacements

German coastal defenses in the V Corps one were distributed in 
accordance with the degree of opportunity offered by different sectors 
for a landing assault (Maps Nos. II and IV) Thirty-two fortified areas 
or strongpoints were located between the Vire River and Port-en-Bessin. 
The Vire Estuary, Grandcamp, and Port-en-Bessin were strongly defended. 
On the long stretches of coast enjoying natural protection by reefs and 
cliffs, the strongpoints were widely spaced. The enemy had recognized 
that the Omaha sector was more favorable for attack from the sea, and 12 
strongpoints were so placed as to be able to bring direct fire on the 
beach.

The enemy's tactical plan for meeting assault was suggested by the 
disposition of his coastal defenses, which were concentrated at the 
beaches and were not developed in any depth. Every evidence pointed to 
the conclusion that the Germans intended a maximum effort on the coast, 
seeking either to smash the attack at the water's edge or, at worst, to 
hold the assaulting forces near the beach until mobile reserves could 
arrive to finish them off. The beach defenses were designed to stop the 
attacking force by obstacles and mines, both on the tidal flat and the 
beach shelf, while it was annihilated with concentrated fires from every 
type of defensive weapon.

In 1944, at all main beaches practicable for massive landings, the 
Germans had begun to construct an elaborate system of obstacles along 
the tidal flat between the high- and low-water marks. These obstacles, 
designed to wreck or block off landing craft, had begun to appear in the 
Omaha sector early in April, and work on them was still in progress by D 
Day.

The first band of obstructions consisted of a series of Element “C,” 
gate-like structures of reinforced iron frames with iron supports, on 
rollers, about 250 yards out from the high-water line. The main support 
girders were 10 feet high, and waterproofed Teller mines were lashed to 
the uprights. The second band, 20 to 25 yards landward, was composed of 
heavy logs driven into the sand at such an angle that the mine-tipped 
ends pointed seaward, or of log ramps, reinforced and mined. This belt 
was found to be more formidable than had been anticipated. One hundred 
and thirty yards from shore, the final row of obstructions included 
hedgehogs, about five and one-half feet high and made of three or more 
steel rails or angles, crossed at the centers and so strongly set

Page 21

(Photo)

Page 22

(Map No. 2)

Page 23

that the ends would stave in the bottoms of landing craft. None of these 
bands were continuous, the elements being staggered at irregular 
intervals. There were no mines in the tidal sands. Shortly after work 
began o n these obstacles, Allied intelligence learned of the new 
development, and Allied planning staffs were preparing measures to meet 
this new and serious complication in the assault problem.

If the attacking troops reached the bank of shingle at the edge of the 
tidal sands, they would still have to cross the narrow shelf of beach 
flat to reach the bluffs. The Germans made liberal use of wire and mines 
to slow up movement beyond the shingle. Along most of the beach, a row 
of concertina wire was placed just to landward of the shingle; at the 
western end, the wire was on top of the sea wall. Irregularly placed 
minefields, usually posted with warning signs, lay in the flat ground 
behind the wire and on the bluff slope. In addition to the ordinary 
types, there were rock fougasses (charges of TNT covered by rock and set 
off by trip wire, sometimes in the concertina), ordinary trip-wire 
mines, French “buttercup” mines, and mustard pots. Some dummy minefields 
consisted of scrap iron planted below the ground surface, but most of 
the fields were real.

Enemy firing positions were laid out to cover the tidal flat and beach 
shelf with direct fire, both plunging and grazing, from all types of 
weapons. Observation on the whole Omaha area, and flanking fire from 
cliff positions at either end, were aided by the crescent curve of the 
shore line. The emplacements between Vierville and Pointe de la Percee 
were particularly dangerous because of their ability to deliver enfilade 
fire on a large stretch of the landing area. Each strongpoint was a 
complex system made up of elements including pillboxes, gun casemates, 
open positions for light guns, and firing trenches, surrounded by 
minefields and wire (Map No. 2). The elements were connected with each 
other and with under-

Page 24

(Photo)

Page 25

ground quarters and magazines by deep trenches or by tunnels. Most of 
the strong-points protecting Omaha were situated near the entrance to 
the draws, which were further protected by antitank ditches and road 
blocks. In some cases the elements of a strongpoint were echeloned from 
the north edge of the beach flat to the top of the bluff, with weapons 
sited for both grazing and plunging fire on every yard of approach to 
the draw. In June the Germans were still in process of completing or 
strengthening several strongpoints, including those guarding E-1 draw.

