From: Paul S. Dixon (dixonps@juno.com)
Date: Mon Jan 05 1998 - 15:17:47 EST
On Mon, 5 Jan 1998 16:06:58 +0100 (MET) Rolf Furuli <furuli@online.no>
writes:
>Paul S. Dixon wrote:
<snip>
><Rule: an anarthrous predicate nominative will be
><definite if and only if the noun can be interchanged
><with the subject with no change in meaning.
><QEOS in Jn 1:1c, for example, would not be definite,
><because the meaning changes radically when we say,
><"God is the Word."
>
><The Argument:
>< 1. If the articular predicate nominative is interchangeable
><with the subject (cf 1 Jn 3:4), and if a definite anarthrous noun is
><just as definite as the articular construct, then it would seem to
><follow that a definite anarthrous predicate nominative can be
><interchanged with the subject with no change in meaning.
>< 2. This seems to follow from the definitions of definite and
><predicate nominative. If a definite noun stresses identity and if a
><predicate nominative equates with the subject, then we have the same.
>< 3. The "if" part of the rule is easily demonstrable. Where
><names are found as predicate nominatives without the article, this
><fits the bill (cf Jn 1:42, SU EI SIMWN).
>< 4. The "only if" part of the rule is not so easily
demonstrable.
>< I have not been able to find an example of a definite anarthrous
><predicate nominative which cannot be interchanged with the subject
><where the meaning changes. But, this is only an argument from silence.
>
><I humbly submit this for your consideration and would appreciate any
><feedback. Please don't hesitate to blow me out of the water. :)
>
>
>Dear Paul,
>
>It is good to hear we agree that a noun can be both definite and
>qualitative (and I suppose you also mean: indefinite and qualitative).
>We also agree that Colewell`s rule has been greatly misused and cannot
be
>applied to John 1:1. You did a very good pioneering work with your
>thesis and really deserve credit for that.
>
Thank you for the compliment. Yes, we agree on the fact that Colwell's
rule
has been abused not only by himself by also by subsequent scholars, and
that his rule cannot be used to argue for definiteness of QEOS in Jn
1:1c. If you will re-read what I said, however, you will not that all I
am addressing is the emphasis on the noun, not whether the noun can be
both definite and qualitative, or both indefinite and qualitative. I'm
not sure that is really a necessary discussion, as we both (?) agree that
the main concern is the author's intended nuance of the noun being used,
that which he wishes to emphasize. So, even if it can be demonstrated
that a noun carries both nuances, I'm not sure that matters.
>There are several attactive sides of your rule, the foremost in my
>view, is that the lack of article before a substantive is giving the
>credit it deserves; only when there are clear reasons are anarthrous
>constructions viewed as definite.
Yes, the older school of thought, as I understand it, is that the
presence or
absence of the definite article is usually not insignificant.
>
>My principal objection is that the rule confine the question of
>definiteness/indefiniteness to the clause and does not account for the
>role of the context and of our knowledge of the world as parameters for
>what is definite or indefinite. One reason may be that you use "the
Gramcord
>Institute's definition of a definite noun as one that stresses
>identity", but this is to vague to be meaningful as a basis for a
grammatical
>rule.
Yes, the definition is rather simplistic and may need to be defined more
definitely (pun intended). I diagree, however, that it confines itself
just to the clause itself. The question is whether or not the anarthrous
noun is stressing definiteness, identity. That is determined by the
context and the culture, as well as the meaning of the word itself.
But, if you think, for example, that an anarthrous noun (should we keep
our discussion to just pred noms?) should be, or may be, definite because
of the presence of the articular noun elsewhere in the context, then how
does that follow? The anaphoric article can certainly tell us that the
articular construction is a reference say to an earlier or well known
noun which may be anarthrous, but this does not tell us that the
anarthrous noun elsewhere in the context (or understood) is definite.
Does it? Can't the author use the noun earlier in a predicate position,
let's say, and mean to signify by such indefiniteness or qualitativeness?
In Jn 1:1c we agree that QEOS is not definite because of the articular
QEON in the immediately preceding clause.
>
>I will illustrate the importance of other factors for than the clause
>for determining definiteness/indefiniteness, by introducing the
physician
>Jim Smith and his lawyer friend Paul Jones, both living in the US. When
>Paul says: "I am going to the hospital", the words "the hospital" may be
>indefinite or definite, depending on whether he has a particular
>hospital in mind. When Jim speaks to his wife and utter the same words,
"the
>hospital" can only be definite, because he works at the particular
>hospital which he has in mind. A knowledge of the world is important!
I'm thinking when he say, "I am going to the hospital," that he knows he
is going to a particular hospital, not any hospital, even though he may
not consciously know just which one. It is still definite.
>
>Your rule relates to states with the verb EIMI and anarthrous PNs, and
>such are different from the situations above which both express actions
and
>where the nouns are articular. However, also regarding states will the
>context and a knowledge of the world play an important role. In Luke
>20:38 we have an occurrence of an anarthrous QEOS before the verb. Carl
>stated that QEOS here is indefinite, and it is very difficult for me to
see
>another alternative, because OUK NEKRWN ALLA ZWNTWN (being indefinite
>both because of the plurality and of lack of article) qualify QEOS. But
>what about your rule here? Are the subject and the PN interchangeable?
That is an interesting question. Let's take QEOS as the subject here.
If so, then it is definite, is it not? Would you say, "a god he is not
of the dead, but of the living," or "God is not (QEOS) of the dead, but
of the living?" The latter seems more likely, inasmuch as the subject is
usually definite and an anarthrous QEOS used as subject can certainly be
definite.
If so, then the rule holds. If we supply QEOS again in the predicate,
with or without the article, then we can interchange it to read, "QEOS
not of the dead, but of the living, is QEOS."
>
>Before we answer, we should study the recent posting of Al Kidd
>thoroughly.I found this extremely interesting because I was not aware of
the
>"title-phrase"-approach. But to me it seems very promising. All you
>Greek experts on the list, what do you think of this? Please give your
>comments!. Perhaps this even can solve the use of QEOS in Luke 20:37.
>Moses is the
>subject, LEGEI is the verb, KURION is the object and TON QEON ABRAHAM
>KAI QEON ISAAK KAI QEON IAKWB is the accusative object.
>KURIOS (YHWH) is definite because it is a proper name, but what about
>the three occurrences of QEOS? They must also be definite, because the
>first has the article, and it is implied with the other two members of
the
>chain, they are qualified by proper names, and because they refer to a
known
>situation. But is each example of QEOS interchangeable with KURIOS?
>Hardly! Could this be an instance where the principle of title-phrases
could
>be applied? In any case do vv 37 and 38 call for a specific definition
>both of interchangeability and of indifiniteness/definiteness.
The rule under discussion does not apply here inasmuch as TON QEON is not
an anarthrous predicate nominative, and neither TON QEON nor KURION is
the subject.
>
> A last point is the "if and only if"- part of the rule. If you leave
this
>out, I think the rest will hold without any exceptions, but then we do
>not have a rule but rather a generalization or even a tautology. My
>conclusion is that before we can say anything more about the rule, all
the
>central concepts must be clearly defined, and the role of parameters
outside
>the clause must be determined.
Well, yes, I did kind of think that the rule was tautologous or
self-evident. But, Jonathan did ask for a rule, and I couldn't resist.
The "only if" part of the rule is admittedly the most challenging, but I
am still looking for an exception to it.
Thanks so much for the feedback.
Paul Dixon
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