Page 150

THE DRIVE ON CHERBOURG

The original plan of VII Corps had contemplated a 2-division drive on 
Cherbourg, with the 90th Division on the right and the 4th Division on 
the left. The 9th Division was to be close at hand should the need for 
its employment in this operation arise. This plan of deployment was 
modified in the first days of the operation as a result of the 
protracted struggle for the Merderet bridgehead and the determined enemy 
resistance along the Quineville Ridge. Still, until 18 June General 
Collins contemplated using the 4th and 90th Divisions for the drive on 
Cherbourg, though he had asked for and received the 79th Division as a 
possible replacement for the 90th. He wished to begin the attack 
northward as soon as possible and, on 16 June, with the 90th Division 
still short of its objective between the Douve and Merderet and the 9th 
Division not yet at the Douve, the 4th Division had been ordered to 
prepare for an attack northwestward in conjunction with the 90th 
Division. But the attack order was withheld pending the outcome of 
operations west of the Douve. The enemy expected an attempted 
breakthrough on 17 June and was surprised when it did not occur. When 
the peninsula was cut that day, plans were again made for the jump-off 
of the 4th and 90th Divisions to Cherbourg, and a surprise attack was 
tentatively scheduled for 19 June.

These plans were changed at the last minute after a meeting between 
General Bradley, General Collins, and some of the division commanders on 
18 June. It was decided that the drive on Cherbourg would be made by 
three divisions abreast-the 4th on the right, the 79th in the center, 
and the 9th on the left. Among the factors which contributed to this 
change were recent intelligence concerning enemy dispositions, the 
unreadiness of the 90th Division, and the availability of a fresh 
division-the 79th. General Bradley had previously authorized the Corps 
to bypass the enemy positions along the east coast. This entire right 
flank was to be covered by elements of the 4th Cavalry Group. The attack 
was thus directed straight at Cherbourg.

The 9th and 79th Divisions were to attack at 0500, 19 June. The 9th 
Division's initial objective was the high ground between Rauville-la 
Bigot and St. Germain-le Gaillard (Map XII). The 79th's main effort was 
to be made on its left, to seize the high ground west and northwest of 
Valognes. Separating the two divisions was an oblong area approximately 
6 miles long and 2 1/2 miles wide, west of the Douve and the main 
railway, in which the 4th Cavalry Squadron was to reconnoiter and 
maintain contact between the 9th and 79th Divisions. The 4th Division's 
attack was to start as a night operation, beginning at 0300,

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the objective being the commanding ground at Tamerville and northeast 
thereof.

For the next eight days the effort of the entire VII Corps was to be 
directed toward the capture of Cherbourg and was, in fact, the focus of 
attention of the whole First Army, since future operations were greatly 
dependent on the seizure of this port. The drive was expected to yield a 
considerable prize in prisoners, though the exact number of enemy forces 
in the peninsula was not known. Estimates varied between 2,000 and 
40,000 troops, including not only the enemy units already encountered 
but also the Cherbourg garrison, Luftwaffe, antiaircraft, rocket, and 
naval personnel, and Todt Organization workers.

Opposing the three American divisions on 18 June were elements of four 
German divisions. The 9th Division had identified elements of the 920th 
and 921st Regiments of the 243d Division. and the 1049th and 1050th 
Regiments of the 77th Division. The latter had been trapped in the 
peninsula when the enemy plan of withdrawal was disrupted by the rapid 
thrust of the 9th Division beyond the Douve, and by the firm stand of 
the 60th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 39th Infantry, along the northern 
flank. Between the Douve and Merderet, where the 79th Division was to 
pass through the 90th Division, were other fragments of the 1049t 
Regiment as well as elements of the 1057th Regiment (91st Division), 
which was supposed to have withdrawn southward. Confronting the 4th 
Division were elements of all three regiments of the 243d Division, 
Sturm Battalion AOK 7, all three regiments of the 709t Division, and 
artillery and antiaircraft batteries. Some of these units had suffered 
heavy casualties in the past thirteen days and all were understrength. 
Sturm Battalion AOK 7, for example, was whittled down to a strength of 
about one hundred men. On the southern flank, facing the 357th Infantry, 
were elements of the 1057f, 1058th, and 922d Regiments. This disposition 
of the enemy's forces indicated that his units were split by the cutting 
of the peninsula. Fragments of the 243d Division were on both the 9th 
and 4th Division fronts.

The First Day

During the four days prior to the jump-off for Cherbourg on 19 June the 
enemy opposite the 4th Division had had time to prepare defenses, 
especially in the Montebourg area. After the capture of Quineville on 14 
June the only American activity was patrolling and reorganization. The 
8th and 12th Infantry Regiments improved their positions. The 22d 
Infantry temporarily took over the Quineville area when the 39th 
Infantry was detached from the 4th Division, but in the following days 
the 22d Infantry was in turn relieved by the 24th Cavalry Squadron (part 
of the 4th Cavalry Group) and went into assembly at Fontenay-sur-Mer.

For the attack of 19 June, General Barton planned to use the 8th and 
12th Infantry Regiments abreast, one on either side of Montebourg (Map 
No. 26). The railway running southwest and northeast from Montebourg was 
designated as the line of departure, although it was still in enemy 
hands. The attack was to begin at 0300, without artillery, and bypass 
the town. Beginning at 1000, the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, was to 
enter Montebourg from the west and capture it. The regiment's 2d 
Battalion was to remain in reserve and the 1st Battalion, in the 
vicinity of le Mont de Lestre, was to screen the 12th Infantry as it 
prepared for the attack. Artillery fires, available on call, included 
the reinforcing ire of the 183d Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm 
howitzer) and the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments planned the main effort along their 
common boundary, their intermediate objectives being the heights 
northwest of Montebourg. Since

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the 12th’s first objectives were Hills 100 and 119, its attack was to 
lead it almost directly west from its line of departure. The regimental 
field order did not provide for supporting fires.

Fairly heavy resistance could be expected in front of the 8th Infantry. 
Patrols had located several enemy positions west of Montebourg and it 
was known that remnants of the Sturm Battalion AOK 7 and 2d Battalion, 
729th Regiment, were dug in along the railway from Montebourg to 
Montebourg Station, and that the 2d Battalion, 921st Regiment, was also 
in the area, although its exact location was not determined. The enemy’s 
strength along this front was estimated at between 1,000 and 1,500 men. 
Colonel Van Fleet arranged for heavy fire by the mortars of all three 
battalions and by Company C of the 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion. The 
1st and 2d Battalions were to lead the attack, with the 1st Chemical 
Mortar Battalion echeloned to the left rear. The first 1,500 yards were 
to be covered before daylight. This would take the regiment through the 
enemy’s prepared positions.

Both the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments attacked at 0300, as scheduled. 
The enemy was well dug in along the railway, the intend-

Page 153

ed line of departure, and at dawn the 12th was still held up short of 
this line, subjected to heavy artillery and Nebelwerfer fire. At 
daylight, however, the German line was broken by the 1st Battalion with 
the support of Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, and Hill 10 was captured 
at about 1000. The 3d Battalion, on the right, had also been held up and 
was ordered to wait for the tanks, which arrived only after finishing 
the mission with the 1st Battalion. With their support, the 3d Battalion 
seized Hill I 19 at 1600. Late in the afternoon the 2d Battalion passed 
through the center, relieved the 1st Battalion, and drove on to the next 
height, 3,000 yards east of Valognes. There the two battalions 
established their line that night.

Since the railway was strongly held, the 8th Infantry gauged its jump-
off from the highway to reach the line of departure at 0300. The men of 
the leading platoons of Company F (Capt. John A. Kulp) crossed the road 
at 020, following the mortar fire so closely that "it burned their 
faces." From then on the attack had the characteristic confusion of 
night operations. Company F walked right through the enemy lines almost 
without being fired on. But when Captain Kulp reached his objective 
1,000 yards northwest of Montebourg, he discovered that he had only 
forty-five men and had lost two platoons. Meanwhile, Company E (Lt. John 
C. Rebarchek) crossed the tracks and reached a sunken trail where it 
picked up one platoon of Company F, which had been fighting there. This 
force then moved through the enemy position and joined Captain Kulp's 
men on the objective.

The rest of the 2d Battalion was also having a hard fight along the 
railway. It was impossible to reach the enemy in his deep entrenchments 
even with mortars. After several hours of fighting a platoon of tanks 
(Company B, 70th Tank Battalion) came up and, with its support, the 
battalion circled through the edge of Montebourg and attacked the German 
positions from the rear. This finally broke the enemy's resistance and 
forced him to withdraw. As he fell back, pursued by the 2d Battalion and 
pressed by the 12th Infantry on the right, he was driven into the 
position held by elements of Company F and Company E. Caught in the 
squeeze, large numbers of the enemy were killed.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion had attacked on the left at 0300 and had 
encountered similar opposition, but, like the 3d Battalion, it finally 
broke through with the aid of tanks. Early in the evening the 2d 
Battalion moved abreast of the 1st Battalion and the 3d Battalion was 
committed in the center. By nightfall the three battalions held a line 
from la Victoire to Huberville. The 12th Infantry held the high ground 
to the right rear.