While machine guns were the basic weapons in all emplacements, there 
were over 60 light artillery pieces of various types. Eight concrete 
casemates and four open field positions were designed for guns of 
caliber from 75-mm to 88-mm; 35 pillboxes were occupied by lighter guns; 
and there were about 18 antitank guns (37-mm to 75-mm). The heavier guns 
were sited to give lateral fire along the beach, with traverse limited 
by thick concrete wing-walls which concealed the flash of these guns and 
made them hard to spot from the sea. Mortar positions were sometimes 
included in the strongpoints but were more frequently placed behind the 
bluffs. About 40 rocket pits were later found, located several hundred 
yards inland on the high ground and each fitted to fire four 32-cm 
rockets.

The considerable areas between the strong-points were supposed to be 
protected by their flanking fires, by minefields scattered on the beach 
flat and the slopes of the bluff, and by occasional trenches, rifle 
pits, and machinegun emplacements along the crest. While the line of 
defense was not continuous, no areas of beach were left uncovered in the 
pattern of defensive fires. Nearly all weapons, machine guns as well as 
artillery pieces, were sited primarily to give lateral fires down the 
length of the beach, and the defense of a given sector usually depended 
as much on the flanking fire from neighboring positions as on the 
emplacements in the sector itself.

The Omaha sector was not strongly defended by coastal batteries of 
heavier guns. But at Pointe du Hoe, some 5,000 yards to the west, there 
was a battery believed to consist of six 155-mm howitzers (French make), 
mounted partly in casemates. This position was regarded as the most 
dangerous in the American one, for guns of that caliber could cover not 
only the V and VII Corps landing beaches but also both transport areas. 
Further west, at Maisy, was a battery estimated at four 155-mm howitzers 
and near Gefosse-Fontenay were four 105-mm field gun-howitzers. Both of 
these batteries were later found to consist of mobile field guns. Just 
beyond the First Army boundary, in the British one, the strong defenses 
of Port-en-Bessin included guns that might be used against the landing 
area at Omaha.

All main enemy defenses in the Omaha sector were on the beach or just 
behind it; there was no evidence that the Germans had prepared positions 
inland for a defense in depth. There were known to be a few minefields 
in the fields just south of the bluffs, and some scattered emplacements 
at bivouac areas and assembly points. Defense beyond the beach would 
depend largely on the use of local reserves in counterattack.

Page 26

Omaha Beach lay in the 53-mile sector reportedly held by the 716th 
Infantry Division, extending from the Orne River to the Vire Estuary 
(Map No. I). This was a defensive division, estimated at two regiments, 
two or three artillery battalions, and other small divisional units. 
Non-German elements in the division were estimated to be as high as 50 
percent, mostly Poles or Russians, and morale was thought to be poor. 
The 726th Infantry Regiment was responsible for the coast defenses from 
west of Grandcamp to a point three miles east of Port-en-Bessin. 
According to the intelligence available, defending troops in the Omaha 
Beach strongpoints amounted to about a reinforced battalion, some 800 to 
1,000 troops, most of them needed to man the beach defenses. Local 
reserves of the 716th Division were estimated at three battalions, two 
of these near enough to the Omaha assault area to reach it in two or 
three hours. Counterattacks by these units were not regarded as likely 
to be effective against penetrations of the beach defenses, and major 
counterattacks would depend on the arrival of mobile reserves. The 
nearest of these to the Omaha area, and the most likely to be committed 
there was the 352d Infantry Division, reported as stationed in the St-
Lo-Caumont area some 20 miles inland. Commanded by Lt. Gen. Heinz 
Hellmich, this was an offensive division of good quality, with a core of 
veterans experienced in fighting on the Russian front, and was expected 
to furnish most of the opposition

Page 27

to V Corps. It was at full strength, with three infantry regiments and 
normal artillery of three battalions of 105-mm and one battalion of 150-
mm howitzers. By commandeering local transportation, the enemy was 
believed able to get one regimental combat team of this division into 
the Omaha area by afternoon of D Day. In addition, the three small 
battalions of the 30th Mobile Brigade, headquarters at Coutances, might 
be used for early counterattack. These battalions, consisting of three 
companies each, were provided with adequate transport for quick 
movement. Other enemy mobile reserves, including his available armored 
divisions, were located nearer the Caen-Bayeux area in the British one. 
V Corps units were warned to guard against possible armored 
counterattack on this flank by late on D Day. The three German divisions 
in the Cotentin peninsula were expected to be completely occupied by VII 
Corps' attack [6] and by the need for defending the Cherbourg area 
against possible further landings.

