Page 76

(Map No. 15)

Page 77

THE BATTLE OF CARENTAN (8-15 JUNE)

For several days special attention had to be given the southern flank of 
the VII Corps sector. The early joining of the Utah and Omaha beachheads 
had acquired an added urgency as a result of the difficulties in the V 
Corps area. Neither corps had made as rapid progress as hoped. 
Considerable anxiety existed, especially in the V Corps sector, where 
only a precarious foothold had been won on Omaha Beach on D Day and 
determined enemy resistance prevented an early consolidation of the 
beachhead. There was serious danger that the enemy would attempt to 
drive a wedge into the gap between V and VII Corps, particularly if he 
were allowed time to bring up reserves. General Eisenhower, viewing the 
situation on a visit to the Omaha area on 7 June, ordered a concentrated 
effort to close this gap. General Bradley accordingly gave first 
priority to this mission of linking the two beachheads and issued the 
necessary directives to the two corps. V Corps was ordered to thrust 
westward through Isigny; VII Corps was to seize Carentan.

The latter mission fell naturally to the 101st Airborne Division, 
already engaged along the southern flank of the Utah sector. In 
temporarily diverting the main effort of the VII Corps, General Bradley 
even suggested to General Collins that the 101st Airborne Division be 
reinforced should it be unable to break through to join up with units 
from V Corps, and indicated his immediate concern over the fusion of the 
two beachheads by specifically assigning first priority to this mission.

St. Come-du-Mont

The 101st Airborne Division was already engaged in efforts to dislodge 
the enemy from St. Come-du-Mont when these new orders were received by 
the VII Corps commander. The new attack on St. Come-du-Mont was 
scheduled for 0445 on 8 June. It was to be led by Colonel Sink of the 
506th Parachute Infantry and was to be made by four battalions (Map No. 
15). On the right the 1st and 2d Battalions, 506th Parachute Infantry, 
were to drive directly from Beaumont to St. Come-du-Mont. In the center 
the 3d Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry, was to advance from north of 
les Droueries to the main highway south of St. Come-du-Mont. On the left 
the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry, was to move through Colonel 
Ballard's force east of les Droueries, and as the entire attack 
approached St. Come-du-Mont it was to slant off to the south and go down 
the highway to blow the causeway bridge.

Preceded by effective preparatory fires on fifteen registered targets, 
the attack got off to a good start. The 3d Battalion, 501st Parachute 
Infantry, cleared les Droueries and advanced rapidly southward. As it 
approached the in-

Page 78

ersection east of St. Come-du-Mont, it was threatened with being pinched 
off by the convergence of the 506th Parachute Infantry units on the 
right and the glider battalion on the left. A reorganization was 
effected and the 1st and 2d Battalions, 506th Parachute Infantry, were 
ordered to move to the west and set up defensive positions on the east 
of St. Come-du-Mont. The glider battalion lagged behind on the left, 
while the 3d Battalion of the 501st went on and reached the Carentan 
highway, just north of the Beaumont road intersection, about midmorning.

Colonel Ewell, commanding the 3d Battalion, thought he saw signs of the 
enemy's withdrawal westward from St. Come-du-Mont, and he decided to go 
south along the Carentan highway to seize the causeway and the bridges. 
But as his men moved onto the highway they were met by small-arms, 
machinegun, and antitank fire from the buildings near the first bridge, 
and 88-mm. guns in Carentan began to shell them. Since no communications 
with the American artillery were available, Ewell's battalion pulled 
back to the east of the highway. As it withdrew, the battalion was 
suddenly faced by a German counterattack from the north. The 
counterattack was repulsed, but an additional effort was needed to clear 
the enemy from a small hill which dominated the highway on the west. 
With this hill as an anchor, the battalion built up an east-west line 
facing north. From this line Colonel Ewell's men beat back five 
successive German thrusts, each of which approached within one hedgerow 
of the American positions.

In the middle of the afternoon, the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider 
Infantry, was ordered by Colonel Sink to go in between Colonel Ewell and 
the 506th Parachute Infantry. But by the time it had moved up, the enemy 
had begun to withdraw. The two American battalions started in pursuit, 
but did not regain contact, although the enemy could be seen moving 
south between the railroad embankment to the west and the highway. About 
forty loaded wagons were captured on the highway.

A patrol found that the enemy's withdrawal had left St. Come-du-Mont 
completely clear. The 101st Division could now prepare to move south to 
attack the four causeway bridges, the second of which had been blown 
earlier in the afternoon by the enemy.

The Causeway Attack

By evening of 8 June, the 101st Airborne Division had occupied a 
defensive arc on the southern flank of the VII Corps from Chef-du-Pont 
to the mouth of the Douve. The 502d Parachute Infantry, after 
accomplishing its missions in the Foucarville area, had taken positions 
on the right flank of the division, from Chef-du-Pont to the vicinity of 
Houesville. The 327th Glider Infantry, which had arrived by sea, 
relieved Colonel Johnson's and Captain Shettle's men in the vicinity of 
the lock and the le Port bridges. The 506th Parachute Infantry held the 
center, astride the Carentan highway, while the 501st Parachute Infantry 
was assembled near Vierville as division reserve.

The plan of the 101st Division provided for two crossings of the Douve. 
The left wing, starting at 0100 on 10 June, was to cross in the vicinity 
of Brevands; part of this force was to join V Corps near the Vire River 
bridge southwest of Isigny, while the main force was to drive southwest 
to seize Carentan. The right wing was to cross the causeway northwest of 
Carentan, bypass Carentan, and seize Hill 30, southwest of the city. 
Capture of Hill 30 would put the Americans astride the principal German 
escape route from Carentan, as movement to the south and east was 
hindered by the Vire-Taute Canal and extensive swampland. As the battle 
for Carentan developed, the left and right wings of the division were 
coordinated to form a ring about the town, and within this ring a 
pincers closed in on the town itself.

Page 79

With St. Come-du-Mont clear, the division's right wing was ready to 
begin its attack across the causeway. There were indications that 
Carentan was not heavily defended. On 18 June Colonel Sink of the 506th 
Parachute Infantry had outposted the first two bridges across the 
causeway after the enemy's withdrawal from St. Come-du-Mont, and on the 
following day he made a reconnaissance to the outskirts of Carentan; in 
the vicinity of the fourth bridge he drew fire (Map No. 16). Airplane 
reconnaissance reported that Carentan had been evacuated and also that a 
big gap had been blown in the railway embankment, thus making the 
causeway the only practicable approach to Carentan. Straight and narrow, 
the causeway rises some six to nine feet above the marshes and spans the 
Douve and Madeleine Rivers and the two Douve canals. Any attack would 
thus be canalized and expose the infantry to fire from the front and 
both flanks. On either side the marshes extend out of rifle range. With 
the western bank of the causeway falling away sharply to the water's 
edge, only the more gradually sloping eastern bank offered an 
opportunity to dig in.

The attack was to be carried out by the 502d Parachute Infantry. The 3d 
Battalion (Colonel Cole) started out shortly after midnight, 9-10 June. 
But the inability of the

Page 80

(Map No. 16)

Page 81

engineers, working under fire, to repair Bridge No. 2 caused the attack 
to be postponed. Shortly after midnight a patrol, led by Lt. Ralph B. 
Gehauf, set out to reconnoiter the road. The patrol crossed the canal at 
Bridge No. 2 in a boat and proceeded to Bridge No. 4. At this point the 
men were forced to edge single file through a narrow opening left by a 
heavy Belgian Gate which had been drawn almost completely across the 
bridge, and

Page 82

which they could budge only about eighteen inches. When they had gone 
about fifty yards beyond the bridge a mortar shell dropped near them, 
flares went up, and then machine guns and more mortars fired on them. 
The fire came from the front and right front, the first indication that 
the Germans were in positions on the highway and on the higher ground 
directly south and west of the highway. At about 0530 the patrol 
withdrew.

The battalion was then told that the attack would be launched in the 
afternoon, with considerable artillery support, principally from the 
65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm. self-propelled guns) and 
the 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion (75-mm. pack howitzers). Most 
of the artillery fire was laid on the suspected and known enemy 
positions southwest of Bridge No. 4. At noon the engineers had still not 
spanned the 12-foot gap at Bridge No. 2, but Colonel Cole and three 
other men improvised a footbridge with engineer planking, enabling the 
battalion to start crossing in single file in the middle of the 
afternoon. From Carentan an 88-mm. gun continued to interdict the 
causeway, but it did not stop the movement and caused no casualties. The 
men moved low or crawled along the embankment. At the end of three 
hours, when the point of the battalion had crossed three of the bridges 
and most of the men were beyond Bridge No. 2, the enemy opened fire from 
the hedgerows and a large farmhouse to the right front. The men in the 
point hit the ditches. As they attempted to move forward, an enemy 
machine gun behind a hedgerow only a hundred yards away searched the 
ditches, and, after three men were hit, the group withdrew.

The battalion, extended in a long thin column on the road and, unable to 
maneuver to either flank, was under enemy small-arms fire along its 
whole length. To advance, it had to send one man at a time to rush the 
Belgian Gate at Bride No. 4 and slip through the narrow opening under 
direct enemy fire. The whole precarious maneuver would have been 
impossible without artillery support, which worked over German positions 
from 1600 to 2330 and undoubtedly reduced the effectiveness of enemy 
fire. Part of Company G, which was leading the battalion, deployed to 
the left of Bridge No. 4, while the rest of the company tried to cross 
the bridge through the narrow opening. Six men edged through; the 
seventh was hit and the company stopped to build up a fire position. 
Three mortars were also brought up and they worried over the German-held 
ground.

Still the battalion could not advance. Company I, exposed on the right 
bank near Bridge No. 3 where men had no grass for concealment and could 
not dig in, was hard hit, first by enemy rifle fire and later (at 2330) 
by two planes that bombed and strafed its positions. The strafing in 
particular took a heavy toll and, when it was over, 21 men and 2 
officers of the company's original 80 moved back behind Bridge No. 2. 
About midnight, during a lull in the firing Company H started moving men 
through the gate at Bridge No. 4.