Due to the prolonged delay of the 8th and 12th Regiments in pushing past 
Montebourg, the 3d Battalion of the 22d Infantry, which was to have 
occupied the town at 1000, did not move in until 1800. Repeatedly 
shelled for a week, Montebourg was abandoned by the Germans. About three 
hundred French civilians emerged from the cellars. Later in the evening 
the bulk of the 22d Infantry was concentrated on the right flank of the 
division, intent on pushing the attack again early the net day.

Westward in the peninsula enemy opposition was progressively lighter. 
Advancing northward the 79th Division encountered only delaying action 
by enemy security and demolition detachments on the roads, and made good 
progress on its first day of combat. The 9th Division made an even more 
rapid advance up the west coast. In fact, it was little more than a road 
march.

Both the 79th and 9th Divisions jumped of at 0500, 19 June (Map XIII). 
The 79th Division's objective, the high ground west and northwest of 
Valognes, was divided between the 313th and 315th Infantry Regiments. 
Valognes was not within the division's zone and

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the 315th Infantry was instructed to bypass the town and cut the 
Valognes-Cherbourg highway. The main effort of the division was to be 
made on the left by the 313th Infantry. The division’s line of departure 
was the former objective line of the 90th Division, stretching roughly 
from the Golleville to Urville.

The 313th Infantry attacked with its 1st and 3d Battalions. The 1st 
Battalion met only slight resistance and took its objective, the Bois de 
la Brique, northwest of Valognes, by 1400. The 3d Battalion encountered 
more opposition, but gained its objective after using the bulk of its 
artillery support.

The advance of the 315th Infantry was slower. The 1st Battalion drew 
fairly heavy enemy fire 2,000 yards north of Urville, and the 2d 
Battalion was counterattacked after passing Lieusaint, farther west. It 
could not move forward again until 1900, and made

Page 155

only a slight advance before digging in for the night. It had been 
unable to reach its objective or cut the Valognes-Cherbourg road. The 3d 
Battalion came up early in the evening to clean out snipers around 
Lieusaint, but the situation at Valognes was still vague. A considerable 
number of stragglers offered scattered resistance west of town and 
around the Bois de la Brique. In view of this situation General Wyche 
decide to leave the 315th to contain the town from the west. The 313th 
was now to make the main effort on the right of the division’s zone, and 
the 314th was to come up on its left. General Wyche decided to commit 
the 314th the same evening and at about 1920 ordered the regiment to 
move out immediately, designating as its objective the first high ground 
beyond the confluences of the Gloire and Merderet Rivers. Within a half 
hour the 2d Battalion was on the move, and reached its objective, Croix 
Jacob, at 0415 the next morning.

The 9th Division, meanwhile, made a relatively uneventful march of over 
ten miles, several thousand yards beyond its assigned objective-the high 
ground between St. Germain-le Gaillard and Rauville-la Bigot (Map XIII). 
The 60th and 39th Infantry Regiments moved out at 0550, each with two 
battalions abreast. Initially there was no contact with the enemy, but 
none had been expected. The best estimate was that the Germans had 
fallen back to Cherbourg, though it was thought they might have strong 
points at Bricquebec and les Pieux. Bricquebec was the objective of the 
2s Battalion of the 39th In-

Page 156

fantry, the right flank battalion of the division. No enemy was found in 
the town and it was occupied by 0700.

The advance of all four battalions was rapid. They simply marched to 
designated objectives, usually commanding heights and likely defense 
areas, and checked these for possible enemy occupation. There was no 
opposition all morning and shortly after noon all units were on their 
objectives. Approximately one hundred enemy stragglers were picked up in 
this period and the 39th Infantry found the body of General Stegmann of 
the 77th Division, who had been killed on 17 June.

The advance of the division had been so rapid that it was necessary to 
pause momentarily to effect coordination with other elements of the 
Corps. The bomb line had to be moved forward. General Eddy issued 
fragmentary orders at 1330 for the 60th Infantry to reorganize at St. 
Germain-le Gaillard and Crosville, preparatory to continuing the 
advance, and authorized Col. Frederick J. de Rohan (commanding the 
regiment) to send motorized patrols to les Pieux pending further orders. 
The 39th Infantry was directed to reorganize at Rauville-la Bigot.

The 4th Cavalry Group (minus 24th Squadron and Troop B, 4th Cavalry 
Squadron) had divided its forces and moved out on schedule that morning 
to reconnoiter the area between the 9th and 79th Divisions and maintain 
contact between them. Troops A and C jumped off from Nehou toward 
Negreville and Troop E and Company F proceeded from Blandamour north 
toward Rocheville. For a while these units kept pace with the 9th 
Division, encountering only slight resistance on the Bricquebec-
Negreville line and converging rapidly toward Rocheville. Near the town 
the advance elements of Troop A suddenly drew heavy artillery, mortar, 
and small-arms fire. A dismounted reconnaissance force discovered what 
was believed to be an enemy delaying force of approximately one 
reinforced platoon, with two antiaircraft guns, in the village. Troop E 
provided an artillery preparation with its assault guns, and then 
dismounted personnel of Troops A and C, with tanks from Company F, wiped 
out the position. The cavalry was still not abreast of the 39th Infantry
at Rauville-la Bigot.

General Eddy was anxious to press the retreating enemy, reported to be 
badly disorganized in the previous day's action, to deny him time for 
reorganization in the rugged terrain around Cherbourg. However, further 
advance without flank protection seemed inadvisable. The cavalry's zone 
of operation, extending only a few thousand yards north of Rocheville, 
was therefore enlarged northward and the cavalry group (really a 
squadron in size) was attached to the 9th Division. The 9th Division's 
boundary was thus, extended eastward to include the area east of the 
railway between Martinvast and St. Martin-le Greard. It was in this area 
that General Eddy planned to use the 4th Cavalry for the protection of 
the division's flank, particularly in the vicinity of les Flagues, 
astride the highway.

Meanwhile, General Collins received the Army commander's authorization 
to have the 1st Battalion, 359th Infantry, take over the Rocheville 
area. This battalion, which had not yet moved out of the Biniville area, 
was attached to the 9th Division for this limited mission. It was 
approximately 1600 when these arrangements were made. An hour later 
General Eddy issued additional fragmentary orders for the resumption of 
the advance, and the division again moved northward.

The 39th Infantry moved north to Couville, where it secured the highway 
junction that night, the 3d Battalion advancing to St. Christophe-du-
Foc. The regiment was supported by part of the 607th Tank Destroyer 
Battalion. The 60th Infantry also had tank destroyer support (899th) and 
tanks (Company B, 746th Tank Battalion), and moved forward to bypass les 
Pieux. The 1st Battalion

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(Photo)

Page 158

patrols reported the town clear at about 1730. The two leading 
battalions were then able to go on to Helleville, where they stopped 
late that night. Contact was made with French Resistance forces in les 
Pieux that evening. A lieutenant of the French Forces of the Interior 
(FFI) had mobilized a platoon, which brought in forty prisoners by 
nightfall and supplied detailed information concerning German defenses 
farther north.

Under its new orders, the 4th Cavalry Squadron moved toward les Flagues. 
Artillery and small arms delayed the column near Rauville-la Bigot, but 
forward elements reached St. Martin-le Greard early that evening. The 
4th Cavalry, 39th Infantry, and 60th Infantry were then roughly abreast 
on an east-west line running through Couville.

Meanwhile, the 47th Infantry had also joined the 9th Division's drive. 
This regiment had had varied missions that day. After being relieved by 
the 37th Infantry east of St. Lo-d'Ourville, it went into assembly in 
the vicinity of St. Jacques-de-Nehou. At noon it was alerted to move 
north to Bricquebec and two battalions started out at 1330. The 2d 
Battalion sent a motorized detachment to the road junction at Cadets and 
Fierville to clean out a pocket of Germans reported to number three 
hundred. The rest of the battalion moved up the Barneville-St. Germain 
road to pick up German stragglers. In the evening it assembled at 
Crosville and was alerted to follow the 60th Infantry past Helleville 
and swing northeast across the front of the 39th Infantry to the Bois du 
Mont Roc. This part of General Eddy's late afternoon orders, however, 
could not be executed on 19 June.

Late in the afternoon General Collins directed the 79th and 4th 
Divisions to continue the drive north that evening and block all the 
roads leading north and northwest from Valognes before dark, thus 
cutting of any enemy units still holding out in the Valognes area. But 
neither division was able to accomplish the task that night. During the 
day the strongest opposition to VII Corps had been in the east and 
proportionately smaller gains were therefore made on the right flank.

Advance to the fortified Line

On the evening of 19 June, VII Corps announced the objectives for the 
next day. The 79th Division was to complete the seizure of its initial 
objective northwest of Valognes and then, with the Valognes-Cherbourg 
highway as its exit of advance, make its main effort on the right to 
seize the height which dominate Cherbourg from the southeast. The 4th 
Division, advancing along the right of the 79th, was to seize Hill 178 
near Rufosses and then isolate Cherbourg from the east by driving on to 
the high ground at Tourlaville, east of the Trotebec River. The 9th 
Division, on the west, was to seize the commanding ground between 
Flottemanville-Hague and Octeville and block any movement from Cap de la 
Hague by capturing Hill 170 east of Haut Biville. Cherbourg would thus 
be isolated from the east and west and the enemy forces in the 
extremities of the peninsula could be dealt with after the city's fall.

