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LAUNCHING THE INVASION

"I am ashore with Colonel Simmons and General Roosevelt, advancing 
steadily (0940). ... Everything is going OK (1025).... Defense is not 
stubborn (2400)." Thus did Col. James A. Van Fleet report the progress 
of his 8th Infantry to his commanding officer, Maj. Gen. Raymond O. 
Barton of the 4th Division, on D Day, 6 June 1944. These messages were 
confirmed by liaison officers returning to the headquarters ship, U.S.S. 
Bayfield, after trips to the beach: "Everything is moving along very 
nicely." To Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, commanding the VII Corps, these 
reports were reassuring indications that at least a foothold had been 
secured on the Cotentin Peninsula and with less difficulty than had been 
feared (Map I). [1]

The comparative ease with which the 4th Division had come ashore on 
"Utah Beach" was, however, only a part of the story of the VII Corps 
assault. Hard fighting in the Cotentin Peninsula had preceded the 
seaborne landings, as two airborne divisions, the 82d and 101st, had 
been dropped into the beachhead area several miles inland beginning at 
about H minus 5 hours. Their mission was to seize crossings or destroy 
bridges over the Merderet and Douve Rivers and secure vital exits of 
causeways leading inland from the beach across inundated areas, and thus 
facilitate the expansion of the beachhead by the 4th Division. The 
mission of the airborne divisions was a key one, for the success of the 
Utah assault was largely dependent on the success of their operation.

The VII Corps assault on the east Cotentin constituted the right flank 
of the larger Allied invasion known as Operation NEPTUNE. The original 
plan for the 1944 invasion of the Continent, known as the OVERLORD Plan, 
did not include an assault on the beaches of the east Cotentin, largely 
because, when the plan was written in. the summer of 1943, it was 
believed that with the resources then allotted to the operation it would 
be sounder to concentrate on the landings over the beaches between 
Grandcamp and Caen. On the other hand it was recognized that a landing 
on the Contentin proper, on beaches northwest of the Carentan estuary, 
would be highly desirable in order to insure the early capture of the 
port of Cherbourg. Tactical planning had been dominated from the 
beginning by the need for adequate port capacity, on which the later 
build-up of forces in the lodgment area largely depended. When Gen. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower 

[1] Maps numbered in Roman are placed in inverse order inside the back 
cover.

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assumed supreme command for OVERLORD in January 19442 it seemed to him 
and his subordinate commanders that the Cotentin assault was not only 
desirable but essential for the success of the invasion. Additional 
resources were found and the original three-division assault was 
increased to five. The assault front was widened both eastward to 
include additional beaches in the British sector and westward to include 
the east Cotentin. Equally important, the provision of additional air 
transport made it possible to land two and two-thirds airborne divisions 
simultaneously. Two of these airborne divisions were to land in the 
American sector to reduce the admitted risks of the west flank assault, 
where troops for some time after landing would be separated

[2]By September 1943 the name OVERLORD had come to be used in two 
senses: to refer to the specific operation with specific assault areas 
and target date, and also to the general concept of cross-Channel 
invasion in 1944. Since security considerations made it desirable to 
restrict the number of persons having access to information on the 
specific operation, the new code name NEPTUNE was adopted to refer to 
this operation. OVERLORD was retained thereafter to apply only to the 
general concept and to be used only in documents that did not directly 
or by implication refer to the assault area or the target date. The 
special security procedure, called BIGOT, which reduced circulation of 
top secret document to a minimum, was thereafter applied to NEPTUNE, but 
not to OVERLORD.

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from the main body of Allied forces by the Carentan estuary and would 
attack in an area where the enemy had formidable defensive advantages.

One of the factors which had dominated the tactical planning for NEPTUNE 
was that the assault area itself did not include a port, which was so 
necessary for sustained operations. The first mission of the invasion 
force following the consolidation of a beachhead was therefore the 
capture of Cherbourg. This mission was assigned to VII Corps, commanded 
by Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins. The VII Corps, together with V Corps, 
which was to land at Omaha Beach, constituted the First U.S. Army under 
Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley. On General Bradley's left was the Second 
British Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Miles C. Dempsey. The two armies 
together constituted 21 Army Group under Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, 
who, for the assault phase, was the over-all ground commander.

Tactical Aspects of the Terrain

The dominant terrain feature of the south Cotentin is the Douve River 
which, together with its principal tributary, the Merderet,
drains the major portion of the peninsula, flows south and southeast, 
and then turns toward the sea (Map I). Neither river has high banks or 
is sufficiently wide to present insurmountable obstacles, but through 
much of their course these rivers flow through flat bottom lands and 
water meadows. A lock and dam at la Barquette, just north of Carentan, 
controls the drainage of most of these bottom lands. At high tide the 
low marshlands of the Douve and the Merderet are below sea level, and by 
opening the lock these lands can be converted into shallow lakes, which, 
supplemented by the water meadows and undrained swampland of the 
Prairies Marecageuses to the south, effectively isolate the Cotentin, 
restricting all land traffic to established routes through Carentan and 
Pont l'Abbe on the east and to a narrow strip of land between St. Lo-
d'Ourville and St. Sauveur-de-Pierre-Pont on the west. The blocking of 
these routes and the seizure of the la Barquette locks intact would 
permit the establishment of an easily defended military line to the 
south, protecting the rear and the west flank of forces pushing 
northward against Cherbourg.

On the east coast of the Cotentin a belt of low-lying meadow land, from 
the mouth of the Douve to Quineville, had been subjected to shallow 
flooding. This area of inundation, running parallel to Utah Beach, had 
been created by the obstruction of several stream exits about fifty 
yards to the rear of the beach, resulting in the flooding or complete 
saturation of the soil for a width of one to two miles. Travel in this 
area was restricted to a few causeways which cleared the inundations by 
approximately one foot but could be easily obstructed by blocks or 
demolitions.

Critical areas of the Cotentin therefore were: (1) the Carentan-la 
Barquette area, with its control of the water level in the low 
marshlands along the Douve and Merderet, which was the key point in the 
east for passage into or out of the peninsula; (2) the dry ground 
between St. Lo-d'Ourville and St. Sauveur-de-Pierre-Pont, which 
controlled the western approaches to the peninsula; and () the inundated 
area between the mouth of the Douve and Quineville, which not only 
restricted the exploitation of an initial landing by canalizing any 
advance from the beachhead but also facilitated the enemy's defense of 
the area.

The VII Corps' original plan of attack was designed to gain immediate 
control of these critical areas. Briefly, it provided for an assault on 
Utah Beach by the 4th Division (with attached tanks and combat 
engineers) and two predawn airborne landings: one by the 101st Airborne 
Division southeast of Ste. Mere-Eglise, with the task of capturing the 
vital beach exits and blocking the eastern approaches

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to the peninsula; and the other by the 82d Airborne Division west of St. 
Sauveur-le Vicomte, with the mission of sealing the western approaches 
to the peninsula.

Utah Beach, located directly east of Ste. Mere-Eglise, is a smooth beach 
with a shallow gradient and compact grey sand between high and low water 
marks. It differs from Omaha in that the terrain along the shore is not 
high; there is no dominating ground to assault and secure. Direct access 
to the beach is hindered only by the Iles St. Marcouf. The beach is 
backed for nearly 10,000 yards by a masonry sea wall, which is almost 
vertical and from 4 to 8 feet high at the proposed landing point. Sand 
is piled against the sea wall face in many places, forming a ramp to the 
top, which has a wire fence. Gaps in the wall mark the termini of roads 
leading to the beach, but these gaps were blocked. Behind the wall, sand 
dunes, from 10 to 20 feet high, extend inland from 150 to l,000 yards, 
and beyond them were the inundated areas whose western banks and exits 
might be easily defended by relatively small enemy forces.

Enemy Defenses

Man-made defenses along the coast took various forms. Since the 
beginning of 1944 construction activity had increased markedly in the 
defensive belt. On the beach itself rows of obstacles had been emplaced 
at a distance of from 50 to 130 yards to seaward. These obstacles were 
in the form of stakes or piles slanted seaward, steel hedgehogs and 
tetrahedra, and Element "C" or "Belgian Gates," which were barricade-
like gates constructed of steel angles and plates and mounted on small 
concrete rollers. The gates were used also to block roads or passages 
where a mobile obstacle was needed to make a defensive line continuous.

Defenses immediately behind the beach along the sea wall consisted of 
pillboxes, tank turrets mounted on concrete structures, "Tobruk Pits," 
firing trenches, and underground shelters. These were usually connected 
by a network of trenches and protected by wire, mines, and antitank 
ditches. Concrete infantry strong points provided interlocking fire, and 
were armed with both fixed and mobile light artillery pieces. The strong 
point at les Dunes de Varreville, directly opposite "Green Beach" and 
first objective of the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, combined most of


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these features. Increased activity was evident in this area early in the 
year, possibly as a result of Field Marshal Erwin J. Rommel's inspection 
of the Atlantic Wall in December and January. Aerial reconnaissance 
revealed new casemated positions and showed that new open field battery 
emplacements were being prepared.
Page 6

those at Crisbecq and St. Martin-de-Varreville. Here heavy- and medium-
caliber guns housed in a series of concrete forts were sited to cover 
both the sea approaches and the beach areas.

The Cotentin Peninsula lay within the defensive zone of the German 
Seventh Army, commanded by Col. Gen. Friedrich Dollmann. Allied 
intelligence estimates between March and early May of 1944 placed the 
enemy force occupying the Cotentin at two infantry divisions, the 709th 
and 243d. The 709th Division was known to have a large percentage of 
non-Germans, particularly Georgians, and was disposed generally along 
the east coast of the peninsula, with two of its regiments (729th and 
919th) believed to be manning the beach defenses. The 243d Division was 
located generally to the rear of the 709th, with the mission of 
defending the western portion of the peninsula. The 716th and 352d 
Divisions, disposed east and south of the Cotentin, were not believed 
capable of affecting the VII Corps assault.

Intelligence reports early in May indicated that the enemy had been 
strengthening his coastal defense units to bring them up to the level of 
field divisions in strength and equipment. Formerly classified by Allied 
intelligence as "static," these divisions had been upgraded to "limited 
employment" or "low establishment." In addition to the organic field 
artillery of the infantry divisions, the enemy had various army and navy 
coast artillery and flak battalions, and the 709th Division was thought 
to have been strengthened by elements of the 17th Machine Gun Battalion 
at Carentan. It was not believed early in May that the enemy had panzer 
battalions or reserves of regimental strength in the Cotentin.

On the basis of these reports, the enemy was estimated to be capable of 
(1) rigid defense of the beaches, manning the crust of coastal 
fortifications and obstacles with the 709th Division and various 
artillery and flak units; (2) reinforcing the 709th Division in the 
assault area with elements of the 243d Division commencing at H Hour; 
(3) piecemeal counterattacks by a maximum of four battalions and a 
battalion combat team on D Day; and (4) a coordinated counterattack with 
motorized armored reinforcements from outside the peninsula at any time 
after D plus 2.