At 0400 on 11 June, Regiment ordered the 3d Battalion to continue the 
attack, and in the darkness Company G and Headquarters Company followed 
Company H across Bridge No. 4. The battalion deployed along both sides 
of the highway. The center of the enemy's positions appeared to be a 
large farmhouse, flanked by hedgerows, on the higher ground which rises 
out of the marshes on the right-hand side of the road.

When the leading scouts on the right approached the farmhouse, they were 
fired on by rifles, machine guns, and mortars. In an attempt to 
neutralize the position, an artillery concentration was placed on the 
area but had no perceptible effect. Colonel Cole then ordered a bayonet 
charge on the farmhouse and called across the road to Maj. John P. 
Stopka, the battalion executive officer, to have the or-

Page 83

der passed along. Artillery put down smoke in a wide arc around the 
objective. At 0615, as the artillery fire was lifted, Colonel Cole
blew his whistle and led the charge. Of the 250 men who should have 
followed him only 20 got up to go; another 50 followed Major Stopka. In 
the confusion and excitement, with the men widely distributed and 
hugging the ground, the order had not been passed around. Some of the 
men never received it; others had only a vague idea by hearing a word or 
two. In addition, parts of Company G, in the meadow east of the road to 
Carentan, became involved with enemy troops, armed with machine pistols. 
The commanding officer of the company was hit by an artillery short 
during the action. Most of the men of Company G did not hear the whistle 
at all, but when they saw the attack they ran after the others, trying 
to catch up.

Despite the initial disorder, the men charged across a ditch into the 
fire-swept field east of the farmhouse. The men, closely bunched, 
followed Colonel Cole and Major Stopka, and Colonel Cole stopped several 
times to get them to fan out. Two men of Company H reached the farmhouse 
first and found it abandoned, but to the west on higher ground the enemy 
still occupied rifle pits and machine-gun emplacements along a hedgerow 
running at right angles to the road. Under the momentum of the charge 
the men also secured this objective and eliminated the Germans with 
grenades and bayonets. The enemy's main defense was thus broken, but he 
still held ground to the south from which he continued to fire on the 
American positions. Colonel Cole wished to take advantage of the enemy's 
disorganization and keep the attack moving, but the 3d Battalion was in 
no condition to push on. All of the men in the battalion managed to 
cross the causeway and assemble near the farmhouse, but units were badly 
mixed and had suffered heavy casualties. Word was therefore sent to the 
rear to ask the 1st Battalion, 502d Parachute Infantry, to come up and 
pass through the 3d and continue the attack south to the high ground at 
la Billonerie (Hill 30).

The 1st Battalion (Colonel Cassidy) was north of Bridge No. 4 when it 
received Colonel Cole's message. It crossed the bridge under heavy fire 
and deployed across the fields toward the house. Instead of relieving 
the 3d Battalion, however, it reinforced it to help secure the ground 
gained. The 1st Battalion had been hard hit, especially by mortar fire, 
and was as disorganized as the 3d. Colonel Cole commanded the positions 
on the right from his command post in the farmhouse and Colonel Cassidy 
stayed on the left; there was little consultation or communication 
between them.

On the right flank the defensive position was improved when a group of 
men, after routing a few remaining Germans from the ridge, pursued them 
down the side road which ran between the farmhouse and the ridge. These 
men set up a machine gun at the crossroads and, together with others who 
joined them later, engaged the Germans who had returned to take up 
positions in the houses south of the crossroads. For the rest of the day 
they remained there, virtually isolated, some 150 yards out ahead of the 
other American positions. Another small group set up two machine guns in 
the corner formed by two hedgerows behind the farmhouse; these guns 
could fire into the hedgerows to the east, into the orchard, and down 
the road to the crossroads.

The defense, however, was not coordinated, and in the farmhouse Colonel 
Cole remained apprehensive. He did not know the situation on his flanks, 
his communications were out, and he thought that the supporting 
artillery was not effective. With their backs against the river, the 
troops had no rear area and hence no local reserve. The artillery 
observers could not see where their shells were landing because of the 
hedgerows and had to adjust fire, in the manner of jungle warfare, by 
sound. Very few of the men saw the enemy,

Page 84

who moved low behind the hedgerows; they judged his closeness by the 
sound of his fire.

In the middle of the morning enemy artillery and mortar fire increased 
in intensity, and the Germans began a counterattack. One of the 
strongest thrusts came through the orchard and threatened to rout the 
Americans south and east of the farmhouse. But machine guns south of the 
house broke up the attack and the position was restored. It held 
throughout the morning.

Shortly before noon an unexplained lull occurred in the fighting. The 
502d Parachute Infantry took advantage of this to re-form its left flank 
positions. Company C moved forward from Bridge No. 4 to a cabbage patch

Page 85

between the second and third hedgerows where they could fire down along 
the forward hedgerow as well as along the highway. Company A took 
positions just behind Company C and extended its line across the road.

At noon Regiment notified the battalions that the enemy had requested a 
truce and ordered cease firing. It was a garbled message. The fact was 
that General McAuliffe, who was directing the operation for the 101st, 
was requesting this truce of the enemy. McAuliffe wanted time to clear 
the lines of his own casualties. Maj. Douglas T. Davidson, regimental 
surgeon, escorted by two Germans, went through the enemy lines to ask 
the military commander of Carentan for a breathing space to evacuate the 
wounded. When Major Davidson returned to Bridge No. 4, having been 
denied an interview with the German commander, the enemy opened fire-
with rifles, machine guns, mortars, and artillery-in the most intense 
concentration of the day. Colonel Cole called Regiment and asked 
permission to return fire. He was ordered to wait, for Major Davidson 
had not yet returned to the regimental command post with definite word 
of the end of the truce. But the men in the line made their own decision 
and opened fire with all they had. They were convinced, not only by 
having observed the movements of the enemy during the truce, but also by 
the effectiveness of his renewed fire, that he had used the interlude to 
strengthen his small-arms positions and to prepare an artillery attack.

The renewed German attack strained the American positions almost to the 
breaking point. The group at the crossroads on the right flank had not 
received the cease fire order and had continued to fire on the Germans 
whom they had observed moving about to their left. When the truce ended 
and the enemy struck at the crossroads, some of the groups were forced 
to give ground. One of the machine guns behind the farmhouse, by 
interdicting the crossroads, helped the others to hold. The positions on 
the left, in the cabbage patch and along the hedgerows, managed to hold 
throughout the afternoon against repeated German attempts to come down 
the ditches beside the highway and along the hedgerows. At times they 
came so near that the men could hear the Germans working their bolts. 
The enemy gave the two battalions no respite and no opportunity to 
reorganize or evacuate the wounded. His artillery was weak, but his 
mortars never stopped firing. 

Colonel Cole, looking out from a second-story window in the farmhouse, 
expected his line to crack. At 1830 he informed Regiment that he planned 
to withdraw and asked to have covering fire and smoke ready when the 
time came. He believed that only closer and heavier artillery support 
would enable him to hold out. But the radio of his artillery liaison 
officer, Capt. Julian Rosemond, had been jammed. When Captain Rosemond 
finally managed to get through to the artillery command post, the 
situation improved rapidly. During most of the day only two battalions 
had been firing in direct support. Now every gun in the command was 
brought to bear. To be effective it was necessary to adjust the fires 
very closely, with the result that two Americans were killed. The shells 
arched high over the American positions and fell in the field directly 
beyond the farmhouse. It lasted only five minutes, but when the fire 
lifted the sound of German firing was receding southward. Patrols sent 
out ascertained that the enemy had fled. At about 2000 the 2d Battalion 
came up to take over the now improved positions, and the 1st and 3d 
Battalions withdrew. The enemy defense barring the way to Carentan from 
the north was broken, but the 502d Parachute Infantry was too exhausted 
to continue the attack. It requested relief, and the 506th Parachute 
Infantry was sent in to finish the job.

Colonel Cole was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his part 
in the Carentan attack. Before he could receive the medal he was killed 
in action in Holland, 19 September 1944.

Page 86

(Map No. 17)

Page 87

The Left-Wing Attack on Carentan

During the two days of the fight across the causeway the 101st Airborne 
Division's left wing had also been pressing southward. The first mission 
of the 327th Glider Infantry was to cross the lower Douve and secure the 
high ground around Brevands (Map No. 17). At 0145 on 10 June, Company C 
silently crossed the river and established a small bridgehead. The 
artillery and mortar barrage which prepared for the crossing of the rest 
of the regiment was so successful that all three battalions were across 
by 0600, and Brevands was occupied shortly thereafter. At noon Company A
of the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry, [2] was ordered to 
reconnoiter southeastward from Brevands toward Auville-sur-le-Vey on the 
west bank of the Vire River. About a mile and a half from its 
destination the company encountered a strong German force, and in a 
running battle it broke the enemy line and knocked out twelve machine 
guns. It then proceeded to Auville-sur-le-Vey, where it made contact 
with the 29th Reconnaissance

[2] The 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry, operated as a third 
battalion of the 327th Glider Infantry. In the airborne division 
reorganization effected in March 1944, the 401st Glider Infantry was 
split, one of its battalions being attached to the 327th Glider Infantry 
of the 101st Airborne Division and the other to the 325th Glider 
Infantry of the 82d Airborne Division. The former retained its own 
designation.

Page 88

Troop and Company K of the 175th Infantry (29th Division). [3] The 
assistant G-3 of the 101st Airborne Division, who had accompanied 
Company A, went to the 29th Division headquarters to report the 
situation of the 101st, while Company A mopped up the enemy force which 
it had just broken up and which had constituted the last obstacle 
separating VII and V Corps. This done, it rejoined the 327th Glider 
Infantry for the advance on Carentan.

The approach to Carentan from the east is cut by the Vire-Taute Canal. 
The 327th Glider Infantry was ordered to block the eastern exits from 
the city by securing the railroad bridge and the Isigny highway bridge 
over the canal. Throughout the afternoon the regiment advanced rapidly, 
but it was stopped at 1800 some 500 yards from the canal by enemy fire 
from the houses and hedgerows on the east bank. The regiment reorganized 
to gain these 500 yards. The 2d Battalion moved north of the highway on 
the right, the 1st Battalion south of the highway; the 1st Battalion, 
401st Glider Infantry, was in reserve. The attack drove the enemy across 
the canal and by midnight the two battalions had reached the last 
hedgerow and dug into positions behind it. They could now fire into the 
city and control the highway bridge, the only bridge still intact.