On the evening of 19 June, General Barton issued verbal orders for the 
22d Infantry, part of which was still in reserve at Fontenay-sur-Mer, to 
move northward into a new assembly area on the Quineville Ridge. This 
would bring the regiment into position to support the 12th Infantry and 
fill the gap which had developed between the 12th Infantry and the 24th 
Cavalry Squadron. The 22d Infantry established itself on the northern 
slopes of the ridge, making contact with the cavalry at le Mont de 
Lestre and with the right rear of the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, 2,000 
yards to the west.

Later in the evening General Barton decided to commit the 22d Infantry 
for the resumption of the drive on the next day. The division plan for 
20 June called for an attack by

Page 159

all three regiments. The 8th Infantry's objective was still the 
Tamerville area (Map XIII). Valognes, which was within the regiment's 
zone, was to be bypassed and contained, and entered only if free of 
Germans. The 22d Infantry was to take over the objective originally 
assigned to the 12th Infantry-the ground northeast of Tamerville. The 
12th Infantry was given only a limited objective in the center and its 
attack was intended mainly as a demonstration. It was to be pinched out 
as soon as the 22d Infantry came abreast and was then to support the 
latter with fire. The decision to commit the 22d Infantry was possibly 
made with the view of permitting it to clear the area west of the Sinope 
River. The 22d was to begin its movement at 0330 so that it might come 
abreast of the 12th Infantry by daylight. To facilitate this 
coordination, one reinforced company of the 22d Infantry was to seize 
the tank ditch on the small tributary of the Sinope near Vaudreville by 
2400.

The 4th Division's experience on 20 June was similar to the 9th's on the 
preceding day. When the attacks began it was found that the enemy had 
broken contact and retired northward. The 22d Infantry moved up during 
the night, as planned, came abreast of the 12th Infantry by daybreak, 
and kept on going. The 12th also reached its objective without incident 
and, at 0830, General Barton ordered the 2d Battalion, with a company of 
tank destroyers, to relieve the 8th Infantry in containing Valognes. 
This proved unnecessary when Colonel Van Fleet reported that patrols 
from his 1st Battalion had found the town clear, although the streets 
were so filled with rubble from previous bombardment that troops could 
not pass through.

Unknown to the 4th Division, the German commander had decided to 
disengage and withdraw his entire force to Fortress Cherbourg. With the 
cutting of the peninsula General von Schlieben had lost physical contact 
with the main German forces outside the Cotentin and was now on his own. 
Execution of the delayed withdrawal to the Cherbourg defenses was 
completely in his hands. Threatened with outflanking by the rapid push 
of the 9th Division up the west side of the peninsula, and under heavy 
pressure in the Montebourg area, von Schlieben decided on 19 June to 
disengage. Withdrawals began during the night. The remnants of the four 
divisions which he commanded had been so hard-pressed and were so battle 
weary, by his own admission, that almost no delaying actions were 
fought.

Despite the absence of opposition, the 4th Division's progress during 
the morning was not rapid. The 8th Infantry was delayed by the necessity 
of investigating conditions at Valognes. The 22d Infantry moved 
cautiously, unwilling to believe that the enemy had withdrawn. At O915, 
Col. R. T. Foster, now commanding the 22d Infantry, was told that his 
battalions were not moving fast enough. "Rumor has it," he told his 
units, "that the 9th is within artillery range of Cherbourg. Guess 
Division Commander Barton is worried that somebody else will beat the 
4th to Cherbourg."

About noon Colonel Van Fleet (8th Infantry) ordered his battalions to 
get on the roads and move rapidly. The 22d Infantry also took a route 
march formation and moved northward. In the afternoon General Collins 
directed General Barton to have the 8th Infantry seize Hill 178, west of 
Rufosses, the 12th Infantry take la Rogerie, and the 22d Infantry 
advance still farther to Hameau Gallis and the road junction to the 
north, patrolling in the direction of the strong points near Maupertus. 
Except for Hill 178, these objectives were reached that night, although 
not without opposition.

The 22d Infantry stopped short of le Theil, part of the regiment going 
into position south of the Saire River. There it was under direct 
observation and heavy fire from the high ground to the north which 
caused considerable casualties in the 1st Battalion.

Page 160

The 8th Infantry first contacted enemy outposts southeast and east of 
Rufosses, meeting some resistance. The 3d Battalion was subjected to 
heavy artillery fire but attacked and took the town before dark, 
establishing a line just east of the Bois de Roudou. The 2d Battalion 
came under fire as it advance up the slope northwest of Rufosses. It was 
nearly dark when the battalion reached this point, and the men dug in 
along the road 600 yards east of the crossroads. Both the 8th and 22d 
Infantry Regiments had tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion in support. 
The 24th Cavalry Squadron protected the division’s right flank, 
reconnoitering as far as Quettehou.

The 8th Infantry advanced more than six miles on 20 June, and the 22d 
more than eight miles. Due to the rapid progress units were often 
without communications with higher headquarters. General Barton, while 
finding it difficult to locate the command posts, nevertheless was 
gratified with the division’s progress.

The 79th Division, like the 4th, had been unable to cut the road in its 
zone north of Valognes on the evening of 19 June. The division’s main 
effort on 20 June was to be made on the right, along the Valognes-
Cherbourg highway, in conjunction with the 4th Division, the objective 
being the heights dominating Cherbourg from the southeast (Map XIII). 
While the 315th Infantry remained to contain Valognes, the 313th was to 
move north to cut the highway and with the 314th attack northwestward 
along this axis.

Page 161

Both regiments jumped off at 0600. The 313th Infantry, moving in a 
column of battalions, crossed the Gloire River to St. Joseph. From there 
it made rapid progress fro a time, as did the 8th Infantry a few 
thousand yards to the east. The 4th Reconnaissance Troop maintained 
contact between the two division in the wooded and hilly region of the 
upper Gloire. At Hameau du Long four light enemy tanks and an 88-mm. gun 
were captured intact. A few hundred yards farther on, the leading 2d 
Battalion received heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, but after a 
slight delay the regiment went on to the crossroads at Delasse. There 
the outposts of the prepared German line were encountered and the 
advance stopped. 

The 314th Infantry’s experience was similar. After following the 313th 
through la Brique it moved up the left of the highway,

Page 162

battalions echeloned to the left rear. No attempt was made to hold the 
rocket bomb site southwest of Brix. Near this town the 3d Battalion 
captured eight tanks. Late in the afternoon the 1st and 3d Battalions 
were halted by heavy artillery fire as they approached the east-west 
highway east of St. Martin-le Greard. Both regiments now sensed that 
they had come up against the prepared fortifications which lay four to 
five miles out from Cherbourg.

During the day the 315th Infantry cleared the area west of Valognes of 
several isolated enemy groups and then moved to an assembly area behind 
the other two regiments.

The 9th Division meanwhile continued its efforts to envelop the 
Cherbourg defenses from the west. On the afternoon of 19 June, when the 
division was making rapid progress, General Collins authorized General 
Eddy to continue northward in order to seize the high ground between 
Flottemanville-Hague and Octeville and to block the main route into the 
Cap de la Hague Peninsula. The 4th Cavalry Squadron and the 1st 
Battalion, 359th Infantry, were attached to protect the right flank, and 
two additional companies of tank destroyers of the 899th Battalion were 
given to the division for antitank protection. That afternoon General 
Eddy roughly outlined the division's plan of attack and both the 39th 
and 60th Infantry Regiments advanced another several thousand yards that 
evening. But the part of the plan which dealt with the 47th Infantry's 
commitment could not yet be implemented.

The plan was based on two major considerations-the necessity of blocking 
of the Cap de la Hague Peninsula, with its prepared defenses from which 
part of the enemy forces could be expected to make a stand, and the 
belief that the two key defense points blocking the approaches to 
Cherbourg were the Flottemanville-Hague and Bois du Mont du Roc areas. 
One regiment was assigned to each mission. The 60th Infantry was to 
attack straight north and block the exits from the peninsula. Its 
objectives were Hill 170, east of Haut Biville, and the ground from 
Branville north to the sea. The 47th Infantry was to follow the 60th 
about as far as Vasteville and then swing east to the Bois du Mont du 
Roc (Hill 171). In this maneuver it was to cross the front of the 39th 
Infantry, which was containing the enemy on the east. The 39th was to 
support the attack with fire and then, when uncovered by the 47th, move 
northward across the 47th's rear to attack through the Flottemanville-
Hague defense area toward the strong point of Henneville, west of 
Cherbourg.