About ten days before D Day it was learned that enemy dispositions in 
the Cotentin had probably been altered as a result of the recent arrival 
of the 91st Division in the Carentan-St. Sauveur-le Vicomte-Valognes 
area. This division was estimated to consist of two or three regiments 
and one battalion of tanks. The 243d Division was believed to have moved 
farther west, while the 91st Division occupied positions to the rear of 
the 709th Division (Map No. 1). The mission of the 91st was

Page 6

The fixed infantry defenses were more sparsely located in the Utah Beach 
area than at Omaha Beach (where V Corps landed), probably because the 
enemy relied on the natural obstacle provided by the inundated area 
directly behind the beach. At and near the roads leading to the beach 
the defense was a linear series of infantry strong points, armed chiefly 
with automatic weapons. About two miles inland on the coastal headlands 
behind Utah Beach were several coastal and field artillery batteries, 
the most formidable being

Page 7

apparently to strengthen the defense of the eastern half of the 
peninsula from Carentan to Valognes. These three divisions were part of 
the LXXXIV Corps, which also controlled other divisions east of the 
Cotentin Peninsula.

The appearance of the 91st Division was a surprise. It upset the VII 
Corps original plan of deployment and forced a change in the initial 
mission of the 82d Airborne Division.

The VII Corps Plan

The VII Corps plan of operations was issued on 27 March 1944. One of its 
major objectives, derived from the tactical aspects of the Cotentin 
terrain, was the cutting of the entire peninsula at its base as a 
preliminary to the drive on Cherbourg. The original plan of deployment
provided that the 101st Airborne Division would land southeast of Ste. 
Mere-Eglise, destroy the bridges in the vicinity of Carentan, and seize 
the crossings over the Douve at Pont l'Abbe and Beuzeville-la Bastille 
in order to protect the southern flank of the VII Corps

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east of St. Sauveur-le Vicomte. The 82d Airborne Division was to land 
west of St. Sauveur-le Vicomte and block the movement of enemy 
reinforcements into the Cotentin in the western half of the peninsula.

This plan of deployment had to be revised when it became known toward 
the end of May that the Germans had moved the 91st
Division into the Cotentin. The additional strength which the enemy now 
possessed greatly increased his capabilities. Not only was he now able 
to meet the beach landings in greater strength, but his possession of 
additional troops at St. Sauveur-le Vicomte constituted a potentially 
serious threat to an airborne landing in this vicinity. It now became 
more important than ever for the seaborne elements to secure rapidly a 
beachhead sufficiently deep to hold against enemy counterattacks in 
force. Of equal importance was the need for a prompt drive to Carentan 
to forestall the destruction of the locks in this area, to seal off the 
enemy's eastern approach to the beachhead, and to keep the Germans from 
driving a wedge into the initial gap between VII and V Corps.

General Collins learned of the changed enemy situation in the Cotentin 
on 27 May, when he was called to General Bradley's headquarters in 
Bristol and was advised of the necessity of making some changes in the 
plans for the drop of the two airborne divisions.

Page 9

It had been clearly understood that the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions 
were to be under First Army control during the mounting of the operation 
and until they actually touched ground in Normandy. Maj. Gen. Matthew B.
Ridgway and Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, commanding generals of the 82d 
and 101st respectively, had, therefore, received their early 
instructions on the planning directly from the First Army staff. 
However, since both divisions were to pass to VII Corps control upon 
landing, General Bradley had agreed that General Collins' staff should 
collaborate closely in the detailed planning.

At the Bristol meeting of 27 May the First Army staff proposed that both 
the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions be dropped east of the Merderet-the 
101st south and east of Ste. Mere-Eglise, and the 82d in the immediate 
vicinity of that town. After some study, General Collins suggested a 
less radical change: that the 82d be dropped between the Merderet and 
the Douve, generally north of Pont l'Abbe, and that the 101st's plan 
remain unchanged. General Collins thought that the 82d would thus be in 
a better position to seize not only the crossings of the Merderet at la 
Fiere and Chef-du-Pont but also the crossings of the Douve farther west 
in the vicinity of St. Sauveur-le Vicomte and Ste. Colombe.

After additional study of the maps, however, it was concluded that 
because of the wooded and thickly hedged area between the Merderet and 
the Douve, and the paucity of clearings large enough to take gliders, it 
would not be possible to drop the entire 82d Division west of the 
Merderet. The final decision, therefore, provided for a divided drop 
astride the Merderet, with one parachute regiment dropping to the east 
and two parachute regiments to the west of the river (Map II).

When this change was made, troops of the infantry divisions were already 
moving into the marshaling areas preparatory to embark-

Page 10

ing at English ports. The altered plan did not affect them. Moreover, 
the VII Corps' mission was not changed. Field Order No. 1, 28 May, read: 
"VII Corps assaults Utah Beach on D Day at H Hour and captures Cherbourg 
with minimum delay." But emphasis was now placed on securing the area to 
the north of the Douve and east of the Merderet, so that the beachhead 
would not be endangered (Map III). The plan had the disadvantage of 
leaving open for a few days the western corridor between St. Lo-
d'Ourville and St. Sauveur-de-Pierre-Pont, whose eventual interdiction 
was required. It was believed, however, that the changes made would 
facilitate the initial effort and thus insure the achievement of later 
objectives.

In the new plan it became the task of the 82d Airborne Division to 
secure the western edge of the bridgehead, particularly by capture of 
Ste. Mere-Eglise, a key communication center, and by establishing deep 
bridgeheads over the Merderet River, on the two main road westward from 
Ste. Mere-Eglise, for a drive toward St. Sauveur-le Vicomte. The 101st 
Airborne Division was to clear the way for the seaborne assault by 
seizing the western exits of four roads from the beach across the 
inundated area. At the same time it was to establish defensive arcs 
along the northern and southern edges of the invasion area and establish 
bridgeheads across the Douve at two points for later exploitation in a 
southward drive to Carentan to weld the VII and V Corps beachheads.

The missions of the 4th, 90th, and 9th Infantry Divisions remained 
unchanged. The 4th Division, principal seaborne unit in the assault on 
Utah Beach, was heavily weighted with attachments for its special 
mission, among them the 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion, the 1106th 
Engineer Combat Group, the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and one 
battery of the 980th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm.), plus 
antiaircraft artillery units and a detachment of the 13th Field 
Artillery Observation Battalion. The 4th Division was to assault Utah 
Beach at H Hour, establish a beachhead, and then drive on Cherbourg in 
conjunction with the 90th Division, which was to land on D plus 1 (Map 
IV). One of the 90th Division's Regimental Combat Teams (RCT), the 
359th, landing on D Day, was to be attached to the 4th Division for 
operations on its northeast flank, reverting to the control of the 90th 
upon the latter's arrival on shore. The 9th Division was to begin 
landing on D plus 4 and assemble in Corps reserve in the area around 
Orglandes, prepared for operations to the northwest.

In addition to these units the revised field order of 28 May provided 
for the temporary attachment to the VII Corps of another division, the 
79th, to begin landing on D plus 8. And, as an added precaution, the 
support of Corps artillery was to be hastened by phasing ahead by three 
days the entry of two 155-mm. howitzer battalions (the 188th and 951st). 
To insure expeditious movement of men and supplies across the beaches 
the 1st Engineer Special Brigade was charged with organizing and 
operating all shore installations necessary for debarkation, supply, 
evacuation, and local security.

At H minus 2 hours a detachment of the 4th Cavalry Group was to land on 
the Iles St. Marcouf to capture and destroy any installations there 
capable of hindering the landing operations.

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(Photo)

PAGE 12

The VII Corps attack was to be preceded by intensive air and naval 
bombardment of enemy defenses in the landing zones of the amphibious 
forces. The Allied air forces had been carrying out an intensive 
strategic bombing of railroads and German Air Force bases. In order to 
deceive the enemy concerning the area to be invaded, concentrated 
bombing of coastal defenses was delayed until D minus 4, and even then 
was deliberately scattered, with more attacks delivered in the Pas de 
Calais area than in the area selected for invasion. Not until D Day 
itself were the Allies finally to show their hand by a concentrated 
bombardment of the coastal defenses at the points where landings were 
planned. The objective was neutralization of the fortifications, 
demoralization of the troops manning them, and disruption of transport 
and signal communications.

About midnight, on s June, bombers of the RAF were scheduled to range up 
the entire invasion coast, centering their attention on known enemy 
coastal batteries, especially on the two big coastal batteries at 
Crisbecq and St. Martin-de-Varreville. Shortly before H Hour, medium 
bombers of the Ninth Air Force were to attack batteries at Utah Beach 
and to the east. The Ninth Air Force was also to provide protection for 
the cross-Channel movement, and one squadron of fighter-bombers was to 
be on air alert over Utah Beach during the assault. After H Hour the 
Tactical Air Forces were to be on call to support the ground troops in 
their advance inland.

Naval fire support was to be given by Task Force 125, organized into a 
bombardment and a support craft group. The bombardment group, consisting 
of 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, and 3 subchasers, was 
organized into 5 fire support units. At H minus 40 minutes these 
warships were to begin the bombardment of enemy shore batteries and 
defenses which threatened the ships and craft in the Utah Beach assault. 
The support craft group, comprising 33 craft variously equipped with 
rocket launchers and artillery, was to deliver close-in supporting fires 
from positions nearer the beach. Rockets were to be discharged when the 
first waves of assault craft were still 600 to 700 yards from the shore. 
Beginning at H Hour naval fires were to be lifted to inland targets on 
call from naval shore fire control parties.

Mounting the Operation

In magnitude the amphibious assault on the Atlantic Wall had never 
before been equaled. Months of special training preceded the actual 
landing. At the Assault Training Center at Wollacombe, England, infantry 
units practiced the assault of various types of strong points, and 
combat engineers received special training in the use of demolitions to 
clear beaches of obstacles. Together with airborne and other units they 
tested these techniques on Slapton Sands in full-scale dry run exercises 
such as DUCK and FOX, in which all phases of marshalling, embarking, and 
assaulting were practiced. The TIGER (27-28 April 1944) and FABIUS (4 
May 1944 ) series of exercises were the last, and were the dress 
rehearsals for invasion. As a result, when paratroops and gliderborne 
units descended upon the Cotentin, followed by 30-man assault teams 
(each comprising an LCVP load ), beach-clearing demolition teams, and 
amphibious tanks, it was an assault by specialists.

The mounting of the invasion began in the second week of May. During 
that week assault troops entered the sausage-shaped marshalling areas 
along the roads of southern England, where a security seal was imposed 
and here the men remained until they departed for the embarkation 
points. While in the marshalling areas they were briefed on the coming 
operation, received final issues of supplies and equipment, and 
waterproofed their vehicles. Troops had concentrated by boat serials, so 
that when they finally left on 1 and 2 June

Page 13

they proceeded directly to the ports and hards (concrete loading points) 
in southern Devon and Cornwall, where they embarked.

Provision of the lift, protection at sea, fire support, and the 
breaching of underwater obstacles were the responsibility of Task Force 
U, commanded by Rear Admiral Don P. Moon, USN. Task Force U was part of 
the Western Naval Task Force under the command of Rear Admiral Alan G. 
Kirk, who himself was responsible to Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, 
commander of the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force. An important factor 
in the success of Task Force U was the high degree of cooperation 
between General Collins and Admiral Moon and their staffs. Jointly they 
worked out the details of the operation in their fenced-in Quonset hut 
camp on Fore Street, Plymouth.