Both the railway bridge to the south and a footbridge to the north near 
the junction of the canal and the Douve had been blown. The footbridge, 
however, could be repaired to permit troops to cross. On the west bank, 
the wood bordering the Bassin a Flot provided a

[3] A slightly different version of the joining of the two corps is 
given in OMAHA BEACHHEAD, published in 1946, pp. 145-46. The account 
given here is based on more complete information than was available when 
OMAHA was written.

Page 89

covered approach to Carentan. Col. Joseph H. Harper, who had assumed 
command of the 27th Glider Infantry that afternoon, decided to use this 
approach when he was ordered to continue the advance on Carentan. At 
dawn on 11 June a patrol repaired the footbridge, and at about 1000 two 
companies of the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry, and Company G, 
327th Glider Infantry, crossed under German mortar fire. Company G was 
to attack along the right side of the Bassin a Flot, Company A along the 
left, while Company C was to be in reserve. The 1st and 2d Battalions 
were to hold their positions to the south along the canal and support 
the attack by firing into the city.

The companies advanced several hundred yards through the woods toward 
Carentan, but when they were about half a mile from the city they were 
pinned down by machinegun and small-arms fire from the houses on the 
northeastern outskirts. American artillery was unsuccessful in checking 
the German fire, and the companies remained in the woods all day, unable 
to advance.

At about 2000 on 11 June, Colonel Harper was called back to the 
regimental command post. Here Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges (Deputy 
Commander, First Army), General Taylor, General McAuliffe, and Colonel 
Johnson (501st Parachute Infantry) had gathered to plan the next day's 
attack on Carentan. General McAuliffe was given the command of the task 
force which was to make a coordinated attack; it consisted of the 501st 
and 506th Parachute Infantry Regiments and the 327th Glider Infantry. 
The 501st was to move from its defensive position north of the Douve, 
cross the river near Brevands, where a treadway bridge had been built, 
and swing southwest to join Colonel Sink's men of the 506th near Hill 
30, thus completing the division's ring around the city. The 1st and 2d 
Battalions, 327th Glider Infantry, were to continue to hold the canal. 
while the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry, and Company G, 327th 
Glider Infantry, were to press their attack into Carentan from the 
northeast.

During the night of 11-12 June Carentan was set ablaze by artillery, 
naval guns, 4.2-inch mortars, and several tank destroyer guns which 
fired on point targets from the 327th Glider Infantry's positions along 
the canal.

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 506th Parachute Infantry, moved out at 0200 
on 12 June. Near the farmhouse which had been Colonel Cole's command 
post they left the highway and moved cross country directly south to 
Hill 30 (Map No. 18). Neither battalion met serious resistance; the 1st 
drove in a German outpost line and occupied Hill 30, the 2d bivouacked 
on its right. Colonel Sink (506th Parachute Infantry) moved his command 
post group over the same route which the battalions had followed, but 
after leaving the highway he missed the way and swung to the south of 
Hill 30, where he dug in forward of the two battalions. At 0500, while 
still unaware of his own position, Colonel Sink ordered the 2d Battalion 
to attack toward Carentan. At dawn, when enemy fire made it apparent 
that the command post position was isolated and surrounded, the 1st 
Battalion was ordered to attack south from Hill 30 through the hamlet of 
la Billonerie toward the command post. As the 1st Battalion started out 
it was counterattacked near la Billonerie. It took heavy fighting 
through the hedgerows and houses to break through and extricate Colonel 
Sink's group.

The 2d Battalion, meanwhile, had moved out astride the main road leading 
into Carentan from the southwest. It received harassing machine-gun fire 
and interdictory artillery fire from the south most of the way into 
town. As the battalion entered, it met the 1st Battalion, 401st Glider 
Infantry, which had already come in from the northeast. This unit had 
pushed a patrol to the edge of the town before dawn, but it still faced 
the enemy rear

Page 90

guard and was temporarily stopped. At 0600 it attacked out of the wood 
at Bassin a Flot and drove rapidly into the center of Carentan. The 
meeting with the 2d Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry, occurred about 
0730 after a short fight with enemy stragglers around the railroad 
station.

While the inner pincers thus squeezed shut in the town, the wide 
envelopment on the left intended to cut the enemy's southern escape 
routes was also closing. At dawn the 501st Parachute Infantry crossed 
the canal south of the 327th Glider Infantry, fought its way to Hill 30, 
and made contact with the 1st Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry, about 
half an hour after the entry into Carentan. The double maneuver 
succeeded in capturing Carentan, but the trap closed too late to catch 
the bulk of the German defenders, who evidently had escaped south during 
the night.

Securing Carentan

With the capture of Carentan, VII Corps had acquired the vital link for 
its communication with V Corps. It now remained to solidify the junction 
of the beachheads and secure the approaches to the city by seizing 
additional ground to the southwest and east. This was included as part 
of the mission of the 101st Airborne Division, as outlined the day 
before, and the division set about this task immediately. The 501st and 
506th Parachute Infantry Regiments were to push out southwestward to the 
Prairies Marecageuses de Gorges, while the 1st and 2d Battalions, 327th 
Glider Infantry, were to secure the ground to the east and, on General 
Taylor's orders, to go beyond the railroad and seize the high ground 
south of Montmartin-en-Graignes, in order to insure the security of the 
intercorps boundary.

Page 91

The 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry, remained in Carentan.

Reinforced by five tank destroyers, the two battalions of the 3 27th 
Glider Infantry set out along the Isigny highway early in the afternoon 
of 12 June (Map No. 18). At le Mesnil they turned south, the 2d 
Battalion advancing on the right, the 1st Battalion on the left. Shortly 
after crossing the railroad they ran into strong resistance, and at 
about 2100-2200 they were held up, the 2d Battalion in the vicinity of 
Rouxeville, the 1st in the vicinity of Lenauderie. The 2d Battalion was 
unable to break through the German positions but the 1st penetrated the 
enemy defenses and contacted a force of about eighty men from the 29th 
Division, including Brig. Gen. Norman D. Cota, assistant division 
commander, which had been surrounded by the enemy. This force joined the 
1st Battalion to continue the attack,

Page 92

which took Montmartin-en-Graignes and the high ground to the south.

Colonel Harper in his command post to the rear of his two battalions had 
lost contact with both and had only a vague idea of their situations. 
When he succeeded in reestablishing radio communication, he ordered the 
1st Battalion to withdraw to the forest south of Lenauderie, abreast of 
the 2d Battalion on the right. He did not know that Montmartin-en-
Graignes and the high ground had been taken. He called Division to ask 
for armor, but was informed that all the available armor was needed to 
check a counterattack against Carentan from the southwest. [4]

On the morning of 13 June, the situation had been cleared sufficiently 
to enable Colonel Harper, on General Taylor's order, to withdraw his two 
battalions, under artillery cover, northward to the railroad. General 
Cota's group was ordered to rejoin the 29th Division. Colonel Harper, 
reinforced by the five tank destroyers, set up defenses which extended 
3,000 yards along the north side of the tracks above Montmartin-en-
Graignes. He remained here until 15 June. The German attack he had 
expected from Montmartin-en-Graignes did not develop

Meanwhile, the battle for the merging of the two beachheads was being 
decided near Carentan. On the afternoon of 12 June the 506th and the 
501st Parachute Infantry Regiments had started to carry out their 
mission of securing the southwestern approaches to the town. The 506th 
on the right moved out westward along the Carentan-Baupte road,
and the 501st on the left set out southwestward from Hill 30 along the 
Carentan-Periers highway. A small enemy force attacked the 2d Battalion, 
506th Parachute Infantry, at noon, but the battalion repulsed this 
counterattack and pursued the enemy into Douville, where it was stopped 
at a strongly organized position manned by parachutists and panzer 
troops. The ensuing fight lasted the rest of the day. During the night 
the 3d Battalion came in on the 2d's right. The 501st Parachute Infantry 
met similar opposition on the Carentan-Periers highway and at the close 
of the day held a line only a short distance southwest of Hill 30.

An attack by the 506th Parachute Infantry was scheduled for the morning 
of 13 June, to deepen the defensive base around Carentan. Before the 
attack could get well under way a strong enemy counterattack, supported 
by armor, struck along both the Carentan-Baupte and Carentan-Periers 
roads (Map No. 19 ). Included in the German forces were elements of the 
37th and 38th Panzer Grenadier Regiments and the 17th Tank Battalion, 
all from the 17th SS-Panzer Grenadier (Goetz von Berlichgen) Division, 
and also remnants of the 6th Parachute Regiment. The attack was 
obviously directed at the recapture of Carentan, and it drove to within 
500 yards of the edge of the city. The 2d Battalion, 502d Parachute 
Infantry, moved down to the 506th Parachute Infantry's right flank and 
helped to regain some of the lost ground. But the attack threatened the 
junction of the V and VII Corps beachheads so seriously that First Army 
decided to send armor to repel it. Not until this armor arrived was the 
German threat eliminated and the link between the two corps firmly 
secured.

At 1030 elements of Combat Command A, 2d Armored Division, arrived in 
Carentan. One task force attacked west along the Carentan-Baupte road at 
1400 and, followed by

[4]0n the night of 12-13 June General Cota reported that he had 
observed, from the high ground south of Montmartin-en-Graignes, some 150 
German troops reentering the town. The message had been garbled to read 
"150 German tanks” and had induced General Bradley to send Colonel 
Harper armored support. When a major from General Bradley’s headquarters 
walked into Colonel Harper's command post with the news that a company 
of medium tanks, a company of light tanks, and a battalion of armored 
infantry were on their way, Colonel Harper in surprise called Division 
to say that he would have enough strength with the armor to push on to 
St. Lo, if that was desired. But General Taylor called Corps and learned 
that because the Germans were threatening Carentan from the southwest he 
was to move the armor to Carentan. This armor was part of the force 
which arrived in Carentan in time to break the German attack. Colonel 
Harper called for artillery and naval barrage on Montmartin-en-Graignes.