This complicated scheme of maneuver was dictated by several 
considerations. First, a change of direction from north to northeast had 
been ordered by Corps, and it was desirable to establish a pivot on 
which the movement could turn. Furthermore, the division was concerned 
about its right flank. The left flank elements of the 79th Division had 
not yet cleared the area east of the railroad, and the protection 
afforded the 9th Division's right rear by the mechanized cavalry of the 
4th Cavalry Group was not considered adequate. The 39th Infantry was to 
provide this security to the division's right flank, guarding 
particularly against a hostile thrust from the east along the east-west 
road through St. Martin-le Greard, and after some adjustment of 
positions was also to assist the 47th Infantry's advance with fire. An 
additional consideration in the choice of this order of attack was the 
fact that the 47th Infantry was relatively fresh.

In the attack on 20 June each regiment was supported by a company of 
tank destroyers and two battalions of field artillery. The 60th Infantry 
also had one company of tanks. The 4th Cavalry continued to operate on 
the division's right and the 1st Battalion of the 359th Infantry 
outposted the right rear to prevent enemy crossings of the upper Douve.

Page 163

General Eddy expected Cherbourg to fall in a day or two, but events of 
20 June proved this view to be over-optimistic. In fact, before the day 
ended it was necessary to revise the entire plan of operation.

At first all went well. Neither the 60th nor the 39th Infantry Regiment 
was opposed when it jumped of at 0800. The 60th, with the 2d and 3d 
Battalions abreast, occupied Vasteville, its intermediate objective 
line, without encountering resistance. By noon it had reached the high 
ground south of Biville and prepared to go on to Hill 170. The 60th 
Infantry was now getting into relatively open country. Fields were 
larger, trees fewer, and some of the hill tops were nearly bare. The 
enemy was dug in on the high ground to the north and had good 
observation. As the 60th Infantry advanced, it received an increasing 
amount of artillery fire.

The 47th Infantry, with the 2d Battalion leading the column, followed 
closely the right rear of the 60th and turned toward the creek line at 
the Bois de Norest, preparatory to jumping off for Hill 171. Before 
reaching the creek the leading battalions diverged, the 2d moving to the 
left of the woods, the 1st to the right. About noon Brig. Gen. Donald A. 
Stroh, 9th Division assistant commander, ordered troops to halt at the 
stream line at the bottom of Hill 171 so that artillery fires could be 
laid preparatory to a coordinated attack. Apparently no serious 
opposition had been expected up to that point.

Early in the afternoon the two battalions crossed the first stream, the 
1st Battalion moving toward Sideville and the 2d Battalion advancing up 
the road to Crossroads 114, southeast of Acqueville. Both battalions 
were suddenly stopped by artillery and small-arms fire from positions on 
the heights to the east. The first fire encountered by the 2d Battalion 
came from houses at Crossroads 114, used as an outpost. This was 
followed by heavy fire from 88-mm. guns, 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, and 
machine guns dug in on the crest of a hill a few hundred yards east. 
Companies E and F, advancing astride the road, were forced to earth by 
shell fire. One 88-mm. shell landed in the center of a small group of 
the command, killing the battalion commander, a platoon leader of 
Company F, and the artillery liaison officer, and wounding both the 
commander and the executive officer of Company F, a radio operator, and 
two runners. Some men from Companies G and E pushed across the road, but 
the battalion was unprepared to reduce the position and had to pull 
back.

The heavy resistance at Crossroads 114 had an immediate repercussion 
since the execution of the whole 9th Division plan hinged largely on the 
47th Infantry breaking through at this point. With the 47th delayed, it 
would become difficult for the 39th Infantry to move through to 
Flottemanville-Hague. Consequently, General Eddy altered the original 
plan. He ordered two battalions of the 60th Infantry to proceed at once 
to Flottemanville-Hague and then to Henneville, originally the 39th's 
objective. The 3d Battalion was to continue to Crossroads 167, the 
junction of the les Pieux and Cherbourg roads into the Cap de la Hague 
Peninsula, and defend the flank of the division against enemy attack 
from the northwest. One battalion of the 39th Infantry was alerted to 
move north and occupy Flottemanville-Hague after its capture by the 60th 
Infantry.

At 1630, when he issued these orders, General Eddy was still optimistic 
and believed that, with these adjustments, the advance could be 
continued. Col. Harry Flint (39th Infantry) was ordered, two hours 
later, to prepare two battalions for an attack along the les Pieux-
Cherbourg highway.

Colonel de Rohan of the 60th Infantry issued orders for an attack at 
191. The attack was to move eastward astride the main road to 
Flottemanville-Hague with the 1st Battalion on the right and the 2d 
Battalion on the

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left. The 3d Battalion continued north toward the main highway 
intersection near Branville and came to within 1,300 yards of its 
objective. The 1st and 2d Battalions, however, immediately encountered 
enemy fire from prepared positions near Gourbesville and were unable to 
go farther. Near Acqueville to the south the 47th Infantry also 
continued to receive heavy fire in the evening and abandoned plans to 
capture the heights beyond Crossroads 114; its 2d Battalion withdrew 
several hundred yards. Consequently the 39th Infantry could not 
implement is plan either, and the orders were canceled.

Thus, on 20 June, the rapid progress of the 9th Division came to a 
sudden halt. The resistance which the enemy began to offer on the line 
Gourbesville-Acqueville-Sideville was impressive, and the 9th Division, 
like the 79th and the 4th, was well aware that it had now run into the 
prepared positions around Cherbourg.

German Defenses in the Hilly North

Since the jump-off on 19 June the three divisions had come into a new 
type of terrain. In advancing up the peninsula they had gradually left 
the low-lying south Cotentin and were now in the hilly north (Map XII). 
In the eastern half of the peninsula a hilly region first becomes 
apparent at Montebourg and gradually leads to higher ground near 
Cherbourg. Between Valognes and the port are several large wooded areas. 
The approach along the western half of the peninsula is even less 
favorable, as the region west of the Douve is frequently broken by 
ridges and stream valleys. Much of the country is of the "bocage" type, 
with fairly steep hills and steep-sided valleys; toward the northwest it 
becomes rugged, with open relief and rocky cliffs. Immediately backing 
the city of Cherbourg is a collar of steeply rising ground with frequent 
outcroppings of bare rock. This ground rise abruptly from the city and 
then falls back to form a high rolling plateau, broken by the deep 
valleys of the Divette, the Trotebec, and their tributaries.

It was country ideal for the defense of Cherbourg and the enemy had 
taken full advantage of it. On a rough semicircle, from four to six 
miles out from the port, the Germans had constructed a belt of 
fortifications varying in depth and type (Maps XIII and XIV). Always on 
commanding ground, these fortifications covered all approaches. 
Defensive lines were often tied in with streams which served as 
obstacles to tanks and self-propelled weapons. Where natural barriers 
did not form a continuous obstacle they were supplemented by ditches, 
and roads were blocked with steel gates or bars. Along the 4th Division 
front the enemy positions generally followed the northern edge of the 
Bois de Roudou and the western edge of the Bois du Coudray. In the 79th 
Division zone, the defenses were concentrated astride the main highway 
on the high ground between the upper reaches of the Trotebec and Douve. 
In front of the 9th Division, the German positions occupied, generally, 
the high ground from Sideville northwest to Ste. Croix-Hague, and then 
followed one of the ridges north through Branville, Greville, and Gruchy 
to the sea. The German "crust" of fortifications thus ran approximately 
as follows, from east to west: Cap Levy-Maupertus-Bois du Coudray-Hill 
178-the upper Trotebec-Hardinvast-Martinvast-Sideville-Hills 128 and 131 
-Flottemanville-Hague-Ste. Croix-Hague-Branville-Gruchy.

The defenses were of various types. In some areas there were permanent 
structures of concrete, with machine-gun turrets and mortars, 
underground personnel shelters, and ammunition storage rooms. In other 
places the fortifications consisted mainly of trenches and ditches, 
sometimes enclosing "Crossbow"

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(rocket bomb) sites, from which the Germans could fight delaying 
actions. Hedges were frequently cut to permit a better field of fire, 
and wire enclosed the fortified area. Within this ring of defensive 
works were many antiaircraft positions, and as the Americans approached 
the Cherbourg defenses the enemy made full use of these weapons for 
ground fire. Most German positions were clearly and accurately shown on 
the large-scale defense overprints issued to all commanders, but exact 
information on the strength of the enemy in these positions was lacking. 
Prisoners continually reported that their units had suffered complete 
disorganization. On the evening of 20 June, General Collins ordered all 
units to probe the enemy's main line of resistance during the night.

The Corps Front on 21 June

General Eddy had abandoned his original plan and once more altered the 
specific objectives of the 9th Division units. The 39th Infantry was now 
assigned a one on the right flank of the division, where it would 
relieve the 4th Cavalry with one battalion and develop enemy positions 
in the direction of Martinvast and in the valley of the Divette with 
strong patrols. The 4th Cavalry was to relieve the 3d Battalion, 60th 
Infantry, west of Ste. Croix-Hague and take over part of the 60th's 
original mission, reconnoitering the Cap de la Hague area and blocking 
enemy egress therefrom. The 3d Battalion, 60th Infantry, was to return 
to its regiment as reserve and both the 60th and 47th Infantry Regiments 
were to develop the enemy positions to the front.