Task Force U comprised approximately 865 vessels and craft in 12 
separate convoys. The lack of a large port necessitated the use of nine 
different loading and sortie points, all taxed to capacity. Most of the 
convoys contained three or four sections, which sailed from different 
ports and had to make precise rendezvous.

The difficulty of coordination was further complicated by a last-minute 
postponement of D Day. The date provisionally set a month earlier had 
been 5 June. On this and the two following days early morning light and 
tidal conditions fitted most closely the requirements of H Hour. It had 
been decided that the landings must be made near low tide, when most of 
the beach obstacles were exposed, and that the approach should be 
covered by darkness, but that the landings were to be made in daylight 
to give the assault troops visual bombing and observed naval fire 
support. Weather, however, interfered with the original plan. 
Predictions of strong winds and heavy seas for 5 June made General 
Eisenhower early on 4 June postpone D Day for twenty-four hours.

Task Force U convoys, having farther to sail than the other assault 
forces, had assembled on 3 June. The postponement of D Day found some of 
them already at sea. They back-tracked to use up the extra day, and some 
250 gunfire support and landing craft sought temporary shelter in 
Weymouth Bay and Portland Harbor.

The regrouping of convoys began again early on the morning of  June. 
Despite the turning back and the obvious difficulty of reorganizing so 
scattered a fleet, the second start was accomplished with a minimum of 
confusion and Task Force U sailed again for the Transport Area, 22,500 
yards off Utah Beach (Map No. 2). Sweepers of the 14th and 16th 
Minesweeper Flotillas had cleared a boat lane across the mine fields on 
Cardonnet Bank and had marked the Channel well with red and green 
lighted dan buoys.

At 0200 the marker vessel was passed at the entrance to the Transport 
Area, and at 0229 the Bayfield, headquarters ship for Task Force U, 
anchored in its assigned berth. Primary and secondary control vessels 
took their stations nearer the shore. LCT's and fire LST's with Rhino 
ferries were anchored a little farther out. The Barnet and Bayfield held 
troops for Uncle Red Beach; the Dickman and Empire Gauntlet held troops 
for Tare Green. H Hour was 0630.

Page 14

THE AIRBORNE ASSAULT

While Task Force U was still approaching the Transport Area, the first 
blows had already struck the enemy from the air. The intensive air 
bombardment of the invasion area had started about midnight, 5 June. At 
that time RAF bombers made intensive attacks on the known enemy 
batteries along the entire invasion coast. Shortly before H Hour medium 
bombers of the Ninth Air Force dropped several hundred tons of bombs on 
enemy defenses at Utah Beach in support of the seaborne assault. Between 
these bombings, however, came the still more telling attacks by airborne 
infantry.

It was the largest use of airborne troops up to that time. Paratroop 
elements of the 82d and 101st Divisions, comprising 6 regiments, with 
the normal complement of parachute field artillery and engineers, 
numbering more than 13,000 men, were flown from bases in southern 
England to the Cotentin Peninsula in approximately 925 C-47's. An 
additional 4,000 men, consisting of glider infantry with supporting 
weapons and medical and signal units, were to arrive in 500 gliders 
later on D Day and on D plus 1 to reinforce the paratroops. Seaborne 
echelons were to join the divisions on D plus 1. To the parachute troops 
was assigned what was probably the most difficult task of the initial 
operation-a night jump behind enemy lines five hours before the coastal
landings.

The 101st Airborne Division Lands

At 2215 on D minus 1, 432 C-47's began taking off from 7 departure 
airdromes in England, with 6,600 paratroops of the 101st Airborne 
Division. They were scheduled to begin dropping at H minus s hours. At 
dawn (H minus 2 hours) they were to be reinforced by approximately 150 
glider troops from 51 gliders, and at dusk (H plus 15 hours) by an 
additional 165 in 32 gliders. Preceding the main echelons of paratroops 
by half an hour were 20 pathfinder aircraft which had the mission of 
marking six drop zones (for both divisions) and one landing zone. 
Marking of the zones was not entirely successful, but all of the 
pathfinder teams carried out at least part of their missions.

Paratroop echelons approached the Cotentin from the west and made their 
landfall in the vicinity of les Pieux (Map No. 2). Formations were tight 
until reaching the coast, but from the coast to the Merderet cloud banks 
loosened the formations, and east of the Merderet flak scattered them 
further. In general the division did not have a good drop, although 
better than that of the 82d Airborne Division (Map V). About 1,500 
troops were either killed or captured and approximately 60 percent of 
the equipment dropped was lost when the bundles fell into swamps or into 
fields covered by enemy fire. Only a fraction of the division's 
organized strength could ini-

Page 15

tially be employed on the planned missions, and many of the missions 
carried out were undertaken by mixed groups which did not correspond 
with original assignments.

The fifty-one Waco gliders, carrying command personnel and antitank 
weapons, came in early on D-Day morning. This type of landing had never 
been attempted before in darkness. Many gliders were wrecked as they 
landed in the small Normandy fields and there as damage to equipment and 
loss of personnel, one of the casualties being Brig. Gen. Don F. Pratt 
(Assistant Commander, 101st Airborne Division), who was killed in 
landing. In general, however, losses were not excessive and the mission 
was a success. Later in the day, at 2100, the serial of thirty-two Horsa 
gliders-carrying command, communications, and medical personnel and 
equipment-suffered heavier losses in personnel and gliders because of 
the unsuitability of the small landing fields. Equipment suffered 
relatively little damage. A seaborne echelon of the division, including 
the 3 27th Glider Infantry, joined the division on D plus 1.

The initial widespread dispersion of the 101st Division was not an 
unmixed evil. The Germans appear to have been confused by the scattered 
drops. For some time they were unable to estimate the magnitude of the 
invasion and, in consequence, reaction was slow and uncertain. The war 
diary of the German Seventh Army noted at 0130, 6 June, reports of 
Allied paratroop landings east and northwest of Caen, at St. Maricove, 
at Montebourg, on both sides of the Vire River, and on the east coast of 
the Cotentin Peninsula. Fighting was reported at le Ham. For several 
hours the

Page 16

German command was uncertain whether the landings represented a major 
action. At 0400 it was estimated that the American plan seemed to be to 
"tie off the Cotentin Peninsula at its narrowest point."

Uncertainty at the enemy command level seemed to have been duplicated 
among the subordinate units. It was generally the experience of the 
101st Airborne Division, at least, that although the enemy defended 
freely with fire he was initially reluctant to move out of his prepared 
defenses to attack. When attacks were launched they were seldom pushed 
vigorously. Thus in some measure the enemy's confusion tended to offset 
that of the invaders and, by dint of considerable improvisation, the 
101st was able to accomplish most of its initial missions.

The plan of the 101st Airborne Division called for the seizure of the 
four inland exits-the western ends of causeways-from the inundated area 
west of Utah Beach between St. Martin-de-Varreville and Pouppeville (Map 
II). In the southern part of the division's sector two bridges across 
the Douve River, on the main highway northwest of Carentan and the 
railroad bridge to the west, were to be destroyed. In addition, the 
division was to seize and hold the la Barquette lock and establish two 
bridgeheads over the Douve at le Port northeast of Carentan. The sum of 
these missions thus provided for the clearing of the enemy's secondary 
beach defenses and the organization of the Corps' southern flank for 
defense and further exploitation. After being relieved in the beachhead 
area by the 4th Divis-

Page 17

ion, the 101st was to seize Carentan and establish contact with V Corps, 
fusing the Utah and Omaha beachheads. Thereafter the 101st Airborne 
Division was ordered to protect the southern flank of VII Corps east of 
the Merderet River. The division would be reinforced by the attachment 
of a company of tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion, the 65th Armored Field 
Artillery Battalion, and a troop of the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance 
Squadron when these were landed by sea.

Fighting for the Northern Beach Exits

The task of securing the two northern beach exits was assigned to the 
502d Parachute Infantry, with the 377th Parachute Field Artillery 
Battalion. The 502d was to drop immediately to the west of Exits 3 and 4 
in Drop Zone A. The 2d Battalion was to capture and destroy the coastal 
battery at St. Martin-de-Varreville as quickly as possible. The 3d 
Battalion was to support this operation, if necessary, and then secure 
Exits 3 and 4 so that the 4th Division could come up the causeways at H 
Hour. The 2d Battalion was to remain on the gun position as regimental 
reserve and establish contact with the 506th Parachute Infantry on its 
right. The 1st Battalion was to clean up a group of buildings, thought 
to be the German artillery garrison quarters, just west of St. Martin-
de-Varreville. It was also to cover the northern flank of the regiment, 
establish contact with the 82d Airborne Division on the left, and cover 
the emplacing of the 377th Glider Field Artillery Battalion guns.

The four serials of the 502d Parachute Infantry came in ten minutes 
apart. The 2d Battalion led with regimental headquarters, followed by 
the 3d, the 1st, and the artillery battalion.

The 2d Battalion failed to land in Drop Zone A as planned. A large 
percentage of the men came down on the southern edge of Drop Zone C. 
Assembly, without landmarks and far from the designated assembly points, 
consumed most of the day, and the battalion as a unit took no part in 
the D-Day fighting.

Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole, commanding the 3d Battalion, landed several 
hundred yards east of Ste. Mere-Eglise (Map No. 3). Unable to orient 
himself, he moved toward Ste. Mere-Eglise, collecting a miscellaneous 
group of about thirty men from regimental headquarters, Company G of the 
506th Parachute Infantry, and a few from the 82d Airborne Division. From 
Ste. Mere-Eglise the men back-tracked north and then northeast, heading 
for the two northern exits of the beach. On the way the group snowballed 
to about seventy-five men and made contact with a small enemy convoy. 
Several of the enemy were killed and ten taken prisoner. This was the 
only incident of the march.

On nearing St. Martin-de-Varreville, a reconnaissance party was sent to 
the enemy

Page 18

coastal battery. It found that the position had been destroyed by 
bombing and was deserted. [1] No heavy guns were found, although there 
was ammunition in the pits and, antiaircraft guns, including some 
multiple 20-mm. mounts. Colonel Cole then split his force to seize Exits 
3 and 4 and dispatched a small group of men to seek contact with the 
506th Parachute Infantry. At 0930, two hours after the defense was 
established at Exit 3, in the vicinity of Audouville-la-Hubert, the 
enemy began retreating across the causeway from the beach. Colonel 
Cole's men, without loss to themselves, killed 50 to 75 of the enemy, 
and at 1300 established contact with the 1st Battalion of the 8th 
Infantry (4th Division). By the end of the day 250 men had gathered 
under Colonel Cole. That night his battalion was ordered to assemble the 
next day in the vicinity of Blosville, south of Ste. Mere-Eglise, as 
regimental reserve.