Page 93

the 502d Parachute Infantry, passed through the 5066th Parachute 
Infantry and drove westward. Another task force attacked along the 
Carentan-Periers highway. Both task forces received close support from 
the 14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. The coordinated efforts of 
the tanks, infantry, and artillery threw the enemy back several thousand 
yards, inflicting an estimated loss of 500 men. That night the 506th 
Parachute Infantry was relieved by the 502d on the right flank and 
passed to division reserve in Carentan.

On 14 June Carentan was secured and the junction with V Corps was 
completed. On the 101st Division's right flank, the 502d Parachute 
Infantry made contact with elements of the 82d Airborne Division at 
Baupte and, with the 501st Parachute Infantry on its left, it secured 
the road which runs southeast from Baupte to join the Carentan-Periers 
highway. The 327th Glider Infantry held the railroad from Carentan to 
the Vire River and had established contact with elements of the 29th 
Division on its left. Against this line enemy pressure dwindled. The 
101st Airborne Division had thus completed its mission by extending the 
southern arc of the beachhead and welding together its isolated 
segments. On 15 June the 101st Division was transferred from VII Corps 
to VIII Corps, which gradually assumed responsibility for the protection 
of the VII Corps' southwest flank.

Page 94

(Map No. 20)

PAGE 95

BREAKING THE GERMAN LINE IN THE NORTH

The terrain in the northern one of the beachhead did not offer the enemy 
as strong a natural barrier as the swamps and rivers in the south, but 
it still favored him over VII Corps. The ground generally rises to the 
north, giving the defender commanding heights, and it is liberally 
crisscrossed with hedgerows (Map I). Fortifications in the fields and 
along the beaches, as well as the large forts at Azeville, Crisbecq, and 
Ozeville, supported the German defense in depth. A backstop line for the 
forward defensive positions was anchored to the coast at Quineville; it 
stretched inland along a high ridge to Montebourg and then bent 
southwestward along a salient of solid ground which points down between 
the Merderet and two of its tributaries. The backstop line roughly 
paralleled the Quineville-Montebourg-le Ham highway and tied in with the 
Merderet River at le Ham. It was part of VII Corps' D-Day objective, but 
five infantry regiments took a full week, from 8 to 14 June, to reach 
and secure it. (Map III).

The Penetration at Ecausseville

The western half of the objective was assigned to the 8th Infantry, 
which was to take the area between Montebourg and the Montebourg 
Station, and to the 505th Parachute Infantry (with the 2d Battalion, 
325th Glider Infantry, attached), which was to take the high ground 
between the station and le Ham (Map No. 20). Defending the le Ham-
Quineville line during the first days of the operation were elements of 
the 709th and 243d Divisions, as well as such reinforcements as the 
Sturm Battalion AOK 7.

The 8th Infantry jumped off from Ste. Mere-Eglise on the morning of 8 
June and attacked along the eastern side of the Ste. Mere-Eglise-
Montebourg highway. It was opposed from the beginning by artillery fire, 
but its first contact with enemy infantry came at Neuville-au-Plain. 
There American forces had already fought the enemy three times but had 
not taken possession of the town. The Germans yielded the town again 
after a sharp skirmish in mid-afternoon. Beyond Neuville-au-Plain the 
going was easier, as the 8th Infantry turned to the left and continued 
its attack on the western side of the highway. As it approached 
Fresville and Grainville, enemy artillery and sniper fire increased and 
slowed down the regiment.

On the left of the 8th Infantry the 505th Parachute Infantry began its 
advance northward at 0800, with its 2d Battalion on the right and the 2d 
Battalion, 325th Glider Infantry, on the left. The 3d Battalion, 505th 
Parachute Infantry, followed on the left rear, screening the attack from 
the strong enemy forces across

Page 96

the Merderet. As the regiment came abreast of Neuville-au-Plain, it 
swung to the northwest, as the 8th Infantry had done, and the 3rd 
Battalion came through the two leading battalions to take over the 
advance. The 3d Battalion of the 505th secured the village, while the 3d 
Battalion of the 8th continued north to Magneville. Here Company I 
fought its way through the houses on the northern side of the town into 
an orchard, where it came under heavy artillery, mortar, and small-arms 
fire from the rising ground to its front and from a fortified hangar 
still farther ahead across a creek. Having discovered

Page 97

this concentration of German strength, Company I was pulled back in line 
and dug in around Magneville with the rest of the battalion. The 1st 
Battalion, 8th Infantry, had also reached this sector and established 
its position eastward to the highway along a road roughly paralleling 
the creek. Throughout the night both battalions were under unusually 
heavy fire, particularly from 88-mm. guns.

The German main line of resistance ran along the north bank of the 
creek, a tributary of the Merderet, with main strong points at the 
hangar beyond Magneville and the village of Ecausseville to the north. 
On the commanding north bank of the creek, the enemy had dug in a large 
number of machine guns and several 88-mm. guns, and he was supported by 
other artillery, mortars, and Nebelwerfers, registered on all routes of 
approach. These positions were part of a line extending eastward to 
Emondeville, Azeville, and Crisbecq. Here the Germans were making their 
first real effort to hold, and by 9 June they had begun to reinforce 
their positions with elements of the 243d Division, and with the Sturm 
Battalion AOK 7, which had been rushed down from Cherbourg on bicycles.

At 0630 on 9 June a coordinated attack by the 1st and 3d Battalions, 8th 
Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 325th Glider Infantry, was launched 
against the German line between the highway and the Merderet. A half-
hour concentration by at least three battalions of artillery preceded 
the jump-off. The 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, was stopped at its line 
of departure; the other two battalions crossed only the first few 
fields. All three battalions then felt the full weight of the enemy's 
fire from across the creek. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 505th 
Parachute Infantry prepared to follow in column behind the 2d Battalion 
of the 325th Glider Infantry on the left, to be employed as needed. 
Colonel Ekman, commanding the 505th, planned an advance up to the creek 
and then a slash almost directly west to le Ham by the glider battalion. 
The 2d Battalion of the 505th, following the lead-

Page 98

ing glider infantry, was to continue on its right and attack northwest 
to Montebourg Station. The 1st Battalion was to become the reserve, 
while the 3d Battalion remained on the defensive near Grainville, 
covering the bridge over the Merderet and protecting the rear of the 
regiment.

After crossing the first few fields the 2d Battalion, 325th Glider 
Infantry, became so cramped between the river and the 8th Infantry's 
zone that it had no room for maneuver and was pinned down within 200 
yards of the creek by artillery and mortar fire from the front and from 
the left flank. To the rear, at Grainville, the 3d Battalion of the 
505th was taking losses from artillery and machine-gun fire from across 
the river. Throughout the afternoon the regiment was unable to advance.

Late in the afternoon Colonel Ekman decided to send the 2d Battalion of 
the 505th forward across the creek to the right of the 2d Battalion, 
325th Glider Infantry. The attack was to have the support of the 456th 
and 319th Field Artillery Battalions and of Battery C of the 80th 
Antiaircraft Battalion, and it was to be coordinated with an attack by 
the 8th Infantry. Colonel Ekman had asked for a 115-minute artillery 
concentration and white phosphorus to screen the infantry advance, but 
when the time for the attack came his communications failed him; the 
319th Field Artillery Battalion (the general support battalion) was 
pulled away for another mission, and he was refused the white phosphorus 
because he had no authentication. Under the circumstances he canceled 
the attack. When

Page 99

he notified the 8th Infantry of his decision, he learned that the 3d 
Battalion of that regiment, on his right, was getting ready to go into a 
defensive position for the night. Therefore the 505th Parachute Infantry 
also dug in.

The attack of the 8th Infantry on 9 June had met with more success 
following its initial difficulties, but at the cost of hard fighting and 
heavy losses. The Germans answered the preparatory fire promptly, and 
both the 1st and 3d Battalions, which were leading the attack, came 
under heavy shelling. The 1st Battalion on the right was stopped on its 
line of departure and stayed there all morning. The 3d Battalion 
attacked toward the hangar. Companies L and I reached the creek 
together. Company L was to flank the hangar on the left, but it was 
stopped at the creek, which in its zone was too wide to jump. Company I 
crossed the creek at a narrow place to the right of Company L and 
charged straight across the large, flat, open field beyond, through the 
grazing fire from enemy positions near the hangar and along the edge of 
the orchard to the north. The men crossed at a dead run without firing 
and, although they suffered heavy losses, two platoons and the command 
post group with the mortars managed to make their way into the orchards 
north of the hangar. There they were stopped by fire from houses in la 
Lande to the north, and from the fields to the northeast.

Company I was out 1,000 yards ahead of the rest of the regiment, and 
part of the platoon on the right was separated from the main group. 
After two hours the company withdrew to a fire line north of the hangar 
buildings. Meanwhile Company L managed to cross the creek and in close-
in fighting captured the hangar area. Company I then moved to its former 
position in the orchard, and Company L came into line on the left. There 
they dug in for the night. The position was threatened by the Germans in 
la Lande to the north and

Page 100

in Ecausseville on the right flank, and Company K was brought up to 
strengthen this flank.

When earlier in the day patrols had reported Ecausseville free of the 
enemy, Colonel Van Fleet decided to commit the 2d Battalion, 8th 
Infantry, in the center in an attempt to aid the 1st and 3d Battalions, 
both of which were temporarily stalled. At about 1400 two platoons of 
Company E led the attack, advancing up the trail which skirts the bend 
in the creek. No opposition was met until the scouts were almost at the 
creek. Then the enemy opened up with artillery, mortars, and machine 
guns. The leading platoons piled into the trail behind the shelter of 
the hedgerows. But the German artillery was accurately registered, and 
time fire or tree bursts lined the trail with American dead. Some of the 
men moved to the left and northward to knock out a German machine gun 
which had enfiladed the trail, but discovered the enemy strongly 
entrenched in an orchard. Others advanced beyond the eastern bend of the 
trail to find cover, but the fire followed them there. A direct hit 
destroyed a mortar; an attached platoon of heavy machine guns from 
Company H lost two of its guns. To avoid the enemy fire fourteen men of 
the 1st Platoon moved so far to the east that they lost contact with 
their company and joined the 1st Battalion, with which they fought for 
the next two days. The confusion was increased when a false order, 
reported to have come "from the rear," started a retreat along the 
trail. It drew most of the company back about 400 yards and, after it 
was checked, less than 75 men remained dug in behind a hedgerow. The 
company had lost all its mortars, half of its machine guns, and between 
fifty and sixty men. About mid-afternoon Company E was ordered to 
withdraw to a line abreast of the 1st Battalion, and at 1730 it was 
further withdrawn to the 2d Battalion assembly area to reorganize.