The execution of these orders was begun during the night. The 3d 
Battalion, 39th Infantry, relieved the 4th Cavalry in the vicinity of 
les Flagues at about 0300, and the latter began relieving the 3d 
Battalion, 60th Infantry, on the opposite flank of the division about 
noon on 21 June. By evening the 4th Cavalry occupied a line along the 
road running through l'Epinette to the coast. All units pushed out 
strong reconnaissance. Patrols from the 60th Infantry found it difficult 
to move, for enemy artillery interdicted all routes of approach. The 2d 
Battalion patrols repeatedly failed to get into Ste. Croix-Hague. The 
regiment's whole position, in fact, was vulnerable, lying between three 
draws and facing German positions to the northeast.

Early on 21 June, the 3d Battalion of the 47th Infantry moved up between 
the 1st and 2d Battalions, opposite the enemy position at Boguenville. 
All units had been cautioned against getting into heavy fire fights. 
General Stroh directed that the 3d Battalion was simply to come up 
abreast of the other battalions and not engage the enemy. Before 
attacking, more exact intelligence was desired, particularly on enemy 
positions on Hill 171 (Bois du Mont du Roc). The day was therefore 
devoted to patrolling.

The 79th Division was similarly occupied in the center. As in the 9th 
Division area, the Germans reacted violently to the patrols, with both 
artillery and small-arms fire. During the day the 315th Infantry moved 
up to St. Martin-le Greard. Here it came up against an enemy defense 
area which throughout the attack had been a kind of no-man's land. 
Responsibility for this sector had changed hands two or three times. The 
9th Division had established road blocks to keep the enemy penned in his 
defensive area, but did not try to clean it out. That task now became 
the main preoccupation of the 315th Infantry of the 79th Division.

On the Corps right flank the 4th Division, unlike the 9th and 79th 
Divisions, had not run into the main enemy defense line the previous 
day, and some progress was made on 21 June. Reconnaissance during the 
night of 20-21 June and the following morning yielded no enemy contact. 
During the rapid march

Page 166

northward on 20 June the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments had a few 
brushes with outposts and received some artillery fire. The enemy 
delaying action, though light, was just sufficient to prevent the two 
regiments from developing the main German defense line before dark. 
General Barton ordered attacks by all three regiments on 21 June, the 
principal tasks being the capture of Hill 178, west of Rufosses, which 
the 8th Infantry had failed to take the day before, the development of 
the enemy's main line of resistance somewhere beyond the Bois du 
Coudray, and the cutting of the St. Pierre-Eglise-Cherbourg highway west 
of Gonneville. These missions were assigned as objectives to the 8th, 
12th, and 22d Infantry Regiments, respectively (Maps XIII and XIV).

Hill 17 8 was north of the east-west road from Hameau Gallis to Delasse, 
and beyond the Bois de Roudou. Barring the 8th Infantry's advance from 
the south were the woods and enemy positions at the northwest tip of the 
woods. The approach from the east was protected by positions astride the 
intersection near la Bourdonnerie (Crossroads 148) and other positions 
farther north and to the left of the road. The defense overprints did 
not show exactly what type of positions these were. At the northwest tip 
of the Bois de Roudou and in the woods north of Crossroads 148 there 
were numerous huts and concrete structures, and evidence of felling of 
trees and construction activity had been noted. These were suspected to 
be buzz bomb sites. The position at Crossroads 148 not only controlled 
the road intersection but also acted as a buffer for the other 
positions. Colonel Van Fleet's plan was to have the 1st and 3d 
Battalions advance north through the woods, while the 2d Battalion would 
attack the position at Crossroads 148 from the east.

The 1st and 3d Battalions moved out at 1000. The 1st Battalion drove 
into the woods on the left and then worked northward along the trail on 
the west edge of the woods. The 3d Battalion, after cleaning out 
remnants of resistance at Rufosses with tanks of Company A, 70th Tank 
Battalion, also entered the woods, swinging north toward the Gallis-
Delasse road. Both battalions met heavy fire from the concrete structure 
at the unfinished installation beyond the northwest tip of the woods and 
from the fortified barracks east of the position. Despite artillery 
support on the initial advance, the battalions were stopped a few 
hundred yards from their objective by heavy fire from enemy 88-mm. and 
antiaircraft guns.

In the meantime, after artillery and mortar preparations, the 2d 
Battalion attacked westward against Crossroads 148 and positions to the 
northwest. Company G shortly became pinned along the north-south road; 
but Company E went through north of Crossroads 148 and advanced several 
hundred yards beyond the road. It then discovered that it had passed by 
the enemy positions at the crossroads and was cut off. Movement became 
impossible, but something had to be done either to extricate Company E 
or help G forward.

The battalion commander decided to commit Company F from reserve with a 
platoon of tanks, organized on the pattern of the infantry-tank team 
which had proved effective in the Normandy fighting thus far when 
properly coordinated. The narrow front, however, compelled a bunching of 
infantry platoons behind the tanks deployed in line, and the tight 
formation limited freedom of maneuver. Nevertheless, the attack was 
successful. Tanks sprayed the hedgerows, which, being low at this spot, 
constituted no obstacle to the advance. The tanks moved cross country 
easily and the enemy seemed to disappear. Company G fell in behind 
Company F and the two came up abreast with Company E to reestablish a 
continuous battalion line. By evening contact was also established with 
the 3 d Battalion across the road to the south.

Page 167

Later, however, it became apparent that the Germans were still in 
position at Crossroads 148. They began to harry the companies from the 
rear, ultimately cutting the supply route during the night. A reinforced 
platoon sent to clean out the enemy proved unequal to the task. When at 
dawn, 22 June, the Germans raided the 2d Battalion command post, Company 
F was ordered to clear out the bothersome crossroads position once and 
for all. While  one platoon made a wide flanking move to the south, 
using the Bois de Roudou as concealment, and then moved up the draw 
through Rufosses for the attack on the crossroads, arrangements were 
made for a heavy concentration of mortar and cannon fire on the woods to 
the north where enemy troops were thought to be concentrated. At a given 
signal mortars and cannon massed their fires in an 8-minute 
concentration on the woods

Page 168

and the maneuvering platoon attacked the crossroads, supported by the 
fire of another. When the firing ceased, white flags appeared and 
seventy-four Germans came out of the woods and surrendered. From them it 
was learned that more were holding out. The heavy fire was therefore 
repeated and one hundred more gave themselves up. When the wounded were 
brought in, the total count of prisoners reached nearly three hundred. 
The threat to the battalion’s rear had been eliminated.

The 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments to the east attacked late on 21 
June. The 12th’s mission was to break through the enemy’s outpost line 
and determine his main line of resistance. Like the 8th Infantry, it was 
confronted by a wood-the Bois du Coudray, which lies between the Saire 
and one of its tributaries. The mission was initially assigned to the 2d 
Battalion, which moved out at 1730 and contacted the enemy half an hour 
later. Resistance was light at first and the battalion moved easily 
through the wood. On the northwest edge of the wood it found the bridge 
blown and received mortar and small-arms fire heavy enough to halt the 
advance. The enemy held the rising ground west and north of the Saire. 
That evening the other two battalions entered the wood, but no attack 
was launched that day.

The 22d Infantry was ordered to advance straight north and seize Hill 
158, a critical terrain point which dominated the surrounding 
countryside, including the heavily defended Maupertus airport to the 
east. The main east-west highway into Cherbourg ran across the hill, and 
the main purpose of the 22d’s 

Page 169

mission was to cut this highway. Possession of Hill 158 was a vital 
factor in the plan of isolating Cherbourg from the east; both the 
division and Corps commanders therefore attached great importance to the 
winning of this objective.

In the advance from le Theil, the 1st and 3d Battalions, supported by 
Company B, 70th Tank Battalion, move out abreast at 1600 behind an 
artillery preparation. Four hours later they were ordered to dig in on 
favorable ground north of Pinabel. But since the 3d Battalion began to 
receive fire from enemy antiaircraft guns, both battalions were ordered 
to keep moving. The 1st Battalion could not advance in the face of heavy 
artillery fire, but the 3d pushed forward 500 yards to reach the 
objective.

The battalions had hardly reached their new positions when large but 
apparently unorganized German forces began to infiltrate across their 
rear from defensive positions around Gonneville. For the next four days 
and nights the enemy interrupted communications and supply. All resupply 
convoys had to be escorted by tanks to get through. Even then it was 
touch and go. A convoy for the 1st Battalion on the morning of  22 June 
was hit by artillery and machine-gun fire and turned back with heavy 
casualties. Another convoy took a wrong turn and was ambushed in a 
narrow trail, losing two light tanks, three half-tracks, three 57-mm. 
antitank guns, and several jeeps.

The date 21 June marks the end of the first phase in the drive for 
Cherbourg. The 9th and 79th Divisions, after running into strong German 
resistance on 20 June, further developed the German positions on 21 June 
to determine more accurately the main enemy line. The 4th Division, 
encountering its first heavy opposition in the upper peninsula, 
established the enemy’s main line of resistance, which ran generally 
from Hill 178 to the northwest edge of the Bois du Coudray and thence to 
Hill 158. The line took advantage of the commanding ground near the 
upper reaches of the Trotebec and Saire Rivers. Strong points were 
situated along the forward slopes. Pressed against this enemy line, the 
4th Division, like the 9th and the 79th in their respective sectors, was 
now ready for the final phase of the assault on Fortress Cherbourg.