The 1st Battalion, 502d Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col. Patrick J. 
Cassidy), had a much stiffer fight for its D-Day objectives. Colonel 
Cassidy landed near St. Germain-de-Varreville in the center of the 
battalion's drop one and a mile from the first objective-the artillery 
garrison buildings designated as "WXYZ" in the plan. He gradually 
collected a small force, mostly from his own battalion, and after 
discovery of a road sign began moving toward the objective. Objective W, 
the house at the crossroads west of St. Martin-de-Varreville, was 
unoccupied. Colonel Cassidy set up his command post in the house and 
then checked the enemy gun position across the road. There he found a 
dozen men under Lt. Col. Steve A. Chappuis (commander of the 2d 
Battalion); Colonel Chappuis, though injured in the jump, had been able 
to reach his objective. He had decided to wait at the gun position for 
more of his men. Colonel Cassidy proceeded with his own mission. His 
plan was, first, to establish defenses at the St. Martin-de-Varreville 
intersection to prevent the enemy from moving east into the beach area, 
and then to clean out the XYZ buildings and set up a defensive line to 
the north.

A patrol sent to check Exit 4 found both it and the causeway clear. The 
3d Battalion, in the meantime, reported Exit 3 covered, and Colonel 
Cassidy, after relaying this information to the 4th Division, turned his 
attention to consolidating the battalion position.

Several groups from Company A assembled north of St. Martin-de-
Varreville during the morning. Forty-five men were collected by Lt. W. 
A. Swanson and ordered to move to Foucarville to establish the right 
anchor of the battalion line with a series of road blocks. Lieutenant 
Swanson set up four blocks shortly after noon and within half an hour he 
trapped and largely destroyed a 4-vehicle enemy troop convoy moving east 
from Beuzeville-au-Plain. Despite this success, Company A's positions 
were not secure as they were dominated by the enemy on the hill to the 
northwest. The Germans, however, made no determined effort to break 
through, although a fire fight continued most of the day as the enemy 
probed at the road blocks without discovering their essential weakness.

Meanwhile the fight at XY was carried on most of the day by a mixed 
group of men under Sergeant Summers, while Company C was held in 
reserve. It was not an easy task. Not until 1530 were the Germans driven 
Out of the last building, after its roof was fired with bazooka rounds. 
More than one hundred were killed or taken prisoner as they tried to 
escape. Another fifty had been killed or captured earlier in the fight.

The establishment of the western end of the battalion line was 
facilitated by the arrival in the area of Lt. Col. John H. Michaelis, 
regi-

[1] The St. Martin-de-Varreville position had been a considerable worry 
to the planners. It had been bombed during the night of 28-29 May, when 
356 tons of bombs were dropped by the RAF Bomber Command. Photo 
reconnaissance, later confirmed by captured German documents, showed 
heavy damage. Nevertheless, this battery was included among the RAF 
targets for the night attack of 5-6 June.

Page 19

mental commander, with two hundred men. This left Colonel Cassidy free 
to move the 1st Battalion north and complete his D-Day mission. Company 
C was ordered to Beuzeville-au-Plain, while Company B reassembled in the 
artillery barracks area.

Actually Beuzeville-au-Plain was not reached that night. Company C moved 
in a body north to St. Germain-de-Varreville and then west along a 
stream bed toward its objective. A little more than halfway the company 
split into three "platoons," no more than combat patrols in strength. 
Each of these platoons became involved separately with small enemy 
forces at the hamlet of Fournel, which the leading group had mistaken 
for Beuzeville-au-Plain. At dark the paratroopers withdrew, and a 
company line was established south of Fournel, facing northwest.

During the night the line was subjected to continuing enemy pressure 
from the west. To cope with this threat, Colonel Cassidy put Company B, 
which had moved north after reassembling, into the line on the left 
flank. As there was still a dangerous gap between Company C and the 
battalion's right flank held by Company A, Colonel Cassidy filled it 
temporarily with a few spare riflemen and asked Regiment for help. 
Regiment, however, had already decided to pass the 2d Battalion through 
the 1st on the following day, and therefore ordered Colonel Cassidy to 
withdraw and consolidate.

Shortly before midnight the principal enemy threat was unexpectedly 
removed when the Germans on the hill opposing Company A hoisted a white 
flag. Bluffed into overestimating Company A's strength, chiefly by the 
in-

Page 20

creasing volume of mortar and machine-gun fire laid down by Lieutenant 
Swanson's men, eighty-seven Germans marched into the American lines. 
Another fifty, attempting to escape north, were shot down by American 
prisoners who had been freed by the surrender.

Capture of the Southern Beach Exits

Regimental headquarters and the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 506th 
Parachute Infantry (Col. Robert L. Sink) were to land in Drop Zone C, 
between Hiesville and Ste. Marie-du-Mont; the 3d Battalion, together 
with a platoon of the 326th Engineer Battalion and two demolitions 
sections, was to land in Drop Zone D, between Vierville and Bse. 
Addeville (Map No. 4). The 506th Infantry had a dual mission-to seize 
the western edge of the inundated area back of Utah Beach between 
Audouville-la-Hubert and Pouppeville (including Exits 1 and 2), and to 
defend the line of the Douve within its sector, capturing the two 
bridges near the mouth of the Douve at le Port and establishing a 
bridgehead over the Douve at this point for subsequent use by the 
division. The bridges were to be prepared for demolition.

These missions were broken down as follows. The 2d Battalion, with one 
demolitions section, was to seize the two southern exits to the 
causeways. The battalion was to assemble at Hebert; Company F was to go 
to Pouppeville and secure Exit 1; Company E, to Houdienville and secure 
Exit 2; and Company D was to remain at Hebert with battalion 
headquarters as reserve. The 1st Battalion was to assemble at Hiesville 
and together with Regimental Headquarters Company constitute the 
regimental reserve. A reinforced platoon from Company B was to be sent 
to the south of Ste. Marie-du-Mont to create a diversion and draw the 
attention of enemy forces there. The 3d Battalion was to seize the two 
eastern bridges and cross the river to secure a bridgehead at le Port.

In the flight from England and the landings in the respective drop zones 
on the peninsula, the 506th Parachute Infantry's experience was similar 
to that of the 502d. The 126 planes cleared the English coast in good 
weather shortly after midnight, but when they approached the French 
coast, fog, and later flak, forced the dispersal of the formation, which 
resulted in a widely scattered drop (Map V). The 3d Battalion had a good 
pattern in Drop Zone D, but the 2d Battalion was completely out of its 
zone. Of eighty-one planes scheduled to drop troops in Drop Zone C, only 
ten found their mark. Yet the resulting difficulties in assembling did 
not prove serious.

Within two hours of landing Colonel Sink had collected forty men of his 
headquarters near the rendezvous point. Near by, the 1st Battalion (Lt. 
Col. William L. Turner) was assembling slowly, and the whole group soon 
moved to Culoville, where the regiment established its command post. No 
word had been received of the 3d Battalion to the south, or the 2d 
Battalion, which should have landed in Drop Zone C to accomplish one of 
the regiment's most critical missions-the seizure of the two southern 
exits. Colonel Sink wished the 1st Battalion to take over that mission, 
but, as Colonel Turner had only about fifty men, it seemed foolhardy to 
split the force and attempt to occupy both exits. Colonel Turner was 
therefore ordered to proceed only to Pouppeville and seize Exit 1.

About the same time, similar orders were given to the 3d Battalion, 
501st Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col. Julian Ewell), by the division 
commander, General Taylor, who had little knowledge of the whereabouts 
of his units and was particularly worried about the southern exits. The 
3d Battalion had been designated originally as division reserve to land 
in Drop Zone C and protect the glider landing zone northwest of 
Hiesville.

Page 21

Although the battalion serial had been scattered, like the others, 
because of fog and flak, and had lost three planes with three-fourths of 
their personnel to enemy antiaircraft fire, a substantial number of the 
men came down within the prescribed area and assembled without undue 
delay. Just south of Ste. Marie-du-Mont, Colonel Ewell dropped with 
ninety of his own men and sixty from division headquarters. Another 150 
men of his battalion assembled near Hiesville and set up the division 
command post there as planned. Colonel Ewell, with elements of his 
battalion (forty men from line companies and some headquar-

Page 22

ters personnel), set out at 0600 for Pouppeville. General Taylor, Brig. 
Gen. Anthony J. McAuliffe (101st Airborne Division Artillery Commander), 
and eighteen other officers accompanied the column. The only enemy 
troops contacted on the march were six Germans at an outpost west of 
Ste. Marie-du-Mont.

Pouppeville was held by sixty to seventy men of the 1058t Regiment (91st 
Division). Colonel Ewell's men attacked the town. Enemy resistance was 
not determined, but Colonel Ewell was handicapped by the smallness of 
his force, which prevented him from maneuvering to envelop the enemy. 
Three hours were thus consumed in slow house-to-house fighting. At noon 
the German commander surrendered. Colonel Ewell's battalion had suffered 
eighteen casualties and inflicted twenty-five on the enemy. An 
additional thirty-eight Germans were taken prisoner.

Some of the enemy forces had withdrawn to the beach, but the approach of 
8th Infantry, 4th Division, from that side made their position hopeless. 
Colonel Ewell heard the 4th Division coming, set up his machine guns, 
and waited for the nutcracker to close. The Germans surrendered to the 
8th Infantry, and it was here, at Pouppeville, that Lt. Col. Carlton 0. 
MacNeely (2d Battalion, 8th Infantry) and Colonel Ewell established the 
first contact between seaborne and airborne forces. In talking to 4th 
Division men at Pouppeville General Taylor learned for the first time 
that the 4th's progress was rapid and that the Utah exits were secure. 
He thereupon decided to direct the 101st's efforts to the second part of 
its mission-securing the Corps’ southern flank.

Meanwhile elements of the 1st Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry, under 
Colonel Turner, became engaged in a series of small fights and were thus 
delayed in their advance on Pouppeville. When they arrived, Colonel 
Ewell's men had already occupied the town and the 4th Division was 
coming in across the causeway. Colonel Turner's force therefore returned 
to the command post at Culoville.

While Exit 1 was being secured, the 2d Battalion, 506th Parachute 
Infantry (Lt. Col. Robert L. Strayer), was advancing on Exit 2, although 
this was not known at regimental headquarters. The battalion had 
achieved a rapid assembly of about two hundred of its men, despite the 
handicap of a drop entirely out of its designated one. Some eighty men 
of battalion headquarters (including communications personnel and a 
machine gun platoon) and about one hundred men from the line companies, 
principally Company D, had gathered under the battalion S-2 and S-3 near 
Foucarville. They were joined by twenty men of the 508th Parachute 
Infantry (82d Airborne Division) and, at 0330, by Colonel Strayer with a 
group of fifteen men who had initially tied up with the 1st Battalion, 
502d Parachute Infantry.

The consolidated force moved out about 0430, heading south. But it 
immediately met opposition from enemy troops which had moved between 
Foucarville and St. Germain-de-Varreville after the 1st Battalion, 502d 
Parachute Infantry, had passed to attack the XYZ buildings. Here Colonel 
Strayer's men were held up most of the morning by machine-gun positions 
and interdictory artillery fire across the road. Part of Company D 
finally was able to bypass the resistance points and, hurrying south, 
reached Exit 2 at 1330. Colonel Strayer, with the remainder of the 
battalion, joined these men about an hour later, and by 1800 the 
battalion had organized the position at Houdienville. By that time, 
however, elements of the 4th Division and tanks of the 70th Tank 
Battalion had already crossed the causeway and were proceeding inland.