Late in the day the 1st Battalion took up the attack again on the 
regiment’s right flank and this time succeeded in breaking through.
It attacked at 1900 and, preceded by two platoons of medium tanks from 
Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, moved up the road which runs northward 
from Magneville. As the tanks crossed the creeks, they machine-gunned 
the houses on the right, swung into the fields north of Ecausseville, 
and fired into the village for ten or fifteen minutes. Answered by 88-
mm. guns in the village, they turned back to rejoin the infantry. On 
reaching the cluster of houses at the turn in the road they found them 
still occupied by the enemy. The tanks attacked from the rear, broke the 
enemy's resistance, and enabled Company A, 8th Infantry, to move in. 
About a hundred prisoners were taken. It was now 2100 and the battalion 
dug in for the night.

Ecausseville, the strongest point on the enemy's first thoroughly 
prepared line, had held out all day. But outflanked by the 1st 
Battalion's drive on the right and by the 3d Battalion's attack through 
the hangar sector on the left, it was abandoned by the enemy during the 
night.

The Montebourg-le Ham Highway

On the following day, 10 June, both the 8th Infantry and 505th Parachute 
Infantry resumed their attack (Map No. 20). The 8th advanced toward the 
high ground at Eroudeville, which it reached that night, while the 505th 
moved on Montebourg Station and le Ham. The latter objective was not 
seized until the following day.

All three battalions of the 8th Infantry jumped off early on 10 June. 
The 2d Battalion, moving in the center, advanced straight toward 
Ecausseville, which it found abandoned. Advancing northwestward it 
cleared the southern portion of Eroudeville, crossed the Montebourg-le 
Ham highway early in the evening, and fought until dark against Germans 
entrenched along the railway; at

Page 101

dark the battalion withdrew to positions east of the highway.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion on the right, supported by tanks, had 
jumped off at 0730, following an artillery preparation. The tanks, some 
of them carrying infantry, advanced along the trail which passed 
Ecausseville on the east. When fired on, some 500 yards south of 
Eroudeville, the tanks dropped the infantry, moved up the trail several 
hundred yards, and knocked out three antitank guns. The infantry 
followed and in a sharp fight drove the enemy (elements of Sturm 
Battalion AOK 7) back toward the le Ham-Montebourg highway. As the 
battalion came within 300 yards of the highway, it was halted by an 
enemy force in Eroudeville and to the north of the village. At 1 s 00 
the enemy counterattacked. Although Company C was pulled in from the 
right flank to reinforce the battalion, the counterattack forced a 
retreat of several hundred yards. The enemy's effort was finally broken 
after five tank thrusts into Eroudeville, and an attack by Company C 
enabled the 2d Battalion to take the village. No further attempt was 
made that night to cross the highway; the battalion dug in about 400-600 
yards east of it, with Company C protecting the Montebourg flank.

On the regiment's left flank the 3d Battalion, temporarily delayed by 
heavy artillery fire, had started a little later than the other two 
battalions. It swung slightly eastward to outflank the enemy-held houses 
at la Lande, which had stopped it the previous night. In its advance it 
received artillery fire from the vicinity of the station and engaged 
some enemy infantry. But when the 2d Battalion began advancing through 
Ecausseville and the 1st Battalion of the 505th Parachute Infantry moved 
up the railway on the left, the enemy troops began to fall back. Behind 
a small tributary of the Merderet, the enemy made a half-hearted stand, 
but at 1000 the battalion attacked across the stream and in the face of 
heavy artillery fire drove the German infantry back to the le Ham-
Montebourg highway. In the evening the battalion made another attack, 
which carried it beyond the highway, halfway to the railroad. Meeting 
heavy fire from the entrenchments along the railroad and finding itself 
in advance of the other two battalions on the right, the 3d Battalion 
pulled back east of the highway. The entire regiment was now on its 
objective, organizing defensive positions which it was to hold until 19 
June.

In the meantime the 505th Parachute Infantry had directed its efforts to 
dislodging the enemy from the extreme west end of his Quineville-le Ham 
line. This line was anchored in and around le Ham, situated on the solid 
ground which extends southwest from the Montebourg Station between two 
small tributaries of the Merderet. The 505th's attack on 10 June was not 
coordinated with that of the 8th Infantry, and in their respective 
advances the two regiments diverged, leaving a gap between them. For 
this attack Colonel Ekman planned to use the 1st and 2d Battalions of 
the 505th, sending them through the 2d Battalion, 325th Glider Infantry, 
which had been pinned down the day before and was still receiving 
flanking fire from across the Merderet and frontal fire from the German 
positions north of the creek. The 1st Battalion was to seize Montebourg 
Station and prepare a defensive arc to the north; the 2d Battalion was 
to follow the 1st beyond la Lande, swing west and cross the first 
Merderet tributary and railway, and then attack southwest toward le Ham. 
The 2d Battalion of the 325th Glider Infantry was to provide supporting 
fire; the 3d Battalion of the 505th was to remain at Grainville.

The air force supported the attack by bombing le Ham and the station 
and, as the 1st Battalion of the 505th jumped off at 1330, another air 
mission forced the retirement of a self-propelled gun which was firing 
on the battalion from a railway overpass. The artil-

Page 102

lery support was also effective, rolling ahead of the battalion's 
advance. Despite all of the preparations a number of Germans still held 
their ground north and west of the creek and had to be driven back 
hedgerow by hedgerow; direct, close-range 88-mm. fire also took heavy 
casualties. But the 1st Battalion pushed slowly ahead and fought its way 
into Montebourg Station at about 1900, forcing the enemy to retire 
northward and southwestward toward le Ham. The 2d Battalion, following 
the 1st, moved farther north than had been planned in order to avoid 
fire from the left flank. Just below the station it turned southwest. 
Resistance stiffened as the enemy was squeezed into the south end of the 
solid ground around le Ham, and as darkness fell the attack was stopped 
about halfway between the station and the town. Colonel Ekman ordered 
the two battalions to organize a defensive position northeast of le Ham 
extending north around the station. The 1000-yard gap between the 
505th’s right flank and the 8th Infantry was covered by patrols from the 
1st Battalion of the 505th Parachute Infantry.

The heavy enemy artillery fire which had fallen around the station eased 
up on the morning of 11 June. By this time the 2d Battalion, 325th 
Glider Infantry, was ready to go again. Instead of sending the 2d 
Battalion of the 505th directly against le Ham from the north Colonel 
Ekman decided to employ it in a holding attack north of the town to 
divert the fire of the enemy while the 2d Battalion of the 325th 
attacked into le Ham from the east. At 1015 the 456th Field Artillery 
Battalion fired a 15-minute concentration on the heavily fortified 
ground east of the town, and at 1030 the 2d Battalion of the 325th 
started its attack from the railroad embankment. Smoke screened the 
advance over the open fields and through the 500 to 600 yards of swamp 
along the stream. Casualties were high, but as the leading elements 
reached the first solid ground enemy fire temporarily slackened. The 
battalion pressed on through the orchards and hedgerows, but was shortly 
stopped by heavy small-arms fire. Depleted in strength and low in 
ammunition the 2d Battalion set up a defensive position and delivered 
spasmodic fire on the enemy. In about forty-five minutes the enemy fire 
died, and the Germans began to withdraw toward le Ham. A machine gun was 
set up to fire into the retreating troops and, for lack of radio 
communications with the artillery, wire was laid and a forward artillery 
observer stationed himself in a building from which he could see le Ham.

The attack order was given at 1800 and after a 10-minute artillery 
preparation the battalion pushed off, deployed on a broad front. Meeting 
its only resistance from a badly shaken covering force, the battalion 
passed abandoned field pieces and swept into le Ham. When it reached the 
center of town at l955 no Germans were in sight, and no riflemen were 
found in the house-to-house search. A patrol set out to clear the area 
directly south; the bridge across the Merderet to the west of the town 
was secured, and contact was established with the 2d Battalion, 505th 
Parachute Infantry, to the north. Late in the afternoon part of the 3d 
Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, had moved up from Grainville to mop 
up any enemy bypassed by the glider battalion and to patrol the river 
line to the south.

By noon, 12 June, the line running from the Merderet through le Ham and 
the station to the outskirts of Montebourg was secured. The 505th 
Parachute Infantry and the 8th Infantry were still in contact with the 
enemy all along their front and the outposts were receiving fire, but 
the only cause for concern was the gap between the two regiments. This 
area was cleared on 12 June by a patrol. It was intended that the 4th 
Division would relieve the airborne units of responsibility in the le 
Ham sector as soon as the coastal area was cleared to Quineville. But 
the 4th Division had not taken Quineville by 12 June. A bat-

Page 103

talion of the 359th Infantry (90th Division) therefore took over the le 
Ham sector on the morning of 13 June, relieving the 505th Parachute 
Infantry for a new mission to the south.

The Advance Toward Montebourg

The enemy's first organized line of resistance had been broken at 
Ecausseville and the enemy forced to retreat to the backstop line along 
the railway north of the le Ham-Montebourg highway. East of the Ste. 
Mere-Eglise-Montebourg highway the Ecausseville line extended across the 
high ground at Emondeville to the heavy fortifications at Azeville and 
Crisbecq (Map VIII). In this sector the enemy offered equally stubborn 
resistance and it became the task of the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments 
to dislodge him and drive him beyond the Montebourg-Quineville ridge.

On the night of 7 June, the 12th Infantry was ordered to seize the high 
ground northeast of Montebourg. At that time the regiment was in contact 
with enemy outposts along the line le Bisson-Azeville, nearly four miles 
to the south. At 0530 the next morning a naval concentration was placed 
on Emondeville and an hour later the 1st and 3d Battalions attacked. 
About 700 yards south of Emondeville the regiment encountered the German 
forward line. The 3d Battalion on the left broke through the enemy's 
forward line but was stopped in the orchards south of Emondeville. 
Company L freed itself and fought into the center of the town and then 
moved on to a hedgerow 600 yards beyond, but Company K was pinned down 
for five and a half hours by artillery and rocket fire. Company L was 
thus left out in a precarious salient. Colonel Reeder decided to commit 
his reserve, the 2d Battalion, on the left flank to relieve the isolated 
elements. After a violent fight the 2d Battalion drove into Basse 
Emondeville and established a line about 300 yards north of the village. 
Company L was moved back to tie in with this line.