It was thought that the German air force would make a supreme effort 
against the Allied convoy and landing operations. Despite his heavy air 
losses during the winter, the enemy was believed capable of making 1,500 
sorties on D Day, mainly of fighters and fighter-bombers. In view of the 
overwhelming Allied naval strength, there was little fear of enemy 
surface action against the assault convoy. Enemy capabilities would

[6] The 245th Infantry Division. believed to be guarding the coat from 
Coutances to Avranches (See Map No. 1), was found in July to have been 
in the Dieppe region at the time of the invasion.

Page 28

be limited to harassing raids by E-Boats on the flanks of the convoy 
lane, and underwater attack by U-Boats from bases in western France.

Pre-Assault Bombardment Plans

The assault landings on Omaha Beach were to be preceded by intensive air 
and naval bombardment in the half-hour before touchdown, designed to 
neutralize all known gun positions and to demoralize enemy troops in the 
beach defenses. For the period just previous to D Day air attacks were 
planned against coastal batteries in the NEPTUNE area, but only as part 
of a widespread program which put its heaviest attacks on the French 
coast north of the Seine. The Pointe du Hoe position, one of the 
priority targets in this pre-D-Day bombing had been hit on 15 April, 22 
May, and 4; June. The RAF was to conclude the effort against coastal 
batteries with a concentrated attack between midnight and dawn of D Day; 
the coastal batteries from the mouth of the Seine to Cherbourg were the

Page 29

target of 1,333 heavy bombers dropping 5,316 tons of bombs.

From H-30 to H-5 minutes heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force would 
strike enemy beach defenses in the assault area between the Vire and the 
Orne. In the V Corps' zone 480 B-24's were to attack 13 target areas 
with 1,285 tons of bombs. Of these targets, 11 were between Pointe de la 
Percee and the eastern end of the Omaha landing one, including every 
strongpoint in the system of beach defenses. The loading consisted for 
the most part of 100-pound fragmentation and high-explosive bombs, with 
some 500-pound high-explosive bombs for certain strongpoints. All loads 
were fitted with instantaneous fuze in order to prevent cratering of the 
beach and consequent delay in movement of traffic across it. West of 
Omaha, the battery positions at Pointe du Hoe would receive a final 
attack by 18 medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force, delivered between H-
20 and H-5 minutes. In the same period, mediums would deliver a blow of 
equal weight at Maisy, and the gun positions there and at Gefosse-
Fontenay were the targets of two squadrons of fighter-bombers.

Naval gunfire would commence at H-40 minutes and continue to H-3 
minutes. The battleships TEXAS and ARKANSAS (mounting a total of ten 14-
inch, twelve 12-inch, and twelve 5-inch guns) would fire from 18,000 
yards off shore. About 600 rounds of their heaviest shells would be 
aimed at the enemy coastal battery at Pointe du Hoe and at the enemy 
strongpoints defending Exit D-3. Three cruisers, with 6-inch or 152-mm 
guns, had as targets for 950 rounds the enemy defenses near Port-en-
Bessin and the strong-points near D-3 and E-1 draws. Firing at 1,800 
yards from swept lanes on the flanks of the landing-craft approach area, 
eight destroyers (4- and 5-inch guns) were to put 2.000 rounds on the 
beach strongpoints.

In addition to the ships, a large number of fire-support craft were to 
place area fire on the beach defenses, and point fire on certain other 
targets. Five LCG (L)'s with two 47-mm guns each, accompanying the 
leading assault wave, were scheduled to fire 630 rounds on selected 
strongpoints beginning at H-20 minutes. Sixteen LCT (A and HE)'s, 
carrying tanks to land in the first wave, were each fitted so that two 
M-4's could fire over the ramp, beginning from a range of 3,000 yards at 
about H-15 minutes; each gun had an allowance of 150 rounds. Ten LCT (5) 
s carried the 36105-mm howitzers (self-propelled) of the 58th and 62d 
Armored Field Artillery Battalions, due to land in the third hour of the 
assault. These howitzers were mounted to fire from the LCT's, opening at 
a range of 8,000 yards about H-30 and closing at a range of 3,700 yards 
by H-5 minutes. Their allowance was 100 rounds per gun. Finally, 9 LCT 
(R)'s stationed in positions 3,000 yards o shore were to fire 1,000 HE 
rockets each when the leading assault wave was 300 yards from the beach.