Throughout most of the day, regimental headquarters, 506th Parachute 
Infantry, at Culoville felt virtually alone on the peninsula. It had no 
contact with the 2d and 3d Battal-

Page 23

ions, little knowledge of other units of the division, and only sketchy 
information about the location and strength of the enemy. Its isolation 
was due in part to the scarcity of radio communication; a more important 
factor, however, was the small number of men which Colonel Sink had at 
his disposal and which he decided to keep together in order to protect 
the rear of the causeway forces and to provide a nucleus for further 
concentration of the regiment. During the morning he sent out a number 
of combat patrols to probe enemy dispositions and try to make contact 
with the 3d Battalion. The missions were not successful. Contact was 
made only with isolated enemy groups and did nothing to clear up the 
basic confusion.

At the same time that patrols were seeking out the enemy, actions were 
developing in the immediate vicinity of the command post. At Holdy, 
1,000 yards northeast of Culoville, about seventy men of the 506th 
Parachute Infantry and the 82d Airborne Division had run into a 
previously unlocated enemy 105-mm. battery. They could make no headway
against enemy defenses of the position, however, and asked for 
reinforcements. Colonel Sink gradually assembled an additional seventy 
or eighty men from the 1st Battalion at the command post and sent them 
up under Capt. Lloyd E. Patch of the 1st Battalion Headquarters Company 
and Capt. Knut H. Raudstein of Company C. When the reinforcements 
approached, the Germans withdrew to the earth revetments of the gun 
emplacements. Rockets were fired into the position, and after they had 
taken their toll Captains Patch and Raudstein moved the infantry in from 
two sides.

The battery had thus been overrun when a lieutenant of the 502d 
Parachute Infantry brought up from forty to fifty more reinforcements. 
Captain Patch turned over to them responsibility for outposting the guns 
and reassembled his own force to attack Ste. Marie-du-Mont from the 
west. The town was taken when elements of the 4th Division, which had 
crossed the causeway, entered from the east and squeezed out the enemy. 
While Captain Patch's men were thus engaged, the lieutenant, doubtful of 
his ability to hold the gun position with so few men, began destruction 
of the battery. Meanwhile, Colonel Sink had sent word to save the guns, 
as he had little other artillery available. The order came in time to 
rescue only one of the four guns.

Before the patrols and various forces which Colonel Sink had sent out 
returned that evening, the colonel's attention was drawn to the 
vulnerability of the command post itself. In mid-afternoon the sound of 
small arms came closer and closer. Twice he scraped together all the 
officers and men in the command post to hold back the Germans who 
pressed in from the surrounding hedgerows. When the forces of Colonel 
Strayer (2d Battalion) and Colonel Turner (1st Battalion) came in that 
evening, after being relieved by the 4th Division, Colonel Sink had a 
total of about 650 men, most of them from the 1st and 2d Battalions, but 
including also antitank personnel, men from the 82d Airborne Division, 
and scattered units of the 101st Airborne Division. There was still no 
contact with the 3d Battalion, and the whole situation to the south was 
vague and uncertain. Both General Taylor and General McAuliffe had 
visited the command post late in the afternoon en route from 
Pouppeville, and plans had been made to move south in the morning.

Securing the Southern Flank

Unknown to Colonel Sink, a small force from his 3d Battalion, of 
slightly more than platoon strength, had collected itself and proceeded 
to its objective. The 3d Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry, was to 
have landed in Drop one D, in the vicinity of Angoville-au-Plain, and to 
have seized the le Port bridges (Map No. 4). The enemy evidently

Page 24

anticipated a drop in the area. Shortly before the drop, heavy 
antiaircraft fire was encountered. An oil-soaked building near the drop 
field was set on fire and the paratroops were immediately hit by 
machine-gun and mortar fire. Some of the men landed in or at the edge of 
the swampy plain east of Angoville-au-Plain.

The battalion S-3, Capt. Charles G. Shettle, came down near Angoville-
au-Plain and walked toward the town, looking for some of his men. He 
found only two other officers and twelve enlisted men. But his thoughts 
were centered on the bridges, and, without further attempting to build 
up his force, he set out for the objective. There were thirty-three in 
the group when the northern bridge at le Port was reached at 0430.

Despite some fire from the opposite shore, a crossing was made and the 
east bank occupied. When an additional five officers and fifteen men 
joined the "battalion," Captain Shettle decided to cross the other 
bridge as well. Officers of Company H led patrols to the far bank, 
crossing under the bridge, and the command group followed. Although the 
bridgehead force killed some Germans and knocked out a few machine guns, 
after two hours the fight became unequal. The Americans ran low on 
ammunition and, having no contact with friendly forces, had no hope of 
reinforcing their position. They withdrew to the west bank to hold there 
for the remainder of the day.

Contact was made later with the group under Col. Howard R. Johnson 
(commanding the 501st Parachute Infantry) at the la Barquette dam, and 
Captain Shettle asked for reinforcements. But Colonel Johnson, who was 
in an equally precarious situation, could spare none. The best he could 
do was to promise help in case of emergency. The help that finally came, 
however, was fortuitous; that night forty men who had dropped farther

Page 25

south, in the Carentan area, walked in and joined the group. Actually 
the Germans made almost no effort to take advantage of Shettle's 
weakness. In the middle of the night they tried a tentative push toward 
the bridge, which Shettle's engineers had already prepared for 
demolition, but gave up in the face of American small-arms fire.

Captain Shettle had thus set up the left anchor of a defensive line 
along the division's south flank. The completion of the division's 
defensive line in the south was the mission of the 1st and 2d 
Battalions, 501st Parachute Infantry (Colonel Johnson). To carry it out 
the 1st Battalion was ordered to seize the lock on the Douve River at la 
Barquette, and the 2d Battalion (Lt. Col. Robert A. Ballard) to blow the 
Douve River bridges on the main road from St. Come-du-Mont to Carentan 
(Map No. 5). The regiment was also ordered to take St. Come-du-Mont, if 
possible, and to destroy the railroad bridge to the west. Of these 
objectives, the la Barquette lock had assumed a special importance in 
the eyes of the planners.

The lock, located due north of Carentan, controls the water level of the 
Douve River to the west as far as the confluence of the Merderet. When 
the lock is opened the high tide floods the river channel and spreads 
gradually over the whole low marshy area between St. Come-du-Mont and 
Carentan. Ultimately, through opening and closing the lock according to 
the tide level, the valleys of the Douve and Merderet can be turned into 
a shallow lake as far north as le Ham and as far west as St. Sauveur-le 
Vicomte. East of the lock the tide flow is kept in the river channel by 
flood banks from six to eight feet high. During the years when the RAF 
had this area under observation, inundations were observed periodically, 
extending in a large westward area between the ridges of high ground 
around St. Come-du-Mont and the solid lower ground

Page 26

south and west of Carentan. Possession of the lock therefore meant 
control of a potentially valuable natural barrier to possible German 
counterattack against the south flank of the beachhead. Furthermore, if 
seizure of the lock were coupled with destruction of the bridges north 
of Carentan on the only good route across the swamps, the task of 
safeguarding the left flank of VII Corps would be greatly facilitated.

Securing of this objective came close to failure at the outset, 
primarily because of a bad drop. The 501st Parachute Infantry, according 
to the original plan, was to drop between Vierville and Houesville, 
astride the two highways north of Carentan. A few days before D Day Drop 
Zone D was shifted southeastward to the area Anoville-au-Plain-Bse. Ad-

Page 27

(Photos)

Page 28

deville at the request of Colonel Johnson, who wished to land closer to 
his objectives, the la Barquette lock and bridges north of Carentan. A 
secondary consideration which also favored this change was the fact that 
anti-airborne landing obstacles were appearing in the fields of the 
original drop zone. This brought the drop zone considerably nearer the 
lower Douve, and when the regiment actually made the drop, the first 
plane serial, carrying the 1st Battalion and regimental headquarters, 
was badly scattered, some of its sticks landing deep in enemy territory 
south of Carentan. Many others landed in the swampy bottom lands to the 
west. The 1st Battalion's command personnel was particularly hard hit. 
The commanding officer was killed, his executive officer was apparently 
captured, and all other company commanders and staff were also missing 
initially. In part, at least, the day was saved by an accident. A large 
percentage of planes of the 1st and 2d Battalions' serials had unloaded 
too soon. As the jump signal flashed in Colonel Johnson's plane, a 
bundle became wedged in the door. The delay caused by this prevented a 
premature unloading and brought Colonel Johnson and his men squarely 
down on Drop Zone D.

Moving south, Colonel Johnson collected some 150 men of miscellaneous 
units. At the trail junction just north of the lock, he verified his 
position and sent fifty men to take the objective, while the remainder 
of the force deployed defensively in place. The assault reached the lock 
in one dash, crossed it, and dug in on the soft ground of the far bank 
before the enemy could bring the area under shell fire. Even then the 
Germans made no attempt to press in on the bridgehead. Colonel Johnson 
thought that with a little additional strength he could proceed with the 
mission of blowing the bridges, which were only 2,000 yard up the river. 
But the patrols sent out in that direction drew fire with every 
movement. Satisfied that the lock situation was in hand, that his own 
position on this low-lying hollow was not favorable, and that he would 
need a stronger force for the task of destroying the Douve bridges, 
Colonel Johnson decided to move north and make contact with elements of 
the regiment at Bse. Addeville, 1,000 yards to the northwest. Patrols 
had reported that Maj. R. J. Allen, regimental S-3, had a sizeable force 
there.

Leaving the defense at the lock, Colonel Johnson took about fifty men to 
Bse. Addeville, hoping to gather sufficient strength to proceed against 
St. Come-du-Mont. At 0900, the force arrived at Bse. Addeville. Near 
this town Major Allen had gathered a hundred men from several units, but 
these were already engaged with the enemy to the north and west. Without 
knowledge of other units in the division, Colonel Johnson was uncertain 
as to how best to employ his small forces. His decision was finally 
crystallized by a radio broadcast of the BBC from London. It was the 
noon news bulletin and brought word that the invasion "is going 
according to plan and the operations of the American airborne divisions 
are meeting with success." This news that the battle was going well 
elsewhere encouraged Colonel Johnson to proceed with the regimental 
mission. A small force was to be left at Bse. Addeville, with the bulk 
of his troops returning to la Barquette to move on the bridges.

At this point Colonel Johnson learned that 250 men of the 2d Battalion, 
501st Parachute Infantry (Colonel Ballard), who had not been heard from 
previously, were heavily engaged at les Droueries, 1,000 yards to the 
northwest. Colonel Johnson was intent on the mission to the south and 
wanted Colonel Ballard's force to join him. But the enemy was between 
Colonel Ballard's force and that of Colonel Johnson's, and neither Major 
Allen's nor Colonel Ballard's units could move to join forces. leaving 
fifty men at Bse. Addeville under Major Allen, Colonel Johnson took 
command

Page 29

of the remainder of the force and moved out at about 1330.