On the right, the 1st Battalion found progress even more difficult. 
Shortly after the start of the attack it was pinned down by artillery 
west of Azeville. At 1400 it was counterattacked by part of Sturm 
Battalion AOK 7. Only the opportune presence of Company B of the 359th 
Infantry, the division reserve regiment, which was hastily attached to 
the 12th Infantry, enabled the 1st Battalion to stop the attack.

Meanwhile Company I was completing a withdrawal from the left flank, 
which had been exposed to attack from across the highway by the 8th 
Infantry's swing northwestward toward Fresville and Grainville. The 
enemy was steadily building up pressure along the highway and in mid-
afternoon threatened the regimental command post south of Emondeville, 
but Company I and headquarters men rallied to repel the attack.

The 12th Infantry suffered nearly three hundred casualties on 8 June, 
but that night the enemy withdrew to Joganville, and the 12th stabilized 
its lines through Emondeville and Basse Emondeville.

On 9 June the regiment took the enemy strong point at the Chateau de 
Dodinville near Joganville. The chateau, a large walled-in stone 
building, was stubbornly defended. Six Sherman tanks from Company B, 
746th Tank Battalion, outflanked the chateau on the west, while the 1st 
and 2d Battalions, at the cost of heavy casualties, fought into it from 
the south. Both battalions then continued northward and reached 
positions 2,000 yards northwest of Joganville. The 3d Battalion made a 
spectacular advance and reached positions 1,500 yards northeast of 
Montebourg, on the edge of the regimental objective and far in advance 
of units on either flank.

On 10 June the 2d Battalion skirted the eastern edge of Montebourg, 
which was strong-

Page 104

ly defended by antitank and machine guns. After an unsuccessful attempt 
to penetrate the city's thick stone walls, the battalion crossed behind 
the 1st and 3d Battalions to take up a position on the extreme right of 
the regiment. Division ordered the regiment to contain Montebourg but to 
stay out of it. The farthest advance northward was made by the 1st 
Battalion, which crossed the Montebourg-Quineville highway, 
overextending its position. Late in the evening the enemy 
counterattacked from Montebourg and from the north. Although repulsed, 
mainly by massed artillery fire, the Germans had shown considerable 
force, and the 1st Battalion was pulled back for safety. The three 
battalions then held positions abreast and south of the highway. The 
next morning ( 11 June) the regiment reached its objective north of the 
highway, but it had lost contact with the units on both flanks. The 
enemy still held strongly fortified positions at Montebourg on the left 
and to the right rear. At 2300 Division ordered the regiment to withdraw 
behind the Montebourg-St. Floxel road and prepare defensive positions, 
although no part of the division had yet reached its objective.

Crisbecq and Azeville

Progress had been especially difficult in the 22d Infantry sector. 
There, along the beach and at the headland fortifications, the enemy 
offered stubborn resistance. After the costly failure of the attacks on 
Crisbecq and Azeville on 7 June, the regimental commander, Col. Hervey 
A. Tribolet, waited for the 3d Battalion (minus Company K) to assemble 
west of the inundated area near Ravenoville as a reserve force, before 
he renewed the push northward. During the night, however, the 3d 
Battalion moved across the inundation to accept the surrender of Taret 
de Ravenoville. Company K, reinforced by 4.2-inch mortars, antitank 
guns, heavy machine guns, and part of a NSFCP, continued to attack the 
beach fortifications farther to the south.

At 1000 on 8 June the 1st and 2d Battalions again attacked Azeville and 
Crisbecq (Map VIII). On the right the 1st Battalion drove the enemy out 
of St. Marcouf, which he had reoccupied during the night, and advanced 
on Crisbecq. As on 7 June, Companies A and B led the attack, with 
Company C organized for assault and prepared to pass through the center. 
At 1330 a 20-minute preparation of naval and field artillery and mortar 
fire began to pound Crisbecq; it gave way to a rolling barrage which the 
infantry followed at 200 yards. Company D provided overhead fire with 
heavy machine guns. The advance and the fires were effectively 
coordinated, permitting the battalion to reach the edge of the 
fortifications with few losses. Companies A and B took positions on the 
flanks while Company C advanced through the center and blew several 
emplacements with pole charges.

The battle then developed in the same way as it had on the previous day. 
The assault sections exhausted their explosives without destroying the 
main enemy fortifications and became engaged in close-in fighting with 
the Germans in the trenches. The whole battalion was shelled by 
Nebelwerfers and by the guns at Crisbecq and farther inland, and its 
left flank was again counterattacked. As the pressure mounted on the 
left, the battalion fell back under cover of smoke, as it had on the 
previous day, to the orchard north of Bas Village de Dodainville. On 
first check the battalion showed less than half strength, but during the 
night a large number of men, separated in the course of the fighting, 
found their way back to the line which the battalion had organized. At 
Azeville, the 2d Battalion had also repeated its experience of 7 June 
when it had been driven back by a counterattack.

On 9 June the Azeville mission was assigned to the 3d Battalion (less 
Company K), which had again moved inland from Taret de Rave-


Page 105

noville. The plan to take Crisbecq was temporarily abandoned, although 
naval and artillery fire continued to neutralize its batteries. The fort 
at Azeville, roughly circular, encompassed the east edge of the village. 
It consisted of four large concrete blockhouses camouflaged as 
buildings, which were armed with 150-mm. guns and turreted machine guns, 
and interconnected by covered trenches. The southern approach was 
protected by small outlying pillboxes and mine fields, and the entire 
area was surrounded by varying widths of barbed wire entanglements. The 
roads in the vicinity were blocked.

The 3d Battalion assembled about 1,000 yards southeast of Azeville, and 
at 1100 it crossed to the draw southwest of the village. Company L moved 
farther west in a wide arc in order to enter the village from the west 
and capture any reserves the enemy might have to the rear of the fort. 
Company I organized into five assault sections, moved north inside the 
arc of Company L, and advanced up the draw and through the fields to 
approach the

Page 106

(Photo)

Page 107

fort from its right rear. The 44th Field Artillery Battalion fired 1,500 
rounds in preparation for the attack. The company started out with the 
support of tanks, but mines held up all except one of them. At noon 
Company I came in sight of the first outlying pillbox. The men did not 
attempt to lift the mines, but after cutting the wire they picked their 
way through the fields and orchards. They buttoned up pillboxes with 
rifle fire and then blew them. Enemy return fire was not heavy. The 
Germans had neglected to clear good fields of fire and to cover the 
approach from the southwest. Company I concentrated on the nearest 
blockhouse. First bazookas and the lone tank opened fire from behind a 
hedgerow, but accomplished little more than to chip the concrete. An 
assault team was then sent in to blow the rear entrance, which was 
recessed in the blockhouse and out of reach of direct fire. The team 
worked its way to its objective, emptied its flame thrower, and set off 
a pack charge. But this had no effect, nor did a second attempt, nor a 
third with a still heavier satchel charge. In a last effort Capt. Joseph 
T. Samuels, commanding Company I, sent Pvt. Ralph G. Riley to the 
blockhouse with the last flame thrower to "give it a few more squirts." 
With the flame thrower on his back, Private Riley ran seventy-five yards 
under fire and dropped into a shell hole for cover. The flame thrower 
would not work, and he tried to think of the proper "immediate action." 
He opened the valve, held a lighted match to the nozzle, and trained the 
stream of fire on the base of the door. At just this time enemy 
artillery fire from Crisbecq began to come in and Captain Samuels 
thought the attack had failed. Suddenly Private Riley heard a popping 
sound, different from the sound of the rifle fire around him. It was 
soon followed by explosions within the blockhouse. The enemy's 
ammunition had been fired by those "few more squirts" of the flame 
thrower. Soon a white flag was raised and, after the firing had ceased, 
the rear door of the blockhouse swung open to let out an American 
parachute officer followed by two Germans. The German commander 
surrendered all 4 forts with their garrison of 169 men.

Ozeville

Shortly after Azeville was captured in mid-afternoon, 9 June, General 
Barton issued an order creating a task force which that same day was to 
bypass Crisbecq and the other German strong points along the coastal 
headlands and swing northeast to "capture Quineville and the high ground 
west thereof." Quineville was the eastern anchor of the German defenses. 
The task force, which was to have first priority on division fires, 
consisted of the 22d Infantry, the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalions and 
the 746th Tank Battalion (less detachments); it was commanded by Brig. 
Gen. Henry A. Barber. Led by tanks, the 22d Infantry was to advance in a 
column of battalions (3d, 2d, 1st) on Ozeville, its first objective. 
Crisbecq was to be contained by a force of tank destroyers and infantry 
and was to be neutralized by division artillery at the time of the 
attack. [1]

The task force moved out at 1630, but it was stopped by fire from strong 
enemy positions at the crossroads west of Chateau de Fontenay and forced 
to dig in for the night. For three days (10-12 June) the task force 
struggled with little success to overcome the enemy resistance, its 
right flank exposed to the bypassed enemy strong points at Crisbecq, 
Dangueville, Chateau de Fontenay, and Fontenay-sur-Mer and its left 
flank to the German positions in the gap of about a mile and a half that 
separated the 22d and 12th Infantry Regiments. The task force lacked 
sufficient

[1] The containing force, commanded by Maj. Huston M. Betty, consisted 
of Company C, 22d Infantry; Company C, 4th Engineer Combat Battalion; 
Company C, 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

Page 108

strength to protect both of its flanks and at the same time push ahead. 
Unfavorable weather denied it air support.

On 10 June the 3d Battalion, supported by tanks, launched two frontal 
attacks on Ozeville which carried it up the rising ground to within a 
few hundred yards of the enemy entrenchments. But the battalion, 
consisting of only two companies, was too weak to gain the objective. 
Company K was still on the beach and Company L had lost 159 men since D 
Day. On the same day the 2d Battalion attacked on the right in an effort 
to reduce the strong point at Chateau de Fontenay, but it was pinned 
down by grazing machine-gun fire. Ordered to withdraw to allow bombing 
of the enemy positions, the battalion became disorganized by the enemy 
fire, and seventy men east of the chateau were left stranded. [2] The 
air mission did not materialize.

