From: Rolf Furuli (furuli@online.no)
Date: Mon Jan 05 1998 - 10:06:58 EST
Paul S. Dixon wrote:
<Jonathan, Wes, Rolf, Carl, Dale, et al:
<We started with Jonathan's citation of the Gramcord Institute's
<definition of a definite noun as one that stresses identity. I like this
<and would like to use it as a basis for establishing a "rule" for the
<determination of definiteness in an anarthrous predicate nominative.
<Before I do, however, it should be noted this definition does not say a
<noun cannot have both definite and qualitative nuances. I am not
<contesting what Wes and Rolf have been affirming. Furthermore, I cite
<Harner's statement (borrowing from Wes), to which I have no necessary
<objection:
SNIP
<It is the emphasis of the noun that is our concern. Now, let me present
<my hypothesis for determining definiteness (by which I mean the emphasis
<being definiteness) of an anarthrous predicate nominative.
<Rule: an anarthrous predicate nominative will be definite if and only if
<the noun can be interchanged with the subject with no change in meaning.
<QEOS in Jn 1:1c, for example, would not be definite, because the meaning
<changes radically when we say, "God is the Word."
<The Argument:
1. If the articular predicate nominative is interchangeable with
<the subject (cf 1 Jn 3:4), and if a definite anarthrous noun is just as
<definite as the articular construct, then it would seem to follow that a
<definite anarthrous predicate nominative can be interchanged with the
<subject with no change in meaning.
2. This seems to follow from the definitions of definite and
<predicate nominative. If a definite noun stresses identity and if a
<predicate nominative equates with the subject, then we have the same.
3. The "if" part of the rule is easily demonstrable. Where
<names are found as predicate nominatives without the article, this fits
<the bill (cf Jn 1:42, SU EI SIMWN).
4. The "only if" part of the rule is not so easily demonstrable.
< I have not been able to find an example of a definite anarthrous
<predicate nominative which cannot be interchanged with the subject where
<the meaning changes. But, this is only an argument from silence.
<I humbly submit this for your consideration and would appreciate any
<feedback. Please don't hesitate to blow me out of the water. :)
Dear Paul,
It is good to hear we agree that a noun can be both definite and
qualitative (and I suppose you also mean: indefinite and qualitative). We
also agree that Colewell`s rule has been greatly misused and cannot be
applied to John 1:1. You did a very good pioneering work with your thesis
and really deserve credit for that.
There are several attactive sides of your rule, the foremost in my view, is
that the lack of article before a substantive is giving the credit it
deserves; only when there are clear reasons are anarthrous constructions
viewed as definite.
My principal objection is that the rule confine the question of
definiteness/indefiniteness to the clause and does not account for the role
of the context and of our knowledge of the world as parameters for what is
definite or indefinite. One reason may be that you use "the Gramcord
Institute's definition of a definite noun as one that stresses identity",
but this is to vague to be meaningful as a basis for a grammatical rule.
I will illustrate the importance of other factors for than the clause for
determining definiteness/indefiniteness, by introducing the physician Jim
Smith and his lawyer friend Paul Jones, both living in the US. When Paul
says: "I am going to the hospital", the words "the hospital" may be
indefinite or definite, depending on whether he has a particular hospital
in mind. When Jim speaks to his wife and utter the same words, "the
hospital" can only be definite, because he works at the particular hospital
which he has in mind. A knowledge of the world is important!
Your rule relates to states with the verb EIMI and anarthrous PNs, and such
are different from the situations above which both express actions and
where the nouns are articular. However, also regarding states will the
context and a knowledge of the world play an important role. In Luke 20:38
we have an occurrence of an anarthrous QEOS before the verb. Carl stated
that QEOS here is indefinite, and it is very difficult for me to see
another alternative, because OUK NEKRWN ALLA ZWNTWN (being indefinite both
because of the plurality and of lack of article) qualify QEOS. But what
about your rule here? Are the subject and the PN interchangeable?
Before we answer, we should study the recent posting of Al Kidd thoroughly.
I found this extremely interesting because I was not aware of the
"title-phrase"-approach. But to me it seems very promising. All you Greek
experts on the list, what do you think of this? Please give your comments!.
Perhaps this even can solve the use of QEOS in Luke 20:37. Moses is the
subject, LEGEI is the verb, KURION is the object and TON QEON ABRAHAM KAI
QEON ISAAK KAI QEON IAKWB is the accusative object.
KURIOS (YHWH) is definite because it is a proper name, but what about the
three occurrences of QEOS? They must also be definite, because the first
has the article, and it is implied with the other two members of the chain,
they are qualified by proper names, and because they refer to a known
situation. But is each example of QEOS interchangeable with KURIOS? Hardly!
Could this be an instance where the principle of title-phrases could be
applied? In any case do vv 37 and 38 call for a specific definition both
of interchangeability and of indifiniteness/definiteness.
A last point is the "if and only if"- part of the rule. If you leave this
out, I think the rest will hold without any exceptions, but then we do not
have a rule but rather a generalization or even a tautology. My conclusion
is that before we can say anything more about the rule, all the central
concepts must be clearly defined, and the role of parameters outside the
clause must be determined.
Regards
Rolf
Rolf Furuli
University of Oslo
furuli@online.no
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