At the la Barquette position the force was met by intense enemy 
artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire, coming partly from east of 
Carentan and partly from the direction of St. Come-du-Mont. Among the 
men Major Allen had collected was Lieutenant Farrell, the naval shore 
fire control officer. He was in radio contact with the fleet and called 
the Quincy. Within a few minutes the first 8-inch salvo was delivered. 
Despite the difficulties, Lieutenant Farrell's adjustments brought a 
remarkably accurate concentration on enemy positions around St. Come-du-
Mont, and their mortar fire slackened immediately. Following this the 
naval fire was shifted to support the 2d Battalion, 501st Parachute 
Infantry, at les Droueries.

With enemy fire partially neutralized in the vicinity of la Barquette, 
Colonel Johnson resumed his efforts to take the Douve bridges. A new 
patrol, however, again reported progress to the west impossible because 
of heavy enemy fire. Colonel Johnson therefore ordered the extension of 
the defense at the lock east and west, pushing as close to the highway 
as possible. The bridgehead was built up to 100 yards in depth south of 
the lock. As protection against attack from the north, the position was 
expanded about 200 yards east and west and reinforced with automatic 
weapons. The 250 men with Colonel Johnson were augmented at 2000 by 30 
brought down by Major Allen from Bse. Addeville. About 20 of the 
defenders were sent out during the night on patrols in an unavailing 
effort to find the headquarters of the division and of the 506th 
Parachute Infantry. Contact with Captain Shettle's men of the 506th at 
le Port was maintained. The other patrols were lost.

By the end of D Day Colonel Johnson's miscellaneous force had 
accomplished only a part of the regimental mission-the part originally
assigned to the 1st Battalion. The 2d Battalion, becoming involved with 
the enemy in the vicinity of St. Come-du-Mont shortly after the drop, 
was never able to move south to deal with the Carentan bridges on 
Colonel Johnson's right flank.

Colonel Ballard (2d Battalion) had assembled, between Angoville-au-Plain 
and les Droueries, small groups from each of his three rifle companies 
and his battalion staff (Map No. 5). He planned to move at once on St. 
Come-du-Mont, which lay astride his main route to the Douve bridges. 
Prior G-2 information had indicated that the town was held by only one 
enemy platoon. It soon became apparent, however, that there were enemy 
forces of some strength at les Droueries between Colonel Ballard and his 
objective. Orders were consequently issued for the attack on les 
Droueries.

At 0530 two "companies," each with about thirty men, moved out abreast 
to seize two crossroads on the two trails from Angoville-au-Plain 
southwest. The third company followed in support. The enemy frustrated 
the frontal attack with small arms and mortars but a new group of men, 
mainly from the 506th Parachute Infantry, arrived and succeeded in 
flanking the enemy on the right. Some progress had been made, although 
the Germans had not been beaten back, when Colonel Ballard received 
orders from Colonel Johnson to join him at la Barquette. The battalion, 
therefore, disengaged as soon as it could and returned to Angoville-au-
Plain about noon, planning to move to la Barquette across the swamps 
south of Angoville-au-Plain. However, the area was covered by enemy fire 
and was soon found impassable, and the battalion moved instead along the 
west edge toward Bse. Addeville, which Major Allen had just reported he 
was about to vacate in order to join Colonel Johnson. The 2d Battalion 
had moved only about 400 yards when it was stopped by heavy fire from 
the same enemy force which had contested the morning at-

Page 30

tack on les Droueries. There the battalion remained for the night, in 
close contact with the enemy. The 501st Parachute Infantry had secured 
the lock at la Barquette, but strong enemy resistance had prevented the 
capture of St. Come-du-Mont as well as the destruction of the railroad 
and highway bridges north of Carentan.

The 82d Airborne Division Astride the Merderet

West of the 101st Airborne the 82d Airborne Division had gained 
possession of the east bank of the Merderet River in the vicinity of 
Ste. Mere-Eglise. Occupation of these positions, however, actually fell 
far short of the mission assigned to the division by plan. Broadly, its 
mission was to assist in sealing off the peninsula from the south by 
destroying bridges at Pont l'Abbe and Beuzeville-la Bastille and 
securing bridgeheads across the Merderet (Map II). Thereafter the 82d 
was to protect the southwest flank of the Corps by securing the line of 
the Douve River. It was therefore also charged with taking the offensive 
to the west in the direction of St. Sauveur-le Vicomte.

The assignments were as follows. The 505th Parachute Infantry was to 
land east of the Merderet River, capture Ste. Mere-Eglise, seize and 
secure the river crossings near la Fiere and Chef-du-Pont, and secure a 
line in the north running through Neuville-au-Plain and tying in with 
the 101st Airborne Division in the vicinity of Bandienville or 
Beuzeville-au-Plain. The 507th and 508th Parachute Infantry Regiments 
were to land west of the river to consolidate the two bridgeheads o the 
west bank. More specifically, the 507th was to assist the 505th in 
securing the la Fiere bridgehead and then establish a defensive line 
running southwest from Gourbesville to Renouf. The 508th was to destroy 
the crossings of the Douve at Beuzeville-la Bastille and Pont l'Abbe and 
extend the 507th’s defensive line south from Renouf. Both regiments were 
to be prepared to assume the offensive westward and secure the line of 
the Douve River. All these forces were to land by parachute and were 
initially under the command of Brig. Gen. James A. Gavin, assistant 
division commander. General Ridgway, commanding the 82d Division, was to 
come in with certain glider elements just before dawn on D Day. The 
remaining glider artillery and infantry were to follow over a period of 
thirty-six hours to support the 508th Parachute Infantry in destruction 
of the Douve bridges. There was also a seaborne force made up of organic 
and attached artillery, tank destroyers, and other special units under 
Brig. Gen. Reese M. Howell.

The drop of the 82d Airborne Division was far from good (Map VI). The 
regiments assigned to the zones west of the Merderet had

Page 31

the worst drop in the entire operation. The 507th Parachute Infantry was 
to land in Drop Zone T, north of Amfreville, but was scattered widely. 
The 508th Parachute Infantry was to land southwest of Amfreville and 
north of Picauville, and had a slightly better drop. But many of its 
sticks came down east of the Merderet, and for some days many of its men 
fought with the 101st Airborne Division.

In contrast with the other two regiments, the 505th Parachute Infantry, 
landing northwest of Ste. Mere-Eglise between the railroad and the main 
highway, had one of the best drops of any airborne unit. About 1,000 of 
the 2,200 men landed in the drop zone, and most of the others, although 
scattered to the north and east, were able to assemble rapidly. They 
were fortunate to come down in an area nearly devoid of enemy. Rapid 
assembly of the regiment enabled it to proceed expeditiously with its 
mission-a mission that became during the day more important defensively 
than the plan contemplated.

The Capture of Ste. Mere-Eglise

Establishment of a defensive base at Ste. Mere-Eglise was one of the 
major undertakings of the division immediately after its drop. The other 
was the establishment of bridgeheads over the Merderet. But, as the 
latter operation began to founder, the capture and holding of Ste. Mere-
Eglise assumed increasing importance. Tactically the most significant 
operation of the 82d Airborne Division on D Day was, therefore, the 
action in and around this town (Map No. 6). The town itself was the 
objective of the 3d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, which was to 
organize the immediate defense by setting up road blocks to the south 
and east. The 2d Battalion was to establish a line to the north, running 
from

Page 32

(Map No. 6)

Page 33

west to east through Neuville-au-Plain and Bandienville, tying in with 
the 502d Parachute Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, on the right. The 
1st Battalion was to seize the Merderet crossings at la Fiere and Chef-
du-Pont, organize the defense of the glider landing zone, and furnish 
security for the regimental command post.

Like the other serials, the planes of the 505th Parachute Infantry ran 
into fog and flak, and for a time it appeared that the drops would be 
scattered. But the pathfinder markers were spotted correctly, and some 
of the planes which had moved out to prevent collision circled back 
before flashing the green light. As a result, all three battalions had 
good drops. The 1st Battalion (Maj. Frederick A. Kellem), after 
assembling the bulk of its force, started for the la Fiere bridge. No 
troops could be sent to Chef-du-Pont immediately.

The 3d Battalion (Lt. Col. Edward C. Krause) moved after collecting 
about a quarter of its men. Colonel Krause organized these men into two 
companies and headed for Ste. Mere-Eglise. Learning from a Frenchman 
that the Germans had recently established themselves outside the town 
along the roads, Colonel Krause planned to surround the town and 
establish road blocks before daylight. He ordered his men to go directly 
into town without searching buildings, and they were told to use only 
knives, bayonets, and grenades while it was dark, so that enemy small-
arms fire could be spotted by sight and sound.

By 0430 the 3d Battalion had occupied the town and raised the same 
American flag which the battalion had raised over Naples upon its entry 
into that city. Before daylight the main Cherbourg communication cable 
had been cut and all the road blocks were in. There was some resistance 
at three of the locations, but it was overcome with grenades. By 0930 
the entire town had been cleaned out. It yielded only about thirty 
prisoners and ten enemy dead. The rest of the Germans, surprised, fled 
southward. Colonel Krause had at this time about 360 men under his 
control.

In the meantime, Lt. Col. Benjamin H. Vandervoort had gathered enough of 
his 2d Battalion to start on its mission of establishing a line through 
Neuville-au-Plain and Bandienville on the north. The battalion had been 
under way for an hour when, at 0614, Col. William E. Ekman, the 
regimental commander, ordered it to stop. He had not heard from the 3d 
Battalion, although Colonel Krause had sent runners with news of the 
situation at Ste. Mere-Eglise. At 0810, still without information about 
the 3d Battalion's location, Colonel Ekman ordered the 2d Battalion to 
return and capture Ste. Mere-Eglise. The order was countermanded on word 
of Ste. Mere-Eglise's fall and then, at about 0930, reissued when 
Regiment received a report of an enemy counterattack against the town 
from the south.

The Germans had attacked with considerable force-two companies of 
infantry supported by self-propelled guns and tanks. The attack had 
begun with mortar and machinegun fire and had hit the flanks of the 
southern road blocks. The 3d Battalion was spread thinly. When the 2d 
Battalion came down at 1000 Colonel Krause ordered the scattered 
elements of Companies G and H on the north to join their companies on 
the south. The 2d Battalion took positions north and east of the town. 
Together the two battalion commanders decided on the defense, and by 
mutual agreement Colonel Krause took charge. Both officers had been 
injured. Colonel Krause had suffered a slight leg injury from shell 
fragments, and Colonel Vandervoort had a broken leg but continued to 
command his battalion from a cart.

Before proceeding to Ste. Mere-Eglise, Colonel Vandervoort had detached 
one rifle platoon (3d of Company D) on receiving word that Neuville-au-
Plain was lightly held by the enemy. He sent the platoon there to 
organize

Page 34

part of the northern defensive line which was the battalion's assigned 
mission. This impromptu decision proved wise, for the German thrust from 
the south at Ste. Mere-Eglise turned out to be only part of a larger 
squeeze which extended also to the north of the town. The effectiveness 
of the squeeze was nullified by the delaying action which the 3d Platoon 
(Lt. Turner B. Turnbull), Company D, fought at Neuville-au-Plain.