On 11 June, General Barber planned to send the 1st and 3d Battalions 
into Ozeville from the west, after an air mission had softened the enemy 
positions. But he was forced to divert the 1st Battalion to the right to 
contain the enemy positions at Fontenay-sur-Mer and Dangueville. The 3d 
Battalion therefore attacked Ozeville alone, but again failed.

While the 2d and 3d Battalions suffered heavy losses in unsuccessful 
attacks on the chateau and the Ozeville strong point, the 1st Battalion 
contained the enemy at Fontenay-sur-Mer and another force contained the 
Crisbecq fortification. Twice on 10 June this latter force pulled back 
for scheduled air missions which were canceled because of unfavorable 
weather. The only real progress during these days was made on the beach 
by Company K, which on 11 June captured two more strong points. For two 
days it had hammered at these positions. At last it learned from 
prisoners that the only effect of heavy American fire on the forts had 
been to force the garrison to shuttle through a tunnel from one part to 
the other. Company K therefore fired fifty rounds of 57-mm. on the first 
fort and then switched suddenly to put eighty rounds into the adjacent 
stronghold. Resistance ended in both forts, and ninety-three prisoners 
were taken.

On 12 June, General Collins ordered the 39th Infantry, 9th Division, 
which had landed on the previous day, to take over the reduction of the 
enemy strong points on the beaches and the coastal headlands. General 
Collins had two reasons for this move. He was determined to reduce the 
beach and headland fortifications from Taret de Ravenoville to 
Quineville, for they continued to shell Red Beach and threatened to slow 
down the unloading of supplies; and he wished to free the right flank of 
the 22d Infantry, in order that it might move on to Quineville. With 
this in view, the 1st Battalion of the 22d Infantry was released from
its task of containing Fontenay-sur-Mer and Dangueville and ordered to 
rejoin the regiment for the drive northward.

Early on 12 June the 39th Infantry fanned out from its assembly area on 
its coastal missions (Map IX). The 2d Battalion pushed patrols to 
Crisbecq and, finding it abandoned, occupied it at 0820. Dangueville was 
occupied in mid-afternoon. Two companies were then sent eastward toward 
the beach. The 1st Battalion moved to St. Marcouf at noon and then sent 
three companies down the roads from St. Marcouf and Ravenoville to the 
beach. There the battalion reorganized and assaulted and captured the 
first pillbox north of Taret de Ravenoville, establishing contact with 
the 2d Battalion patrol below Fort St. Marcouf. The 3d Battalion 
meanwhile attacked through the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, drove the 
enemy back from Fontenay-sur-Mer, where he resisted stubbornly, and 
established outposts along the roads to the north and east.

[2] Only one of these men returned-an aid man who was later found among 
the prisoners at Cherbourg.

Page 109

The 22d Infantry was now free to make a concerted attack on Ozeville. It 
was to jump of at noon of 12 June. The air force was to bomb Ozeville at 
1100, and the artillery (44th and 20th Field Artillery Battalions) was 
to fire on known enemy positions south of Ozeville from 1115 to 1130, 
then lift to Ozeville until 1200, after which fire was to be available 
on call. In addition to the organic weapons of the 22d Infantry, the 
attack was to be supported by two platoons of 81-mm. mortars and the 
Cannon Company of the 12th Infantry. The 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, on 
the left flank was to place mortar and antitank fire on the strong point 
from 1115 until 1200; and the 1st Battalion on the right flank was to 
support the attack with its tanks and cannon. Colonel Teague's 3d 
Battalion in the center, which was to lead the attack, was to be 
supported by one company of chemical mortars (87th Chemical Mortar 
Battalion), a platoon of tanks (Company C, 70th Tank Battalion), and an 
extra platoon of antitank guns.

At 1005 General Barber notified Colonel Teague that the air mission was 
canceled, but that heavy artillery fire would be substituted. The 
preparatory fires were delivered and the attack jumped off on time. With 
the 2d Battalion covering the gap on the left flank and the 1st 
Battalion becoming heavily engaged in the vicinity of Fontenay-sur-Mer, 
the main assault was made by the 3d Battalion alone toward the southwest 
corner of the strong point.

The troops advanced behind overwhelming fire power. Even naval support 
was available, particularly on Quineville where German guns had opened 
up. Covered by Companies I and L on either side, two assault sections of 
Company K closed in on the Ozeville defenses. After a short but violent 
fight a white flag appeared on one of the positions. But as Lieutenant 
Dewhurst, a platoon leader, climbed up on a pillbox to stop the firing, 
he was cut down by German fire. The men of Company I suddenly fought 
with greater fury; they rushed into the emplacements with bayonets and 
grenades and wiped out a large part of the garrison.

Ozeville was captured and the last major barrier to an attack on 
Quineville was removed. On the same day, 12 June, the 39th Infantry 
cleared resistance from the 22d Infantry's right flank, while on its 
left flank the 12th Infantry retook the ground east of Montebourg which 
had been relinquished the day before.

The 12th Infantry's attack was launched at 1600, when the capture of 
Ozeville became assured. After an artillery preparation the 2d Battalion 
moved against its objective, the strong point built around two stone 
quarries near les Fieffes-Dancel (Map IX) . While tanks gave close fire 
support, Company E assaulted the position with rifles and hand grenades. 
An enemy counterattack from the northwest, threatening to check the 
assault, was thrown back, mainly by Company B which had been sent up 
from the 1st Battalion in reserve to reinforce the 2d Battalion. The 2d 
Battalion then completed the capture of the stone quarry position. The 
3d Battalion on the left had, in the meantime, captured the height 1,000 
yards to the west, and Company A had established an outpost northeast of 
Montebourg. The 12th Infantry was again extended in an exposed position.

So far no attempt had been made to seize the city of Montebourg. When 
the two regiments approached the city on 10 June, General Barton ordered 
them to stay out of it; his division was spread out over a wide front 
with few reserves and, expecting a counterattack, he wished to avoid 
street fighting. On 11 June the 4th Engineer Combat Battalion 
established road blocks on the highway south of Montebourg and covered 
the gap between the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments. But on 12 June 
patrols reported that the town was only lightly held. At the same time 
the 4th Division's burden had been lightened by the

Page 110

attachment of the 39th Infantry, and by the arrival of the rest of the 
9th Division as Corps reserve. General Barton therefore notified Colonel 
Van Fleet that Montebourg was included in the 8th Infantry's zone and 
should be seized and occupied that day if it could be done cheaply.

Colonel Van Fleet organized a battalion-size task force to attack 
Montebourg and placed it under the command of Lt. Col. Fred Steiner, his 
executive officer. The task force, composed of two rifle companies, a 
platoon each of engineers, heavy machine guns, anti-tank guns, 4.2-inch 
mortars and tank destroyers, a cannon company, and the 29th Field 
Artillery Battalion in direct support, moved out at 2100 and reached the 
edge of the town at dark. Although the German force inside the town was 
not believed to be large, approaches were well covered by automatic 
fire. One company, on the left, was forced to withdraw and reorganize, 
and Colonel Steiner decided to wait until morning to renew the attack. 
At 0700 on 13 June the task force moved out again, one company on either 
side of the highway. Upon reaching the stream on the very edge of the 
town, the tank destroyers decided not to venture farther because of the 
88-mm. fire. General Barton then resolved against risking the loss of 
men in street fighting and ordered the force to take a position from 
which it could contain Montebourg. Small patrols were sent into the town 
to observe enemy activity.

The Capture of Quineville

Enemy possession of Montebourg technically exposed the left flank of the 
22d Infantry's attack toward Quineville. But the danger was not too 
great and General Barton hoped to gain Quineville and the ridge to the 
west on 13 June. However, neither the 39th Infantry nor the 22d Infantry 
was able to make sufficient progress. The 1st Battalion of the 39th 
attacked northward along the beach toward Fort St. Marcouf, aided by 2d 
Battalion mortars and four tank destroyers, but it made only small gains 
(Map IX). The 3d Battalion attacked east from Fontenay-sur-Mer to the 
edge of the swamp and then north, with the intention of clearing the 
balance of the regimental zone south of the Quineville-Montebourg 
highway and along the north edge of the inundation. But it was held up 
by both friendly and enemy artillery fire falling on its forward 
elements.

The 22d Infantry reached the ridge but was unable to secure it or attack 
eastward to Quineville. The 2d Battalion made a wide swing through the 
12th Infantry's area to the Montebourg-Quineville highway east of les 
Fieffes-Dancel. The 3d Battalion moved north to the forward slope of the 
ridge and then was ordered to side-slip to the east in preparation for 
an attack in column down the ridge on Quineville. Colonel Teague 
extended one company to the right, passed the second across its rear 
farther to the right, and then passed the third behind the other two. 
This maneuver, made across ground dominated by the enemy positions on 
the ridge and harassed by heavy Nebelwerfer and artillery fire, resulted 
in a number of casualties.

In ordering the attack of 14 June, Regiment directed all three 
battalions of the 22d Infantry to secure the ridge and the two hills to 
the east as necessary preliminaries to the attack on Quineville. The 2d 
Battalion, with one company of 4.2-inch mortars attached (Company C, 
87th Chemical Mortar Battalion), was to seize the crest of the ridge, on 
the left flank. The 1st Battalion, with the 70th Tank Battalion in 
direct support, was to seize the eastern nose of the ridge, which was 
fortified, and Hill 54A to the east. The 3d Battalion, aided by a 
company of chemical mortars (Company A, 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion), 
was to capture Hill 54B, the easternmost hill, and was then to turn 
right and at-

Page 111

tack Quineville. Preparatory fires were to be delivered for fifteen 
minutes on the fortified nose of the ridge, the two heights to the east, 
and a coastal battery farther east. South of the highway the 3d 
Battalion of the 39th Infantry was also to attack and come into position 
for a later coordinated attack on Quineville with the 3d Battalion, 22d 
Infantry. The battalion was to be pinched out just south of the town.