Analysis of the combined plans shows that the great weight of air and 
naval bombardment would fall on the immediate beach defenses in the 
Omaha area, including positions which could put flanking fire on the 
beach. All the main enemy strongpoints, and the Pointe du Hoe coastal 
battery, were targets for attack both from air and sea.

Beginning at H Hour naval fires would shift to inland targets such as 
possible assembly areas, or wait for direction by naval shore fire 
control parties. There were 24 of these, permitting an allotment of one 
to each battalion (including the Ranger Battalions) in the two assault 
divisions, excepting the regiment in corps reserve. High-performance 
spotting aircraft would be available up to H+5 hours. For purposes of 
supporting the attack inland, Fire Support

Page 30

Group I, consisting of a battleship, cruiser, and four destroyers, would 
be on call for the 29th Division units and Fire Support Group II, a 
battleship, two cruisers, and four destroyers, for the 1st Division.

Plan of Assault Landings

Air and naval bombardment was designed to soften up the beach defenses; 
the main job of reducing them and breaking through inland would have to 
be done by the assault landing teams. These had been built up to include 
every type of specialized technique and weapon needed in the fight at 
the beach. Every unit, down to the smallest, had been trained to carry 
out a particular task in a definite area (Maps Nos. II, IV, V, VI).

For purposes of the landing operations, the whole Omaha area had been 
divided into beach sectors and sub-sectors, with six sub-sectors falling 
in the main one of landings. The 1st Division planned an attack by two 
regiments abreast. On the two easterly sub-sectors (Easy Red and Fox 
Green), totaling about 3,000 yards, the 16th RCT would assault with two 
battalion landing teams abreast, one on each sub-sector; the support BLT 
would touchdown on Easy Red at H+70 minutes. On the four western sub-
sectors (Dog Green, Dog White, Dog Red, and Easy Green), totaling about 
3,000 yards, the 116th RCT would likewise assault with two BLT' s 
abreast, the support battalion coming in on the three eastern sub-
sectors.

The Provisional Ranger Force of two battalions (six companies each), 
attached to the 116th RCT, had special missions on the right flank. 
Three companies of the 2d Ranger Battalion were to scale the cliffs at 
Pointe du Hoe, three miles west of the main landings, and take the 
fortified battery positions. One company of the same unit would land 
just west of the 116th near Exit D-1 and assault the enemy positions at 
Pointe de la Percee. If the assault at Pointe du Hoe was successful by 
H+30 minutes, the 5th Ranger Battalion and the remaining companies of 
the 2d Battalion would land there; if not, they would come in on Dog 
Green at H+70 and proceed overland for attack on Pointe du Hoe.

Further break-down of the assault tactics can best be followed in terms 
of the landing schedule, which brought the BLT's and their specialized 
supporting attachments ashore in a pattern to conform to the expected 
needs and development of the battle. The schedule for the 116th RCT may 
be taken as representative. (See Landing Diagram, 116th RCT, and Maps 
Nos. V, VI.)

H Hour would be fixed so as to bring in the first landing waves as soon 
after dawn as possible, and under conditions of tide low enough to 
expose fully the underwater beach obstacles. This timing was an 
essential feature of the assault plans. It meant that the first waves 
would have to cross several hundred yards of open ground on the tidal 
flat, but it would allow an engineer task force to clear lanes through 
the obstacles before the arrival of larger forces and supplies at high 
water.