Lieutenant Turnbull had forty-two men with normal infantry weapons plus 
extra bazookas, BAR's, and two 57-mm. antitank guns. He deployed the 
platoon on high ground north of Neuville-au-Plain, and at 1030 the men 
engaged an enemy column which outnumbered them five to one. By weight of 
fire power, Lieutenant Turnbull's men were able to fight the enemy to a 
draw for eight hours. Gradually, however, enemy mortar fire, which the 
platoon was unable to neutralize, took its wearing toll, and the Germans 
began to use their superior numbers to turn the flanks of Lieutenant 
Turnbull's platoon. It became clear that the unequal fight could not 
continue. Colonel Vandervoort sent a platoon of Company E to cover 
Turnbull's withdrawal, and he pulled out late in the afternoon with 
sixteen of his forty-two men.

The platoon's tenacious fight at Neuville-au-Plain, however, had held 
back the northern prong of the enemy thrust long enough for the two 
battalions in Ste. Mere-Eglise to meet the stronger German threat from 
the south. Companies G and H, though hardly more than platoon strength, 
still held the southern edge of town. Two companies were in reserve in-
side the town. The enemy was building up strength on high ground 1,500 
yards south of Ste. Mere-Eglise, where according to reports he had 
emplaced an artillery battery. He was moving infantry into the draw in 
front of his base.

After the first German attack had been repulsed, Colonel Krause sent 
Company I, with eighty men, to strike at the enemy's western flank. The 
counterattack was almost disastrous, as Company I, confused by the 
zigzag course through hedgerows, turned east too soon and emerged on the 
road just ahead of the enemy position. As a result of this 
miscalculation, however, the company hit an enemy convoy and destroyed 
it with Gammon grenades. [3] The surprise and effectiveness of the blow 
led the enemy forces immediately south of Ste. Mere-Eglise to 
overestimate American strength, and they began to withdraw. Company I, 
after following the flank of the withdrawal for some time, returned to 
the perimeter defense of Ste. Mere-Eglise.

As night approached, the general situation around Ste. Mere-Eglise began 
to appear more satisfactory. A few snipers had to be ferreted out of 
buildings, and roving groups of enemy delayed the free movement of 
messengers and supply personnel. But these did not constitute a serious 
threat. Except for a critical shortage of water, supply was adequate. 
Considerable quantities of food, ammunition, 57-mm. antitank guns, and 
engineer and signal supplies were gathered in from crashed gliders, 
whose occupants had been killed. After the morning attacks the enemy had 
exerted no pressure against the town during the rest of the day. It was 
not until after dark that he began to probe half-heartedly at the road-
block outposts. These attempts, largely from the north, and presumably 
made by the same enemy which had overrun Neuville-au-Plain, were 
defeated without difficulty.

Along the Merderet

The events of Ste. Mere-Eglise assumed a greater significance in view of 
the critical situation which developed along the Merderet. There, more 
than anywhere else, the well-laid plans miscarried with a far-reaching 
impact

[3] Sacks of 2-pound plastic explosive, point detonated, used as 
antitank weapons.

Page 35

on the operation as a whole. Securing the la Fiere and Chef-du-Pont 
bridges from the east was the assigned mission of the 1st Battalion, 
both Parachute Infantry. Company A was to seize the one at la Fiere. 
This company, along with the rest of the battalion, had an excellent 
drop and effected a remarkably rapid assembly, moving to its objective 
immediately.

On the other side of the river the 507th Parachute Infantry and the 
508th Parachute Infantry, with the mission of securing the west bank of 
the river, probably depended

Page 36

(Map No. 7)

Page 37

more than any other units on a good drop pattern for success. Both 
regiments, however, were scattered and faced some of the most difficult 
problems of assembly of any of the airborne units (Map VI).

The two regiments came in between 0230 and 0300, as scheduled. 
Pathfinders preceding them had in many cases found it impossible to mark 
the drop zones north of Amfreville and Picauville because of the 
presence of the enemy. Momentarily puzzled by the failure to see marker 
lights and by the realization that it was necessary to rely on 
alternative signals like the Eureka, pilots in some cases overshot the 
drop zones. Large numbers of paratroopers thus landed in the watery 
marshes along the Merderet. Aerial photos had indicated that the 
Merderet was a fairly narrow stream bordered with grassy swampland. But 
the photos were deceptive in that they did not reveal the wide flood 
areas created by the closing of the la Barquette lock. Grass had grown 
out of the water so thickly that from above this shallow lake looked 
like a prairie. Paratroops, heavily laden with equipment, found 
themselves in water several feet deep. The whole problem of assembly and 
recovery of equipment was therefore complicated. Both regiments were 
also widely dispersed. Part of the 508th Parachute Infantry dropped east 
of the Merderet and operated with the 101st Airborne Division. The 507th 
Parachute Infantry dropped generally east of its assigned zone, but 
personnel were found in widely separated places in the entire peninsula. 
Small groups held out against the enemy for several days, isolated from 
the rest of the division.

At first there was a noticeable gravitation to the la Fiere bridge area, 
and ultimately elements of four regiments, including the 325th Glider 
Infantry, had a hand in the establishment of the bridgehead (Map No. 7). 
This convergence on la Fiere was due in part to the tendency of the 
groups landing in the Merderet marshes to collect at or move toward the 
railroad. The railroad embankment rose prominently from the marshland 
and was a convenient orientation feature. The men knew it was the only 
railroad in the Merderet valley and naturally used it as a guide. 
Probably the first group to do so was the one led by Capt. F. V. 
Schwartzwalder. His group of men from the 507th Parachute Infantry had 
landed along the swamp east of the Merderet and assembled on the 
railroad embankment. They moved down to the la Fiere bridge and met 
their first opposition there at daylight. In an orchard near the group 
of houses east of the bridge, they were fired on by mortar and small 
arms. Several attempts to rush the houses netted only casualties.

The engagement thus begun involved, in the course of the day, groups 
from all three parachute regiments. Company A, 505th Parachute Infantry, 
which had assembled almost to a man in the drop zone near Ste. Mere-
Eglise, was already engaged on the right of Captain Schwartzwalder's 
unit. Next on the scene were men of the 507th and 508th under Col. Roy 
Lindquist, Commanding Officer, 508th Parachute Infantry. Colonel 
Lindquist, after landing in the swamps northeast of Amfreville, moved to 
the railroad' embankment, assembling a hundred men as he went along. On 
reaching the railroad, he was joined by thirty men of the 507th under 
Lt. John H. Wisner, regimental S-2. Lieutenant Wisner wished to reach 
the regimental assembly area in the vicinity of Amfreville. Colonel 
Lindquist's objective was Pont l'Abbe. Both planned to follow the 
railroad as the clearest route south, and to cross the river at la Fiere
if the bridge was taken. 

They arrived at dawn at the intersection of the railroad and the highway 
from Ste. Mere-Eglise west, to find Company A, 505th Parachute Infantry, 
moving toward the bridge. The company was deployed to the north of the 
road and Colonel Lindquist decided to move up abreast. Lieutenant 
Wisner's men.

Page 38

leading off, were stopped by machine-gun fire 300 yards east of the 
bridge. At about the same point Company A, also pinned down by enemy 
fire, tried unsuccessfully to outflank the German positions from the 
right.

About that time Lieutenant Wisner, reconnoitering to the north, ran 
across another group making its way to la Fiere. This new group numbered 
about 300 men, principally from the 507th Parachute Infantry, who had 
assembled, like so many others, north of la Fiere and had followed the 
railroad south. Part had been collected by General Gavin, and part by 
Lt. Col. Arthur Maloney and Lt. Col. Edwin J. Ostberg. General Gavin's 
initial intention, after assembly, was to move this force south against 
the west end of the la Fiere bridge and causeway. However, fruitless 
efforts to retrieve a jeep and an antitank gun from the marshes delayed 
the move until daylight. With the light, enemy fire seemed to build up 
along the west bank. The original plan was therefore abandoned and the 
force proceeded east and thence south along the railroad embankment.

When this force arrived at la Fiere, the first American attempt to 
approach the bridge had been checked, but still it did not appear that 
the enemy was strong. Moreover, men of the 507th and 508th continued to 
drift into the position until by midmorning some 500 to 600 had gathered 
there. General Gavin therefore decided to commit part of the force 
elsewhere. Colonel Maloney was sent south with seventy-five men to 
reconnoiter another crossing. A little later General Gavin and Colonel 
Ostberg took another group of seventy-five men to try to cross the 
Merderet at the Chef-du-Pont bridge, which had been reported undefended.

Colonel Lindquist took command of the assorted units remaining at la 
Fiere. The principal organized groups, comprising about 400 men of all 
regiments, were Company B, 508th Parachute Infantry; Company G, 507th 
Parachute Infantry; and Company A, 505th Parachute Infantry. Company G, 
under Captain Schwartzwalder, in position on the extreme left, south of 
the road, had probed out the weakest portion of the enemy line but had 
not followed up the advantage. When Colonel Lindquist ordered attack at 
noon by all forces, Company A, which had displaced to the north of the 
road, failed to get the order, but Lindquist's own force, attacking 
through the area where Company A had been held all morning, destroyed or 
captured the last of the enemy. As the fire fell away, Captain 
Schwartzwalder's men crossed the causeway and made contact near the west 
end with a patrol from the 2d Battalion, 507th Parachute Infantry (Lt. 
Col. Charles J. Timmes).

The 2d Battalion, 507th Parachute Infantry, had achieved an early 
assembly of fifty men under Colonel Timmes 1,000 yards east of 
Amfreville, near the battalion's planned drop zone. Soon after the 
initial assembly a patrol under Lt. Lewis Levy of Company D was sent to 
investigate the la Fiere causeway and to clear it if possible. The 
patrol found a few men of the 507th already established in the village 
of Canquigny, though enemy infantry held the ground south and east. The 
forces joined but were unable to work their way to the causeway until 
the attack from the east bank carried across. The success of that attack 
cleared the west bank and brought eighty men into the bridgehead. 
Lieutenant Levy then established contact with the forces still on the 
east side and received assurance that the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute 
Infantry, was coming across to take over the bridge.

The position seemed secure. Yet within the next hour the bridge was 
lost. The Germans countered quickly. Enemy artillery began to hit the 
vicinity of Canquigny, while small-arms fire built up to the south; 
tanks were heard approaching from the west. Before these signs of coming 
battle had become critical, Captain Schwartzwalder had decided that his 
primary mission was to go on toward Amfre-

Page 39

vile to join the 2d Battalion and, under prodding of the first enemy 
artillery bursts, had pulled out fast with his eighty men and some 
additional personnel of the 508th. As no other troops from the east bank 
crossed over, this move left the bridgehead in the hands of four 
officers (including Lieutenant Levy) and eight enlisted men. With 
grenades and rifles and one machine gun, this handful of men fought off 
the enemy and even succeeded in disabling two enemy tanks with Gammon 
grenades, but they finally had to withdraw northward to join the 2d 
Battalion of the 507th.