Page 170

(Photo)

Page 171

THE FORTRESS IS BREACHED

On the night of 21 June General Collins sent an ultimatum by radio and 
messenger to the commander of the German ground forces, General von 
Schlieben. Pointing out that Cherbourg was isolated and the German 
position hopeless, he asked for the surrender of the port. The message 
was broadcast in Polish, Russian, and French, as well as in German, to 
the members of the enemy garrison. The ultimatum was to expire at 0900 
on 22 June.

Meanwhile General Collins proceeded with plans for the assault of the 
semicircular perimeter of fortifications surrounding Cherbourg. An 
outstanding feature of the attack was to be an intensive air bombardment 
of the main defenses south and southwest of the city. While the three 
divisions probed the German lines on 21 June, arrangements for the air 
support were made with Ma. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada of the IX Tactical Air 
Command. The plan called first for eighty minutes of bombing and 
strafing of known enemy installations prior to H Hour by Typhoons and 
Mustangs of the 2d Tactical Air Force (RAF) and by fighter-bombers of 
the Ninth Air Force. At H Hour medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force 
were to begin delivering a series of attacks designed to form an aerial 
barrage moving northward in anticipation of the advance of the ground 
forces. All eleven Groups of the IX Bomber Command were to participate 
in the attacks on eleven defended localities.

The day and hour of the attack depended largely on the weather, which 
was not promising at the time. General Collins, however, tentatively 
scheduled the attack for 1200-1600, 22 June, and outlined the plan to 
the three division commanders. The principal targets for the air 
bombardment were to be the heavily defended areas north and east of 
Flottemanville-Hague and Martinvast; the fortifications astride the 
Valognes-Cherbourg highway at les Chevres, which barred the 79th 
Division's advance; and three strong points, referred to as "C," "D," 
and "F." "C" was a strong antiaircraft position southwest of Cherbourg 
in the path of the 47th Infantry. "F" and "D" were strong points on the 
southern approaches to Cherbourg, "D" being the formidable Fort du Roule 
built into the cliff overlooking the port. For the pre-H-Hour bombing, 
troops were to be pulled back at least 1,000 yards behind the bomb line. 
Artillery fire was to immediately follow this bombing and the attacking 
troops were to move rapidly to their initial objectives.

General Collins directed the 4th Division to continue on its mission of 
isolating Cherbourg from the east. Its main effort was to be made by the 
12th Infantry, which was to capture heavily defended Tourlaville and 
then cut through to the coast (Map XIV). The 79th Division was to make 
its principal drive on its right, moving up the highway and seizing the 
high nose which commands the city and ter-

Page 172

minates in the fortified cliff at Fort du Roule. The 9th Division's 
chief effort was also to be on its right, the principal objective being 
the Octeville heights which overlook Cherbourg from the west and south.

During the last few days the capture of Cherbourg had taken on an even 
greater urgency than had existed before. On 19 June the highest tide of 
the year combined with a 4-day storm had damaged unloading craft and the 
floating piers and roadways, threatening serious delay in the unloading 
of supplies. As a precaution against future shortages First Army ordered 
a one-third reduction in artillery ammunition expenditure in the 
Cherbourg attack. General Collins, in his verbal orders on 21 June, 
said: "This attack on Cherbourg is the major effort of the American Army 
and is especially vital now that unloading across the beaches has been 
interfered with by weather. All Division Commanders surely appreciate 
the importance of this attack."

The Final Drive Begins

On the morning of 22 June the ultimatum expired without word from the 
German fortress commander. The weather had turned favorable. At 0940 the 
Corps commander therefore notified the division commanders that the 
attack would be launched. H Hour was 1400. Bombing was to begin at 1240. 
Division and regimental commanders had already made their plans and 
issued field orders on the basis of the previous day's verbal orders. 
All that remained was for unit commanders to give last-minute 
instructions regarding H Hour, the withdrawal for the bombardment, and 
the jump-off.

A few minutes before the fighter-bombers appeared, front lines were 
marked with yellow smoke and bomb lines with white phosphorus. At 1240 
the pre-H-Hour bombing and strafing attacks were initiated by four 
squadrons of rocket-firing Typhoons, followed by six squadrons of 
Mustangs, all from the 2d Tactical Air Force (RAF). At approximately 
1300 the attacks were taken over by twelve groups of fighter-bombers of 
the Ninth Air Force. For fifty-five minutes P-47's, P-38's, and P-51's 
(562 planes) bombed and strafed front-line strong points at low level, 
one group coming over approximately every five minutes. Between 1300 and 
1330, the 47th, 60th, and 22d Infantry Regiments all called their 
headquarters to say that they were being bombed and strafed by friendly 
planes, and sought means of stopping the attacks. These units and others 
suffered several casualties from the air attacks. The errors were 
believed to have been caused at least in part by the drift of the 
marking smoke in the fairly strong northeast wind. As the mediums began 
to come over at 1400 to bomb the German lines in front of the 9th and 
79th Divisions, the attacking units jumped off; at 1430 the three 
regiments of the 4th Division joined the attack. Between 1400 and 1455 
the eleven groups of light and medium bombers of the IX Bomber Command 
(387 planes) delivered their attacks on the eleven defended areas 
expected to give trouble in the drive on the city.

Measured by sheer physical destruction the bombardment was none too 
effective, except on a few targets. Its greatest effect was in cutting 
German communications and depressing enemy morale, but in general the 
bombing was scattered-as indicated by the drops to the rear of the 
American lines. This was the first large-scale use of medium and 
fighter-bombers in close support of ground troops since the launching of 
the Normandy operation, and coordination of all elements had not been 
perfected. Arrangements for the bombardment had to be made through 
difficult command channels. While General Quesada went to VII Corps 
Headquarters to work out the initial air plan, he was chiefly with First 
Army Headquarters at this time, and most of the aircraft were still 
operating from Eng-

Page 173

land. The bombardment had had to be planned very hurriedly; there was 
insufficient time to transmit details on last-minute changes in the plan 
to all the parties concerned, or to coordinate artillery fires against 
antiaircraft batteries with the bombing attacks or even in some 
instances to brief pilots properly. However, fighter-bombers did 
exceptionally effective work in destroying some of the German positions, 
particularly on the west side of Cherbourg. A later analysis of the fire 
support in the assault on Cherbourg concluded that the best air-
artillery-infantry coordination had been achieved by the 9th Division, 
with artillery first firing effectively against flak positions, followed 
by the air bombing, and then artillery resuming fire to cover the 
infantry advance. However, while the Corps' attack achieved penetrations 
of varying depth, no real breakthrough was made immediately anywhere 
along the Cherbourg front. All the divisions were forced to a methodical 
reduction of strong points. Not until 24 June were the main defenses 
cracked.

The Right Flank

The primary objective of the 4th Division was the Tourlaville area, 
guarding the eastern approaches to Cherbourg (Map XIV). Attention was 
focused on the 12th Infantry, which had this mission as the center 
regiment. The 8th Infantry was to be pinched out when it had seized the 
high ground east of la Glacerie. It would then support the 12th Infantry 
with fire. The 22d Infantry, also assigned a supporting mission, was to 
assist the 12th by protecting its right and rear.

These plans were upset on 22 June when the 12th Infantry failed to break 
through the defenses north and northeast of the Bois du Coudray. The 
attack had to be launched from the edge of the woods across the Saire 
and up the slopes directly into enemy positions. The 2d Battalion was 
still in position at the northwest edge of the woods, where it had been 
stopped on 21 June by the enemy across the bridge.

The regimental plan on 22 June called for the 3d Battalion to attack 
north, circling around to the rear of the enemy opposing the 2d 
Battalion. The 3d Battalion moved up to the northern edge of the wood 
during the morning. The Germans, observing the movement, opened fire 
from the slopes above the creek and heavily shelled the draw formed by a 
small tributary of the river. The 3d Battalion replied with artillery 
and overhead heavy machine-gun fire. The axis of attack was shifted 
slightly to the right to avoid the interdicted draw. Companies I and L 
led out abreast at 1430, crossing the stream and proceeding up the 
opposite bank. With the first determined charge, the enemy broke and 
fled. About twenty were captured. Here the 12th Infantry identified some 
of the first miscellaneous units thrown into line by the Germans, such 
as labor service troops, which were found scattered throughout the 
Cherbourg area.

Across the stream the battalion wheeled to the left to carry out the 
original plan, but Companies I and L, after advancing west almost to the 
Digosville road, were stopped by heavy fire. The Germans were firing 
from across a draw just ahead and were entrenched around the road 
junction. To the rear, continued interdiction of the draw had the effect 
of isolating the lead companies from the rest of the battalion for a 
while, although Companies K and M and battalion headquarters, on the 
first nose north of the woods, were only about 800 yards back. The rear 
companies were at last guided forward across the draw, suffering only a 
few casualties from enemy artillery.