At H-5 minutes Companies B and C (DD tanks) of the 743d Tank Battalion 
would make the first touchdown on Dog White and Dog Green. These tanks, 
fitted to navigate on water or land, were to be launched from 6,000 
yards out, swim ashore, and take up firing positions at the water's edge 
to cover the first phase of the assault. Their fire was to be placed on 
the main enemy fortifications, particularly those west of Exit D-l which 
could bring flanking fire on Dog Beach. Moving up through the obstacles 
as the tide rose, the tanks would support the main assault and then 
clear the beach through Exit D-3. At H Hour eight LCT's would land 
Company A of the 743d

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(Chart)

Page 32

Battalion on Easy Green and Dog Red. This unit had a mission similar to 
that of the other tank companies. With Company A were landed eight tank 
dozers, towing trailers of explosive and scheduled for use by engineers 
in demolition work on obstacles. All three companies were attached to 
the battalion landing teams to insure closest coordination with the 
infantry assault.

At H+1 minute the first infantry assault wave would touch down: four 
companies, each loaded in six LCVP's and correspondingly organized in 
boat sections rather than platoons. Company A would land on Dog Green, 
spearheading the 1st BLT's attack on the important Exit D-1. Companies 
E, F, and G were on the three sub-sectors to the east. This primary 
assault force was to cross the tidal flat through the obstacles and make 
its attack immediately on the German defenses. The boat sections were to 
operate as tactical units, each carrying out a carefully planned assault 
mission in a well-defined sector. The sections would assist each other 
in the work of reducing the beach defenses, but no attempt was to be 
made to organize for action as companies until an inland assembly point 
had been reached. The infantry attack, together with the fire of the 
tanks, would occupy the attention of the German strongpoints and cover 
the work on demolition of beach obstacles by the Special Engineer Task 
Force.

That Force was to come in at H+3 to H+8 minutes in 13 LCM's. Army 
personnel (for this section of the beach) was composed of the 146th 
Engineer Combat Battalion, organized in eight assault and four support 
teams, and a control section. [7] Averaging 41 men each, 11 of the teams 
included a Naval Combat Demolition Unit of an officer and 12 men. They 
had a vital mission to perform: landing when the tide was below the 
obstacles, to clear and mark lanes through the beach obstacles so that 
craft could reach the upper sands at flood stage of the tide. In the 
116th's half of the beach, they were to prepare eight 50-yard gaps 
through all obstacles (two gaps per sub-sector). The eight tank dozers 
would be used to push, break, and tow off obstacles at the lower edge of 
the beach. Demolitions would be used on other obstacles, and mine crews 
would take care of the mines on obstacles and (if found) in the sand.

A 30-minute interval would be allowed for the work of the Engineer 
Special Task Force. Beginning at H+30 minutes, the second and larger 
group of assault waves would come to shore in a sequence of 5 landings, 
spaced over 30 minutes. These would bring in the remaining units o the 
two assault BLT's and (behind the 2d BLT the supporting 3d BLT. Also 
included were battalion and regimental headquarters, two companies of 
the 81st Chemical Weapons Battalion, and elements of the 112th and 121st 
Engineer Combat Battalions. This second contingent of engineers had the 
mission of assisting the assault infantry through minefields and 
obstacles on their route of advance, and of opening the beach exits for 
passage of vehicles by H+3 hours They would then move inland with the 
116th RCT, one of their first tasks being to open the transit vehicle 
areas.

Advance elements of still a third engineer force were due in with the 
second series of landings. This force comprised the Provisional Engineer 
Special Brigade Group, commanded by Brig. Gen. William M. Hog and 
organized in two brigades of three battalions each. They would aid in 
clearing the beach area of mines and obstacles and in opening exits; 
then, when the engineers attached to 116th RCT went inland, the

[7] In the 16th RCT’s sector, the 299th Engineer Combat Battalion 
furnished the Army contingent for this force.

Page 33

Brigade Group engineers would take over organization, operation, and 
maintenance of the beach installations up to the beachhead maintenance 
line.

Between H+90 and H+120 minutes the first artillery units would come in, 
led by the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, which had taken part 
in the preparatory bombardment by fire from LCT's. Dukws would bring in 
the 111th Field Artillery Battalion, the 467th AAA AW Battalion, and the 
antitank and cannon companies of the 116th RCT. Some vehicles had been 
included in the second wave; however, the real influx of vehicles and 
supply would come from H+180 minutes on, in steadily mounting 
proportion. By H+240 minutes there would be cranes, tank-recovery 
vehicles, half-tracks, and trucks of all types on shore. From that time 
on, rhino-ferries and dukws were to play a large part in transport of 
vehicles and supply.