In the meantime, Company B, 508th Parachute Infantry, had been sent, 
belatedly, across the causeway. When it arrived on the west bank it met 
the enemy attack head on. Unable to organize or hold its ground, it was 
forced south along the river, and survivors swam back under fire to the 
east bank.

The bridge so handily won was thus lost through failure to consolidate 
rapidly the west bank position. The reason for the failure was in part 
that the groups participating in the action had only a vague idea of 
what neighboring units were doing. The hedgerow country virtually penned 
each unit in its separate field of action.

Not only had the bridge been lost, but the enemy counterattack had 
isolated the force under Colonel Timmes (now including Captain 
Schwartwalder's men) from the units at la Fiere. Colonel Timmes' group 
had taken up a defensive position in an orchard near Amfreville and was 
caught and virtually immobilized by the enemy forces attacking toward 
the bridgehead. An attack south to la Fiere was planned for that night 
but not attempted. The force numbered about 120 men; many were exhausted 
or casualties; and, in addition, friendly artillery fire began to fall 
in the causeway area. Colonel Timmes' force remained isolated in this 
position for two more days.

At la Fiere, after the retreat of Company B, 508th Parachute Infantry, 
the position on the east bank was reorganized. Men of the 507th and 
508th Regiments under Colonel Lindquist were relieved on the left and 
the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 505th, joined Company A in the line. 
Colonel Lindquist's men were placed in reserve west of the railroad. But 
the position was still far from satisfactory. The forward defenses of 
the 1st Battalion, 505th, were exposed to heavy mortar and artillery 
fire, and the enemy, after his success in clearing the west bank, began 
to show unusual aggressiveness. Two German tanks attempted to exploit 
their success by crossing the causeway. Company A's road block covered 
by bazooka men stopped the attack, destroying both tanks. But it seemed 
probable that the Germans would try again. General Gavin came up to la 
Fiere from Chef-du-Pont late in the afternoon and found the situation 
serious. Ammunition was low; medical aid was scarce. General Gavin sent 
orders to Colonel Maloney at Chef-du-Pont to bring all his force, less 
about a platoon, to la Fiere at once.

Before Colonel Maloney arrived, the enemy attacked the east bank again 
in considerable strength, and the position of the 1st Battalion, 505th 
Parachute Infantry, was, in the opinion of its commander, becoming 
rapidly untenable. At about 2000 Colonel Maloney brought 200 men to la 
Fiere and moved up to the 505th Parachute Infantry line. By dark the 
American defense was again fairly well stabilized and the enemy had 
ceased his attack across the causeway.

Locally the situation was secure. But there was still no news at 82d 
Airborne Division headquarters, located west of Ste. Mere-Eglise, of the 
progress of the seaborne invasion. General Ridgway therefore took steps 
to provide for the possibility that the whole division might have to 
consolidate its defense in the vicinity of Ste. Mere-Eglise. Colonel 
Lindquist was ordered to move his force, now numbering some 250 men, to 
a position from which

Page 40

he could prevent the enemy from cutting off la Fiere units from Ste. 
Mere-Eglise. This movement, however, was not accomplished until the next 
day.

While the chief concern of the 82d Airborne Division during D Day was 
with the la Fiere bridgehead, where the bulk of the assembled forces 
were committed and where the enemy put up his strongest resistance, 
another attempt to secure a crossing of the Merderet River had been made 
at the same time to the south of Chef-du-Pont and had fared slightly 
better. The initial attack at Chef-du-Pont had been undertaken by the 
seventy-five men under Colonel Ostberg. The enemy withdrew from the town 
and the eastern approaches to the bridge but dug in along the causeway 
and on the west bank. Though apparently not numerous, the Germans fought 
tenaciously. Colonel Ostberg's men were stopped at the bridge. The 
seventy-five reinforcements who arrived later under Colonel Maloney 
could do nothing to break the deadlock. At about 1700 the Chef-du-Pont 
force was stripped to a platoon in order to send reinforcements to the 
hard-pressed paratroopers at la Fiere.

The remaining platoon of thirty-four men under Capt. Roy E. Creek almost 
at once were whittled down to twenty effectives by direct fire from an 
enemy field piece on the opposite bank. At the same time from seventy-
five to one hundred Germans were observed forming on the east bank in 
some buildings to the left rear of Captain Creek's position. Captain 
Creek asked for reinforcements. Before they could arrive, immediate help 
was provided fortuitously by the landing within American lines of a 
glider carrying a 57-mm. antitank gun and ammunition. The gun was 
emplaced and fired to neutralize the enemy artillery piece. Nearly one 
hundred men came down from la Fiere shortly thereafter and the enemy 
threat was removed. With the reinforcements a defensive position was 
organized to bring greater fire power to bear on the enemy. In a short 
time the east bank was cleared, and a platoon crossed the bridge and dug 
in on the other side without opposition. The bridge was secured, though 
the position remained enfiladed by enemy fire from the Carquebut area.

The capture of Ste. Mere-Eglise, and the fights for the Merderet River 
crossings at la Fiere and Chef-du-Pont, together constituted the 
principal efforts of the 82d Airborne Division on D Day. But there were 
also a number of isolated groups of the division which organized 
themselves west of the Merderet and fought independently-in some cases 
for four or five days. These isolated groups contributed in some degree 
to the accomplishment of the division's missions, though they carried on 
what amounted to fights for survival rather than battles for planned 
objectives.

Col. George V. Millet, Jr., commanding the 507th Parachute Infantry, 
collected in the course of D Day some seventy-five men northwest of 
Amfreville. But, though he was not more than 1,000 yards from the 2d 
Battalion, 507th (Colonel Timmes), he made no contact with this 
battalion or other friendly elements until D plus 4.

Farther south, elements of the 508th Parachute Infantry were having 
similar experiences. One group, initially led by Lt. Gerald P. Guillot 
and later by Capt. Jonathan Adams, had one skirmish after another with 
the enemy, and survived to join the regiment on D plus 5.

The largest force from the 508th Parachute Infantry to assemble west of 
the Merderet was commanded by Col. Thomas J. B. Shanley (Commanding 
Officer, 2d Battalion). Colonel Shanley landed near Picauville. He 
assembled a small group, not large enough to proceed, as he wished, on 
the mission against the Douve bridge at Pont l'Abbe. Before noon he 
established radio contact with Lt. Norman McVicar, who had a force of 
about sixty men a mile to the northeast, and started out to join this 
force. He met a patrol from another force off

Page 41

to his left under Maj. Shields Warren, Jr. Junction between these three 
groups, however, was delayed by enemy pressure on the south, which 
forced Colonel Shanley's men to engage. It was mid-afternoon before they 
could free themselves even so far as to choose better ground and 
organize a defensive position. Before nightfall, however, the enemy had 
been cleared sufficiently to allow the Shanley, Warren, and McVicar 
forces to join. But in the meantime Colonel Shanley had learned that the 
German force which had been trying all afternoon to close in on him had 
the strength of a battalion, and that more of the enemy was dug in 
around Pont l'Abbe. He therefore abandoned the idea of attacking toward 
the Douve bridge and decided to proceed to the regiment's assembly area, 
the high ground known as Hill 30, dominating the Chef-du-Pont causeway. 
At 2300 the entire force, organized into two companies, moved there and 
improvised an all-around defensive position.

The Airborne Divisions at the End of D Day

A hard fight had been fought on D Day by the 82d and 101st Airborne 
Divisions-a fight that had not gone entirely according to plan and had 
cost heavy casualties. Not one battle but fifteen or twenty separate 
engagements had been fought.

Both divisions had had scattered drops, with varying losses in men and 
materiel. Initial dispersion was further aggravated by the Normandy 
terrain; the hedgerows made it difficult to assemble and still more 
difficult to coordinate the maneuver of units. Some units were 
completely unaware of others, fighting only a few hundred yards away. 
The groups were usually mixed, and men strangers to their leaders fought 
for objectives to which they had not been assigned. Still, the airborne 
operation was in general a success. Small groups of parachutists took 
advantage of a surprised and temporarily disorganized enemy to seize 
many of the vital objectives quickly.

When D Day ended, the 101st Airborne Division had accomplished the most 
important of its initial missions. General Taylor had estimated at 
noontime that, despite the errors of the drop, the tactical situation of 
his division was sound. The way had been cleared for the movement of the 
seaborne forces inland. The northern sector in the vicinity of 
Foucarville was securely held by the 502d Parachute Infantry. On the 
other hand, the forces holding the southern flank of the Corps front 
along the Douve north of Carentan were not as strong as intended. The le 
Port bridges had been taken, but the bridgehead had to be abandoned. The 
la Barquette lock was occupied, but precariously. Virtually isolated, 
with a total strength nearer three companies than three battalions, 
short of ammunition, and facing unexpectedly tenacious opposition, the 
prospects of the southern units did not appear bright. In the St. Come-
du-Mont area the enemy effectively held the 501st Parachute Infantry 
against the swamps in the vicinity of les Droueries and Bse. Addeville. 
There were no men to be spared to proceed against the railroad and 
highway bridges across the Douve, and the enemy was thus left strong and 
mobile to the southwest.

Yet here, as elsewhere on D Day, the weakness of the American forces was 
more than offset by the almost total lack of aggressiveness on the part 
of the enemy. Positions which tactically should have required battalions 
for defense could be and were held by small improvised forces which had 
to worry more about cover from artillery and mortar fire than about 
counterattack. Probably the weakest feature of the whole situation at 
the close of D Day was the lack of communication. This had plagued the 
activities of most of the battalions during the day. At night, though it 
was only the southern forces that remained

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out of contact, the southern flank was precisely the most seriously 
threatened portion of the division sector (Map No. 9).

The situation of the 82d Division was more serious than that to the 
east. The plan by which the 82d was to have been placed in possession of 
both banks of the Merderet was voided by the faulty drop. Large numbers 
of the division were isolated west of the Merderet, unable to reach the 
division's planned objectives in that area. The la Fiere bridgehead had 
been won only to be promptly lost. This was costly, for it created a 
tactical problem that engaged the major forces of the entire division 
for the next three or four days. Moreover, the expected reinforcements 
by sea and glider had not arrived by the end of D Day and many of the 
latter had been irretrievably lost in landing. General Ridgway, viewing 
the operation at the Merderet and lacking information about the other 
divisions, was naturally alarmed and took measures to consolidate his 
defensive base at Ste. Mere-Eglise.

There was probably little optimism in the minds of most of the 
commanders of the 101st and 82d Divisions as D Day came to a close. Of 
the 6,600 men of the 101st Division dropped on the morning of D Day, 
only 2,500 men were working together at the end of the day. 
Reinforcements were needed for all of the airborne units. Such 
reinforcements had to come across the beach. Fortunately the seaborne 
landing had been relatively unopposed. The arrival of the 4th Division 
had freed the 101st Airborne Division of responsibility in the north and 
east and released a large part of this division for employment 
elsewhere. The rapid progress of the 4th Division on D Day promised to 
improve greatly the situation of the two airborne divisions.