Reunited, the battalion tried to renew the advance, but enemy fire was 
so intense that the attempt had to be abandoned. Judging the forward 
position to be unfavorable, Lieutenant Colonel Dulin, the battalion 
commander,

Page 174

decided to move back to the ground occupied earlier by the rear 
elements. The battalion retraced its steps about 2100 and found Germans 
again occupying some of this ground. The battalion commander was killed 
in the sharp skirmish which followed before the area was cleared. By the 
time the new commander, Maj. Kenneth R. Lindner, established a defense, 
the Germans had infiltrated to the south and cut the battalion's supply 
routes. The ammunition supply was satisfactory, however, and Col. J. S. 
Luckett (commanding the 12th Infantry) promised additional supplies from 
Regiment in the morning.

The whole situation between Gonneville and the Bois du Coudray was 
fluid. The 22d Infantry was already being supplied by tank-escorted 
convoys. The same solution was now indicated in the case of the 12th. 
Tanks were already attached to this regiment, but they had not 
participated in the attack because the infantry did not succeed in 
finding suitable routes for them. With the 3d Battalion cut off, it 
became vital to find a route the tanks could use. Regiment sent out a 
patrol four times before a satisfactory route was discovered. Over this 
route, at 0700 on 23 June, seven medium tanks loaded with ammunition and 
rations moved with infantry escort. They also carried orders for the 
day's attack which, except for the use of tank support, did not depart 
from the previous day's plan.

Two tanks were attached to each of the leading companies (I and K) and 
three were kept in reserve. As it finally worked out, the tanks were 
generally confined to the road and moved in an extended column, except 
when they were used to clear out fields. Companies I and K advanced on 
either side of the road, the tanks supporting the movement with fire 
from the road or entering the fields to cut down enemy resistance. In 
this way the attack made steady progress. Company L from time to time 
had to fight off enemy harassing attempts from the right rear. In one 
raid to the rear the enemy attacked the battalion aid station, but the 
attack was repulsed by a platoon of Company B which had come up with the 
tanks that morning and was guarding the aid station.

The opposition decreased as the battalion approached the Tourlaville-
Hameau Gallis road. The Germans who had opposed the advance of Companies 
I and L with such determination the previous day had apparently retired 
before the tank-supported attack. At the crossroads the battalion made a 
sharp turn southeast and drove in on the enemy confronting the 2d 
Battalion in the woods. From bunkers on the slopes the Germans had been 
able to cover the stream bed and the approaches to their positions 
effectively but, hit from the rear, they gave up with hardly a struggle. 
The 2d Battalion was now free to cross the stream, and it was given the 
mission of mopping up the Mesnil au Val area. The 3d Battalion made an 
about-face and again took up the advance toward its objective, 
Tourlaville. Against sporadic opposition from detached riflemen and an 
occasional machine gun, the battalion moved steadily along the 
Tourlaville-Hameau Gallis road, its first objective being Hill 140, 
southeast of Tourlaville, the commanding ground between the battalion 
and Cherbourg. On its forward slope was a defended crossroads.

The battalion moved out once more at 2030, again with Companies I and K 
astride the road and the tanks between them. The tanks were withdrawn to 
assembly at 2100. The infantry, continuing alone, met gradually 
increasing enemy machine-gun and mortar fire as it neared the 
crossroads. Artillery was called for and, behind a succession of 
concentrations laid within fifty yards of the advancing troops, the 
battalion marched up the hill. It consolidated there for the night. 
Casualties in the attack had been light and an important terrain point 
had been captured on the route to Tourlaville.

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To the east the situation in the 22d Infantry sector remained extremely 
fluid during 23 June. It had been planned that the 22d Infantry would 
assist the 12th in the advance on Tourlaville by clearing the fortified 
Digosville area on the latter's right flank. But the 22d Infantry was so 
harassed from Maupertus and Gonneville that its combat strength was 
devoted mostly to dealing with enemy infiltrations and keeping its 
supply route open.

The 3d Battalion was to have led the attack on 22 June from its position 
on Hill 158, west of Gonneville, while the 1st Battalion held the hill 
and the 2d Battalion, in position to the south, prepared to come up 
later on the 3d Battalion's left. Before the attack could start, 
however, the enemy enveloped Hill 18 and the 2d Battalion had to be 
committed in a mission to clear the Germans from the rear of the 3d 
Battalion. It was late afternoon by the time this task was completed. 
All three battalions were dug in on the hill for the night. The attack 
westward in support of the 12th Infantry therefore failed to materialize 
on 22 June. However, the 12th Infantry had itself failed to shake free 
from the Bois du Coudray for the planned attack northwestward.

In a situation that precluded bold plans, it was decided that on 23 June 
the 1st and 3d Battalions, 22d Infantry, should completely clear and 
consolidate the high ground before any further missions were undertaken. 
Beginning at about 0900 the 1st and 3d Battalions began to carry out 
this task, while the 2d Battalion sent a combat patrol south to clean up 
resistance north of Hameau Cauchon. To cover the mop-up operation, heavy 
artillery and mortar fire pounded the enemy line from Maupertus to 
Gonneville; part of the 24th Cavalry Squadron, together with Company B, 
801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 4th Reconnaissance Troop, contained 
the enemy in the vicinity of the airfield; and tanks demonstrated toward 
Gonneville. Late in the day the consolidation of this ground had 
progressed far enough to free the 2d Battalion for an attack westward. 
The attack began at 1930, but before it reached the line of departure it 
was turned back by heavy fire from the German position southeast of 
Digosville. Once more the attack had to be postponed. Late that evening 
the battalion was attached to the 12th Infantry for the advance against 
Tourlaville.

The objective assigned the 8th Infantry on 22 June was the high ground 
east of la Glacerie, lying between the Trotebec and its main tributary, 
which formed the regiment's boundaries. The regiment was attacking into 
a wedge and upon reaching its objectives was to be pinched out. But 
between the Bois du Roudou and the objective the enemy had at least 
three strong defensive positions. To reduce these took three full days.

On the morning of 22 June, the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, was still 
fighting for the possession of Crossroads 148, near la Bourdonnerie. 
While that fight was taking place the 1st and 3d Battalions prepared to 
jump off to the northwest. Several small enemy counterattacks had to be 
broken up by artillery before the two battalions could move out at 1430. 
The 1st Battalion made only small gains northwest of the Bois du Roudou. 
The 3d Battalion attacked northward, bypassing a buzz-bomb installation, 
and headed toward a strong point about 1,000 yards away. The Germans in 
this position had cut lanes of fire in the hedgerows and waited until 
the battalion was almost on the position, when they suddenly opened 
fire. The attack stopped short and flattened. In a flanking maneuver 
through the woods on the right, Company I was hit by tree-burst 
artillery fire and suffered over fifty casualties, but the battalion 
eventually reached its objective by night. Altogether the battalion lost 
thirty-one killed and ninety-two wounded.

The enemy, organized as Kampfgruppe Rohrbach, was a conglomeration 
containing

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elements of the 729th and 739th Regiments (709th Division), as well as 
searchlight, panzer, labor front, marine, military police, antiaircraft, 
and coast artillery personnel. His exact strength was not known, but the 
defense he was offering from his prepared positions had been impressive.

On 23 June the attack was to be renewed at 0730, but was delayed for an 
hour by poor communication and by enemy harassment of supply routes, 
which held up resupply of the tanks. When the attack finally got under 
way it made little progress due to enemy artillery and mortar fire, 
which the 3d Battalion at first thought came from friendly units. After 
additional artillery, mortar, and cannon fires the two battalions again 
pushed the attack. By 1400 the 1st Battalion had moved about 1,00 yards 
west of the Bois du Roudou, but in the evening it was counterattacked 
and the 81-mm. mortar platoon had to abandon its equipment. Although the 
mortars were recovered later, the battalion’s attack was temporarily 
disorganized. Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion assaulted a strong point 500 
yards away and found the enemy forming an attack at the same time. As 
the American tanks and infantry moved through the wooded area east of 
the position, they found the Germans lying head to heel in the ditches 
along the hedgerows. A

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wild shooting melee ensued and most of the Germans were routed with 
heavy losses from the combined infantry and tank fire. One more enemy 
strong point had fallen. To complete the job, one company was sent back 
to clean out the bypassed buzz-bomb installation. Blasted from concrete 
shelters by bangalores, satchel charges, and flame throwers, 228 Germans 
surrendered.

The Center

Similar in character to the 4th Division's struggle was the fight of the 
79th Division, attacking in the relatively narrow middle sector between 
the Trotebec and Divette Rivers (Map XIV). The division's logical route 
of attack was the main Valognes-Cherbourg highway. Major obstacles to 
its advance were three prepared defense areas along the highway. The 
first, near les Chevres, straddled the road and tied in with the upper 
reaches of the Trotebec and Douve Rivers to form a continuous line of 
defense. The ground, relatively bare at this point, allowed good 
defensive fields of fire. In addition to the usual trenches, rifle pits, 
and emplaced guns, there was a zigzag tank ditch extending well to both 
sides of the highway and tying in with the streams on either side. About 
two miles farther along, commanding the highway approach, was strong 
point "F," at la Mare a Canards. Another two miles north was Fort du 
Roule, Target "D," dominating Cherbourg harbor and heavily defended 
against air and land attack. In addition to these three strong points, 
there was a fortified area to the west of the Cherbourg-Valognes highway 
on the forward slopes of the ridge along which ran the road to 
Hardinvast.