At O915 on 14 June the 4th Division artillery began to fire 
concentrations on the four ridge targets. At 0930 a round of green smoke 
signaled the lifting of fires and the three battalions of the 22d 
Infantry jumped of. The fight lasted for over three hours. By 1300 the 
nose of the ridge and the two hills were occupied. Meanwhile the 3d 
Battalion, 39th Infantry, had also taken up the attack on the southern 
slopes of the ridge south of the highway, completing a 90-degree turn to 
the east just south of Hill 4B and advancing on Quineville with Company 
K in the lead. The attack on the town could now proceed as planned.

Before this plan was put into effect, however, the 39th Infantry 
received permission from Division to send its 3d Battalion independently 
against Quineville without the assistance of the 22d Infantry. At 1400 
thirty-six A-2 0 's carried out a bombardment of enemy positions at 
Quineville and it was desirable that this bombardment be followed as 
soon as possible by an infantry attack. At 1600 the 3d Battalion, 39th 
Infantry, moved out with Company K in the lead. Initially the company 
encountered little opposition and took sixty-eight prisoners. On the 
slopes just southwest of Quineville leading elements of the company 
successfully attacked a casemated 88-mm. gun and took the crew prisoner. 
At this time tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion, operating with the 39th 
Infantry, opened fire at long range on what appeared to be enemy 
vehicles on the right flank, and drew antitank fire. This movement on 
the right proved to be that of tank destroyers attached to the 
regiment's 1st Battalion, which was fighting its way up the beach in the 
vicinity of St. Marcouf. The firing ceased after identification was 
established by flare and radio.

As Company K entered Quineville it received heavy mortar fire, but it 
went on to the first street intersection. There the 3d Platoon, which 
had been leading the attack, turned right and advanced toward the beach. 
In its path lay a tank ditch, extending to the mouth of the Sinope River 
on the north and to the swamps on the south. As the platoon proceeded 
down the street a small antitank gun opened fire from a pillbox on the 
beach, forcing lead elements of the platoon back and driving the rest to 
cover in ditches and buildings.

Meanwhile the 1st Platoon had pushed into the northeast part of town 
with the intention of cutting through to the beach. The Weapons Platoon 
emplaced its 60-mm. mortars south of town and rushed up light machine 
guns and one section of heavy machine guns from Company M through heavy 
enemy fire to join the 1st Platoon. The platoon and attached guns 
entered the northeast section and the machine guns were set up on the 
edge of town, looking out onto the beach and the river mouth where the 
enemy had fixed positions. But the men found themselves dangerously 
exposed and were forced to take cover after receiving numerous 
casualties when they attempted to advance in the open toward the beach 
fortifications. The 2d Platoon succeeded in clearing the western part of 
town with little opposition, for the enemy's strength was concentrated 
on the east for the protection of the beach fortifications.

Aside from this minor success in the western part of town the attack at 
this point did not offer much hope of succeeding. Company I had suffered 
heavy casualties, including the 1st and 3d Platoon officers. The 
remainder of the battalion had been of little assistance. Company M's 
heavy mortars had been em-

Page 112-113

(Map No. 21)

Page 114

placed earlier to cover only the original mission of the battalion and 
were now out of accurate range of Quineville; they were at this point 
moving forward over difficult terrain and mined trails, and 
communications with them were out. Companies I and L had halted under 
the last remaining cover about 400 yards southwest of town, alerted to 
take up the attack on either flank of Company K, but there was little 
room for their deployment except in the open and across wire 
entanglements flanking the town.

Before resuming the attack the 3d Battalion commander, Lt. Col. William 
P. Stumpf, requested artillery fire on enemy fortifications. Its purpose 
was to cover the reorganization of Company K and the approach of tanks 
of the 70th Tank Battalion which were waiting outside the town, and to 
soften the enemy fortifications. Following this fire Company K was to 
assault the enemy positions under the cover of smoke, supported by the 
tanks. Radio communication was difficult, but the requested fire was 
adjusted by relay through the 39th Infantry Cannon Company and was 
delivered by division artillery. The fire was not effective against the 
concrete fortifications, but did result in a temporary cessation of 
enemy mortar fire. Smoke was not available at this time. One tank 
reached the intersection, turned east, and immediately drew fire from 
the antitank gun on the beach and was damaged. The tank returned the 
fire, but faced with the antitank ditch and heavy mortar fire, it 
withdrew. Two other tanks then moved up to the intersection to support 
the infantry, but also retired due to the heavy mortar fire.

Colonel Stumpf, observing the very limited support which the tanks were 
able to give and losing hope of getting the requested smoke, decided to 
resume the attack with the forces at hand. Company L was ordered to lead 
the assault on Company K's left. Company L had just moved out on the 
approach and was drawing mortar fire when a heavy concentration of smoke 
fell squarely on the enemy positions. Taking advantage of the long-
awaited smoke, delivered by 4th Division artillery, Company K attacked 
immediately. As leading elements of the 1st and 3d Platoons reached the 
fortifications under the cover of the smoke, all enemy positions were 
suddenly surrendered, ending the fight for Quineville at 2130. Company K 
had lost twenty-eight wounded and five killed.

In the meantime the 1st Battalion of the 39th Infantry had continued its 
attack northward along the beach. During the day it suffered heavy 
casualties in crossing a mine field, but succeeded in taking Fort St. 
Marcouf. That night it made contact with patrols from the 3d Battalion. 
Thus, by the capture of Quineville and the ridge on 14 June, the enemy's 
main line in the north was ,broken, depriving him of his best natural 
defense against the advancing northern flank.

The capture of Quineville and the clearing of the coast to the south 
also helped to speed the landing of supplies and personnel for VII 
Corps. In the early days of the landings German artillery had prevented 
the use of the Navy pontoon causeway built on D plus 1, and difficulties 
in beaching landing craft and in the functioning of the ferry control 
organization had resulted in a lag in unloading of about thirty-six 
hours. Now the causeway became usable. Moreover, on D plus 3 the 
practice of drying out LST's by beaching on a falling tide was begun and 
on D plus s additional DUKW's were made available. On D plus 6 a joint 
Army-Navy meeting devised means of expediting the unloading; the 
original plan of establishing a beach at Quineville was abandoned and a 
third beach, Sugar Red, was established above Tare Green. This new 
beach, together with the increased capacity of the assault beaches, made 
the Quineville beach unnecessary. By 14 June an average of over 4,000 
tons of stores was being unloaded daily, compared with an average of 
1,500 tons dur-

Page 115

ing the first three days. By the evening of 14 June a total of nearly 
86,000 personnel, 12,000 vehicles, and 26,000 tons of stores had crossed 
Utah Beach.

With the increase of the VII Corps’ striking power, the security of its 
position also increased. By 14 June, the D-Day objectives had been 
gained. The threat to the Corps’ southern flank had been removed with 
the capture of Carentan, and firm contact had been established with V 
Corps (see Map No. 21, which shows the extent of the Allied beachhead in 
Normandy on 14 June). In the west, VII Corps troops were operating well 
to the west of the Merderet. [3] The seizure of the Quineville Ridge 
broke the anchor of the enemy line in the north and increased his 
apprehension of a breakthrough toward Cherbourg.

The Enemy Situation

With the capture of the Quineville Ridge and the linking of the two 
beachheads the crucial first week of the campaign had passed. The enemy 
had failed to launch the expected counterattack.

[3] See the following chapter.

Page 116

(Photos)

Page 117

Allied air superiority, the enemy’s supply shortages, especially in 
fuels, and his early uncertainty about Allied plans had delayed 
reinforcements. Spitfires, P-47’s, and P-38’s forced units to detrain 
even before they reached the German Seventh Army zone. On 10th June the 
77th Division was still in the Avranches area and, because of a lack of 
fuel, the 17th Panzer Grenadier Division, intended for the Carentan 
area, could not come up in time to prevent the linking of the V and VII 
Corps beachheads. The advance elements of the 77th Division began 
arriving in the Valognes area only on 10 and 11 June and did not face 
American forces in large numbers until 12 and 13 June when the reduction 
of the Montebourg-Quineville line was nearing completion. The 17th SS-
Panzer Grenadier Division finally reached its assembly area on 12 June, 
but some of its assault guns had been destroyed by Allied fighter-
bombers, and the weakness of its communications, supply, and command 
organization forced it to postpone it counterattack in the Carentan 
sector. When it did attack, on 13 June, the 101st Airborne Division and 
elements of the 2d Armored Division were strong enough to drive it back.

The enemy had initially considered the Calvados beachheads as the main 
Allied effort in Normandy. On D plus 2, when he picked up from the 
waters of the English Channel a copy of the VII Corps field order for 
Operation NEPTUNE, he realized that a second “main effort” was being 
made in the directions of Valognes-Cherbourg, and he took measures to 
prevent the cutting off of the peninsula so that his units in the north 
could be reinforced. He decided to strengthen the Cotentin forces with 
the 77th Division, which had been originally intended to join the II 
Parachute Corps in preventing a junction of the two U.S. corps in the 
Carentan area. Furthermore, in view of the possibility of airborne 
landings at Valognes and amphibious landings on the northwest coast of 
the Cotentin, the German commander also alerted the 17th SS-Panzer 
Grenadier Division near Carentan for a possible shift westward to plug 
the St. Lo-d’Ourville gap.

Page 118

German Seventh Army believed that, while it did not have adequate forces 
for a counterattack, it could hold its own in the Cotentin and defend 
Cherbourg. But on 9 and 10 June, when the 4th Division penetrated the 
defensive front south of Montebourg and forced the 709th Division to 
give way at Ecausseville, the enemy became alarmed. Lt. Gen. Heinz 
Hellmich, commanding the 243d Division and elements of the 709th and 
91st Divisions, was ordered to hold the Montebourg-Quineville line at 
all costs. General Erich Marcks of the LXXXIV Corps urgently requested 
air power to combat the effective naval fire which assisted the 4th 
Division advance in the Emondeville and coastal sectors. He believed 
that the decisive phase of the battle for Cherbourg was fast approaching 
and that a breakthrough might be attempted within a day or two. With the 
fall of Quineville and the Quineville Ridge on 14 June an Allied 
offensive toward Cherbourg appeared imminent. However, the northern 
front remained relatively quiet for nearly a week, while VII Corps 
concentrated on taking advantage of its Merderet bridgehead to cut the 
Cotentin Peninsula.