On Easy Red and Fox Green, the 16th RCT (with attachments) was to land 
by a very similar plan. The differences in respect to infantry landings 
can be seen on Maps Nos. V and VI. Of the three companies of the 741st 
Tank Battalion, B and C (DD's) were to land on Easy Red and Fox Green 
respectively, with Company A astride the boundary of these sectors. The 
employment of engineer units was similar for both parts of Omaha Beach, 
[8] and artillery and supply elements would come in at about the same 
rhythm.

The larger support elements of the assault force were to start landings 
on Omaha at H+195 minutes, when the 18th RCT would reach Easy Red. The 
infantry elements of the 115th RCT were to touch down behind the 116th 
on orders of the commanding general, V Corps, and to operate initially 
under 1st Division control.

Plan for Movement to Inland Objectives

As the landing schedule clearly shows, the two assault regimental combat 
teams were expected to break through the beach defenses within the first 
two hours after touchdown. The enemy strongpoints protecting the exit 
draws were to be neutralized early enough to permit their opening for 
traffic off the beach by H+3 hours. After reducing beach defenses in 
their allotted ones, the companies in the assault battalion landing 
teams were to make their way to battalion assembly areas, ordinarily 
about a thousand yards inland. From there on, the battalions would 
operate toward assigned missions inland (Map No. IV).

In the 16th RCT zone, the 2d BLT had the mission of seizing Colleville, 
then fanning out beyond and holding the high ground just south of that 
village so as to cover later landings against possible enemy 
counterattack from Trevieres or Bayeux. The 3d BLT, once on the plateau, 
was to turn east and reduce the enemy defenses along the bluff as far as 
Ste-Honorine-des-Pertes; then, to cover the eastern flank of the 
division, along the army boundary, by occupying the high ground as far 
as Mount Cauvin. The 1st BLT, in support during the beach assault, would 
move through the 2d Battalion, capture Formigny on the main highway, 
occupy the high ground overlooking Trevieres and the Aure Valley near 
that village, and secure the river bridges near Trevieres Positions for 
all-around defense against possible enemy counterattack were to be 
secured and organized by all battalions.

Of the other 1st Division units, the 18th RCT, assembling under cover of 
the advance made by the 16th RCT, would move across the Aure southeast 
of Colleville and occupy the high ground east of Trevieres, patrolling 
to the D-Day phase line. The 26th RCT, loaded in Force “B” and landing 
when

[8] The demolition team had the mission of clearing six gaps on Easy Red 
and two on Fox Green.

Page 34

ordered by corps, would revert on landing to the 1st Division. Its 
mission was to seize and organize for defense the area south and 
southeast of Tour-en-Bessin, in contact toward Bayeux with 50 (British) 
Division.

On the western flank of the beachhead, 29th Division units had the 
mission of occupying the important area between the flooded Aure Valley 
and the sea. After capturing Vierville the 1st BLT would move west along 
the coastal highway, and together with the Rangers clear out enemy 
defenses from the beachhead to the Vire Estuary. It would be ready to 
seize Isigny and the important bridge there and to make contact with VII 
Corps to the west. The 2d BLT had St-Laurent as its first objective and 
then the higher ground southwest of that point. The 3d BLT landing in 
support was to move through Longueville, occupy the high ground 2,500 
yards to the west, and prepare for advance toward Isigny. The 115th 
Infantry, landing in attachment to the 1st Division, would assist if 
necessary in mopping up the beach defenses in the one of either of the 
assault regimental combat teams. It would be prepared to move through 
Longueville to the la Cambe area, outpost the high ground south of the 
Aure, and patrol considerably to the south of the outposts. The 175th 
Infantry, in Force “B” and designated as corps reserve, was scheduled to 
land on D+1.

Artillery support would be given by five battalions of 105-mm howitzers 
landing in attachment to the regiments of the 1st Division, two each to 
the assault RCT's. These battalions were to move inland with the 
advance. Additional fire support would be rendered by the heavier guns 
of the Navy, directed by the fire control parties with the infantry 
battalions.

If successful, this plan put V Corps in position to advance on D+1 south 
beyond the Aure toward the key high ground in the Cerisy Forest area, 
and west through Isigny toward a junction with VII Corps. Corps plans 
did not contemplate movement in force beyond the Vire, as it was hoped 
that the southward advance would compel an early enemy retreat from the 
area between the Vire and Carentan.