General Wyche's plan for 22 June called for an attack by three regiments 
abreast. The 313th Infantry was to continue the main effort, generally 
astride the highway, with the fortified positions at les Chevres as the 
first objective. At 1400, following the air bombardment, the division 
jumped off, each regiment in a column of battalions.

The 1st Battalion of the 313th was fired on from pillboxes and bunkers 
near les Chevres shortly after its jump-off, but these positions were 
reduced when the 3d Battalion, pushing up on the left, enveloped them 
while the 1st Battalion attacked frontally. The regiment then 
reorganized and resumed the advance with the 1st and 3d Battalions 
abreast and the 2d Battalion echeloned to the right rear. The 2d 
Battalion became involved with enemy troops in the wooded area of the 
upper Trotebec and lost direction, delaying the regiment. But the 1st 
and 3d Battalions, with about seventy men of the 2d, finally resumed the 
advance astride the highway and late that night (at 0200) reached a 
point 400 yards north of the junction of Hardinvast road with the 
Cherbourg highway (Crossroads 177). The 313th Infantry reported that the 
air bombardment had damaged the German installations very little, but 
that nevertheless it had made the attack easier.

The 1st Battalion of the 314th Infantry meanwhile led the attack in the 
center. All companies of the battalion met fierce resistance as they 
attempted to force their way through the draws east of Tollevast. 
Company C made a wide swing on the left, but was badly shot up and 
became disorganized in the vicinity of this village. All attempts to 
break through during the day were without success. After dark the 3d 
Battalion slipped around the enemy positions just to the west of the 
highway and succeeded in tying in with the 313th Infantry west of 
Crossroads 177. The 1st Battalion also disengaged late that night and 
followed the 3d, coming in on its left at about 0200 the next morning. 
Two battalions of the 314th and part of the 313th now held a line along 
the east-west road which crosses the Cherbourg highway at Crossroads 
177.

The 315th Infantry meanwhile became occupied with the task of clearing 
the Hardin-

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vast area on the left flank of the division’s zone. The enemy positions 
there were a threat to any advance along the main highway and had to be 
cleared or at least contained so that the 313th and 314th could proceed 
with the attack northward.

On the morning of 23 June both the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 314th 
found themselves cut off from the rear elements of the regiment. In 
skirting the enemy positions west of the highway during the night, the 
two battalions left the Germans free to move back and cut the regiment’s 
supply route. The 313th Infantry was likewise without a line of 
communications to the rear. Measures were immediately taken to reopen 
the supply routes. The forward battalions of the 314th organized a task 
force for this purpose, and Regiment at the same time sent the 2d 
Battalion forward, thus reestablishing the main supply route.

In the meantime an attack on the two strongpoints straddling the highway 
at la Mare a Canards was planned by the 314th Infantry. Division 
arranged to have the position, known as “F” in Corps orders, dive-bombed 
at 0900. The air attack took place as scheduled, but had no noticeable 
effect, and another mission was therefore planned two hours later. While 
these arrangements were being made the 3d Battalion jumped off and 
occupied part of the objective. Division consequently requested that the 
air attack be can-

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celled. But it was already late and no assurance could be given that the 
mission could be forestalled. Fortunately the division chief of staff 
took the added precaution to have the artillery commander order the 
marking smoke lifted a thousand yards. This diverted most of the bombing 
to the north of the target. The Germans meanwhile laid heavy artillery 
fire on the 3d Battalion and caused many casualties.

The 1st Battalion's attack, launched a bit later, was more successful. 
Company A, in fact, broke through to the northwest and occupied the long 
narrow ridge 1,00 to 1,800 yards northwest of the enemy fortifications 
at la Mare a Canards. Objective "F" had not been captured, and Company A 
therefore occupied a position well out in front of the rest of the 
division. However, the company continued to occupy the ridge, while the 
remainder of the regiment withdrew to permit still another air attack on 
the enemy positions the following day.

The Left Flank

Like the 4th and 79th Divisions, the 9th engaged in some of its hardest 
fighting in the day and a half following the jump-off, but by the night 
of 23 June it had broken the hard crust of the Cherbourg defenses and 
occupied the commanding ground southwest of Cherbourg near the Bois du 
Mont du Roc (Map XIV)

On 21 June the 39th Infantry had been committed on the right flank of 
the division to develop enemy positions east of the Divette. Late in the 
day its mission was changed. During the night it was withdrawn from its 
position east of the Divette and moved to an assembly area in the 
vicinity of Helleville. Since the 9th Division's main effort was still 
to be made on the right, moving the 39th Infantry behind the 47th would 
place it in position to reinforce the latter and give depth to its 
attack.

The main impact of the division's drive on 22 June fell roughly along 
the line Acqueville-Sideville. East of the road running north from 
Teurtheville-Hague the Germans were well entrenched along a crest of 
high ground. The enemy line crossed a creek east of Boguenville and more 
strong points were located on the forward slopes of Hill 171 (Bois du 
Mont du Roc), west of Sideville. North of Acqueville the 60th Infantry 
was to attack with battalions echeloned to the left, since the whole 
left flank was open and the enemy situation on this side was vague. From 
Crossroads 114 to Sideville the attack was to be carried by the 47th 
Infantry, all three battalions attacking at once.

Profiting from the air bombardment, the units of the 9th Division made 
good initial gains. Within half an hour, the 2d Battalion, 47th 
Infantry, passed Crossroads 114 and the 3d Battalion pressed beyond 
Boguenville. Within an hour the 1st Battalion was across the stream east 
of the village. The 60th Infantry took Acqueville half an hour after the 
jump-off.

But the ease of this advance was deceptive. Both the 2d and 3d 
Battalions of the 47th Infantry had bypassed strong enemy positions 
along the high ground northeast of Crossroads 114 and between the 
crossroads and Boguenville. In probing for weaknesses one company of the 
2d Battalion had passed to the left of the crossroads position, and one 
to the right. Meanwhile the 3d Battalion pushed through Boguenville 
while artillery fire neutralized the enemy positions northwest of the 
town. With the continuing aid of artillery, Colonel Clayman (3d 
Battalion) pushed two companies across the stream and started up the 
slopes of Hill 171. The 3d Battalion soon found itself dangerously out 
on a limb, for on its right the 1st had been stopped shortly after 
crossing the stream. Before attempting any further advance Colonel 
Clayman therefore wanted his flanks cleared, particularly the left.

Page 180

At 1920 Colonel Smythe, the regimental commander, ordered Company G to 
clear the enemy entrenched above Crossroads 114 while the other two 
companies moved forward to come abreast of the 3d Battalion. With very 
close coordination of mortar fire from Company H, one platoon of Company 
G charged directly into the crossroads position and took fifty 
prisoners. The positions north of Boguenville remained uncaptured, but 
the division commander decided to deal with them later. That night the 
3d Battalion dug in on the southwest slopes of Hill 171, with the 2d 
Battalion nearly abreast farther north.

Similarly, the 60th Infantry, after taking Acqueville, found progress 
more difficult. It attacked the fortifications southwest of 
Flottemanville-Hague initially with one battalion and made little 
progress. After a small counterattack early in the evening another 
battalion was committed on the left, and the two were able to fight 
their way to the edge of the enemy positions, where they were nearly on 
a line with the 47th Infantry on the right. There was still a gap 
between the regiments, through which some enemy infiltrated during the 
night.

By the night of 22 June the 9th Division had maneuvered into position to 
make the final thrust through the main Cherbourg defenses. The critical 
enemy defense areas at Flottemanville-Hague and Hill 171, though not yet 
overrun, were closely pressed, and another day’s action was likely to 
result in their capture. The enemy was committing miscellaneous static 
troops to eke out a thin defensive line, and commanders were ordered to 
save

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(Photo)

Page 182

men by spreading them out and to conserve ammunition by trying to 
repulse the American attacks with small-arms fire.

On 23 June, the 39th Infantry joined the attack with tank destroyer 
support and cleared fortified positions on the heights northwest of 
Boguenville bypassed the previous day. At the same time the 47th and 
60th Infantry Regiments resumed their attempt to break through toward 
Cherbourg. The 47th attacked to consolidate its hold on Hill 171 and 
reduce an enemy antiaircraft position to the west. After the 1st 
Battalion had been stopped by heavy concentrations from the German 
antiaircraft guns, the 2d and 3d Battalions were finally sent against 
the flak positions late in the day. Before dark the 2d Battalion was on 
its objective and the 3d had reached the southern edge of the German 
positions. The attack netted four hundred prisoners and large quantities 
of materiel.

The 60th Infantry waited nearly all day for air bombardment of the 
Flottemanville-Hague defense. After the bombing, which was delivered at 
2000, and the artillery concentrations which followed, it took the 1st 
and 2d Battalions less than two hours to move up and occupy their 
objectives.

The enemy’s fortified line had been broken. The 9th Division was ready 
for the final drive into Cherbourg with the 60th Infantry in position to 
protect the northern flank from counterattack and the 47th Infantry, 
supported by the 39th, astride the ridge leading to the port.